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“Quite clearly we have advanced no theory of the interdependence 
of social action processes and the biological and physical factors 
of their determination. This would be an exceedingly important 
task for social science, and the failure to attempt it here is in no 
way meant to imply a suggestion that it is not important.” 
(Talcott Parsons) 
 
“Nothing about culture makes sense except in the light of 
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 Abstract 
 
The emergence of modern societies is an evolutionary puzzle. Homo sapiens is the only animal species 
capable of cooperating in large-scale societies consisting of genetically unrelated individuals. From a 
biological point of view, this feature leads to enormous questions. Social scientists typically assume 
that human life is lived in large-scale societies as a result of cultural, social and institutional history. 
In this perspective, social institutions such as law, economy and religion enhance cooperation to 
higher levels. Gene-culture coevolutionary theories have studied this issue in an integrated 
framework that accounts for social and biological theories of cooperation. These theoretical 
approaches have provided an account of the emergence of human institutions with reference to a 
coevolutionary background in which specific innate psychological features of the human mind 
enabled the evolution of social institutions that impose social pressures, requiring the evolution of a 
complex moral psychology that enables life in a social environment with institutions. However, 
although gene-culture coevolution theories can explain cooperation in pre-modern societies, they 
still cannot explain social life in complex contemporary functionally differentiated democracies. 
Cooperation now occurs not only between individuals, but also across autopoietic social systems. 
How was this endeavor possible? This is the research problem investigated in this thesis, which 
proposes that the evolution of constitutionalism was an important factor to be taken into account. In 
the first chapter, I present the need of integrating constitutionalism and evolutionary theory, 
highlighting that such theoretical path sheds new lights on old constitutional problems. The second 
chapter is focused on the evolution of human cooperation from a multilevel selection perspective, 
based on recent advances in gene-culture coevolution theory that helps us understand the evolution 
of psychological traits necessary for social life. The limitations of such approach to explain 
contemporary sociability will be also explored. In the third chapter, I explore further the idea that 
the evolution of human societies is a case of multilevel selection, exploring Peter Godfrey-Smith's 
contributions about Darwinian populations. This theory is an important step in the thesis, insofar as 
it allows for a better integration between biology and sociology. From the sociological side, I bring 
Niklas Luhmann's systems theory into conversation with Godfrey-Smith in order to propose an 
integrated approach. The fourth chapter aims to explain the function of law in an evolutionary 
theory of stratification. Why have human societies become so unequal, considering that the first 
bands of human-gatherers lived in egalitarian groups?  Based on anthropological insights 
from  Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus and the sociological and biological background so far 
explored, I offer an evolutionary view on the adaptive function of stratification for premodern 
societies. In the fifth and last chapter, I claim that the trend to stratification is reversed in modern 
times and advance the thesis that constitutionalism played a major role in this process. Not only 
constitutions promote cooperation at the individual level, but they also promote integration between 
social systems in a complex society. In this sense, this dissertation is an attempt to integrate 
sociology, biology and legal theory in its understanding of constitutionalism as an evolutionary 
adaptation to specific historical and sociological circumstances that demanded the emergence of 




O surgimento das sociedades modernas é um enigma evolutivo. O Homo sapiens é a única espécie 
animal capaz de cooperar em larga-escala em sociedades compostas por indivíduos geneticamente 
não-aparentados. De uma perspectiva evolutiva, essa característica traz muitas questões. Cientistas 
sociais usualmente assumem que a vida social humana deriva apenas da história cultural, social e 
institucional. Nessa perspectiva, instituições sociais como o direito, a economia e a religião impelem 
a cooperação a níveis cada vez maiores. Teorias da coevolução gene-cultura têm estudado essa 
questão em uma perspectiva multidisciplinar que leva em conta teorias da cooperação baseadas 
tanto na sociologia quanto na biologia. Essas abordagens providenciaram um entendimento do 
surgimento de instituições humanas com fundamento em um pano de fundo evolutivo em que 
traços psicológicos inatos possibilitaram a evolução de instituições sociais que, por sua vez, alteram 
o ambiente social e exigem uma complexa psicologia moral que torna possível uma vida social 
complexa. Contudo, embora teorias da coevolução gene-cultura possam explicar a cooperação em 
sociedades pré-modernas, são incapazes de explicar o funcionamento das complexas democracias 
contemporâneas, funcionalmente diferenciadas. A cooperação agora ocorre não apenas entre 
indivíduso, mas também entre sistemas sociais autopoiéticos. Como isso é possível? Esse é o 
problema de pesquisa investigado nessa tese, que propõe a evolução do constitucionalismo como 
um fator relevante a ser considerado. No primeiro capítulo, argumento pela necessidade de integrar 
o constitucionalismo à teoria evolutiva, destacar que essa abordagem teórica ilumina problemas 
constitucionais antigos. O segundo capítulo se concentra na evolução da cooperação humana a 
partir de uma perspectiva de seleção em múltiplos níveis, baseada em avanços recentes na teoria da 
coevolução gene-cultura, que explica a evolução dos traços psicológicos necessários à vida social. As 
limitações dessa abordagem também serão exploradas. No terceiro capítulo, exploro a ideia de que 
a evolução das sociedades humanas é um caso de seleção em múltiplos níveis, explorando as 
contribuições de Peter Godfrey-Smith sobre populações darwinistas. Essa teoria é um passo 
importante na tese, uma vez que permite uma melhor integração entre biologia e sociologia. Do 
lado sociológico, ponho em contato a teoria dos sistemas de Niklas Luhmann com Peter Godfrey-
Smith, de forma a construir uma abordagem integrada. O quarto capítulo busca explicar a função 
do direito em uma teoria evolutiva da estratificação. Por que as sociedades humanas se tornaram 
tão desiguais, considerando que os primeiros bandos de caçadores-coletores viviam em grupos 
igualitários? Baseado nas considerações antropológicas de Kent Flannery e Joyce Marcus e no pano 
de fundo biológico e sociológico explorado até então, discuto a função adaptativa da estratificação 
nas sociedades pré-modernas a partir de uma visão evolucionista. No quinto e último capítulo, 
sustenta-se que a tendência à estratificação é revertida nos tempos modernos e que o 
constitucionalismo teve um papel fundamental nesse processo. Não apenas constituições promovem 
a cooperação no nível individual, mas também a integração entre sistemas sociais em uma 
sociedade complexa. Nesse sentido, esta tese busca integrar sociologia, biologia e teoria jurídica de 
forma a compreender o constitucionalismo como uma adaptação evolutiva a circunstâncias 
históricas e sociológicas específicas, que demandaram instituições capazes de acomodar diversidade, 














































Nothing about law makes sense except in the light of evolution.  
The emergence of modern societies, structured around the rule of law, is an 
evolutionary puzzle in need of explanation.1 Although traditionally seen as the result of historical, 
philosophical and sociological contingencies, these societies are also an unexpected and improbable 
institutional construction when observed through the lens of modern biological theories of 
cooperation. Homo sapiens is the only animal species capable of cooperating in large-scale societies 
where individuals are not genetically related.  
Although it is possible to find natural examples of animal species whose members live in 
societies consisting of millions of genetically related individuals or in small societies in which 
genetically unrelated members cooperate, we are the only known species capable of cooperating 
under both of these conditions: we cooperate in large-scale societies composed of unrelated 
individuals. More than that, we cooperate in a culturally and institutionally complex environment. 
Our interactions are not only based on our biological nature, but also on shared beliefs transmitted 
through various methods of cultural transmission, embedded in an institutional background and – 
especially after modernity – in functionally differentiated social systems. We collaborate not only to 
fulfill our biological needs, but also to fulfill sociological expectations, performing economic, 
religious, educational, legal and political operations.  
From an evolutionary perspective, this is an intriguing question that must be addressed. 
Social scientists usually assume that life in large-scale societies is the result of cultural, social and 
institutional history. In this perspective, social institutions such as law, economy and religion 
facilitate cooperation at higher levels. However, the answer to this puzzle just calls for the following 
question: Why do these institutions exist and how do they regulate human social cooperation in a 
way that allows for the growth of large-scale cooperation in our species? Gene-culture 
coevolutionary theories have been studying this issue from an integrated framework that accounts 
																																																								
1 Part of this dissertation has been published in Almeida, F. (2014). The Emergence of Constitutionalism as an 
Evolutionary Adaptation. Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal, 13(1), 1-96.  
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for social and biological theories of cooperation.2 These theoretical approaches have provided a 
successful account of the emergence of human institutions with reference to a coevolutionary 
background in which specific innate psychological features of the human mind enabled the 
evolution of social institutions that impose social pressures, requiring the evolution of a complex 
moral psychology to enable life in a social environment with institutions.  
However, whereas gene-culture coevolution theories can explain cooperation in pre-
modern societies,3 they still cannot explain cooperation in functionally differentiated societies as 
complex as contemporary societies. The primary mechanism that allows for cooperation in large-
scale societies, as we will see, is symbolic marking: the psychological ability to identify cultural signs 
– religion, language, dressing style, tattoos and ritual practices, among others. These markers inform 
how people belong to particular groups, and they enforce cooperation with a greater number of 
people because they allow the easy identification of those who are from the same group, allowing 
the targeting of altruistic acts to benefit group members. However, symbolic marking is not enough 
to explain by itself the evolution of complex societies that are strongly divided by different symbolic 
markers. In contemporary democratic societies, cooperation is possible even in a context in which 
individuals do not agree about the comprehensive doctrines that embody the main values of their 
society.4 In other words, individuals in democratic societies are able to cooperate with other 
individuals who do not share their symbolic markers.  
Acknowledging this fact brings into question the discussion concerning how it has been 
possible, from a biological perspective, that individuals cooperate in large-scale societies with people 
with whom they are not genetically related and with whom they also do not share emotionally 
strong symbolic markers. Following the ambition of Edward O. Wilson5 to achieve consilience 
between natural sciences and humanities, I will argue that the cooperation level needed to drive the 
evolution of complex societies is possible as a result of the emergence of one particular institutional 
sociocultural framework: constitutionalism. In this sense, this paper is an attempt to integrate 
sociology, biology and legal theory to understand constitutionalism as an evolutionary adaptation to 
specific historical and sociological circumstances that demanded the emergence of institutions that 
could accommodate diversity, pluralism and complexity. 
																																																								
2 See Gintis, H. (2011). Gene-culture Coevolution and the Nature of Human Sociality. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 366(1566), 878-888.  
3 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. pp. 235-236. 
4 See Rawls, J. (2005). Political Liberalism (Kindle ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 532-702. 
5 See Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience among the Great Branches of Learning. Daedalus, 127(1), 131-149.  
 14 
In this dissertation, I argue that nothing in law makes sense except in the light of 
evolution. This strong statement, an explicit appropriation of the title of a lecture delivered by the 
biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky in 19736, implies some epistemological commitments, especially 
the supposition that evolutionary theory can help us understand how human societies came to be 
what they are nowadays and the role that law – and more specifically constitutional law – played in 
this process. However, stating that nothing in law makes sense except in the light of evolution is bolder than 
that, and this claim needs to be justified. This is the task I hope to accomplish in the first chapter: as 
I see it, only an evolutionary approach can allow us to understand legal history as part of a much 
wider process that encompasses not only written history, but also our very history as an evolved 
biological species. As a result, legal history will be observed as part of the evolutionary history of 
how we, humans, came to cooperate in such a distinct way. 
I discuss the evolutionary foundations of human pro-social behavior in the second 
chapter. How do we cooperate? In which ways does human cooperation resemble how other 
individuals in other species interact and collaborate? And, more important, how is human behavior 
distinct? In this chapter, the human pro-social behavior will be examined as part of natural history. 
In order to do so, I begin by examining the evolutionary mechanisms that predispose altruistic 
behavior, such as kin selection and direct reciprocity, in order to explain how human behavior is 
unique. An important point highlighted here is the role of our psychological dispositions to act in 
accordance with social rules and to engage in egalitarian and reciprocal interactions – what I call a 
‘normative mind’. In this chapter, it will become clear how our evolved social psychology paved the 
way to the emergence of tribal societies such as egalitarian bands of hunter-gatherers.  
The third chapter is dedicated to another issue. I will discuss how human societies are to 
be understood as evolutionary units. Based on Peter Godfrey-Smith’s Darwinian Populations and 
Natural Selection, the sociological micro-macro link debate will be addressed. Issues such as the 
emergence of society as an autonomous entity, as described in social theory from Durkheim 
onwards, and how the social order emerges from individual interactions and plays a causal role on 
social behavior will be taken into account. I will also assess Luhmann’s systems theory, 
reconstructing it in order to devise a theoretical approach capable of describing the interaction 
between sociological and psychological processes, by taking as a premise that biology imposes some 
constraints on sociocultural evolution.  
In the fourth chapter, I discuss the role law played in the development of stratified 																																																								
6 See Dobzhansky, T. (1973). Nothing in Biology Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution. The American Biology 
Teacher, 35.  
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societies. As already mentioned, the pre-historical bands of hunter-gatherers were egalitarians. In 
the last 5,000-10,000 years, however, things changed and many stratified societies marked by a deep 
and structural inegalitarianism emerged. How did this happen? In order to discuss the issue, I 
present the function of law as an adaptive feature of society that promotes cooperation and 
maintains the social structure. The concept of function is also an important theme in this chapter, 
insofar as I attempt to demonstrate that it is an abstract concept, applicable not only to biology, but 
also to sociological entities. The role of psychological predispositions in the evolution of law will be 
also evaluated in this chapter, where I claim that the normative assumptions nested within our 
innate social psychology shape a universal structure of law. These normative predispositions can be 
understood as the natural law root of all legal systems, in the sense that law must adjust itself to the 
normative assumptions nested within our minds. Law is also presented as a necessary feature in the 
development of stratification in pre-modern societies, which, as I will argue, became widespread as 
a result of evolution. Stratified societies prevailed because they were more efficient vis-à-vis other 
societal forms, at least until modernity. 
Constitutionalism is the theme of the fifth – and last – chapter. The question to be 
answered is: how did modern constitutional democracies reverse the pervasive stratification of pre-
modern societies? My hypothesis is that constitutionalism played a fundamental role in this process, 
by structuring egalitarianism not only in the micro-dynamic level of individual interactions – as in 
pre-historic hunter-gatherer bands –, but also as a functional imperative regulating the very 
relationship between social systems. The emergence of such possibility will be explained in strictly 
Darwinian terms, as a result of the natural selection acting upon the societal structure and sorting 
out less fit social structures in comparison to others. As I will argue, constitutional societies were 
selected because constitutions are an adaptive feature in the context of modernity, when functional 
systems became increasingly differentiated, thus reducing the fitness of pre-modern societies, which 
were unable to cope with such a complex environment. Another debated issue relates to the 
connection between constitutionalism and moral psychology. In order to structure a stable social 
order, constitutions must be compatible with our innate psychological normative predispositions – 
or, otherwise, social unrest would lead to rebellions and revolutions, probably undermining the 
endurance of constitutional societies. As I will sustain, there are strong reasons to believe that 
constitutionalism, as a matter of fact, fits with many features of our own psychology. 
The dissertation is indebted to many theoretical traditions. First of all, evolutionary 
theory is the most obvious influence. From Darwin to many recent developments within the 
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evolutionary framework, such as gene-culture coevolution theory, allusions to theories of biological, 
social and cultural evolution will be constant. The reference to evolution is not to be understood as a 
strictly biological approach, considering the fact that the sociological reality must be understood in 
its own terms. As a result, also pervasive in the dissertation is the attempt to understand social 
evolution considering an interdisciplinary framework which respects and takes seriously the 
contributions made by sociologists, economists and other social scientists. In this sense, I am 
indebted to the research developed by Peter Richerson, Robert Boyd, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Samuel 
Bowles, Herbert Gintis, E. O. Wilson, Marc Hauser, Paulo Abrantes, among many others. 
A major sociological reference here is Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. Luhmann’s 
complex work opens many theoretical possibilities that can be used to structure a theory of how 
biological and sociological entities relate to each other. The approach to Luhmann’s theory will be 
dialogic, meaning that I will not take his theory as a departure point, but as an important 
interlocutor whose insights will be debated on, accepted as part of the proposed project or, 
sometimes, rejected. However, the reader will notice the prominent influence of Luhmann’s work, 
especially concerning, but not restricted to, the description of the modern world society and the 
transition from pre-modern times. Other social theorists also had a major influence, such as Talcott 
Parsons, Jonathan Turner, Marcelo Neves, Kent Flannery and Joyce Marcus and David Sciulli, 
whose theories influenced me in one way or another. Hauke Brunkhorst’s Critical Theory of Legal 
Revolutions was also an important influence, as will be clear in chapter 5. 
Another pervasive influence in this text is John Rawls’ philosophy. However, his famous 
two principles of justice will be barely mentioned here. For the purposes of this dissertation, what 
interests me are usually considered secondary insights in his thought, such as the use of Chomsky’s 
explanation of how individuals grasp a language to understand how we reason about normative 
issues. Another major influence of Rawls relates to his late perception that the stability of 
constitutional democracies relies on an overlapping consensus. I will refer to these (and other) 
Rawlsian insights and attempt to provide an evolutionary explanation for them, while 
simultaneously taking into account sociological and biological considerations. 
As I see it, the relevance of this dissertation relates to the interdisciplinary approach 
taken. The complexity of human societies urges us to explain how the social order emerged by 
making reference to all the theoretical tools available in the pursuit of a balanced and consilient 
perspective that understands the various scientific fields as complementary, and not opposite 
attempts to understand social reality. This is an inherently difficult task, although – I believe – a 
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valuable one.  	  
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1. Constitutionalism, Evolution and Social Theory: the Need of 




The market of ideas has already provided a lot of theoretical approaches to 
constitutionalism. Legal Historians such as Jack Rakove, Gordon Wood, Lynn Hunt, Jonathan 
Israel, Maurizio Fioravanti, Arthur Jacobson, Bernard Schlink — among so many others! — have 
carefully analyzed, scrutinized and explained almost every possible historical aspect on 
constitutional origins’ revolutions.7  Despite their disagreements over substantial issues, legal and 
moral philosophers from widely different traditions, such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy 
Waldron, F. A. Hayek, Robert Alexy, Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, Jacques Derrida, Bruce 
Ackerman, Sanford Levinson, among many others who could also be on this list, have also clarified 
many issues about the meaning of constitutionalism, its premises, strengths and contradictions.8 The 
contributions from legal sociology to understanding the meaning of constitutionalism in modern 
societies cannot be overrated, and so we must also invoke the research advanced by Jürgen 
Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Marcelo Neves and Günther Teubner.9 More recently, economic and 
																																																								
7 See, e.g., Rakove, J. (2010). Revolutionaries. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; Wood, G. S. (2002). The American 
Revolution - A History. New York: The Modern Library; Hunt, L. (2008). Inventing Human Rights: A History (Kindle ed.). 
New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Israel, J. (2014). Revolutionary Ideas. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
Jacobson, A. J., Schlink, B. and Cooper, B. (2000). Weimar (Cooper, Caldwell, Cloyd, Hemetsberger, Jacobson and 
Schlink, Trans.). Berkeley: Univ of California Press; Fioravanti, M. (2001). Constitución: de la Antigüedad a Nuestros Días 
(Neira, Trans.). Madrid: Editorial Trotta. 
8 See Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice (Revised ed.). Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press; Rawls, J. (2005). Political 
Liberalism; Dworkin, R. (1986). Law's Empire. Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press; Dworkin, R. (1965). Does Law Have a 
Function? A Comment on the Two-Level Theory of Decision. The Yale Law Journal, 74(4), 640-651. ; Waldron, J. (2006). 
Are Constitutional Norms Legal Norms? Fordham Law Review, 75, 1697-1713. ; Waldron, J. (2009). Can There Be a 
Democratic Jurisprudence? Emory Law Journal, 58, 675-712. ; Waldron, J. (2013). Separation of Powers in Thought and 
Practice. Boston College Law Review, 54(2), 433-468. ; Alexy, R. and Rivers, J. (2010). A Theory of Constitutional Rights. New 
York: Oxford University Press; Kelsen, H. (2013a). The Essence and Value of Democracy (Graf, Trans.). Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield; Kelsen, H. (2009). General Theory of Law and State (Wedberg, Trans.). Clark: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd; 
Schmitt, C. (1985). Political Theology (Schwab, Trans.). Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press; Hayek, F. A. (1998). Law, 
Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge; Derrida, J. (1990). Force of Law. Cardozo Law Review, 11(5-6), 920-1045. ; 
Derrida, J. (2012). Negotiations (Rottenberg, Trans.). Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press; Ackerman, B. (1993). We 
the People: Foundations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Ackerman, B. (1997). Temporal Horizons of Justice. The 
Journal of Philosophy, 94(6), 299-317. ; Ackerman, B. (1999). Revolution on a Human Scale. The Yale Law Journal, 108(8), 
2279. ; Ackerman, B. (2000). We the People: Transformations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Ackerman, B. (2014). 
We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Levinson, S. (1995). Responding to 
Imperfection. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Levinson, S. (2011). Constitutional Faith. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
9 See  Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: MIT Press; Habermas, J. (2001). Constitutional 
Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles? Political Theory, 29(6), 766-781. ; Luhmann, N. (2004). 
Law as a Social System (Ziegert, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Luhmann, N. (2010). Los Derechos Fundamentales 
como Institución: Universidad Iberoamericana; Luhmann, N. (2014). A Sociological Theory of Law. New York: Routledge; 
Neves, M. (2011). A Constitucionalização Simbólica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes; Neves, M. (2013). Transconstitutionalism. 
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institutional theory has provided lots of insights on the role that law — and constitutions — play in 
providing a structural framework of costs and incentives to individuals and businesses, and so one 
cannot forget to mention at least Elinor Ostrom, Douglass North, Adam Przeworski, Eric Posner, 
Robert Cooter, Jon Elster and, more recently, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.10  
Of course, I could not do justice in this already huge list of names to all those many 
theorists who have made strong contributions to our knowledge of constitutions in the last few 
decades and who were not listed. Obviously, my point here is not to appraise their contributions, 
but to justify the claim advanced here. And, in order to do so, I must differentiate the proposal 
hereinafter developed from the theoretical body of other disciplines, highlighting the specific 
contributions of an evolutionary approach to legal theory. In this sense, the first question I want to 
address is quite straightforward: are we really in need of an evolutionary perspective to understand 
constitutionalism? After all, what should we gain from studying constitutionalism from another 
approach, considering the fruitful insights the already existing perspectives have already provided? 
Do we gain anything at all that we did not have within the theoretical body of the already existing 
set of disciplines? 
In this chapter, I argue that an evolutionary perspective offers new insights concerning 
the understanding not only of legal dynamics, but specifically of the emergence of constitutional law, 
its mode of change and its specific function in societal11 organization.  In this sense, the quick and 
dirty answer to the proposed question would be that the adoption of an evolutionary perspective 
allows us to see theoretical problems and solutions in legal theory that we could not see through the 
lenses of alternative theories.  
In order to understand this point, it is important to clarify what I mean by adopting an 
evolutionary approach. Scholars and legal practitioners are used to talk about legal evolution in a 
																																																																																																																																																																																								
Portland: Hart Publishing; Teubner, G. (1993). Law as an Autopoietic System. Oxford: Blackwell; Teubner, G. (2012). 
Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
10 See Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Ostrom, E. (2009). Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Przeworski, 
A. (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Posner, R. A. (2000). Cost‐
Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers. The Journal of Legal Studies, 29(S2), 1153-
1177. ; Cooter, R. (2002). The Strategic Constitution. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Elster, J. (1988). Economic 
Order and Social Norms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 
144(2), 357-366. ; Elster, J. (2000). Ulysses Unbound. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, D. (2005). 
Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's the Economic Effects of Constitutions. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 43(4), 1025-1048. ; Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012). Why Nations Fail: the Origins of 
Power, Prosperity and Poverty (Kindle ed.). New York: Crown Publishers. 
11 As will clarify in the text, I outline a difference between the concepts of “social” and “societal”. The domain of the 
social is related to social relations and social roles, as understood traditionally in sociology. The domain of the societal 
relates to society and its overall structure, as will become clearer in the subsequent chapters. 
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usual, but wrong, sense. They assume that law evolves when it develops from a primitive legal 
system to a more complex one, usually the kind of legal order where they carry their lives.  In this 
sense, they say that Western law, based on respect for human rights, separation between church and 
state and on democratic participation is a more developed system than the alternatives, both from 
the past and from the present. Legal history is seen as the history of how the normative institutions 
of the present became what they are today, and legal evolution is conceived of as the unfolding of 
law to its full potential, changing to “better” forms of law.   
Alan Watson’s The Evolution of Western Private Law is a major example of this way of 
thinking. The intent of the book is clear from the beginning: Watson aims to “show the evolution of 
Western law as a process”,12 and in every use of the expression ‘legal evolution’ in the tome, the 
term could be replaced by ‘development of law’. In the beginning of the first chapter, this is stated 
more clearly:  
 
As I insisted in the Preface, a concept of legal evolution in the Western world 
cannot be built up on a basis of abstract theory but on history; and general history 
cannot be discussed except as a result of examples. (…) My starting point, based I 
believe on experience but perhaps on prejudice, is that for the development of law 
and for its relationship to society attention must first be given to the individual 
sources of law, their availability in a given society, and their interaction.13 
 
The same bias could be observed in other passages of the text, where Watson focuses his 
attention on the unfolding of newer legal institutions from ancient traditions, often stating the direct 
influence of remote causes such as Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis on the French Code Civil as if the 
latter were a natural unfolding of the former.14 
Watson is not alone in this reading of legal evolution. Many authors also refer to the 
evolution of specific legal institutions when they are in fact alluding to their historical development 
or about how that particular branch of law became as sophisticated as it is contemporaneously. 
There are many academic papers and books about the evolution of democracy, human rights, 
contracts, property rights and of as many legal institutions as one could possibly devise, and most of 
them are referring to the history of such appraised institutions.15 																																																								
12 In Watson, A. (2001). The Evolution of Western Private Law. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. p. xi. 
13 In Watson, A. (2001). The Evolution of Western Private Law. p. 1. 
14 Watson, A. (2001). The Evolution of Western Private Law. p. 135. 
15 See, e.g., Picado, S. (2004). The Evolution of Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America: A Ten Year 
Perspective. Human Rights Brief, 11(3), 1-4. ; Buergenthal, T. (1997). The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 19(4), 703-723. ; Owen, D. G. (2007). The Evolution of Products 
Liability Law. The Review of Litigation, 26, 955-989. ; Anderson, T. and Hill, P. J. (1975). The Evolution of Property 
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From the standpoint of evolutionary theory, however, this is a misuse of the expression 
‘evolution’. First, evolution is not simply history. As we shall see in the next chapters, evolution, as 
understood in evolutionary theory — Charles Darwin’s theory, in its current formulation —, is 
change mainly through processes of selection in populations that display variation and inheritance.16 
It is clear that Darwin himself did little to link his theory to an evolutionist approach. The first 
edition of The Origin of Species did not even use the word ‘evolution’, and Darwin wrote ‘evolved’ only 
once, usually referring to his theory with phrases like ‘descent with modification’.17 However, it is 
undeniable that his theory has been explicitly related to evolution, which happened mostly as the 
result of Herbert Spencer’s efforts to popularize his theory.18 
Taking the evolutionary road in order to explain the processes of emergence and change 
of legal and political institutions means that we cannot credit them to be simply the result of history. 
Of course, history matters, and evolutionary explanation is a kind of historical explanation in its 
own right.19 As a result, it also takes history seriously, albeit in a very different sense from legal 
scholars’ usual historical approach. When explaining the evolution of a particular institution, legal 
scholars are usually satisfied if they can elucidate the sociopolitical circumstances and the sequence 
of statutes and judicial decisions that have led to a specific state of affairs. However, this is not 
enough if the task is to adopt an evolutionary stance; although all these historical and social 
elements have to be weighed in, it is also needed to clarify what if any evolutionary processes acted 
in order to select the institution subjected to examination.   
Second, there is another sense in which the common usage of the term ‘evolution’ by 
legal scholars is mistaken from the perspective of Darwinian theory. Although not always explicitly 
recognized, it is not unusual, when describing the evolution of a legal institution, to assume a biased 
normative presumption in favor of the institutions of the present when comparing them with those of the 
past. As a result, evolution is understood as a ladder that leads to better institutions. History is an 
arrow of progress that always leads to the best possible world – not surprisingly, and, 
ethnocentrically biased, our own contemporary world.20  
The political scientist Adam Przeworski calls this the retrospective criterion, which is 																																																																																																																																																																																								
Rights: a Study of The American West. Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 163-179. ; Parker, G. (2015). The Evolution of 
Criminal Responsibility. Alberta Law Review, 9, 47-88. ; Tabusca, S. (2013). Evolution of Human Rights Protection 
Within the EU Legal System. Law of Ukraine Legal Journal, 256-264.  These are only some casual examples of my claim. 
16 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. vii; 
Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2010). Darwin's Conjecture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. vii. 
17 On this point, see Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2010). Darwin's Conjecture. p. 30. 
18 See  Bowler, P. J. (1989). Evolution. Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 251. 
19 See Beatty, J. and Desjardins, E. C. (2009). Natural Selection and History. Biology & Philosophy, 24(2), 231-246.  
20 See Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. p. 3. 
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epistemologically unjustified (and unfair?) not only to the past, but also to the present times.21 As 
ourselves, the citizens of the 18th century had no idea of the future results of their actions, and 
surely their political ideals were far from being the same as ours.  We simply are not justified in 
reading their actions as if they were trying to build the kinds of institutions that we came to have 
nowadays. No matter what their conscious objectives were, the plurality of historical, political, 
economic and sociological circumstances brings contingency into play and the certainty that the 
resulting status quo will be far from the intended purposes. Reading our present state of affairs as the 
necessary result of direct will is a mistake.22 Nevertheless, it would be also a mistake to conceive of 
them as a product of pure randomness, a simple succession of chaotic events.  
These are good reasons for rejecting this traditional approach to legal evolution, but it 
does not mean that the insight that law is a product of evolution should be abandoned. On the 
contrary, we should take this idea seriously from the very beginning and understand evolution as 
proposed by Darwinian evolutionary theory. This assertive raises an immediate question: how can 
evolutionary theory be applied to law, if it has been elaborated in order to explain biological 
phenomena? This is a legitimate question that deserves to be answered, and will be addressed in this 
and in the following chapters.  
Nonetheless, the main point to be sustained is that Darwinian processes are not limited 
to the biological world and, given some conditions, we might expect evolutionary processes to arise 
in other contexts as well.23 Acknowledging this point brings us to the main question of this chapter: 
to what extent can evolutionary theory contribute to the understanding of how constitutionalism have emerged and 
evolved?  
After all, constitutional law has been studied and explained through many theoretical 
lenses. Legal and moral philosophers, sociologists, historians, economists and many more scholars 
have discussed and unveiled most of constitutionalism tenets and how its institutions innovated not 
only in the legal field but also in the sociocultural framework of modern civilizations.  What should 
we gain, then, by studying constitutionalism from the perspective of evolutionary theory? This is the 																																																								
21 See Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. p. 8. 
22 My claim is not that all historians adopt such a naïve point of view about the evolution of society, but that this is a 
common-sense understanding among many legal scholars. Historiography has progressively abandoned this approach at 
least since the late 1920s, when the Annales d’Historie Economique et Sociale developed an interdisciplinary paradigm 
through the adoption of models from fields other than the social sciences. See  Hobsbawm, E. (2011). On History (Kindle 
ed.). London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. p. 1206. On a late history of the Annales School, see Hunt, L. (1986). French 
History in the Last Twenty Years: The Rise and Fall of the Annales Paradigm. Journal of Contemporary History, 21(2), 209-
224.  
23 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize the Social Sciences. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. 
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subject of discussion in this chapter, which will debate this issue from two different perspectives. 
Firstly, this approach is important to notice that, although not so popular nowadays, 
there is a long tradition in legal theory of using an evolutionary approach as a point of reference. 
This is not a new insight in legal theory at all – even though legal scholars have forgotten this 
honorable tradition – and this will be the subject of analysis in the first section of the chapter. I will 
present a historical background of the relationship between legal theory and evolution in order to 
describe the foundations of a tradition that began in the 19th century, but which has been almost 
forgotten by mainstream legal philosophy circles in the last few decades. Nowadays, only a few legal 
scholars have been dedicated to these issues and only in marginal academic spaces, which is 
something to be regretted.24  My purpose is not merely historical, though; by describing this 
tradition, it will be possible to evaluate how legal scholars have derived their theoretical assumptions 
from evolutionary thought in order to explain the legal phenomenon. 
Secondly, a justification for an evolutionary explanation of constitutionalism will be 
provided. Even though many legal scholars have attempted to provide evolutionary explanations for 
law per se, almost none of them have aimed to study the emergence of constitutionalism from an 
evolutionary perspective. In the second section of this chapter, therefore, I will offer some reasons 
for undertaking the challenge of explaining constitutionalism from a strictly Darwinian evolutionary 
perspective, with the explicit purpose of justifying the broader project and of stating some 
assumptions for the other chapters. In this sense, the main question of the chapter will be debated in 
this section: why do we need an evolutionary approach to constitutionalism? Up to that moment, I will have 
discussed how legal theory has taken advantage of evolutionary theories to explain law generally, 
and not in order to account for a specific field such as constitutional law.  
In sum, the purpose of this section is to put forward some substantive gains that 
constitutional theory might achieve by adopting an evolutionary approach, and to assert a main 
point that will be discussed later: constitutionalism is an evolved institutional structure that organizes cooperation 
in complex societies. But how does it fit into the theory of cooperation from an evolutionary point of view?  																																																								
24 See, v.g., Zamboni, M. From "Evolutionary Theory and Law" to a "Legal Evolutionary Theory". German Law Journal, 
09(4), 515-546. ; Zamboni, M. Evolutionary Theory and Legal Positivism: A Possible Marriage. Working paper.  Retrieved 
01/11/2014, from http://goo.gl/UYDT9L; Erhard, O. (2003). Evolution and Constitution: the Evolutionary Selfconstruction of 
Law. Boston: Kluwer Academic; Jones, O. D. (2001). Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered. Brook 
L Rev, 67, 207. ; Gommer, H. (2012). The Biological Essence of Law. Ratio Juris, 25(1), 59-84. ; Dyevre, A. Law and the 
Evolutionary Turn: The Relevance of Evolutionary Psychology for Legal Positivism. Ratio Juris, 27(3), 364-386. ; 
Monahan, J. Could "Law and Evolution" be the Next "Law and Economics"? Virginia Journal of Social Policy the Law, 8(1), 
123-128. ; Ruhl, J. B. (1996). The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and 
Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy. Vanderbilt Law Review, 49, 1406-1490. ; Załuski, W. (2009). Evolutionary 
Theory and Legal Philosophy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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By addressing these questions, I hope to define and justify precisely the scope of the 
research project, introducing the subject that will be better discussed in the next chapters.  
 
1.1. Legal Theory and Evolution: a Historical Background 
 
The idea that law somehow evolves is deeply established in legal thought, but mostly as 
a metaphor.25 As I have already mentioned, it is not uncommon to hear that law evolves in order to 
explain how it became what it is nowadays, or that it adapts to its ‘social environment’, without 
further elucidation of what either ‘adaptation’ or ‘environment’ means. Besides this metaphorical 
common sense referral of legal evolution, there is also a long tradition in jurisprudence that took the 
metaphor of biological evolution seriously and aimed to explain legal phenomena within an 
evolutionary framework. 
Here, I will follow E. Donald Elliott’s paper The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence as a 
guideline, since it is one of the best essays on the subject. According to the Yale Law School 
Professor, during the 19th century many legal theories assumed as a principle that law was 
somehow shaped by its environment.26 Not all of these theories were influenced by Charles 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, but all of them followed the major evolutionist trend in biological 
thought of the period.  Evolutionism became very popular by the end of the 18th century as a result 
of many scientific discoveries that supported the conclusion that animal species changed over time.   
Before the beginning of the 19th century, Georges Cuvier had already published 
conclusive research that showed differences between living elephants and those from the fossil 
records, which also showed that some species – such as mammoths — had gone extinct. In 1788, 
James Hutton described how geological processes could operate gradually through longs periods of 
time, and William Smith, in the 1790s, developed the still used geological methodology of ordering 
rock strata through the careful examination of fossils in the geological layers. These exciting 
discoveries in the field of geology continued during the first half of the 19th century, when Charles 
Lyell published his Principles of Geology, which would be later a major influence on Darwin.  
In the field of biology, those times also saw the publication of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s 
Philosophie Zoologique (1809), and the important contributions to the theme offered by Erasmus 
Darwin (Charles Darwin’s grandfather), Robert E. Grant and Richard Owen.27 In this sense, when 																																																								
25 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. Columbia Law Review, 85, 38-94.  
26 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 39. 
27 See Bowler, P. J. (1989). Evolution. pp. 81-82, p.130-134, p.156. 
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Darwin published On the Origin of Species, in 1859, evolutionism was already a major trend in 
European scientific thought.  
Darwin’s main contribution, in this sense, was not the idea of evolution per se, but his 
proposal of a naturalistic mechanism that could explain why evolution happens — natural selection. 
My purpose here is not to detail their work or to provide a broad description of evolutionist history, 
but to state a broader claim. Even if the legal scholars of the 19th century were not experts in 
Biology, it is clear that evolutionism as a respectful theoretical tradition was diffused in their 
scientific cultural background. As a result, these ideas influenced legal philosophy, a claim that can 
be demonstrated by observing the fact that many evolutionist legal theories were developed in that 
century, even if not based on a full and correct understanding of evolution — or in any particular 
evolutionist theory at all.28 
E. Donald Elliott divides theories of legal evolution into four basic groups, the social, the 
doctrinal, the economic, and the sociobiological approaches.29 
Social theories of legal evolution claim that law is not an autonomous system, but part of 
the broader social system. Law evolves only in the sense that it follows the changes that happen in 
language, culture, politics and economy. Elliott highlights the role of three major contributors to this 
perspective: Savigny, Maine and Wigmore. 
Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the German legal philosopher associated with the historical 
school of jurisprudence, had a major influence on theories of legal evolution due to his emphasis on 
history instead of abstract theorization. Lauded as the “Darwin of the science of law” in an article 
published in 1910 in the journal of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law,30 
Savigny advocated, in his Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (1814), an organically 
progressive jurisprudence, a strong defense of the common law against the movement for 
codification.31 His argument was based on a theory of stages of legal development, built over an 
analogy to biological evolution as understood in the times before Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection. Law should evolve gradually through stages, and not through radical change — an 																																																								
28 According to E. Donald Elliott: “I consider theories about the nature and sources of law to be ‘evolutionary’ if they 
propose that the law is shaped by its environment in a way that is analogized explicitly to the theory of evolution in 
biology: namely, the theory, usually attributed to Charles Darwin, that the forms of living things are shaped by 
environmental conditions, not by the design choices of a Creator. By referring to legal theories as ‘evolutionary,’ I do 
not mean to imply, however, that they are based on a correct understanding of evolutionary theory in biology. My 
central concern is the effect that evolutionary ideas have had on legal thought, not whether the lawyers got their biology 
right”. In Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 39. 
29 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 40. 
30 See de Montmorency, J. E. G. (1910). Friederich Carl Von Savigny. Society of Comparative Legislation Journal, 11(1).  
31 See von Savigny, F. K. (1831). Of The Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (Hayward, Trans.). London: 
Littlewood & Co. Old Bailey. 
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explicit criticism of the French Revolution and the resulting codification movement.32   The 
evolution of law, in Savigny’s perspective, derived from two evolutionary forces: custom and 
jurisprudence, in opposition to the conscious and rational enactment of legislation.33  
Savigny’s emphasis on history was highly influential. Donald Elliott mentions the work 
of the British jurist Henry Maine as one of the intellectual heirs of the historical school. His most 
influential book, Ancient Law,34 was published in 1861, only two years after the publication of 
Darwin’s masterpiece — a fact that has left much room for speculation on the naturalist influence 
on Maine’s work.35  Paralleling Savigny’s proposal, Maine also believed that social evolution 
proceeded through sequential and gradual stages, from less evolved to more progressive societies. In 
the first stage, the legal system is based on the judgment of kings, but they are mere commands, not 
qualifying as true law.36 The main feature of the second stage, the “Customary Law”, is the rule of 
aristocracies, which results from the replacement of the king’s power by a bureaucratic council. 
According to Maine, this stage already conceives of law as a body of rules and sets the framework 
for customary law and, later on, to the third stage, the “Era of Codes”, when codification replaces 
custom as the main source of law.37  
Maine’s contribution to an evolutionary theory of law went further than only describing 
the stages of legal evolution; he also envisaged the mechanisms through which evolution would 
occur. According to him, legal fictions,38 equity and legislation were the main forces that propelled 
																																																								
32 In Savigny’s own words: “During this period [of the French Revolution] the whole of Europe was actuated by a blind 
rage for improvement. All sense and feeling of the greatness by which other times were characterized, as also of the 
natural development of communities, all, consequently, that is wholesome and profitable in history, was lost”. See von 
Savigny, F. K. (1831). Of The Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence pp. 20-21. See also, on the debate 
between Savigny and Thibau about codification in France, Bobbio, N. (1999). O Positivismo Jurídico (Pugliesi, Trans.). 
São Paulo: Cone Editora. pp. 57-62. 
33 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 42. 
34 See Maine, H. S. (1906). Ancient Law. New York: Henry Bolt and Company. 
35 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 43. It is important to notice that Darwin 
was mentioned in the appendix of the book, albeit only in a comment concerning speculations about the first human 
societies. See Maine, H. S. (1906). Ancient Law. p. 421. 
36 In Maine’s words: “A true law enjoins on all the citizens indifferently a number of acts similar in class or kind ; and 
this is exactly the feature of a law which has most deeply impressed itself on the popular mind, causing the term "law" to 
be applied to mere uniformities, successions, and similitudes. A command prescribes only a single act, and it is to 
commands, therefore, that "Themistes" are more akin than to laws. They are simply adjudications on insulated states of 
fact, and do not necessarily follow each other in any orderly sequence.” See Maine, H. S. (1906). Ancient Law. p. 8. 
37 See Maine, H. S. (1906). Ancient Law. pp. 5-16. 
38 This is the definition of legal fiction proposed by Maine: “But now I employ the expression ‘Legal Fiction’ to signify 
any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter 
remaining unchanged, its operation being modified. The words, therefore, include the instances of fictions which I have 
cited from the English and Roman law, but they embrace much more, for I should speak both of the English Case-law 
and of the Roman Responsa Prudentum as resting on fictions. Both these examples will be examined presently. The fact is 
in both cases that the law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was.”  See Maine, H. S. 
(1906). Ancient Law. p. 25. 
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legal change.39  
 Donald Elliott highlights two points concerning the relationship between Maine’s 
theory and Darwinism. First, evolution is not understood as variation of traits within a population, 
as in Darwin’s, but as evolutionary stages through which societies evolve. This might have been an 
influence from Herbert Spencer’s theory of evolution, who also believed that evolution proceeded 
through stages, from simpler forms to more complex ones.40 Derek Freeman synthetizes these 
features of his theory in these words: 
 
Thereafter, Spencer (1884:446) continued to maintain that "the inheritance of 
functionally-produced modifications" was "the chief factor throughout the higher 
stages of organic evolution, bodily as well as mental," and in 1873 he systematically 
extended his fervently held Lamarckian beliefs to human social evolution. The 
"process of social evolution," Spencer pronounced (1873:676-77), was "limited by 
the rate of organic modification in human beings"; before there could "arise in 
human nature and human institutions, changes having that permanence which 
makes them an acquired inheritance for the human race," there had to be 
"innumerable recurrences of the thoughts, and feelings, and actions, conducive to 
such changes," and there was thus "no way from lower forms of social life to the 
higher, but one passing through small successive modifications.”41  
 
In addition, Maine developed a selectionist approach towards law. According to him, 
the norms adopted by a community are those that were “on the whole best suited to promote its 
physical and moral well-being”.42 Again, this is not supported from a standard Darwinian point of 
view, since it assumes that evolution is always an efficient process. However, Maine at least assumes 
that there is an evolutionary relationship between legal practices and their effects on society, at least 
in the sense that the social environment selects legal institutions for its own purposes. 
John Henry Wigmore has also developed an evolutionary theory of law.  His Evolution of 
Law, a masterpiece with more than 2,000 pages inspired by Maine’s project and partially co-
authored by Albert Kocourek, was deeply influenced by Darwin. His argument considers how law 
has been selected by many environments, including social, cultural, political, and geophysical 
factors, including the population density, the degree of foreign intrusion in internal affairs, and 
																																																								
39 See Maine, H. S. (1906). Ancient Law. p. 24. 
40 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 46. 
41 In Freeman, D., Bajema, C. J., Blacking, J., Carneiro, R. L., Cowgill, U. M., Genovés, S., Gillispie, C. C., Ghiselin, 
M. T., Greene, J. C., Harris, M., Heyduk, D., Imanishi, K., Lamb, N. P., Mayr, E., Raum, J. W. and Simpson, G. G. 
(1974). The Evolutionary Theories of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer [and Comments and Replies]. Current 
Anthropology, 15(3), 211-237.  
42 See Maine, H. S. (1906). Ancient Law. pp. 17-18. 
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imitation.43 He also considered the relevance of studying animal behavior and even anticipated 
some themes that will be better explored later in this volume: 
 
Many of the pieces anticipate themes that have only recently begun to be 
reexplored under the rubric of sociobiology. One article describes the development 
of something akin to property rights among animals. Another comes close to 
outlining the modern theory of "reciprocal altruism" and the evolution of 
cooperation. A third anticipates economic theories of legal evolution by suggesting 
that the law evolves as a more efficient mechanism for reducing intra-group 
conflict.44  
 
 Even closer to Darwinian theory, he also did not think of evolution as a progressive 
direction, in which one stage anticipated the other and was necessary to achieve more complex 
organizations. Wigmore criticized Maine on this point and argued that legal systems do not follow 
the same stages or evolutionary direction.45 
The second group of theories presented by Elliott is composed of doctrinal theories of 
legal evolution. The main difference between doctrinal theories and social theories relies on the fact 
that these theories take into account not only that evolution happens at the level of societies and 
only indirectly affects how law changes, but also that legal rules, principles and theory also evolve.46 
In a certain sense, doctrinal theories of legal evolution take into account that law is at least partially 
an autonomous social system that not only follows social evolution, but also adapts to its 
surrounding sociocultural environment, unfolding its own evolutionary dynamics. 
The major predecessor of doctrinal theories of legal evolution was Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. Belonging to the common law tradition, Holmes believed that law is more of a product 
from the cumulative effect of judicial rulings rather than from a legislator’s rational planning. He 
was highly influenced by Darwinism in the 1870s, especially because of his association with the 
Metaphysical Club, which included Charles Peirce and William James, among other pragmatists. 
Darwinism had a major influence in this circle, and Holmes soon became interested in applying an 
evolutionary approach to social reality.47   
According to Holmes’ approach, law is like an organic form that evolves through natural 
selection. In the lectures The Common Law, he explores the history of liability, the prevention of harm 
and the history of contracts, describing how legal rules change over time as if they were randomly 																																																								
43 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 47. 
44 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 48. 
45 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 48. 
46 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 50. 
47 See Vetter, J. (1984). The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution. California Law Review, 72(3), 343-368.  
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produced, by chance, and then are selected by judicial rulings without following any prior guiding 
rationality.48 Under his approach, law evolves not only as a result of judicial activity, but also as a 
response to other social pressures, originating from the community’s moral values, political power 
and economic factors.49 He also explored the patterns of legal evolution in a later article published 
in 1900, Law in Science and Science in Law, where, again, he embraced the analogy between 
evolutionary processes in law and in nature: 
 
Surely a flower is not more unlike a leaf, nor a segment of a skull more unlike a 
vertebra, than the executor as we know him is remote from his prototype, the 
saleman of the Salic law. I confess that such a development as that fills me with 
interest not only for itself but as an illustration of what you see all through the law - 
the paucity of original ideas in man, and the slow, coasting way in which he works 
along from rudimentary beginning to the complex and artificial conceptions of 
civilized life. It is like the niggardly uninventiveness of nature in its other 
manifestations, with its few smells or colors or types, its short list of elements, 
working along in the same slow way from compound to compound until the 
dramatic impressiveness of the most intricate compositions, which we call organic 
life, makes them seem different in kind from the elements out of which they are 
made, when set opposite to them in direct contrast.50 
 
Holmes goes further, stating his belief in the autonomy of law and legal evolution: “We 
have evolution in this sphere of conscious thought and action no less than in lower organic stages, 
but an evolution which must be studied in its own field”.51  
In this article, he further developed his ideas about how law evolves. First, he states that 
legal concepts arise in a process that resembles the way species are formed in nature. According to 
him, legal concepts are the result of selection between competing ideas within particular fields of 
law, in a process akin to natural selection. Holmes assumed that the three elements of Darwin’s 
theory — variation, differential fitness and reproduction — were also present in legal evolution.52 
Variation occurs both because there is divergence between how facts are understood, and, as a 
result, different legal theories are developed. In addition, variation exists because of errors in the 
transmission of legal principles from one case to the other. He believed that the existence of 
different legal ideas applicable to the same domain would lead to competition for selection, and, in 
																																																								
48 See Vetter, J. (1984). The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution. p. 366; Holmes Jr, O. W. (2009). The Common 
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the end, only the fittest would “survive”.53 But what would work as a selector? In nature, the 
environment selects the variants that will survive. In legal evolution, the judges work as the 
environment, selecting which legal ideas shall persist or perish. This does not mean that legal 
evolution is rationally directed by the will of judges, because it is the result of multiple selection 
processes that are quite independent between themselves. Although every judge decides each case 
rationally, the resulting state of affairs is unpredictable. 
E. Donald Elliott also mentions two other important exemplars of the doctrinal view of 
legal evolution, Arthur Corbin and Robert Clark. The first one is Arthur Linton Corbin, who 
developed in The Law and the Judges (1914) many of the insights suggested by Holmes and 
emphasized the creative role of variation in law.54  In opposition to Holmes, however, and following 
Savigny, he emphasized the role of the community in legal evolution. According to him, although 
judges select many legal rules in their judicial activity, it rests on the community the power to accept 
(and ultimately select) the result of judicial activity by following them and stabilizing their presence 
as a normative guide.55  
Robert Charles Clark is also mentioned by Elliott as an exemplar of the doctrinal 
approach, especially because he rediscovered the evolutionary tradition in the 1970s after a long 
period of almost 50 years in which evolutionary approaches had been forgotten in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.56  Clark innovated in Holmes and Corbin’s argument because he assumed that law 
not only evolved through judicial decisions, but that statutes also evolved, being shaped in response 
to shifting social, cultural and economic environments. In his own words: 
 
Quite surprisingly for a corpus of rules that is an artificial construct of highly self-
conscious human intellects, rather than an attempt to rationalize preexisting social 
relations, the law exhibits an intricacy approaching that of living systems. The 
analogy suggests a question. Did the corporate tax law, like a mature organism, 
have its major traits determined by a set of genes fixed in its infancy, or did it grow 
in a passive, mechanistic way, its important parts constantly shaped and reshaped 
																																																								
53 Elliott describes his insight in these terms: “Following his discussion of variation, Holmes turns to his analogy to 
natural selection, the struggle among competing legal ideas. Once variation produces two or more legal ideas that are 
arguably applicable, Holmes imagines them in a competition for survival, as Darwin saw life as a competition among 
animals and plants. Holmes uses the evolution of contract law to illustrate his conception of the common law as 
analogous to natural selection. He begins with the notion that there were a number of different "legal ideas" that might 
have served as sources for a theory of contract law: the oath, the sale, the hostage. Holmes sees "a struggle for life 
among competing ideas" such that there will be an "ultimate victory and survival of the strongest." See Elliott, E. D. 
(1984). Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence pp. 123-124. 
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in response to the shifting pressures of a changing environment?57  
  
Clark also speculated about the analogy between the evolution of species and legal rules 
by identifying two general patterns of change.58 The first one is that the selection of legal rules and 
principles that lead to cost reduction is usually selected as a result of technological or social changes 
that create opportunities to lower transaction costs, through the invention of new legal principles 
and, later, through competition “over the distribution of cost savings”.59 The second pattern occurs 
as a result of changes in the size of economic units and the subsequent development of new rules.60  
Besides social and doctrinal theories of legal evolution, Elliott also highlights a third 
group, which includes economic theories of legal evolution. The underlying thesis of this group is that 
variations in legal rules and principles are selected when they reduce costs and, as a result, promote 
economic efficiency.61 As representatives of this group, Elliott highlights the role of Paul Rubin, 
George Priest, Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser. I would add the role of Richard Posner and 
F. A. Hayek as important members of this group as well.  
Paul Rubin62 and George Priest63 disagree with previous legal theories of evolution in 
asserting that the role of judges is far less decisive than the decisions of litigants in selecting the legal 
norms that survive.  
Rubin was the predecessor of this thesis, which is based on the obvious insight that 
judges only decide cases that litigants bring into courts. Common law is not only the product of 
judicial activity, but also a joint venture between judges and litigants. In this sense, it is in the hands 
of litigants which cases will be brought to the legal system and will be further selected to become 
part of the body of jurisprudence.  According to him, litigants help maximizing the efficiency of 
legal rules because they will most often debate in courts rules which are not already efficient. 
Otherwise, they will only follow the rule or settle for the results fixed by the existing precedents, for 
it will not be possible to achieve a better result through litigation, which will also bring its own 
economic costs due to lawyer’s fees and related expenditures.64 Priest insists in Rubin’s argument, 																																																								
57 See Clark, R. C. (1977). The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform. The Yale 
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58 See Clark, R. C. (1980). The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution. The Yale Law Journal, 90, 1238-1274.  
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61 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 63. 
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asserting that it is not even necessary that the parties involved be seriously affected by a particular 
rule in order to test it in courts, because the only necessary assumption for the model to work is that 
the transaction costs of inefficient rules are positive.65  
 
[T]his tendency toward efficiency is a characteristic of the common law process so 
that the content not only of the common law itself, but also of the legal 
interpretation of statutes or of the Constitution, is subject to forces pressing toward 
efficiency. The only assumption necessary for the hypothesis is that transaction 
costs in the real world are positive.  
 
Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser criticized Rubin’s thesis, reinstating the role of 
judges as a main evolutionary force in the evolution of legal systems.66  According to them, although 
law can stabilize the most efficient solutions through extrajudicial settlements reached by the 
litigants themselves, in most cases it evolves through judicial decisions — although judges never 
know a priori which rule is the best one. Their mathematical model, under these assumptions, leads 
to an interesting conclusion, according to which there is no reason to assume that legal evolution 
will ever lead to more efficient rules. Although it can happen, this is not necessarily an evolutionary 
result.67 The most probable outcome, on the contrary, is one in which efficient rules would be in 
equilibrium with non-efficient rules, leading to a situation where multiple equilibria would be admitted. 
Besides these authors, it is a surprise that Elliott has understated the work of judge 
Richard Posner in his analysis of the economic theories of legal evolution. Although he 
acknowledges Posner’s insight that common law’s efficiency68 lies at the very basis of Rubin’s and 
Priest’s perspectives, Elliott does not give much credit to Posner as a legal evolutionist. Why is 
common law efficient, in Posner’s account? To him, the very purpose of common law is to promote 
wealth (his concept of economic efficiency), and the common law is more prone to achieving that 
than statutory law because it produces more variations to be selected than legislative reasoning, an 
argument very close to Rubin’s proposal.69 
Nevertheless, Posner contributed to an evolutionary explanation of law in a different 
way, by considering in a less known paper, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 																																																																																																																																																																																								
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how law was an important mechanism to explain cultural evolution in archaic societies.70 His main 
purpose in the text is to see “whether and how far the theory that law is an instrument for 
maximizing social wealth or efficiency — a theory that has proved fruitful in studies of modern law 
— could be extended to primitive law”.71  According to him, many features of these societies, far 
from being exclusively the product of a cultural background, are the result of informational costs 
and uncertainty derived from the inexistence of effective centralized governments. 72  In this 
situation, the private gains from innovating are negligible because there are no institutionalized 
property rights that could assure their appropriation. Nevertheless, it should be expected that these 
ancient societies should rely on insurance principles based on some ethic of redistribution — as it 
has been described by many anthropologists.  
The uncertain conditions of production and storage creates the necessary condition for 
the emergence of insurance-like institutions, in which hunter-gatherers share the food they obtained 
with their less fortunate peers, expecting reciprocation in the future. As we will see in the next 
chapter, this kind of institution relies not only on economic logic, but also on evolutionary 
mechanisms that sustain cooperation. Posner also explained other features of ancient societies in 
terms of economic logic and high informational costs, like polygyny, kinship cooperation, family 
law, contracts, property rights, and even the belief in witchcraft.73  
Posner’s relevance as a theorist of legal evolution relies on how he tried to extend his 
belief that common law was a guide to efficient results to archaic societies, applying it as a universal 
evolutionary principle. In this perspective, bottom-up processes of producing legal expectations in 
those societies — pretty much like common law — reduce the cost of information and, as a result, 
produce efficiency and tend to maximize wealth. Whether this conclusion is reasonable is another 
question, but it does not preclude the relevance of his thesis as an important evolutionary legal 
theory. 
The fourth and last theoretical group explored by Elliott is composed of sociobiological 
theories of legal evolution, which were influenced by the sociobiological debate of the 1960s and 
1970s. Since I will discuss the sociobiological approach in the next chapter, I will only define this 
perspective broadly by stating that sociobiologists extrapolate evolutionary mechanisms that cause 
animal behavior in order to extract direct implications for the understanding of the internal 																																																								
70 See Posner, R. A. (1980). A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law. The Journal of Law and 
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dynamics of human social behavior. This is the assumption presumed in sociobiological theories of 
law:  
 
Sociobiological theories of legal evolution apply the conclusions of sociobiology to 
law. The sociobiological school of legal evolution sees evolution not merely as a 
metaphor for the internal dynamics of a legal system; its members believe that 
evolution is the causal process which accounts for the existence of law and, to some 
extent, for the law's form and content. What distinguishes sociobiological theories 
of legal evolution is not the claim that law evolves, but the claim that law has 
evolved; that law is itself a product of evolution.74  
 
The most important scholarly work mentioned by Elliott as a representative of this 
group is an important article from Richard Epstein published in 1980.75 In this paper, Epstein 
argues that many instincts and dispositions were selected in the course of human evolution, and 
many among them are at the roots of legal institutions. Epstein cites four examples that could have 
emerged through the evolution of our species: the inclination to resist aggressive behavior from 
peers; the rule of first possession as an indication of special power over certain objects; special 
obligations concerning the care of younglings by their parents, as a result of the evolutionary 
mechanism of kin selection; and the innate tendency to fulfill promises and obligations, promoted by 
reciprocal altruism.76 
An important and unjustifiable omission from Elliott’s important synthesis is the 
relevance of Hayek’s contribution to an evolutionary understanding of law. Elliott justifies his 
neglect by affirming that Hayek’s theory of legal evolution is indistinguishable from his theory of 
state and his theory of justice, and therefore he would not be included as a specific contributor to 
legal theory.77 However, this is a mistake. Hayek’s Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973) is, beyond any 
doubt, one of the most celebrated economic evolutionary legal theories of the last decades.  
F. A. Hayek’s insights are deep and anticipate many questions that will be discussed in 
this volume. For now, I will highlight three of his major contributions related to the understanding 
of legal evolution: (i) his consideration of psychological features that underlie normative behavior 
and which were selected in our evolutionary history; (ii) how law can be explained through 
mechanisms of cultural evolution; and (iii) a preliminary multilevel approach to the evolution of 
human institutions. 																																																								
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His insights are evolutionary from the beginning, since he considers that human 
behavior is highly influenced by cognitive dispositions and instincts that resulted from our genetic 
evolution. These instincts guided much of the social behavior in small ancient groups of hunter-
gatherers, and probably configured a “natural morality” based on instincts that ensured cooperation 
among group members.78  Hayek assumes, in this sense, an evolved nature of moral rules and 
morality, linked at first to our own biological nature and, later, when societies become more 
complex, to cultural evolution. In this sense, he does not assume — as sociobiologists did — a direct 
link between our biologically based instincts and institutional rules. On the contrary, he 
acknowledges the relevance of the autonomous process of cultural evolution to explain legal 
evolution.79 And, instead of considering that cultural evolution superseded natural evolution, he 
considers that both processes work together in a coevolutionary process: 
 
Nearly all writings on this topic stress that what we call cultural evolution took place 
during the last 1 per cent of the time during which Homo sapiens existed. With 
respect to what we mean by cultural evolution in a narrower sense, that is, the fast 
and accelerating development of civilization, this is true enough. Since it differs 
from genetic evolution by relying on the transmission of acquired properties, it is 
very fast, and once it dominates, it swamps genetic evolution. But this does not 
justify the misconception that it was the developed mind which in turn directed 
cultural evolution. This took place not merely after the appearance of Homo sapiens, 
but also during the much longer earlier existence of the genus Homo and its 
hominid ancestors. To repeat: mind and culture developed concurrently and not 
successively. Once we recognize this, we find that we know so little about precisely 
how this development took place, of which we have so few recognizable fossils, that 
we are reduced to reconstruct it as a sort of conjectural history in the sense of the 
Scottish moral philosophers of the eighteenth century.80 
 
A second contribution from Hayek's thought is that he conceives of law as an 
evolutionary product that can only be explained through mechanisms of cultural evolution. First of 
all, his very concept of law is based on the idea of a spontaneously evolved social order (cosmos), 
instead of a rationally organized order (taxis).81 Above all, Hayek believed that law is not a product 
of conscious evolution, but of a process of selection, production of random variation of rules and 
survival of the most efficient normative system. Different institutions compete and the most efficient 
ones survive.82 This is a shared insight with some economic theories of legal evolution, but Hayek’s 																																																								
78 See Rubin, P. H. and Gick, E. (2004). Hayek and Modern Evolutionary Theory (pp. 79-100): Emerald (MCB UP ). p. 
80. 
79 See Hayek, F. A. (1998). Law, Legislation and Liberty. p. 155. 
80 In Hayek, F. A. (1998). Law, Legislation and Liberty. p. 155. 
81 On the distinction, see See Hayek, F. A. (1998). Law, Legislation and Liberty. pp. 35-38. 
82 See Hayek, F. A. (1992). The Fatal Conceit. London: Routledge. p. 25. 
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approach is different in the sense that he does not only take the economic approach seriously, but 
also present many of the evolutionary issues that were under discussion at the time of his writings in 
other fields. More specifically, his work highlights the differences between biological and cultural 
evolution, anticipating many questions that would arise in the following decades. 
Third, Hayek developed a preliminary multilevel approach to the evolution of human 
institutions. Instead of relying strictly on theories about law that take into account only the systemic 
effects for the whole society, such as Posner’s wealth maximizing perspective, he developed a theory 
that takes into account two selection processes occurring simultaneously in the course of human 
evolution, involving both individual and group selection. The individual predisposition to obey 
legal/moral rules leads to a simultaneous process of individual selection and group selection. In a 
comment on Hayek’s approach, Rubin and Gick highlight this feature of his thought: 
 
Let us give an insight in the selection processes discussed by Hayek. The important 
contribution of Hayek, as already discussed in the historical perspective, is that the 
individual predisposition to perceive rules from outside the group (society or 
subgroups) allows for a process of individual selection as well as group selection.83  
 
The individual perceives rules and is responsible for a first selection — whether to obey 
or not a particular norm, or even participate as an active member of rule creation by formulating 
new rules. It is not necessary that this decision is a conscious one, because it can also happen as a 
result of a trial or error process. This particular individual can be more successful in solving old 
problems than when he followed the old rules and other members of their community can perceive 
this and follow the new rule. This would be individual selection, but there is also a group selection 
process. The set of rules (law) adopted within a community frames the order of the society as a 
whole, and different legal systems affect group-level processes, leading to more (or less) efficient 
results. In his own words: 
 
On the other hand there is the more recent development in cultural evolution 
wherein we no longer chiefly serve known fellows or pursue common ends, but 
where institutions, moral systems, and traditions have evolved that have produced 
and now keep alive many times more people than existed before the dawn of 
civilisation, people who are engaged, largely peacefully though competitively, in 
pursuing thousands of different ends of their own choosing in collaboration with 
thousands of persons whom they will never know. 
How can such a thing have happened? How could traditions which people do not 
like or understand, whose effects they usually do not appreciate and can neither see 																																																								
83 See Rubin, P. H. and Gick, E. (2004).  Hayek and Modern Evolutionary Theory. p. 89. 
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nor foresee, and which they are still ardently combating, continue to have been 
passed on from generation to generation?  
Part of the answer is of course the one with which we began, the evolution of moral 
orders through group selection: groups that behave in these ways simply survive 
and increase.84 
 
This is a major contribution and an anticipation of much of the debate on cultural group 
selection that followed until our days, as will be discussed later. How does evolution occur on 
different levels? Is there a cultural evolution? Under which conditions does it occur? Does cultural 
evolution preclude biological evolution? Hayek discussed many of these questions, and, as such, he 
occupied a relevant place in the history of ideas on legal evolution. In this sense, Hayek’s absence in 
Elliott’s synthesis is odd, given the Austrian philosopher’s important contribution.  
Besides Hayek, another relevant omission from Elliott’s synthesis is the complete 
absence of important scholarships based on sociological theory. He blatantly ignores the 
contributions of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who inaugurated an important school of 
thought in European legal sociology that is still actively producing relevant theoretical work.85 
Luhmann developed an important approach on the evolution of legal systems in many of his 
books,86 and adopted Darwinism as part of his profoundly interdisciplinary theoretical framework. 
However, as his contribution will be discussed later in this dissertation, and since the purpose of this 
section is only to highlight the variety of theories that aimed to explain law within an evolutionary 
perspective, I will only mention Luhmann, for now, as an important theorist of legal evolution. 
The main objective of this section was to revisit a rich tradition that had almost been 
forgotten in legal philosophy.  Although evolutionary-based explanations of law have been around 
for many decades, it is clear that they are not part of current mainstream explanations of the legal 
phenomenon. Even if Law and Economics is a widespread theory in the Anglo-American world, 
and part of it has developed some insights from an evolutionary perspective — like Posner’s and 
Cooter’s contributions —, its approach relies more on mathematic economic modeling than on a 
strictly evolutionary approach. We could only speculate about the reasons why theories on legal 
evolution came to be relegated to a marginal space on legal scholarship.  Elliott conjectures that this 
banishment of social theories based on an evolutionist approach probably was the product of the 																																																								
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bad political reputation of social Darwinism after the 1950s.87  
I would add another reason for this: the fact that many of these theories are based on 
mere speculation, lacking empirical support or better evolutionary models. If this is the case, then 
we have reasons to suspect that we will see a revival of legal evolutionary theories in the next years, 
since much of the interdisciplinary work developed quite recently can be appropriated in order to 
produce more robust theoretical research.  
As a matter of fact, it seems that this is the case indeed. Since the late 1990s, the 
Vanderbilt University hosts the Society for the Evolutionary Analysis of Law, which has organized fifteen 
Conferences on interdisciplinary issues concerning law and evolution. Harvard University Law 
School is also home to The Project on Law and Mind Sciences, an interdisciplinary forum supervised by 
professor Jon Hanson that has organized since 2007 some Conferences on issues that embrace law, 
psychology and evolutionary explanations of moral behavior. These are just some examples that 
highlight the current relevance of the subject on the legal field. Many more initiatives could be 
mentioned from a broad range of social sciences, from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary 
Anthropology to the Santa Fe Institute. These institutes have provided funding for much interdisciplinary 
research that has already led to interesting results on the understanding of the intersections between 
normative behavior, moral/legal institutions and evolution. This dissertation, in this sense, can be 
seen as part of this respectable body of research. 
 
1.2. Do We Need an Evolutionary Approach to Constitutionalism? 
 
Despite being an honorable tradition in legal scholarship, evolutionary explanations of 
law have been relegated to marginal research spaces for a long time. One reason for this apparent 
situation is that it might not be so clear what are the benefits from evolutionary explanations. After 
all, as we will see in the next chapters, many conclusions reached through evolutionary analysis 
could be also derived from historical, philosophical, anthropological or sociological approaches. 
Why, then, invoke evolution?   
This seems to be an even more urgent question to this current project, considering the 
kinds of explanation usually given in the field of law. Why invoke evolution in order to explain the 
origins of constitutionalism, a set of institutions that has already been dissected through many other 
disciplines? Why do we need an evolutionary approach to understand constitutionalism? 																																																								
87 See Elliott, E. D. (1985). The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence. p. 38. 
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In this section, I will explore some possible paths of answer to this question. 
The first one stems from the fact that Darwinism imposes a challenge to all social 
sciences. The Darwinian logic based on variation, heredity and differential fitness provides a 
compelling model of change not only to biology, but also to all social sciences. If the biologist 
Theodosius Dobzhansky once said that “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution”,88 Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd state that “nothing about culture makes sense except 
in the light of evolution”.89 Like animal and vegetal species, societies, social systems and culture also 
evolve. And, by affirming their evolution, I mean that they evolve in the Darwinian sense, as they 
present all the necessary features for the ignition of the evolutionary process: variation, inheritance 
(reproduction) and differential fitness. Of course, this claim must be justified and, in the course of 
the present dissertation, I intend to provide substantiation for this strong statement. If this is the 
case, then, we might hope that legal scholars have to take evolutionary theory into account in order 
to explain the evolution of legal phenomena, including constitutionalism.  
Another reason for undertaking a project of evolutionary analysis is acknowledging that 
it offers a consilient perspective. One of evolutionary theory’s tenets is the denial that complexity 
arises out of nothing.  Complex systems emerge out of simpler systems, and not as fiat. As the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett says in his Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, there is no skyhook in nature that 
guides evolution as if it were planned by an intentional being out of nothing. There are no shortcuts, 
no ways of building complex organisms without relying on slightly simpler beings. Evolution always 
proceeds through small, cumulative steps — randomly accumulated innovations selected in the long 
run, giving support to further evolution.90 To this effect, the evolution of complex systems is 
straightforwardly connected to past evolutionary accumulations, resting no gaps between the 
mechanisms operating in different levels.  
This epistemological project, designated as consilience by the biologist Edward O. 
Wilson,91 is discussed as an important benefit of the Darwinian approach to constitutional theory. I 
hope to demonstrate that the evolutionary perspective exposes the links between constitutionalism 
and not only close disciplines such as political science, sociology and history, but also with far more 
distant subjects as biology and ethology. By acknowledging that lower levels give support to the 
emergence of higher levels, it becomes clear that, although higher levels operate through their inner 
specific logic, their operational logic must be somehow ontologically compatible with the lower level 																																																								
88 See Dobzhansky, T. (1973). Nothing in Biology Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution 
89 In Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 252. 
90 See Dennett, D. C. (1996a). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. New York: Penguin. pp. 75-77. 
91 See Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience among the Great Branches of Learning 
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evolved system that gives support to the higher level systemic evolution.  
In simpler words, this is only a consequence of accepting the trivial claim that the 
biological operations of a living system must be coherent with the chemical and physical operations 
that support the very possibility of the existence of that system. In the same sense, social systems are 
not only built on the complexity of biological beings, but their internal logic must be also compatible 
with the behavioral logic of these entities.  It must be noticed that it does not mean that this project 
accepts only bottom-up causation, as if only biology could affect social operations. In a slight 
reformulation of Wilson’s concept of consilience, I’ll sustain that evolution can work both ways, 
either through bottom-up causation or via top-down selective pressures that lead to the evolution of 
different lower level systems. Some implications of this line of reasoning to constitutional law will be 
explored in the third subsection of this text, aiming to demonstrate that constitutionalism must be 
understood as a result of interlinked evolutionary processes. 
A third reason for taking the evolutionary road is that we can revisit old problems of 
legal philosophy from a different perspective. In this tentative and speculative chapter, I will argue 
that the Darwinian approach allows us to see those problems in a more productive way, 
incorporating old themes into a new theoretical framework. Questions related to natural law, to the 
legitimate use of political power and to the role of norms on the regulation of behavior — among 
countless others — can be discussed through a new lens, and rediscovered again as important issues 
in jurisprudence not only from the standpoint of a legal philosopher, but also from the perspective 
of sociology, anthropology and — why not? — biology and ethology. 
A fourth justification relates to the fact that an evolutionary perspective allows us to see 
that legal/constitutional problems, although unique in their own complexity, evoke issues that are 
similar to problems that arose in the evolutionary history of cooperation. Law and constitutionalism 
are structures that organize cooperation in a sophisticated level of organization of human societies, 
but some of the issues they cope with are similar to problems that arose in other stages of the 
evolution of cooperation. For instance, all structures of cooperation that have arisen in the course of 
biological evolution, from the emergence of eukaryote cells to the countenance of cancer and the 
hierarchical line of authority among great apes have to deal with the game-theoretic problem of 
free-riding. And, since the solutions to this problem are similar in each domain, an evolutionary 
perspective might provide some insights on how these issues could be solved at the level of legal and 
constitutional analysis. 
Of course, these reasons for adopting an evolutionary perspective in legal research are 
 41 
not exhaustive. They represent only a small fraction of the possibilities in which an evolutionary 
analysis can help legal scholars understand the problems of their field. Nevertheless, these are 
important reasons because they impose a methodological onus on the alternative of not adopting the 
evolutionary stance: after all, what would legal scholars lose by using an evolutionary framework to 
study legal problems? Nothing at all; on the other hand, there are many benefits in adopting it, and I 
hope that these reasons, which will be further explored, can be compelling for those who think 
otherwise. 
 
1.2.1. The Darwinian Challenge to Social and Legal Scholarship 
 
When Charles Darwin published his On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, in 
1959, he set a scientific explanation for two phenomena that, before him, were attributed to 
supernatural explanations. First, he proposed a mechanism that accounted for the amazing diversity 
of biological entities of the natural world. But, more important for our purposes, he attempted to 
offer a kind of explanation that could account for complex phenomena.92 How could intricate 
adaptations such as eyes, lungs, hearts and brains exist without a conscious mind capable of 
projecting them in advance?  
Darwin’s answer to this problem was powerful because it provided a consistent, 
straightforward and practical scientific explanation for these phenomena, based on a set of quite 
elementary principles: variation, differential fitness and inheritance, with a fourth being a consequence of 
the first three – natural selection.93 These principles, working on a population of individuals, lead to 
the accumulation of changes which, over long periods of time, can produce quite complex results, 
such as the organs alluded to before.  
Nonetheless, the Darwinian principles do not work only in the biological world, as is 
often thought. The British naturalist himself offered some speculative thoughts on the evolution of 
other complex features in the sociocultural world. In The Descent of Man, Darwin explicitly proposed 
that natural selection could account for cultural evolution and the emergence of different languages, 
in a process similar to the evolution of different species: 
 
The formation of different languages and of distinct species, and the proofs that 																																																								
92 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize the 
Social Sciences. p. viii. 
93 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize the 
Social Sciences. p. viii. 
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both have been developed through a gradual process, are curiously the same. But 
we can trace the formation of many words further back than in the case of species, 
for we can perceive that they have arisen from the imitation of various sounds, as in 
alliterative poetry. We find in distinct languages striking homologies due to 
community of descent, and analogies due to a similar process of formation. (…) 
Languages, like organic beings, can be classed in groups under groups; and they 
can be classed either naturally according to descent, or artificially by other 
characters.94 
 
Following this insight that natural selection could be applied to other domains than the 
biological, many researchers have applied Darwin’s three principles to explain evolution in the 
domains of social sciences that had been so far excluded from evolutionary analysis. Issues such as 
the evolution of scientific theories, 95  technological change, 96  military strategies, 97  business 
organization98 and economic change99 have been successfully examined from evolutionary thinking.  
For certain, Economics is a major field where evolutionary perspectives have been well 
accepted. In a classical book on the subject, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Richard Nelson 
and Sidney Winter argue that firms (businesses) are guided by routines, which would be the 
equivalent of genes in the economic realm. In a nutshell, routines produce better or worse outcomes 
(profit) for the firms, and firms with routines that produce the best economic outcomes expand at 
the expense of the others. The market operates as the environment that selects those who survive 
and those who do not. 
 
Our use of the term "evolutionary theory" to describe our alternative to orthodoxy 
also requires some discussion. It is above all a signal that we have borrowed basic 
ideas from biology, thus exercising an option to which economists are entitled in 
perpetuity by virtue of the stimulus our predecessor Malthus provided to Darwin's 
thinking. We have already referred to one borrowed idea that is central in our 
scheme - the idea of economic "natural selection." Market environments provide a 
definition of success for business firms, and that definition is very closely related to 																																																								
94 See Darwin, C. (1981). The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. pp. 
59-60. 
95 See Hull, D. L. (1988). Science as a Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Campbell, D. T. (2005). Blind 
Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes. Psychological Review, 67(6), 
380-400.  
96 See Basalla, G. (1989). The Evolution of Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Constant, E. W. (1982). 
The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution: Technology and Culture. See also Brito, M. T. S. (2009). Nos Trilhos da Inovação: Uma 
Contribuição Filosófica para a Consolidação de um Modelo para a Evolução Tecnológica. (Master of Philosophy), Universidade de 
Brasília, Brasília.   
97 See Leonard, S. M. (2001). Inevitable Evolutions: Punctuated Equilibrium and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Kindle ed.). 
Damascus: Penny Hill Press. 
98 See Alfred D Chandler, J. (1990). Scale and Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Vol. 248). Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press), Cambridge. 
99 See Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press; Hodgson, G. M. (2004). The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American 
Institutionalism. London: Routledge. 
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their ability to survive and grow.100 
 
Another important illustration of how relevant the application of Darwinian 
mechanisms is to investigate issues from domains other than biology is George Basalla’s approach to 
technological evolution. 101  Instead of being the product of the genius of a few individuals, 
technology is a product of evolution from older artifacts. According to George Basalla, technological 
evolution is founded on four concepts: novelty, continuity, diversity, and selection. New inventions 
(novelty) emerge from older artifacts as a result of a process of variation that individuals produce 
from older products at their disposal. There is no fiat; new technologies appear as a result of 
continuity between older artifacts and novel ones, which result from them. Diversity is a result of 
many factors, such as personal tastes and small changes that accumulate in a given period of time. 
And selection results from many social aspects, such as the economy or military interests and other 
social and cultural factors.   
More important, a growing body of scientific research relies on Darwinian methods to 
make cultural change intelligible. As a matter of fact, the two aforementioned examples can be 
understood as illustrations of this perspective as applied to the economic and technological domains.  
Issues raised by cultural change are similar to those faced by biologists studying the 
problem of biological diversity and complexity. Human culture, as biological life, is enormously 
diverse. As Alex Mesoudi states, “there are approximately 10,000 different religions currently 
practiced in the world, almost 7,000 different languages spoken, each one of which contains of 
around half a million words, and 7.7 million patented items of technology in the United States 
alone”.102  
Legal systems themselves are enormous sources of diversity, not only for the huge 
differences between the legal orders of distinct countries and the international legal framework, but 
also for the complexity feature within each of these systems. Each legal order produces an enormous 
amount of material, which is a source of diversity in their own right, ranging from judicial decisions 
to legal statutes and roles, courts, and administrative procedures. 
The fundamental issue rose by the Darwinian challenge, then, is this: can the 
complexity and diversity of the human cultural world be explained through the principles proposed 
by Charles Darwin – variation, differential fitness, and inheritance? As will be further explored in 																																																								
100 In Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. pp. 9-10. 
101 See Basalla, G. (1989). The Evolution of Technology. 
102 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize 
the Social Sciences. p. ix.  
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the next chapters, there is evidence that this is the case. There is variation in cultural traits; these 
cultural variants cannot all occupy the space at their disposal and, as a result, they must compete for 
epistemic resources (differential fitness); and cultural variants are transmitted from one individual to 
another (inheritance).103 
 This growing body of evidence indicates that Darwinian processes are also involved in 
the origins of many features long studied by social scientists, from anthropologists to economists, 
sociologists, and – why not? – Legal scholars. Darwinian thought, then, imposes a challenge for the 
social sciences because it is a powerful theoretical framework to understand how complexity 
emerges. Assuming that societies and legal orders are complex systems that evolve, the Darwinian 
framework can be a productive toolset for explaining their inception and change.  
Besides that, accepting the Darwinian challenge and using its methods in social sciences 
does not mean abandoning the methods already developed and successfully employed by social 
theorists. Instead, the evolutionary framework invites us to adopt a pluralistic methodology in which 
the Darwinian toolkit is understood as an abstract framework, which needs the support of the 
materials, methodologies and theories provided by the social sciences in order to make sense. It is a 
collaborative work between different epistemological perspectives, not a vindictive project in which 
a paradigm should replace and bury the other.  
The inspiration for this pluralistic approach derives explicitly from David Sloan Wilson 
and Elliott Sober Unto Others. In the conclusion of the book, they discuss how different intellectual 
traditions adopt such incompatible concepts of functionalism that they seem to be describing 
different worlds, in spite of discussing the same subject.104 Through the analysis of their different 
claims, Wilson and Sober demonstrate that no position can be fully understood without the other. 
As a result, they propose the adoption of two forms of pluralism. The first one is a pluralism of 
perspectives, which assume as natural that scientists represent the same processes in different ways. 
And the second kind of pluralism relates to the diversity of causes of evolutionary change, which 
require different approaches to explain them adequately. I think that the same point can be made 
here. Even if substantive advances can be made in the social sciences and in legal theory without 
adopting an evolutionary paradigm, there is no doubt that new insights can be gained from this 
perspective. Also, and there is no reason to assume in principle that the new conclusions will erode 
																																																								
103 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize 
the Social Sciences. pp. 27-34; Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 30. 
104 See Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 329. 
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the theoretical body of the social sciences, as has been argued by some sociobiologists.105 This is 
something that only empirical results can settle and, although they have showed the relevance of 
psychological dispositions to understand social behavior, nothing thus far has indicated the need of 
a complete revision of social theory.  
Legal scholars should accept the Darwinian challenge and try to formulate their own 
questions in an evolutionary fashion. By doing this, we might finally accept that law in its current 
state is not a necessary and final product of human reason, but a result of small steps that were 
accumulated over centuries as a result of evolutionary forces that can be understood through careful 
examining.  
The purpose of this dissertation originates from accepting this challenge in the domain 
of constitutional law, with the explicit aim to rely on an evolutionary perspective in order to explain 
the emergence of constitutionalism. As I hope to demonstrate, some new intuitions about the 
reasons why constitutionalism has emerged and stabilized in the context of modern societies will 
arise from adopting the Darwinian theoretical stance. 
 
 
1.2.2. Evolutionary Theory Offers a Consilient Approach to Constitutional Theory  
 
In his 1998 book Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge, the biologist Edward O. Wilson 
advocated for the idea of unifying all sciences under one system of thought.106 This is the heart of 
the philosophical concept he devises on the book – consilience –, whose origin traces back to 
William Whewell’s 1840 The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. Whewell defined consilience as a test of 
the truth of a theory backed by inductive evidence extracted from different sets of facts.107 
Consilience takes place when two inductions, obtained from different classes of facts, happen to 
coincide. Building on Whewell’s insight, Wilson defines consilience broadly as an epistemological 
thesis according to which principles extracted from different disciplines should be linked together in 
order to construe a more comprehensive theory about the world.108   
This ideal has been at the center of the metaphysical project of explaining the natural 
world since at least the pre-Socratic philosophers of Ancient Greece and their conviction that all 																																																								
105 See Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (Eds.). (1992). The Adapted Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 
12-13. 
106 See Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. New York: Vintage Books. 
107 See Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 8. 
108 See Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. 
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phenomena could be reduced to the same general laws of nature.109 The Milesian school assigned to 
material principles the existence of everything, such as demonstrated by Thales, who declared water 
to be the foundational principal of everything that exists, and Anaximenes, who thought that air was 
the organizing principle of nature. Other philosophers have proposed more abstract principles, such 
as the Pythagoreans and the number; Heraclitus and the perpetual flux; and Parmenides and the 
immutable.110   
Many of these themes persisted later on Medieval thought and even after the Scientific 
Revolution and during the Enlightenment.111 The idea that nature could be explained through 
simple and universal principles – specially the Pythagorean notion that the numbers, through 
mathematics, were the universal language through which the world could be explained, endured – 
and one might say – endures in many epistemological circles.112 Even if the Renaissance and the 
Scientific Revolution fractured many ontological premises from the Ancient and Medieval 
worlds, 113  the belief in a unified metaphysical conceptual body that could account for the 
explanation of reality still persisted – what Wilson refers to as the Ionian Enchantment.114 
Edward O. Wilson sees his approach towards consilience as a direct heir of this 
tradition. According to him, consilience is the “belief in the unity of the sciences – a conviction, far 
deeper than a mere working proposition, that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small 
number of natural laws”.115  
Consilience refers to some epistemological commitments. First, it refers to a unified 																																																								
109 According to Wilson: “The idea is amplified by what Gerald Holton has called the Ionian Enchantment, the 
conviction that all tangible phenomena share a common material base and are reducible to the same general laws of 
nature”. In Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 131. 
110 See Bornheim, G. A. (2008). Os Filósofos Pré-Socráticos (18 ed.). São Paulo: Editora Cultrix. 
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113 On this point, see Koyré, A. (1982). Estudos de História do Pensamento Científico (Ramalho, Trans.). Brasília: Editora 
UnB. pp. 46-47. 
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mere working proposition, that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural laws. Its roots go 
back to Thales of Miletus, in Ionia, in the sixth century B.C. The legendary philosopher was considered by Aristotle two 
centuries later to be the founder of the physical sciences. He is of course remembered more concretely for his belief that 
all matter consists ultimately of water. Although the notion is often cited as an example of how far astray early Greek 
speculation could wander, its real significance is the metaphysics it expressed about the material basis of the world and 
the unity of nature. The Enchantment, growing steadily more sophisticated, has dominated scientific thought ever since. 
In modern physics its focus has been the unification of all the forces of nature—electroweak, strong, and gravitation—
the hoped-for consolidation of theory so tight as to turn the science into a “perfect” system of thought, which by sheer 
weight of evidence and logic is made resistant to revision. But the spell of the Enchantment extends to other fields of 
science as well, and in the minds of a few it reaches beyond into the social sciences, and still further, as I will explain 
later, to touch the humanities”. In Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. pp. 4-5. 
115 In Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 4. 
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approach towards the different sciences – or, in his words, “the great branches of learning”.116 He 
believes that the explanandum of science, the world, is not a union of cracked parts, but a unified 
ontological continuum and, as such, it encourages the consilience of knowledge in all its disciplines, 
including the social sciences.117 In this sense, the sciences reflect an ontological feature of the world 
and, in principle, they could be unifiable in a single theoretical framework. Wilson  assumes from 
the outset the metaphysical assumption beneath this project, which he features as “a metaphysical 
world view (…) [that] cannot be proved with logic from first principles (…)  [because] its best 
support is no more than an extrapolation of the consistent past success of the natural sciences”.118 
A second assumption in Wilson’s thought is that the sciences are organized 
hierarchically – as ontological reality also is assumed to be. There is a causation chain that links 
lower ontological levels, such as physics, chemistry and biology, to higher levels of reality, such as 
consciousness and the cultural and social levels. The lower levels establish the preconditions through 
which the higher levels establish themselves.  
Although Wilson recognizes this project as entailing an ontological reductionism,119 this 
does not mean that the lower ontological levels determine the kinds of organization that emerge in the 
upper levels. Biology makes the emergence of culture and social reality feasible, but these levels are 
organized through an inner logic that, although compatible with the lower levels of reality, is 
complex in its own right, and not fully determined by processes occurring in the lower levels. As a 
result, there is a causation flow that goes from the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, and 
allows for the emergence of social and cultural reality. This causation flow can be determined 
through backward induction, but determining what will happen in the higher levels from the inner 
logic of the ontological lower levels is impossible.  
 
There is another defining character of consilience: It is far easier to go backward 
through the branching corridors than to go forward. After segments of explanation 
have been laid one at a time, one level of organization to the next, to many end 
points (say, geological formations or species of butterflies) we can choose any thread 
and reasonably expect to follow it through the branching points of causation all the 
way back to the laws of physics. But the opposite journey, from physics to end 
points, is extremely problematic. As the distance away from physics increases, the 
options allowed by the antecedent disciplines increase exponentially. Each 
branching point of causal explanation multiplies the forward-bound threads. 																																																								
116 See Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 8. 
117 In his words: “If the world really works in a way so as to encourage the consilience of knowledge, I believe the 
enterprises of culture will eventually fall out into science, by which I mean the natural sciences, and the humanities, 
particularly the creative arts”. In Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 12. 
118 In Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 9. 
119 See Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 11. 
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Biology is almost unimaginably more complex than physics, and the arts 
equivalently more complex than biology. To stay on course all the way seems 
impossible. And worse, we cannot know before departure whether the complete 
journey we have imagined even exists.120 
 
The idea of consilience, as proposed by Wilson, has been criticized on many grounds, 
especially for being reductionist, vague and epistemologically naive and superficial. H. Allen Orr, 
while reviewing the book, states that the proposal presents a number of philosophical problems, 
such as the mind-body, free will, and the failure of logical positivism, but these issues are faced 
superficially due to Wilson’s overconfidence on the developments of the mind sciences.121  
In another review, Jerry Fodor states an important distinction that E. O. Wilson does 
not take into account.122 As specified by him, there is an epistemological thesis according to which 
consilience holds that all knowledge could be in principle reducible to the basic fields of science. But 
there is also a metaphysical thesis, according to which “all the facts supervene on the facts of basic 
science”.123 The problem – Fodor argues – is that Wilson thinks that epistemological consilience 
follows from metaphysical consilience, which is not necessarily true. It is possible to hold that all 
reality is built on the laws of physics without accepting the claim that all sciences can be reduced to 
physics.  
As a matter of fact, I do not agree entirely with Fodor reading Wilson, because he has 
construed a straw man out of his thesis. Wilson does not sustain that the unification of knowledge 
comes from reducing everything to the laws of physics. As the last cited passage shows, he believes 
that each new layer of reality has a complexity of its own, which is built on the elements enabled by 
the lower layers. As he says, “As the distance away from physics increases, the options allowed by 
the antecedent disciplines increase exponentially. Each branching point of causal explanation 
multiplies the forward-bound threads”.124 We can understand the physics and chemistry underlying 
the biological processes of cells, but we cannot preview the whole range of cells (and other biological 
entities) that could evolve based on the same underlying physics and chemistry.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to concede to Fodor’s criticism on the grounds that Wilson has 
unjustifiably derived epistemological consilience from the metaphysical kind. Accepting that the 
emergence of sociocultural reality is built on the ontological potential enabled and structured by the 																																																								
120 In Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. pp. 73-74. 
121 See Orr, H. A. (1998). The Big Picture. Boston Review. from http://ow.ly/3xr6oY. 
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Books, 20, 3-6. 
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lower layers of physical laws does not entail that all ontological levels must be explained through 
scientific discourses that can be reduced to the science of physics, in a hierarchic fashion. It is 
perfectly sustainable that a higher level scientific discourse could not be reduced to physics due to 
the intrinsically complexity of that level, which can be satisfactorily explained through a specific 
conceptual framework devised for that specific purpose. As a result, for instance, social systems 
could only be explained through sociological theories, and not via the laws of physics, and cultural 
systems could not be reduced to biological explanations. Nevertheless, this does not entail that social 
or cultural systems are not constrained by underlying processes. 
We should distinguish, then, between two concepts of consilience. In the strong form, 
consilience is what Fodor criticizes. It entails that all knowledge could be unified in a single 
theoretical set of different – but coherent – theories, each of them dealing with differing domains of 
reality. Ultimately, however, all theories would derive their scientific validity from their coherence 
with low-level theories such as physics. It is possible to devise a weaker concept of consilience, 
though. In this weaker form, consilience is only the acknowledgement that striving for a coherent 
explanation among different explanatory levels is a possible – though not necessary – endeavor of 
science and philosophy. As a result, no one is obliged to strive for consilience while construing a 
theory or doing field work, but nonetheless it is to be admitted that some research can be done on 
the frontiers of two or more ontological levels, in order to construe theoretical links among different 
theories. 
This weaker form of consilience is not unitary. It does not entail that all sciences should 
be reduced to one single theoretical framework, nor does it exclude the possibility that some 
theoretical advances can be made in higher-level ontological level explanations without assuming 
consilience as a necessary assumption. As a result, it preserves pluralism,125 while assuming that 
some kinds of scientific explanations can assume consilience as a theoretical framework – especially 
when dealing with conjectural issues that deal with two or more ontological layers. This is so 
because evolutionary explanations usually offer external reasons for the emergence of a particular 
phenomenon. It is concerned with how a particular system has evolved out of its interaction with its 
environment, allowing much room for other disciplines to explain the particularities of how the 
system works. Of course, a full understanding of the operations of a system can only be pursued 
when we take into account both internal and external explanations of how it came to be as it is. In 
this sense, there is nothing wrong in adopting a pluralistic epistemological perspective, pursuing an 																																																								
125 The lack of pluralism is another ground for criticism against consilience. See King, M. (2013). Against Consilience: 
Outsider Scholarship and the Isthmus Theory of Knowledge Domains. Integral Review, 9, 123-144.  
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equilibrium between evolutionary explanations and the theoretical contributions from more 
specialized fields.  
Evolutionary theory offers a consilient approach compatible with this weaker perspective 
because it helps understand how complex systems, organized through their own internal principles, 
emerge out of lower-level systems, without entailing itself as the only possible perspective.126 This is 
to say, it offers new lenses to look at the world without asking us to throw away the older ones. As a 
matter of fact, an evolutionary perspective allows us to retain most of what we already know about a 
particular field and use that knowledge as a departure point to understand how things came to be 
that way. 
A problematic point in Wilson’s concept of consilience relates to the fact that he thinks 
of causation as a bottom-up process. Physical and chemical laws enable the emergence of biological 
organization, which in its turn sets the background conditions that allow for the evolution of social 
beings and culture. But Wilson’s argument does not take into account the possibility that the higher 
levels of organization can also impose constraints on the operations performed in lower ontological 
layers.  To him, all social sciences should resort to models based on psychology and biology, based 
on bottom-up processes.127 
This is why Edward O. Wilson thinks that the explanation model proposed by 
evolutionary psychologists to explain human cultural behavior is essentially correct. According to 
evolutionary psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists adopt the Standard Social Science 
Model (SSSM), a paradigm in which culture creates and molds individual minds and social 
institutions.128 Instead, evolutionary psychologists propose the inverse path of causation: individual 
minds create culture and social institutions (what they call the Integrated Model). According to this 
view, the SSSM is wrong because it denies the influence of human nature in any relevant 
sociocultural issue. As Tooby and Cosmides, the proponents of this description of the social 
sciences, affirm:  
 
We suggest that this lack of progress, this "failure to thrive," has been caused by the 																																																								
126 See Northrop, R. B. (2010). Introdution to Complexity and Complex Systems. Boca Ratón: CRC Press. pp. 12-13, p.170-
179. 
127 According to him: “THE FULL UNDERSTANDING of utility will come from biology and psychology by reduction 
to the elements of human behavior followed by bottom-up synthesis, not from the social sciences by top-down inference 
and guesswork based on intuitive knowledge. It is in biology and psychology that economists and other social scientists 
will find the premises needed to fashion more predictive models, just as it was in physics and chemistry that researchers 
found premises that upgraded biology”. In Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 224. 
128 See Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: the Unity of Knowledge. p. 204. This view was popularized by Steven Pinker. 
See Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank Slate. New York: Penguin Books. 
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failure of the social sciences to explore or accept their logical connections to the rest 
of the body of science—that is, to causally locate their objects of study inside the 
larger network of scientific knowledge. Instead of the scientific enterprise, what 
should be jettisoned is what we will call the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM): 
The consensus view of the nature of social and cultural phenomena that has served 
for a century as the intellectual framework for the organization of psychology and 
the social sciences and the intellectual justification for their claims of autonomy 
from the rest of science. Progress has been severely limited because the Standard 
Social Science Model mischaracterizes important avenues of causation, induces 
researchers to study complexly chaotic and unordered phenomena, and misdirects 
study away from areas where rich principled phenomena are to be found.129  
 
This reading of the social sciences is backed by an understanding by some key scholars, 
such as Émile Durkheim, Franz Boas and Alfred Kroeber, who advocated the autonomy of social 
phenomena, based on the famous claim by Durkheim that social facts can only be explained by 
other social facts.130  
While some radical social constructionists might hold this kind of thought, the claim that 
all anthropological and sociological theory is based on the SSSM is not backed by evidence. As will 
be further discussed later on, functionalist sociology – a long and respectable tradition in the social 
sciences – is founded on a strict analogy between social and biological processes, which shows much 
respect for the natural sciences. In addition, it is worth noting that although many social scientists, 
such as Bronislaw Malinowski and specially Talcott Parsons, sustained that social structures depend 
on the relationship between society and the biological/psychological structures of human beings; 
Malinowski, for instance, sustained that social stability can only be warranted if the biological needs 
of society’s individual members are reasonably satisfied.131 In the same vein, Parsons’ sociological 
theory explicitly acknowledges the existence of personality systems, taking into account the role of 
psychological dispositions and the agent’s cognitive states in the construction of social systems.132 As 
a matter of fact, to him, cultural systems are not only “social facts”, but their functional role consists 
precisely on integrating individuals (personality systems) within a single symbolic system, which 
assumes a need of taking into account an understanding of individual psychology in order to explain 																																																								
129 In Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (Eds.). (1992). The Adapted Mind. p. 22. 
130 As Tooby and Cosmides declare: “Durkheim, for example, in his Rules of the Sociological Method, argued at length 
that social phenomena formed an autonomous system and could be only explained by other social phenomena 
(1895/1962). The founders of American anthropology, from Kroeber and Boas to Murdock and Lowie, were equally 
united on this point. For Lowie, ‘the principles of psychology are as incapable of accounting for the phenomena of 
culture as is gravitation to account for architectural styles,’ and ‘culture is a thing sui generis which can be explained only 
in terms of itself.... Omnis cultura ex cultura’. Murdock, in his influential essay ‘The science of culture,’ summed up the 
conventional view that culture is ‘independent of the laws of biology and psychology’”. Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. and 
Tooby, J. (Eds.). (1992). The Adapted Mind. p. 22. 
131 See Malinowski, B. (2002). A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays. New York: Routledge. p. 140. 
132 See Parsons, T. (2012). The Social System. New Orleans: Quid Pro Books. p. 530. 
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social phenomena.  
The contemporary sociologist Niklas Luhmann is also a good example of social scientist 
that looked for integration between these domains, although he also strived for the maintenance of 
sociology’s autonomy. Much of his sociological theory might be indebted to Parsons, and, as the 
American sociologist, Luhmann has also acknowledged the role of psychology – not as a subject of 
study by sociologists, but as a relevant background to social facts. According to him, psychology 
(psychic systems) is part of the environment of social systems and, as such, although it does not take 
part in communication processes at the social level, it imposes pressures (noise) which social 
communication incorporates and translates into the various social systems.133  
This brief analysis shows that the view of evolutionary psychology about the SSSM is 
nothing but a straw man. The integrated model proposed by Tooby and Cosmides is problematic 
because it is based on a one-way bottom-up causation process between biology and culture/society. 
Biology constrains culture, or, in Wilson’s words, “genes hold culture on a leash”.134  However, this 
is not the only possibility for conceiving a consilient approach to the relationship between legal 
theory, sociology, psychology and human biology through an evolutionary approach. It is also 
possible to concede that top-down processes also influence the biological and, especially, the 
psychological processes; and much of what is understood under the label of SSSM might be 
research backed by this assumption. This is what is at stake when sociologists talk of socialization – 
in Parsons’ terms, the process of integrating a personality system into a cultural system through the 
internalization of its values. 135  This is a top-down process of causation, because, through 
socialization, an individual is causally integrated into a sociocultural system and can be held as a 
member of that system. Another possibility would be that the operations of social and cultural 
systems affected the very course of human genetic evolution, imposing environmental pressures that 
would not exist otherwise – the process which came to be known as gene-culture coevolution. As 
Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd affirm, maybe culture is on a leash, “but the dog on the end is 
big, smart, and independent. On any given walk, it is hard to tell who is leading who”.136   
Albeit consilience has been founded on such unsustainable premises, its ideal of 
integrating sciences and of acknowledging that social reality is founded on natural bases is a 
worthwhile one. If we abandon the radical embracing of assumptions such as hierarchy among 
sciences, unitarianism, and the strict adoption of bottom-up causation, this ideal can still be 																																																								
133 See, e.g., Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. pp. 255-277. 
134 In Wilson, E. O. (2004). On Human Nature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 167. 
135 See Parsons, T. (2012). The Social System. pp. 209-211. 
136 In Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 194. 
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sustainable in a weaker – but epistemologically stronger – sense.  
Constitutional theory can benefit from the adoption of a consilient perspective in many 
ways, especially through an evolutionary approach, which can offer a meta-theoretical framework to 
organize the relationship between legal theory, sociology and other sciences. In this regard, it is 
possible to advance a new angle in constitutional law, especially in what concerns the emergence of 
constitutionalism and its change. The Darwinian point of view can help construe a structured 
theory of how constitutionalism emerged out of the context of the 16th-19th century not only from 
the perspective of sociology and legal theory, but also from a broader point of view, that includes it 
in the wider scope of human evolution.  
Some themes come naturally into focus from this perspective. First, constitutionalism 
can be understood as a sociocultural structure that has evolved as a result of cooperation problems 
that emerged in Western societies during the Modern Era. There is a selectionist history behind 
constitutional emergence if we consider that constitutions perform a function in dealing with 
cooperation problems, and that they were selected in a specific environment precisely as a result of 
performing this function. This hypothesis, however, can only be formulated by assuming an 
evolutionary background as a premise.  
Acknowledging this implies that constitutionalism is part of a long history not only 
pertaining to legal institutions, but also to the emergence of cooperation in the human species and 
how it has been structured in the course of human evolution. As will be discussed later on, many 
problems that are present in the history of constitutionalism are also issues that appear in other 
contexts, such as the very evolution of altruism in nature.  
Second, adopting a consilient approach to constitutional theory entails that the proper 
understanding of constitutionalism cannot be strictly limited to the understanding of how the 
constitutional level works per se. Its foundations, although they can be also studied as autonomous 
processes, are grounded on lower levels. Here, psychological processes are of special relevance, since 
many deontological operations necessary for the legitimation and stabilization of constitutions are 
grounded on how the human mind works. There are many evidences that our minds are equipped 
with innate dispositions that are necessary to moral and normative reasoning, and, as such, much 
can be learned about constitutional dynamics if we focus on the interplay between constitutions and 
human psychology. 
In sum, the consilient approach thus far advocated entails that evolutionary theory can 
offer new insights on constitutionalism both on synchronic and diachronic frameworks. 
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Synchronically, it allows us to see how constitutions work in harmony with the dispositions of our 
innate psychology, enabling the formulation of hypotheses about constitutional legitimacy and their 
stability. This does not mean that this perspective leaves the important contributions of sociology 
and legal philosophy aside, but, on the contrary, that it brings a new player into the scene – the 
tenets of our evolved psychology. Diachronically, this framework allows us to see legal theory, and, 
more specifically, constitutionalism, as a structure with its own evolutionary history. 
 
1.2.3. Shedding New Lights on Old Problems 
 
The British legal philosopher Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, in his The Concept of Law, 
made a distinction between two important and complementary ways to look at law. First, we can try 
to understand law from the point of view of a member of a community that accepts and uses 
particular legal rules in order to cope with their internal affairs, using those rules as normative 
standards to guide conduct and judge the behaviors of others. This is what Hart calls the internal 
point of view, which is also the perspective adopted by most legal theorists, who try to understand 
law as a legal practitioner working inside the premises of a particular legal system.137   
Most problems of the legal doctrine have been dealt with mainly from this perspective. 
For example, when a legal theorist wants to examine whether a particular claim or legal rule is 
valid, they have to verify whether it is coherent with the set of other statutes, the judicial precedents 
and moral/legal principles accepted in that system. This is how a judge, a lawyer or a law-abiding 
citizen behave as members of a legal community.  
However, Hart also conceived of an external way to look at legal problems. This is the 
perspective taken by someone who, while not accepting the rules of a particular legal system, tries to 
understand it. The external observer can assert that the group members accept particular rules and 
even predict their behavior and the consequences of not acting in the desired way. However, they 
would not be able to understand fully the normative reasons underlying that behavior. His example 
concerning the external point of view towards the understanding of traffic signal rules is well known: 
 
For such an observer, deviations by a member of the group from normal conduct 
will be a sign that hostile reaction is likely to follow, and nothing more. His view 
will be like the view of one who, having observed the working of a traffic signal in a 
busy street for some time, limits himself to saying that when the light turns red 
there is a high probability that the traffic will stop. He treats the light merely as a 																																																								
137 See Hart, H. L. (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 89. 
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natural sign that people will behave in certain ways, as clouds are a sign that rain 
will come. In so doing he will miss out a whole dimension of the social life of those 
whom he is watching, since for them the red light is not merely a sign that others 
will stop: they look upon it as a signal for them to stop, and so a reason for stopping 
in conformity to rules which make stopping when the light is red a standard of 
behaviour and an obligation. To mention this is to bring into the account the way 
in which the group regards its own behaviour. It is to refer to the internal aspect of 
rules seen from their internal point of view.138  
 
In his appreciation, the external point of view can only observe behavioral regularities, 
but not understand the social meaning of normativity. As Hart says, from the internal point of view 
“the violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a 
reason for hostility”.139 The external point of view could only see that law is sanction-threatening 
and, as such, could foresee the application of a sanction; but, from the internal point of view, law is 
not only a threat to apply sanctions, but also obligation-imposing. And the dimension of the 
obligation was precisely not seen from the external viewpoint. 
Hart’s ultimate rejection of the external point of view can be understood as a refusal to 
agree with legal realists’ emphasis on predictability.140 Predictability might be desirable, but focusing 
only on it would be to miss the point of what having an obligation is, from a normative viewpoint. 
To understand what a legal obligation is, is to decipher the legal rules on which it is based on, and 
the chain of rules that link them to their ultimate foundations. 
Nonetheless, legal realism is not the only possible external approach to understand law. 
The evolutionary point of view can also be held as an external position; but, if assumed from the 
beginning as one position among others – including internal frames of reference –, the criticism 
pointed out by Hart can be avoided.  
As a matter of fact, adopting the evolutionary stance comes with the advantage of 
shedding light on old jurisprudential problems which could not be satisfactorily tackled via an 
internal frame of reference. Take the problem of constitutional validity, for instance.  
The internal point of view is a standard reference for legal practitioners because, for 																																																								
138 In Hart, H. L. (1994). The Concept of Law. pp. 89-90. 
139 In Hart, H. L. (1994). The Concept of Law. p. 90. 
140 See, for instance, this passage from O. W. Holmes: “When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well-
known profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a 
way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to 
advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and 
the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to 
know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than 
themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, 
is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts”.   
In Holmes Jr, O. W. (1998). The Path of the Law. Boston University Law Review, 78, 699-715.  
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most of the time, they are concerned with issues of legal validity. In their daily activity, they discuss 
whether a claim made by a particular citizen is founded on legal norms, or if specific statutes find 
their foundations on the constitution. Usually, the internal point of view is enough to deal with most 
issues raised by validity questions because legal practitioners stop raising questions about validity 
when they get to the constitution.  
However, when legal scholars try to ask questions about the validity of the constitution 
itself, they find themselves in a paradoxical dead end. On the one hand, a natural law theorist might 
say that the legitimacy of the constitution rests on ultimate moral values external to law. But this is 
not a satisfactory way to argue for the validity of a constitution because, in complex societies, no one 
can agree on ultimate values upon which we establish the legitimacy of a legal system.141 On the 
other hand, positivists have struggled to find solutions that are, like the Schrödinger’s cat, inside and 
outside the system at the same time. Hart, confined to the internal point of view, has to make up 
rules of recognition, assuming the acceptance of the system of legal rules as a rule for itself.142 Hans 
Kelsen, another positivist, assumes a basic norm as a logical foundation to the rest of the legal 
system.143  
However, these are only arbitrary solutions to the paradox, because they assign an 
ultimate validity to another rule (either the basic norm or the rule of recognition) and stop asking 
questions about the problem. This is to beg the question, not to answer it.  Asking why a constitution is 
respected is one of the foundational questions of constitutional law, but legal theory has not been able 
to provide satisfactory answers to it because it has stuck itself to the internal point of view, which 
limits itself to see the problem from the perspective of a member of the legal community.  
When seen from the eyes of an external observer, the paradox is at least acknowledged, 
as does the sociologist Niklas Luhmann. According to him, constitutions do not owe their 
foundations to external moral values, but are produced as a result of a self-description of the 
political system in the differentiation process between law and politics.144 As a result, a constitution 
is a structural coupling between these two systems, enabling the translation of the internal 
operations of one system into the terms of the other.145 However, constitutions are not constrained 																																																								
141 See Rawls, J. (2005). Political Liberalism; Waldron, J. (2004). Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
142 See Hart, H. L. (1994). The Concept of Law. pp. 95-96. 
143 See Kelsen, H. (1978). Pure Theory of Law (Knidght, Trans. 2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press; Kelsen, 
H. (1959). On the Basic Norm. California Law Review, 47, 107-110. ; Raz, J. (1974). Kelsen's Theory of the Basic Norm. 
The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 19, 94.  
144 See King, M. and Thornhill, C. (2006). Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Politics and Law. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 
173-174. 
145 See Luhmann, N. (2004). Law as a Social System. p. 404. 
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by a moral natural law, or owe their validity to a superior basic norm or rule of recognition. 
Constitutions provide their own self-referential validity – a paradox that can only be seen from the 
external point of view adopted by Luhmann:  
 
In sum, we can say that the constitution provides political solutions for the problem 
of the self-reference of the legal system and legal solutions for the problem of the 
self-reference of the political system. The constitution is a constitution of the 'state' 
and presupposes that the state is a real object, which needs to be constituted. Not 
the text but the constitutional state fulfills the function of coupling - regardless of 
whether it is understood as a people-in-a-form, as an institution, as an organization, 
or just as 'government'. The constitution, which constitutes and defines the state, 
has a correspondingly different meaning in both systems. For the legal system it is a 
supreme statute, a basic law. For the political system it is an instrument of politics, 
in the double sense of both instrumental politics (which changes states of affairs) 
and symbolic politics (which does not).146  
 
The sociological perspective is one among many external possibilities of approaching 
this problem. Another external alternative would be to adopt an evolutionary point of view.  This is 
part of the subject of the present text, but, at the moment, I can only outline a possible line of 
answer. The starting point would be to consider that constitutions are, from the outset, institutions 
with a long history that have been retained in the course of modern democracies because they 
performed some specific functions.147 The evolutionist would have to define what this function is 
and tell a selectionist history that could account for the selection of this kind of social structure 
instead of others.  
Concerning the problem of constitutional validity, an evolutionist could see it from two 
different angles. First, they could consider it to be a false issue. Constitutions exist and they perform 
their function, which is the reason why they have been selected – and that is all there is to it. What 
remains to be understood is how they have become what they are today. But a second and more 
interesting point could also be made. The problem of constitutional validity is raised as an internal 
problem because of some features that all human societies display, and they display these attributes 
due to an inner evolutionary logic hardwired in the human mind. Human minds were selected for 
life in large groups and the innate psychological dispositions needed for that achievement are 
grounded on the assumption of symbolic integration.  
This is a far more interesting history to be told because it unifies both external and 																																																								
146 In Luhmann, N. (2004). Law as a Social System. p. 310. 
147 As a matter of fact, Luhmann’s point could be slightly similar. This is not a surprise, since his functionalist thought is 
also indebted to an evolutionary view. 
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internal points of view in a unique way. The external kind of explanation provided by evolutionary theory 
clarifies why the very internal point of view exists. Legal scholars seek to find an ultimate ground for legal 
rules because this is a way to think about the moral world that has been hardwired in our minds in 
the course of human evolution. This is not a metaphysical claim, but an anthropological one: every 
human society unified under a blueprint that embodies a single shared conception of the normative 
world.148 When legal scholars create intricate fictions of “basic norms” or “rules of recognition,” 
they might be only echoing hardwired intuitions that have been inside the minds of our Homo sapiens 
ancestors for the last 200,000 years. The Luhmannian paradox can be diluted in a Darwinian 
illusion caused by the way our mind is used to think about moral issues. 
To back this claim, however, we need to take into account more than an abstract 
evolutionary approach. We need to grasp the most recent researches that have been made in fields 
as diverse as sociology, anthropology, psychology, neurology, ethology and biology – not to say, 
legal theory and history itself. To think in a Darwinian way is to organize the gathered evidence in 
order to understand them in a consilient set. This is part of the task proposed in this dissertation. 
This process will also shed light on other old jurisprudential problems.  The most 
obvious is the issue of natural law and its relationship with positive law, a debate that has almost 
been abandoned in the last decades. In an evolutionary perspective, it is possible to reformulate the 
natural law doctrine in a completely new fashion, a path that has already been taken by some 
scholars like Edwin Scott Fruehwald149 and Larry Arnhart150. Unfortunately, however, their view is 
still simplistic, grounded on a naïve attempt to found rights strictly on a biological human nature, 
with no consideration for sociological processes.  
There is another route to this path, which also needs to be interdisciplinary. The 
evolutionary perspective, as Fruehwald and Arnhart argue, shows that rights are grounded on 
human nature, but they are also grounded on sociocultural evolution. In order to demystify natural 
law, we need to take both processes into account simultaneously, a task that can be accomplished 
with evolutionary lenses. 
 
1.2.4. Constitutionalism as a Cooperation-Enhancing Evolved Structure 
 
A consilient view on law and normative institutions implies accepting that these societal 																																																								
148 See Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the Forest. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. p. 67. 
149 See Fruehwald, E. S. (2008). Reciprocal Altruism as the Basis for Contract. University of Louisville Law Review, 47, 489-
530. ; Fruehwald, E. S. (2009). A Biological Basis of Rights. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, 19, 195-236.  
150 See Arnhart, L. (2003). Darwinian Conservatism as the New Natural Law. The Good Society, 12(3), 14-19.  
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structures solve problems that might have been continuous to earlier issues of evolutionary history. 
And this is indeed the case of constitutionalism. The evolution of complex structures, from 
biological organisms to the sociocultural human world, demands sophisticated methods to cope with 
problems of organization between units that give rise to emergent structures that are necessary to 
support increasing complexity.   
A great part of this problem is related to the issue of cooperation (or altruism) as 
understood in biology. In the current and most popular sense of the term, the words ‘cooperation’ 
and ‘altruism’ refer to a situation where one individual helps the other with the intention of doing 
so. In biology, this is not necessarily the case. Cooperation, in this more technical sense, occurs 
when one individual acts in such a way that benefits another individual (or individuals) while 
incurring in a loss for oneself. There are millions of examples in nature, including situations where 
our common sense would acknowledge the occurrence of cooperation and altruism.  
Let us see a few examples. Why do the cells of our body not reproduce themselves 
infinitely, but respect the needs of the organism? For sure, disorderly cellular reproduction is a 
possibility, as it occurs in the case of cancer; but it is an undesirable result of a process that has gone 
wrong, rather than the expected behavior of our cells.151 Cells – obviously in a non-conscious, but 
genetically programmed way – limit their reproduction, decreasing the chances of expanding the 
proportion of their own genes in the future, but increasing the fitness of the organism as a whole. A 
similar process takes place in beehives. A worker cooperates with the hive by limiting its own 
reproduction and, like the cells, decreases the odds that its genes will gain proportional 
representation in the genetic pool of the next generation. Workers also cooperate with the beehive 
in other ways besides limiting their own reproduction. A widely known example is the fact that bees 
are selfless warriors in the defense of the beehive. In a kamikaze style, when they attack an offender, 
they lose their sting and die. 
The reproductive limitation of both cells and bees is an example of how cooperation can 
produce the emergence of higher levels of complexity. Without this behavioral limitation, neither 
organs nor hives could ever exist. The differences between individual bees and cells would be so 
large that a structure could hardly be built upon them. The conflict between individual cells and 
bees would lead to the destruction of any collective-like endeavor from the start, because individuals 
would be more concerned with their own fitness rather than promoting the well-being of the whole 
aggregate.  																																																								
151 See Axelrod, R. M., Axelrod, D. E. and Pienta, K. J. (2006). Evolution of Cooperation among Tumor Cells. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 103(36), 13474-13479.  
 60 
This is the free rider problem: how can cooperation emerge if individuals are foremost 
concerned with their own interest and wellbeing? This problem can be solved, and has been solved 
many times both in nature and by human societies, through the development of many mechanisms. 
As we will see in the chapter 3, cells and bees do not fight for their individual interests because they 
share a huge percentage of their genes, thereby increasing the potential for cooperation and for 
suppressing free riders (the intrinsic logic of this reasoning will be explained later).  Chimpanzees 
and vampire bats have discovered another way to cope with this problem: they punish those who 
fail to cooperate. A chimpanzee helps another chimpanzee today expecting that the recipient of the 
act will return the favor later; if it does not act as expected, some sort of punishment will follow.  
These ways to solve free-riding problems are based on structural mechanisms that use 
the interaction logic of the units in order to build larger and more complex cooperative units. 
Cooperation, in this sense, is not to be expected as a natural and unproblematic evolutionary result; 
because, in order to emerge, it has to solve many free riding problems that arise not only between 
conscious beings, but also in the evolution of many other structures, such as eukaryote cells, 
mutualism, and functionally differentiated organs. In all these cases, evolution has provided 
exquisite solutions to problems relating the coordination of lower level units in order to provide 
stability for higher level organization.  
My claim is that constitutionalism is a structure that has evolved because it sustains 
cooperation in complex societies. In order to understand how constitutions perform this function, 
we need to comprehend how cooperation has evolved and how cooperation-enhancing structures 
proceed in order to arrange and stabilize the combined effort of the inner units of the system in 
order to fortify the solidity of complex societies.  
As a matter of fact, this is the main claim of this dissertation. Constitutionalism is a 
sociocultural structure that organizes lower level units in order to sustain cooperation in complex 
societies. Constitutionalism, in this sense, is just another emerging structure that evolved because it 
organizes cooperation and sustains further complexity. In order to understand the role of 
constitutionalism, we need to comprehend fully the logic that has sustained cooperation in the 
course of evolution. 
All these reasons provide a good case for adopting an evolutionary jurisprudence on 
constitutional issues. Even if a more skeptic reader might claim that I have not successfully 
demonstrated that we need an evolutionary approach to constitutionalism, I hope the reasons I 
offered can at least back the claim that an evolutionary perspective might be useful to see some 
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points that other theoretical frameworks do not allow us to see. In the next chapter, I will outline 
more precisely what I mean by an evolutionary perspective in this dissertation, clarifying some 
concepts and structuring the background assumptions that will be needed to build my argument 






2. From Hierarchical Primates to an Egalitarian Species: 




How have we humans become capable of making normative assessments? Evaluating 
moral situations is so common to us that we hardly consider how rare we are in nature. For sure, 
chimpanzees, gorillas and bonobos are all capable of many behaviors to which, in principle, we 
could assign moral qualities. However, among the millions of species on Earth, Homo sapiens is the 
only one whose social life is fully organized through moral and legal systems.  
How has this happened? How has evolution produced a species capable of acting based 
on moral principles, and, more than that, of organizing its societies based on such a complex social 
system as law?  When we look back at 1,000,000 years ago, nothing like that existed among our 
Homo erectus ancestors. By 200,000 years ago, when the first Homo sapiens walked on Earth, only 
rudiments of cultural life and moral codes could have been found – and, 200,000 years later, we 
have become capable of such a revolution in the course of natural evolution. This is, for sure, a story 
worth telling – or, at least, worth speculating about.  
In this chapter, I will explore some recent theoretical explanations concerning the 
origins of normative behavior within our species. The departing point is quite simple: how can 
evolution produce cooperation152 at all? This is the subject of the chapter’s first section. Then, I will 
investigate the evolutionary basis of human pro-social behavior and the foundations of our ability to 
think based on social norms.  
 
2.1. Gene-centered Mechanisms of Cooperation 
 
According to a well-known image of biological evolution, nature is “red in tooth and 
																																																								
152 The term ‘cooperation’ is to be understood in the same sense as biologists usually refer to ‘altruism’. Both terms, as 
used in biology and game theory, allude to situations in which at least two agents engage in forms of mutually beneficial 
joint action although, in the short run, each of them could be better off by being selfish. The classic example is the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. For a deep discussion on this subject, see Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others. pp. 17-
54. It is to be noticed, as well, that cooperation is to be distinguished from simple ‘coordination’. In coordination, all 
agents act jointly because both have a short-term interest in doing so, insofar as doing the same thing results in higher 
payoff for all of them. In cooperation, there is a short-term cost for at least one of the involved agents. On this subject, 
see Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R. and Henrich, J. Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation. In Hammerstein (Ed.), Genetic 
and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (pp. 357-388). Cambridge: The MIT Press. p. 358. 
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claw”.153 “Struggle for survival” and “only the strongest ones survive” are also associated with 
biological evolution, and suggest violence and competition as the normal condition of natural 
beings. Although Charles Darwin stressed competition and the struggle for existence as primary 
driving forces of evolution, the British naturalist also highlighted that cooperative behavior might 
evolve if it confers an evolutionary advantage to its bearer. In a quite distinct and prescient passage 
of The Descent of Man, Darwin posits that virtues such as courage, altruism and loyalty could evolve in 
human societies because groups whose members had these qualities would have a competitive 
advantage over groups consisting of selfish people. Thus, he proposed the following explanation for 
the evolution of morality: 
 
When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into 
competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a great 
number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always ready 
to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would 
succeed better and conquer the other. Let it be borne in mind how all important in 
the never-ceasing wars of savages, fidelity and courage must be. The advantage 
which disciplined soldiers have over undisciplined hordes follows chiefly from the 
confidence which each man feels in his comrades. Obedience, as Mr. Bagehot has 
well shown, is of the highest value, for any form of government is better than none. 
Selfish and contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can 
be effected. A tribe rich in the above qualities would spread and be victorious over 
other tribes: but in the course of time it would, judging from all past history, be in 
its turn overcome by some other tribe still more highly endowed. Thus the social 
and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the 
world.154  
 
Darwin thought that group-beneficial individual traits could be subjected to natural 
selection. This theory, which has been referred to as group-selection theory, had not had a real 
theoretical basis until the 1960s. In the 1930s, Ronald Fisher, J. B. Haldane and Sewall Wright 
attempted to elaborate a group selection theory. Fisher doubted that group selection could have an 
important evolutionary role because the extinction rate of groups is too slow when compared to that 
of individuals, which would result in the predominance of individual selection over group 
																																																								
153 Although the expression “tooth and claw” was known in the first half of the 19th century, it is usually attributed to 
Alfred Lord Tennyson’s In Memorian A.H.H. The quotation, extracted from Canto XVI, stresses the violence and 
savagery of human nature in this way: 
 
Who trusted God was love indeed 
And love Creation's final law 
Tho' Nature, red in tooth and claw 
With ravine, shriek'd against his creed. 
154 See Darwin, C. (1981). The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 
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selection155. Accordingly, Haldane did not credit group selection as a relevant force in evolution, 
although he developed a theoretical framework that established some necessary conditions in which 
group selection could be an important evolutionary force. Only Wright thought that group selection 
might be an important force in its own terms.156 Although there were good reasons to discard the 
idea that natural selection favored group-benefitting behaviors, group-selection explanations were 
quite popular in the first half of the 20th century. Konrad Lorenz, for instance, explained the 
submissive behavior of deer males when in dispute against other males as a feature that has been 
selected for the sake of the whole species.157 
In 1962, the Scottish biologist Wynne-Edwards provided the first sound theoretical 
explanation founded on group selection that was based on the idea that many social behaviors 
displayed by animals are adaptations that regulate population size in order to prevent 
overpopulation.158  After studying the ecological behavior of Lagopus lagopus scoticus (the red grouse) 
for some time, he discovered that, each year, part of the population occupies the best lands and 
reproduces, while other part is relegated to a marginal area where they are more subject to death 
due to predation. According to the biologist, this behavior is an adaptation that evolved because it 
diminished the risk of overpopulation and the resulting scarcity of food reserves. The population 
would diminish its birth rate for the good of the species.159  
Nevertheless, his explanation of altruistic behavior through group selection was harshly 
criticized in the 1960s, largely because of the research developed by George C. Williams, William 
Hamilton, Robert Trivers, John Maynard Smith, David Lack and findings from game theory,160 
which could explain cooperation and altruism solely by resorting to individual selection. This 
development led group selection to be discredited, and it remained restricted to certain circles of 
biology researchers.  
The first kind of criticism against group selection was inspired on the research by 
George C. Williams, who proposed a principle of parsimony, according to which group selection 																																																								
155 See Okasha, S. (2006). Evolution and the Levels of Selection (Kindle ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 2290-2296. 
156 See Okasha, S. (2006). Evolution and the Levels of Selection. p. 175. 
157 See Okasha, S. (2006). Evolution and the Levels of Selection. pp. 2296-2301. 
158 As Wilson & Sober state: “Wynne-Edwards interpreted this social system as an adaptation that evolved to prevent 
the grouse population from overexploiting its food supply. In addition, he thought that most species in nature face the 
same problem. In Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior, Wynne-Edwards (1962) interpreted a vast array of social 
behaviors as adaptations for regulating population size. For example, birds sing in the morning and zooplankton 
migrate to surface waters at night to assess their density and regulate their reproduction accordingly. Wynne-Edwards's 
writing conveyed the electric quality of someone who believed he had discovered a major principle of evolution.” See 
Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others. p. 36. 
159 See Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others. p. 36. 
160 See generally Axelrod, R. M. (2006). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
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should not be invoked unless it were strictly necessary. Later, this methodological criticism gained 
support from research by Hamilton, Trivers, John Maynard Smith and from some theoretical 
developments in game theory, which showed that the behavior described by Wynne-Edwards could 
be explained by other mechanisms.  
George C. Williams also criticized Wynne-Edwards on the grounds that his thesis was 
based on a conceptual mistake. According to him, Wynne-Edwards confused adaptations and traits 
that only fortuitously benefitted the group. Group adaptations would be traits that really evolved through 
processes of group-selection because they conferred specific advantages for the group, while 
fortuitous benefits could evolve through other means (through drift, for instance).161 
However, these theorists did more than only undermine the credibility of group 
selection theories. They also developed a convincing alternative, based on the premise that natural 
selection acts upon genes, not groups. George C. Williams sustained that many complex animal 
behaviors could be explained if we took into account the genetic level of reality. A gene is not 
selected because it is good for the individual or for the group, but because it produces individuals 
capable of maximizing the statistical representation of that gene in future generations.162 When trying 
to explain a useful trait, one must adopt the gene's eye view and always seek the answer to the 
following question: how will these genes benefit from this feature?  
Many kinds of problems could be addressed through this approach. David Lack, for 
example, addressed the explanation proposed by Wynne-Edwards of the red grouse population 
control, suggesting that natural selection would favor the evolution of individuals able to regulate 
the size of its nest according to the environmental situation. Common-sense would suggest that the 
fittest individuals would be those able to produce the largest offspring. But producing a huge 
amount of offspring might not be efficient, because it costs more to take care of them than to take 
care of less descendants. In this sense, the more offspring one individual produces, the less efficiently 
it can take care of them. Lack perceived this and proposed that natural selection would favor the 
evolution of individuals able to generate the optimal amount of descendants for the surrounding 
environment: an individual that produced more than this optimal amount would probably end up 
with less living descendants than an individual that followed the most favorable pattern.163   																																																								
161 See Okasha, S. (2006). Evolution and the Levels of Selection. pp. 2306-2311. 
162 See Laland, K. N. and Brown, G. R. (2011). Sense and Nonsense. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 74. 
163 Dawkins concludes Lacks’ reasoning: “According to Lack, therefore, individuals regulate their clutch size for reasons 
that are anything but altruistic. They are not practising birth-control in order to avoid over-exploiting the group's 
resources. They are practising birth-control in order to maximize the number of surviving children they actually have, 
an aim which is the very opposite of that which we normally associate with birth-control.” In Dawkins, R. (2006). The 
Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 116. 
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This gene-centered approach became very popular after the publication of Richard 
Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene in 1976.164 According to this view, group selection is unlikely to be a major 
evolutionary factor. In a group composed both of altruists and free riders, the advantages of being 
selfish would be clear because they would earn the benefits of cooperation without having to pay its 
price.165 As a result, the proportion of free riders would increase over time, and the altruists would 
become scarcer. In this sense, Darwin’s theory of human cooperation would not work because 
selection among groups is weaker than selection within groups and, as a consequence, natural 
selection within the group would select free riders over altruists.166 
However, how could the gene-centered view explain socially cooperative behavior, if 
selfish individuals have an intrinsic advantage over altruists? 
 
2.1.1. Kin Selection 
 
In 1964, W. D. Hamilton proposed the kin selection theory, according to which an 
individual’s genes can spread faster if their carriers help genetically-related individuals, given that a 
great proportion of their own genes would also spread through the population.167 To this end, 
altruistic behaviors could arise if the considered individuals had a high proportion of shared genes. 
His basic idea is that we should consider the costs and benefits of altruistic action. An individual that 
helps another (donor) pays a cost (c), which can express a reduction of the probability that that 
individual will reproduce itself. However, their act causes a benefit (b) for the recipient of the altruist 
act. If those are the only variables at stake, it would not make any evolutionary sense for one individual 
to help another because they would pay the cost, reducing their fitness (their ability to produce 
offspring) while benefiting someone else to increase the recipient’s fitness.  
However, Hamilton noticed that we should solve the problem of altruism if we consider 
a third variable: the probability that both individuals share a percentage of the same genes (r, from 
relatedness). If both the donor of the altruist act and the recipient are genetically close, it makes sense 
that one helps the other because the result of the altruistic act raises the odds that the genes of the 
donor, which are also shared with the recipient, are transmitted to the next generation. According 
to Hamilton, the selection of an altruistic behavior is probable when the condition c < br is met. In 																																																								
164 See Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene. 
165 See Williams, G. C. (1996). Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
166 See Domondon, A. T. (2013). A history of altruism focusing on Darwin, Allee and E.O. Wilson. Endeavour, 37(2), 94-
103. ; Leigh, E. G. (2010). The Group Selection Controversy. J. Evol. Biol., 23(1), 6-19.  
167 See Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I. J. Theoret. Biol., 7, 1-16.  
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other words, if the cost of the altruistic act is inferior to the multiplication of the benefit of that act 
and to the relatedness between the donor and the recipient.168  
To incorporate kin selection into evolutionary theory, Hamilton proposed the concept of 
‘inclusive fitness’: the genetic success of a particular animal is not only connected to its ability to 
reproduce and spread its own genes (individual fitness), but also to spread its genes through the 
reproduction of its close kin. Furthermore, individuals who share a large amount of genes with their 
relatives are more prone to cooperate with them than individuals who share a lower percentage of 
their genes. Kin selection theory provided an explanation for self-sacrificing behavior because one 
could sacrifice oneself but improve the odds that their own genes would spread through the 
reproductive successes of close relatives.169  
It is important to notice an important question concerning the terminology used here. 
Hamilton does not refer to the term “altruism” in the same sense of a moral philosopher or a fellow 
citizen. In our daily lives, when we refer to an altruistic act, we are roughly talking about an act 
practiced by someone who was genuinely concerned with the well-being of the recipient of their act. 
A stranger helps an old lady to cross a street because they want her to arrive at her destiny. Here, 
one can wonder about the psychological state of the donor of the act — they helped her because they 
thought X, where X is a state of mind concerning the well-being of the recipient. This kind of 
analysis, however, is very different from Hamilton’s proposal. He is not concerned with the 
psychological state of the donor, but only with the behavioral fact that they act in such a way that 
reduces their fitness (c) and raises the fitness of the recipient of their act (b). 
Wilson & Sober suggest that we differentiate two categories of altruism: psychological 
altruism and evolutionary altruism. This dichotomy is based on Ernst Mayr’s distinction between 
proximate and ultimate causes.170  Proximate causes are related to immediate and mechanical 
influences on a trait and behavioral dispositions related to the functioning of the trait. Ultimate 
causes are historical per se, often concerning evolutionary explanations referring to natural selection 
operations. Although this distinction has been recently subjected to some criticism,171 it is useful to 
the purpose of explaining the differences between psychological altruism and evolutionary altruism. 
The former is related to proximate causes. When someone is talking about psychological altruism, 																																																								
168 See Laland, K. N. and Brown, G. R. (2011). Sense and Nonsense. p. 76; Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene. pp. 
94-108; Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others. pp. 58-61. 
169 See Dawson, D. (1999). Evolutionary Theory and Group Selection: The Question of Warfare. History and Theory, 
38(4), 79-100.  
170 See Mayr, E. (1961). Cause and Effect in Biology. Science, New Series, 134(3489), 1501-1506.  
171 See Laland, K. N., Sterelny, K., Odling-Smee, J., Hoppitt, W. and Uller, T. (2011). Cause and Effect in Biology 
Revisited: Is Mayr's Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy Still Useful? Science, 334(6062), 1512-1516.  
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they are referring to the psychological states that cause the displayed altruistic behavior. 
Evolutionary altruism refers to the natural selection history that explains the logic underneath the 
selection of that behavior.  
Of course, psychological and evolutionary altruism might be related at least in the weak 
sense that psychological altruism relies on mental structures that evolved within a particular 
evolutionary history. But the distinction is useful because it highlights the fact that we do not need to 
expect an extraordinarily sophisticated mind in order to expect altruistic acts. As a matter of fact, 
psychological altruism is not even needed for evolutionary altruism to work. If the condition c < br is 
met, and given enough evolutionary time, it is possible that even beings equipped with quite modest 
minds be172 evolutionary altruists without being psychological altruists.  
Kin selection can explain altruistic behavior without relying on psychological altruism. It 
explains the natural selection of some dispositional traits that cause altruistic behavior without the 
need of inferring mental states. For instance, it offers at least a partial explanation of why 
cooperation among the cells of a single organism is expected to arise, since each cell is an almost-
perfect genetic clone of every other cell of the organism.173  But the textbook illustration of kin 
selection is offered by the degree of cooperation that evolved among social insects, as a result of the 
high degree of genetic-relatedness each individual insect display with the rest of the fellow members 
of its colony.   
This is particularly evident in the Hymenoptera order, which includes honeybees, ants 
and wasps. A worker honeybee can sacrifice itself in order to protect the hive even if it cannot 
reproduce itself because it shares seventy-five percent of its genes with its sisters and fifty percent of 
the queen’s genes. It is an altruistic act because the worker pays the cost (c) of not reproducing and 
by sacrificing itself on behalf of the hive (b). A honeybee queen only shares half of its own genes with 
its worker daughters; thus, the genetic success of worker honeybees is best achieved when it protects 
its own sisters, not by having its own sons and daughters. But this altruistic behavior pays off its costs 
because of the high degree of relatedness (r) between the worker and its siblings, in such a way that 
the structure of a beehive obeys Hamilton’s rule. This explains why workers are sterile and guard 
the hive.174  																																																								
172 I adopt a broad concept of mind encompassing all kinds of intentional systems, whose behavior can be explained 
through the use of what Daniel Dennett calls the intentional stance. See Dennett, D. C. (1996b). Kinds of Minds. New 
York: BasicBooks. p. 34. 
173 See Michod, R. E. and Roze, D. (2001). Cooperation and Conflict in the Evolution of Multicellularity. Heredity, 86(Pt 
1), 1-7. ; Smith, J. M. and Szathmáry, E. (1997). The Major Transitions in Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 
283. 
174 See Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene. 
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Kin selection is the ultimate cause of altruistic behavior not only among social insects, 
but in many other animal species. Its effects can be observed in parental care, the special devotion 
parents dedicate to their offspring until they are able to fend for themselves. Care-taking among 
siblings and close kin is also a common feature, observed not only amid humans and primates, but 
also in other mammals175 and even wild turkeys,176 among other examples.  
Although kin selection might offer an interesting theoretical framework to offer probable 
evolutionary explanations for many features of animal and human societies, such as parental 
investment and nepotism,177 it cannot explain how cooperation could emerge among unrelated 
individuals — like ourselves. Humans help one another even if they are not siblings or close kin. We 
give money to charity in order to help strangers and most of us pay our taxes even if the tax 
collector is not knocking at our door.  How is this possible? After all, these are examples of costly 
actions without any predictable benefit in terms of fitness. 
 
2.1.2. Direct Reciprocity 
 
According to Martin Nowak,178 there are other mechanisms that might explain altruism 
toward genetically unrelated individuals. The first of those is direct reciprocity.179 In a classical 
paper published in 1971, Robert Trivers suggested that when non-related individuals interact over 
an indefinite amount of time, altruistic behavior might be selected when there is a high probability 
that the recipient of the benefits will return the favor to the donor in the future.180 The logic of this 
mechanism has been explained by game theory, and, in order to understand it, I must explore some 
features of this branch of mathematics.  
In a nutshell, game theory studies decision-making in situations involving conflicts of 
interest between rational agents. A game is defined as any strategic interaction between two or more 
rational players, who act according to strategies that result in a specific payoff, measured in terms of 																																																								
175 One good experiment that shows the disposition to help kin is the research conducted by Paul Sherman, who studied 
alarm calls in ground squirrels. These squirrels warn other individuals about the presence of predators. However, by 
doing this, the caller draws attention to itself, increasing the odds that the predator will notice and pursue them. 
Sherman noticed that the calls were more frequent when there were relatives closer to the caller. See Milius, S. (1998). 
The Science of EEEEEK! Science News, 154(11), 174-175.  
176 See Krakauer, A. H. (2005). Kin Selection and Cooperative Courtship in Wild Turkeys. Nature, 434(7029), 69-72.  
177 See Masters, R. D. (1982). Is Sociobiology Reactionary? The Political Implications of Inclusive-Fitness Theory. The 
Quarterly Review of Biology, 57(3), 275-292.  
178 See Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314(5), 1560. ; Nowak, M. A. and 
Highfield, R. (2011). SuperCooperators (Kindle ed.). New York: Free Press. pp. 494-2018. 
179 See Trivers, R. L. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.  
180 See Trivers, R. L. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism 
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utility.181 Utility refers to the immediate sensation of preference experienced by a player. It is 
measured in relative terms, compared to the alternative results potentially obtained through the 
adoption of the other strategies. In this sense, utility is a transitive concept. If the player prefers A 
over B, and B over C, then they also prefer A over C. In strictly mathematical terms, 
u(A)>u(B)>u(C). 
Standard game theory also assumes that the players are rational in the sense that they 
act according to the strategy that leads to the best possible payoff, considering the possible outcomes 
from the other strategies at their disposal and the probable strategies that their opponents might also 
choose, considering their respective payoffs. In this sense, the players are rational not only because 
they choose strategies that lead to the best results for themselves, but also because they take into 
account that the other players are rational as well.182   
In an equilibrium situation, the feasible results of the game are compatible with the 
premise of rationality. In 2-player zero sum games, where the sum of the payoffs obtained by both 
players equals zero, there is always a pair of strategies in which the strategy chosen by one player is 
both the best choice and the best option at the disposal of the other player. John Von Neumann, the 
founder of game theory, proposed the minimax equilibrium solution, which is achieved when each 
player adopts the strategy which results in the best minimum result regardless of the strategy adopted 
by the other player. If one of the players adopts a minimax strategy, the game will remain in 
equilibrium because the other player can do no better than to also choose their minimax strategy. 
But the most influential solution concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium, which can be defined as 
“[t]he combination of strategies that players are likely to choose is one in which no player could do 
better by choosing a different strategy given the strategy the other chooses”.183 In this situation, no 
player has an incentive to change their strategy. 
As a matter of fact, Von Neumann’s minimax and Nash equilibrium are identical in 
games where the players interact only once, as one can observe in the prisoner’s dilemma, the most 
well-known game theoretic structure. Elaborated in formal terms by the mathematicians Merrill 																																																								
181 See Leyton-Brown, K. and Shoham, Y. (2008). Essentials of Game Theory. San Rafael: Morgan & Claypool. pp. 30-31. 
182 As Leyton-Brown and Shoham state: “A strategy is rationalizable if a perfectly rational player could justifiably play it 
against one or more perfectly rational opponents. Informally, a strategy profile for player i is rationalizable if it is a best 
response to some beliefs that i could have about the strategies that the other players will take. The wrinkle, however, is 
that i cannot have arbitrary beliefs about the other players’ actions—his beliefs must take into account his knowledge of 
their rationality, which incorporates their knowledge of his rationality, their knowledge of his knowledge of their 
rationality, and so on in an infinite regress. A rationalizable strategy profile is a strategy profile that consists only of 
rationalizable strategies.” In Leyton-Brown, K. and Shoham, Y. (2008). Essentials of Game Theory. p. 88 
183 In Baird, D. G., Gertner, R. H. and Picker, R. C. (1994). Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. p. 21. 
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Flood and Melvin Dresher and popularized by the Princeton professor Albert Tucker, the prisoner’s 
dilemma shows how improbable the emergence of cooperation among rational agents is.  
According to Tucker’s formulation of the dilemma, the police arrests two members of a 
gang, A and B, and imprison them in isolated cells, with no means of communication. Since the 
police do not have enough evidence to convict both of the thugs on the principal charge, they 
develop a plan to induce betrayal between the suspects. The officers offer the following bargain to 
them: (a) if both of them betrays the other, each serves 2 years in prison; (b) if A betrays B, but B 
stays in silence, A will be freed and B will serve 3 years in prison (and vice versa); (c) if both suspects 
remain in silence, they will only serve 1 year in prison.184  
What should the prisoners do? Should one betray the other? Or should they stay quiet 
and hope that the other would do the same? The only rational solution, which obeys both Nash 
equilibrium and the minimax theorem, is to betray the other suspect. To understand this, one has to 
take notice of the formal structure of the game: the best possible result for each of the suspects is to 
be set free. But this is an impossible result, which does not exist in the payoff matrix. The best 
solution for both players is to serve 2 years in prison, and this is also the second best solution for each 
player. But it is not rational to expect that things work out this way. Both agents would have to 
assume, in order to achieve this payoff, that the other player stayed quiet, which would be irrational 
due to the risk of falling into the worst possible scenario — serving 3 years in prison while the other 
suspect is set free. There is no rational basis to expect that the other player will stay in silence. The 
only rational solution is that each suspect betrays the other, and this is also the third worst possible result 
for each player. 
This is a disappointing result for the theory of cooperation. After all, the structure of the 
dilemma reflects many real life situations where we should expect altruistic behavior to emerge. 
Why doesn’t it happen as a result of rationality? In order to address this question, Merrill Flood and 
Melvin Dresher proposed an experiment, based on a slightly changed prisoner’s dilemma. Instead 
of playing the game only in one round as in the original structure, the players would play the games 
in multiple rounds, choosing between two strategies — cooperate or defect. By doing this structural 
modification, the Flood-Dresher experiment induced the evolution of cooperation. After the first 
few rounds, the players realized that the most efficient strategy for themselves was to cooperate with 
the other player, as long as the other player also did the same. The experiment shows that playing 
the dilemma a single time or iteratively changes the solution of the game: in a one-round dilemma, 																																																								
184 See Poundstone, W. (1992). Prisoner's Dilemma. New York: Anchor Books. p. 118. 
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the solution is to cheat; in a multiple rounds dilemma, the equilibrium changes to a cooperative 
solution.185  
   The conclusion arrived at in the Flood-Dresher experiment was reinforced in the 
famous tournaments held by the political scientist Robert Axelrod around 1980. 186  In two 
tournaments, Axelrod tested which strategy would prove to be the best in an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma framework where players who adopted different strategies would come across one another 
and have to choose whether to defect or cooperate. To simulate natural selection, the strategies that 
achieved the worst results would be gradually eliminated from the game and those that achieved the 
best results would be maintained. The winning strategy in both tournaments was the simple Tit-for-
Tat. This strategy cooperates in the first move and then replicates whatever the other player has 
done in the previous round. In so doing, it began showing good faith to establish a cooperative 
interaction, but then it was quite vengeful; whenever the other player defected, it would retaliate 
that move. In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the Tit-for-Tat strategy could do better than free 
riders, because it would benefit from a long-term cooperation with altruistic players, without being 
subject to exploitation from opportunistic strategies.   
This is the core of the second evolutionary mechanism that sustains cooperation, direct 
reciprocity. Altruism can emerge if there are repeated encounters between players who can decide 
whether to cooperate or to defect at every interaction. There are some conditions for the emergence 
of altruism, however: first of all, the individuals must remember past interactions in order to decide 
whether they will cooperate or defect; and, also, there must be a high probability of future 
interaction between the agents.  
In this sense, direct reciprocity depends on altruistic punishment. If a player always 
cooperates, they might be easily exploited by free riders. Tit-for-Tat has been successful in 
tournaments, however, because it punished other opportunistic strategies. Nevertheless, altruistic 
punishment can only sustain cooperation in small societies, as the cooperation is supported by the 
direct punishment applied by those who have been previously harmed by a free rider. In large 
populations, on the other hand, there is always the possibility that free riders will interact with 
altruists who they have not exploited yet, which would result in obtaining the benefits of 
cooperation for free and without suffering the costs of punishment. Even if free riders sometimes 
interact with altruists who they have harmed in the past, it would pay to be selfish because there are 
																																																								
185 See Poundstone, W. (1992). Prisoner's Dilemma. pp. 106-107. 
186 See Axelrod, R. M. (2006). The Evolution of Cooperation. 
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always other altruists to exploit.187  
Nevertheless, this mechanism explains certain animal behaviors, such as the sharing of 
blood among vampire bats188 and the grooming reciprocity in chimpanzees.189 It has even been 
used to explain some human behaviors. In Robert Trivers’ seminal article on reciprocal altruism, 
features of human societies such as friendship, moralistic aggression related to punishing free riders 
and maintaining cooperation, and feelings of sympathy, guilt and gratitude, are all explained in 
terms of direct reciprocity. According to Trivers: 
 
There is no direct evidence regarding the degree of reciprocal altruism 
practiced during human evolution nor its genetic basis today, but given the 
universal and nearly daily practice of reciprocal altruism among humans 
today, it is reasonable to assume that it has been an important factor in 
recent human evolution and that the underlying emotional dispositions 
affecting altruistic behavior have important genetic components.190 
 
However, explaining altruistic behavior through direct reciprocity turned out to be not 
as promising as Trivers might have first thought.  
Direct reciprocity relies on altruistic punishment. If a naïve player always cooperates no 
matter with whom they are interacting, cheaters might easily exploit their strategy. Tit-for-Tat has 
been so successful in the tournaments because it punished any player who tried to exploit it. Over 
the long term, however, it is possible that other strategies could obtain even better results by 
cooperating with Tit-for-Tat rather than defecting. There is evolutionary game-theoretic evidence 
that other strategies might get even better results than Tit-for-Tat, such as Win-Stay or Lose-Shift, 
which is a strategy where the player repeats their previous move if it has been successful or changes 
it when they obtain a bad result. Tit-for-Tat can lead to a long sequence of retaliation because it can 
respond aggressively to a mistake committed by another player, who might have played “defect” 
while the intended strategy was “cooperate”. Win-Stay or Lose-Shift can address these situations by 
responding more accurately to the moves of the other player.191  
In addition, it is important to notice that, in large societies, the marginal costs of being 
punished for being a free rider might diminish to a point at which it pays to defect. This causes 
cooperation to fail. Those employing opportunistic strategies would have better odds to reproduce 																																																								
187 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 200. 
188 See Corning, P. A. (2008). Holistic Darwinism: The New Evolutionary Paradigm and Some Implications for Political 
Science. Politics and the Life Sciences, 27(1), 22-54.  
189 See Newton-Fisher, N. E. and Lee, P. C. Grooming Reciprocity in Wild Male Chimpanzees. Animal Behaviour, 81, 
439-446.  
190 See Trivers, R. L. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. p. 48. 
191 See Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. p. 1560. 
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and increase the proportion of their genes in large societies than altruists. This happens because 
direct reciprocity relies on the circumstance that the same individuals will have repetitive 
encounters, allowing for a long-term relationship in which cooperation will pay. However, in larger 
societies, there is always the possibility that a free rider will meet strangers with no reasonable 
expectation of having future interactions. The larger the society, the lower the marginal cost of 
being punished and the more it pays to be a free rider, thus imposing a threshold to the possibilities 
of growth of any given society.192  
In any case, direct reciprocity requires constant monitoring of other individuals’ 
behavior, which demands complex cognitive capacities. An individual must have a brain with a 
good memory in order to remember their past interactions with other members of their group, and 
they also require a psychological disposition to punish cheaters in order to avoid being exploited.  
In fact, there is evidence that both free-riding and cognitive limitations have been a real 
issue to our hominin ancestors, whose brains evolved in response to the selective pressures posed by 
social life.193 The British anthropologist and evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar studied the 
relationship between the relative dimensions of the neocortex in relation to the brain and the 
standard group size of different primate species. As a result, he found a direct correlation between 
these measurements, which suggests that increasing average group size led to the evolution of a 
larger neocortex. 194  This same result ensued in the evolution of the hominin lineage: the 
Australopithecus afarensis’ average group size is approximately sixty members, Homo habilis lived in 
groups of no more than 80 individuals, and the average Homo erectus group held approximately 120 
members.  
Progressively, each of these hominid species evolved a larger neocortex in proportion to 
their brain volume. According to Dunbar, the covariation between neocortex growth and group size 
was not a coincidence, considering that life in larger groups demands cognitive abilities that only a 
more complex brain could have and, in this sense, that neocortex size is a constraint on group size 
in primates.195 However, this leads to a puzzle that must be solved: following this progression, one 
should expect the average size of human societies to amount to no more than 150-160 individuals, 																																																								
192 Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., Gintis, H. and Bowles, S. (2005). The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment. In Boyd and 
Richerson (Eds.), The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (pp. 241-250). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 242. 
193 See Byrne, R. W. and Whiten, A. (1988). Machiavellian intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, 
and humans. New York: Oxford University Press. 
194 See Dunbar, R. (1998). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 112; 
Gowlett, J., Gamble, C. and Dunbar, R. (2012). Human Evolution and the Archaeology of the Social Brain. Current 
Anthropology, 53(6), 693-722.  
195 See Dunbar, R. (1992). Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. Journal of Human Evolution, 22(6), 
469-493.  
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which is still much smaller than most human social groups. How can this be explained? 
 
2.2. Gene-culture Coevolutionary Foundations of Human Pro-social Behavior 
 
This is as far as exclusively biological theories have gone in understanding the evolution 
of altruism. Cooperation is possible in sizable groups of genetically related individuals through kin 
selection, and it is also possible in small groups of unrelated individuals through direct reciprocity. 
Given that many countries can be seen as huge cooperation networks consisting of millions (or 
billions!) of individuals, how can these human societies be explained? 
 
2.2.1. The Role of Indirect Reciprocity 
 
A third mechanism, besides kin selection and direct reciprocity, was proposed to address 
this issue: indirect reciprocity. Unlike direct reciprocity, which accounts only for the past interactions of 
the agent, indirect reciprocity also depends on observing how individuals behave toward one 
another. This mechanism enhances cooperation because the members of a group may observe and 
acknowledge the reputation of other members they have not met before.196 This logic unveils one 
important feature of human moral and legal systems: the evolution of third-party punishment as a 
response to the violation of social norms. As discussed, direct reciprocity relies on dyadic 
punishment to foster cooperation, and an agent punishes a free rider that betrayed them in the past. 
Third-party punishment, on the other hand, relies on the punishment of free riders by agents who 
have not been affected by the cheaters’ actions.197 
According to Peter Richerson & Robert Boyd, sanctioning violations applied by third 
parties might lead to moralistic punishment, which might be more effective than dyadic punishment 
to establish cooperation in larger societies.198 Direct reciprocity is not so effective in sizable groups 
because the cost of being punished is inversely proportional to the community’s size. On the other 
hand, moralistic punishment increases this cost because the free rider can be punished not only by 
those with whom they have previously interacted but also by any other individual who knows about 
their bad reputation.  
Although indirect reciprocity solves some problems, it leaves others unresolved. The first 																																																								
196 See Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity. Nature, 437(7), 1291-1298.  
197 See Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 
25(2), 63-87.  
198 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 200. 
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unresolved problem is related to the cost of punishing others. There is an economic cost to 
punishing free riders, because of the need to spend time and energy in doing so, and the risks posed 
to the punisher’s own physical health in pursuing and punishing opportunists. This cost might lead 
to a second-order free rider problem: individuals might be inclined to cooperate but not to punish 
those who fail to do so,199 which could weaken indirect reciprocity because the fitness of cooperators 
who do not punish turns out to be greater than the fitness of those who do so because of the costs of 
punishing. In effect, punishers obtain the benefits from punishing, but also pay for it; and non-
punishers (second-order free riders) obtain the reward from punishment without paying its price.200  
Richerson & Boyd propose that this problem might have been addressed easily by 
natural selection if moralistic punishment were common and the punishments were sufficiently 
severe, because most people would “go through life without having to punish very much, which in 
turn means that a predisposition to punish may be cheap compared with a disposition to 
cooperate.”201 In this sense, an innate predisposition to punish first and second-order free riders 
might have evolved and stabilized cooperation through indirect reciprocity.  
There is scarce evidence of indirect reciprocity in non-human animals.202 For instance, 
recent research by Katrin Riedl, Joseph Call, and Michael Tomasello demonstrated that, although 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are able to punish cheaters who offend them directly, they do not 
castigate those who inflict harm on others.203 The skill to punish those who offend others is 
fundamental to understanding certain features of human societies, such as the existence of legal and 
moral norms that are enforced by agents such as police officers and judges, who act to guarantee the 
punishment of individuals who have offended other citizens. If individuals only punished those who 
had offended them directly, how could it be possible to understand the very existence of normative 
institutions whose function is precisely to enforce rules and standards?   
This reasoning leads to the following mystery: why are humans able to be involved in 
indirect reciprocity, unlike chimpanzees or other primates whose behavior is significantly similar to 
ours, but can only accommodate direct reciprocity? Moral and legal reasoning both require the 
normative evaluation of another individual’s behavior not only toward the evaluator but also in 																																																								
199 See Panchanathan, K. and Boyd, R. (2004). Indirect Reciprocity Can Stabilize Cooperation Without the Second-
Order Free Rider Problem. Nature, 432(7016), 499-502.  
200 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 200. 
201 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 200. 
202 See Barta, Z., McNamara, J. M., Huszár, D. B. and Taborsky, M. (2011). Cooperation among Non-Relatives 
Evolves by State-Dependent Generalized Reciprocity. Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society, 278(1707), 843-
848.  
203 See Riedl, K., Jensen, K., Call, J. and Tomasello, M. (2012). No Third-Party Punishment in Chimpanzees. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109, 14824-14828.  
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relation to third parties. In this sense, Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher indicate that the very 
existence of social norms depends on third-party punishment, because frequently violating norms 
does not harm anyone individually, so there is no single individual that could respond to these 
violations.204  
Answering this question is of prime importance to understanding normative reasoning 
and, as a result, the evolution of law and morality in our species. Why is indirect reciprocity so rare 
in nature? Part of the answer is related to the fact that indirect reciprocity requires more cognitive 
capacities than direct reciprocity, because one needs to remember not only their past interactions 
but also the outcome of the interaction between other individuals. Additionally, living in small 
societies requires less cognitive capacity than living in larger societies, because the number of 
interactions every individual is required to remember is smaller.205   
Overcoming these cognitive constraints was a crucial development in our evolutionary 
history. However, evolution is not teleological; natural selection does not necessarily lead to more 
intelligent beings that live in larger societies composed of genetically unrelated individuals. On the 
contrary, natural selection is quite frugal; it selects adaptations that efficiently perform particular 
functions without relying on resource-demanding, complex biological structures. There is a trade-off 
between efficiency and metabolic cost: if two adaptations can do the job, natural selection will more 
likely favor the evolution of the least resource-consuming option.206  
Because complex brains are highly expensive due to their metabolic costs, the 
environmental pressures that led to the evolution of such brains must be understood.207 There are 
good reasons to suppose that living in large groups demands (at least) the ability to engage in 
indirect reciprocity, which requires complex cognitive capacities. Here is the evolutionary puzzle: 
why has the hominin lineage had to live in large groups in which these expensive abilities would 
prove useful? Other primate species are quite adapted to life in relatively small groups – why has 
that not also been the case for the hominin lineage? 
This issue has been the subject of debate over the past three decades. And many of the 
suggested answers to this question illuminate our understanding of the human normative behavior – 
our ability to evaluate social situations through the lenses of moral/legal rules and principles. 
																																																								
204 See Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms. p. 64. 
205 Assessing all possible bargaining situations that might arise from interactions among multiple agents might lead to a 
combinatorial explosion whose evaluation would demand an exponential increase of brain processing power. 
206 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 158. 
207 See Aiello, L. C. and Wheeler, P. (1995). The Expensive-Tissue Hypothesis: The Brain and the Digestive System in 
Human and Primate Evolution. Current Anthropology, 36(2), 199-221.  
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Therefore, to understand the reasons behind the evolution of normative thinking in human 
ancestors, the evolutionary forces must be sought within the cognitive abilities underlying indirect 
reciprocity that proved to be efficient adaptations.208  
First, it is a reasonable premise in evolutionary thinking to assume that extant species 
that share certain traits have inherited them from a common ancestor. The evolutionary 
anthropologist Christopher Boehm, for instance, proposes that it would be theoretically possible to 
reconstruct certain behavioral traits of ancestral Pan – the “shared antecedent of humans and our 
two genetically closest relatives, Pan troglodytes (chimpanzees) and Pan paniscus (bonobos).”209 To 
perform this reconstruction, we should look for strong similarities between the human species and 
these ancestors in order to expose the common traits that humans, chimpanzees and bonobos 
inherited from the ancestral Pan. Boehm himself identified many of these traits: 
 
All three live in bounded social groups and fight with conspecifics, and all 
three have territorial tendencies, along with a substantial amount of dyadic 
dominance-and-submission behavior that can erupt into serious conflict 
countered by active, sometimes highly effective, peacemaking. In addition, 
all three form community-wide coalitions that cooperatively threaten males 
of other groups, whereas within their communities sizable coalitions of 
subordinate individuals may band together to reduce the domination of 
higher-ranking males. Here, I rely on a behavioral phylogenetic approach 
that allows me to conclude that such shared traits are primitive and were to 
be found in ancestral Pan. By analyzing similarities across all three 
descendants of ancestral Pan, I can make conclusions about behaviors likely 
to have been present in our ancestors. From this estimate of our ancestral 
behavior, I can explore the factors that may have led to the more uniquely 
human set of behaviors we find in modern Homo sapiens.210 
 
To this effect, ancestral Pan most likely had the psychological features that made them 
capable of engaging in cooperative behavior through the logic of kin selection and direct reciprocity. 																																																								
208 This evolutionary reasoning presumes that the evolution of such cognitive capacities is an adaptation. This 
assumption, however, is not uncontroversial. The paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould and the evolutionary biologist 
Richard Lewontin prefer to adopt a conservative approach about explanations based on adaptationism. According to 
these scholars, adaptive explanations are usually incorrect because many traits might be historical accidents or side 
effects related to the evolution of other features. See Gould, S. J. and Lewontin, R. C. (1979). The Spandrels of San 
Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: a Critique of the Adaptationist Programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. 
Series B, Containing papers of a Biological character. Royal Society (Great Britain), 205(1161), 581-598.  Nevertheless, Richerson 
and Boyd argue that adaptive explanations are useful because they help us understand how organisms are well suited to 
their environment. See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human 
Evolution. p. 102. According to them, Gould and Lewontin’s skepticism “would be justified only if, in addition, non-
adaptive outcomes were much more common than adaptive ones, or if the cost of mistakenly invoking an adaptive 
explanation was very much higher than the cost of mistakenly invoking a nonadaptive explanation. [They] do not think 
that either of these two things is true”. 
209 See Boehm, C. (2012a). Ancestral Hierarchy and Conflict. Science, 336(6083), 844-847.  
210 See Boehm, C. (2012a). Ancestral Hierarchy and Conflict. p. 844. 
 79 
There is abundant evidence of nepotistic biases among chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans, which 
makes cooperation among genetically close individuals more likely. Additionally, chimpanzees and 
bonobos, like humans, are capable of engaging in dyadic cooperation maintained by altruistic 
punishment.211  
In the hominin lineage, Darwinian evolutionary processes selected innate cognitive 
structures that enabled cooperation through a particular moral psychology. The primate mind 
copes with its social environment through cognitive biases that induce cooperative behavior toward 
kin and altruists.212 The ultimate cause of cooperation within our lineage is thus the natural 
selection of innate cognitive mechanisms that operate through the logic of both kin selection and 
direct reciprocity; and its proximate cause is the evolved moral psychology that allows specific 
individuals to engage in a reasoning based on that type of logic.213  
The second important element for the evolution of cognitive skills in order to engage in 
indirect reciprocity is related to the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis.214 According to this 
hypothesis, primates evolved bigger brains as an adaptation to life in unusually complex societies in 
which struggling for existence means not only coping with the natural environment but also with the 
challenges posed by other socially intelligent agents. Intense social competition led to the selection of 
those who were more capable of successfully adopting social behaviors, which include lying, 																																																								
211 See Boehm, C. (2012a). Ancestral Hierarchy and Conflict. p. 844. 
212 These biases are fast and frugal heuristics that enable quick and (usually, but not always) correct decisions. As 
previously discussed, natural selection favors the evolution of “cheap” adaptations – traits that accomplish their duties 
without spending too many resources. Cognitive biases can be understood as rules-of-thumb that usually display the 
correct answer to a specific situation, but not always. The evolution of a brain that could correctly respond to every state 
of affairs in a reasonable amount of time would demand infinitely more energy and structural complexity than a biased 
mind that can be effective in most situations. See Goldstein, D. G. and Gigerenzer, G. (1996). Reasoning the Fast and 
Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality. Psychological Review, 103(4), 650-669.  
213 According to the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr, ultimate causes and proximate causes should be distinguished in 
order to fully understand an evolutionary phenomenon. Proximate causes govern the immediate responses of the 
individual and their organic structures to the actual factors of their environment. On the other hand, ultimate causes are 
related to the evolutionary explanations of a particular behavior, which caused the selection of the proximate structures 
that directly cause that behavior. Ultimate causes are evolutionary causes – the environmental pressures that led to the 
selection of particular traits, the path dependent traits that turned out to be necessary for the evolution of further 
complex traits, and so on. As an example of this, Mayr explains the migration of a bird species by referring to both 
proximate and ultimate causes: “Now, if we look over the four causations of the migration of this bird once more we can 
readily see that there is an immediate set of causes of the migration, consisting of the physiological condition of the bird 
interacting with photoperiodicity and drop in temperature. We might call these the proximate causes of migration. The 
other two causes, the lack of food during winter and the genetic disposition of the bird, are the ultimate causes. These are 
causes that have a history and that have been incorporated into the system through many thousands of generations of 
natural selection. It is evident that the functional biologist would be concerned with analysis of the proximate causes, 
while the evolutionary biologist would be concerned with analysis of the ultimate causes. This is the case with almost 
any biological phenomenon we might want to study. There is always a proximate set of causes and an ultimate set of 
causes; both have to be explained and interpreted for a complete understanding of the given phenomenon”. See  Mayr, 
E. (1961). Cause and Effect in Biology. p. 1503. 
214 See Byrne, R. W. and Whiten, A. (1988). Machiavellian intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in 
monkeys, apes, and humans. 
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cunning behavior, forming coalitions, and manipulating the behavior of others. The presence of 
greater social intellect in some individuals in a primate group would exert selection pressures on the 
social intelligence of others, which would in turn lead to the evolution of even more complex social 
brains. The result would be an evolutionary arms race between the increasingly sophisticated ability 
to predict the behavior of others and the skills to manipulate them. This process led to the evolution 
of more complex primates that were capable of attributing mental states (intentions, beliefs and 
desires) to others in order to predict and anticipate their behavior, which is a skill typically known as 
mind reading or theory of mind.215 
Understanding others’ minds to predict their behavior and react accordingly might have 
led to the increase in group size – which, in turn, became itself an environmental pressure for the 
evolution of more complex cognitive skills. Socially sophisticated minds may accommodate larger 
groups, and larger groups demand even more sophisticated minds in a coevolutionary dance 
between group size and social intelligence.  
At this stage, one question still remains unanswered: social skills are required for the 
growth of groups, but why did groups have to grow? Could the number of individuals in a group 
not remain stable and compatible with the cognitive skills of its members? This question admits too 
many correct answers. The quick-and-dirty answer would be that it is evolutionarily stable to live in 
small groups where relatively simpler social minds are able to accommodate social complexity, and 
many primate species are certainly well adapted to life in smaller groups. However, bigger groups 
should have an adaptative advantage over smaller groups in competition for resources and in 
eventual conflicts, being reasonable to assume an evolutionary force towards larger societies, whose 
stability would depend on particular psychological tenets. 
Evolution is path dependent. Even the slightest difference between our ancestors’ minds 
and the psychology of other primates could have given rise to enormously different evolutionary 
results. Although there are many controversies about what the psychological differences were 
between our ancestors and other apes, gene-culture coevolutionary researchers propose that by the 
time our hominin lineage began to separate from other primates, our ancestors had the mental-																																																								
215 See Cheney, D. and Seyfarth, R. (2007). Baboon Metaphysics - the evolution of a social mind. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. pp. 197-198 As stated by Orbell, et al.: “At the heart of the ‘political intelligence’ hypothesis is the 
assumption that, throughout human evolution (or at least in the Pleistocene ‘environment of evolutionary adaptation’ or 
EEA), there was an arms race between such manipulative and mindreading capacities. Social living was indeed a 
necessary condition for our ancestors’ survival, but social living also meant that any mutation produced advantage in 
manipulation also provided a basis for selection on mindreading and vice versa—producing an upwardly ratcheted arms 
race that continually increased both capacities”. See Orbell, J., Morikawa, T. and Allen, N. (2002). The Evolution of 
Political Intelligence: Simulation Results. British Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 613-639.  
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reading abilities that were necessary for a skill that would prove to be very useful: the ability to 
imitate. It is still not clear why other primates, although skilled enough to learn socially through 
other means, are not capable of truly imitating as we can.216 Richerson & Boyd suggest that 
imitation skills may have originated as an incidental effect of mind reading in our lineage, and it 
might have led to the evolution of rudimentary cultural traditions, which in turn required a more 
sophisticated ability to imitate.217  
According to this hypothesis, imitation became an important adaptation because it is an 
evolutionarily stable strategy to accommodate moderately stable environments. In these conditions, 
animals capable of learning individually and of imitating the behavior of others would do better 
than those who rely either solely on innate behavioral strategies or on individual learning.218 
Imitation enables the fast spreading of adaptive behaviors through a particular population because 
the environmental changes are slow enough to allow for the social transmission of adaptive 
information. In extremely unstable conditions, however, social learning would not be reliable 
because it would increase the diffusion of maladaptive behaviors in a group. Richerson and Boyd 
propose that our ancestors coped with moderately stable conditions, where it would pay to imitate. 
Along the lines of their conjecture, the evolution of social learning in primates may be understood as 
an adaptation to the increased climate variation that took place in the Pleistocene, between 1.8 
million years BCE and 11,500 BCE.219 Our ancestors might have been the only species with mind-
reading skills sophisticated enough to induce the evolution of faithful imitation abilities and thus be 
able to cross this cognitive threshold. 
 																																																								
216  Susan Blackmore discusses the ability of other apes to learn socially through stimulus enhancement, local 
enhancement, or other simple forms of social learning. See Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. pp. 48-50. 
217 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 138 
(“Some have suggested that primate intelligence was originally an adaptation to manage a complex social life. Perhaps 
in our lineage the complexities of managing food sharing, the sexual division of labor, or some similar social problem 
favored the evolution of a sophisticated ability to take the perspective of others. Such a capacity might incidentally make 
imitation possible, launching the evolution of the most elementary form of complex cultural traditions. Once elementary 
complex cultural traditions exist, the threshold is crossed. As the evolving traditions become too complex to imitate 
easily they will begin to drive the evolution of still more-sophisticated imitation.”). 
218 Imitation is unlikely to evolve in unstable environments because natural selection would rather favor the gradual 
evolution of innate behavioral strategies that can cope adequately with natural challenges without requiring such a 
complex cognitive capacity. Because the evolution of specific innate adaptations able to cope with particular 
environmental issues requires time (hundreds or thousands of years!), innate behaviors are adaptive to deal with stable 
environments. In this sense, innate specific adaptations cannot accommodate highly unstable environments; in these 
conditions, an animal capable of learning its way individually through trial-and-error might do better than another that 
relies on an innate behavioral strategy. See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture 
Transformed Human Evolution. p. 112. 
219 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. pp. 
133-134. 
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2.2.2. The Emergence of Culture and Cultural Evolution as Preconditions to 
Cooperation among Humans 
 
Imitation allowed for the emergence of a different type of evolutionary system – cultural 
inheritance.220 However, the ability to create culture is not a real difference between us and other 
animals. Other species are also able to maintain cultural traditions over many generations.221 The 
difference between those species and us involves another aspect of our ability to process culture: by 
having the skills to imitate accurately, we not only learn aspects of our culture but also transmit our 
own cultural contributions to future generations. In this way, humans can accumulate culture and 
transmit, via language, useful innovations proposed by one generation to the next, gradually storing 
solutions to environmental and social problems.222 
Understanding culture as an inheritance system leads us to questions involving its 
evolutionary dynamics. As Dan Dennett argues, natural selection may be understood as an 
algorithmic process that occurs whenever three key conditions are satisfied: variation, 
inheritance/replication and differential fitness.223 Does cultural evolution satisfy these conditions? 
According to the anthropologist Alex Mesoudi, all three conditions are met by cultural dynamics.224 
First, there is much evidence with respect to cultural variation not only regarding the 
same cultural trait225 (such as different types of arrows) – which would be analogous to within-
species variation – but also among distinct cultural traits (e.g., arrows, axes and shields) and between 
the cultural sets of different populations (e.g., different languages).226  																																																								
220 Although there is an enormous debate about the precise meaning of culture, I adopt the concept elaborated by Peter 
Richerson and Robert Boyd. In this sense, culture is “information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they 
acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission.” See 
Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 5. 
221 There is some evidence that non-human primates, such as chimpanzees and some species of monkeys, also display 
“culture” in some sense of the concept. See Martínez-Contreras, J. (2011). O modelo primatológico de cultura. In 
Abrantes (Ed.), (pp. 224-240). Porto Alegre: Artmed. pp. 224-240. Some studies even suggest that other unexpected 
species, like dolphins and crows, also have culture. See Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. p. 50. 
222 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. pp. 
125-143. 
223 See Dennett, D. C. (1996a). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. p. 343. 
224 See Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A. and Laland, K. N. (2004). Perspective: Is Human Cultural Evolution Darwinian? 
Evidence Reviewed from the Perspective of "The Origin of Species". Evolution, 58(1), 1-11.  
225 For the purpose of the present dissertation, the terms ‘cultural trait’, ‘cultural variant’ and ‘meme’ will be used to 
refer to the same concept. However, it is important to keep in mind that the adoption of each term relies on different 
theoretical assumptions. A technical use of the term ‘meme’, for instance, connotes a strict analogy between discrete 
cultural particles and genes, understood as discrete biological particles. See Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene. p. 
192. I am not commited to this assumption. 
226 Alex Mesoudi also refers to technological evolution as an example of variation in human cultures, by mentioning the 
huge number (7.7 million) of patents issued only in the United States between 1790 and 2006. He also presents some 
anecdotal evidence, such as the fact that there are more than ten thousand religions spread around the world, many of 
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Second, there is also inheritance of cultural traits via cultural transmission. People learn 
through (1) vertical transmission, when a parent teaches something to their own offspring; (2) 
oblique transmission, when information is transferred from a member of a former generation to a 
non-related member of the next generation; and (3) horizontal transmission, when communication 
occurs among individuals of the same generation.227 Mesoudi gathers evidence from technological 
and scientific innovation to demonstrate that there are gradual accumulations of tiny modifications 
in culture. The invention of the steam engine by James Watt, for instance, was built on the 
preexisting Newcomen steam engine; and mathematics also evolved “through the accumulation of 
successive innovations by different individuals over time.”228 
Third, the adoption of distinct cultural traits leads to differential fitness among 
individuals. The odds that an individual survives and reproduces are affected not only by biological 
traits but also by the adopted cultural variants. And, as more genetic fitness means increasing the 
probability that genes will spread throughout a population, one might also think in terms of cultural 
fitness. Certain cultural traits are more likely to increase their proportion in the ‘cultural pool’ as a 
result of their effect on their carrier’s behavior. Thus, there is competition between different 
memes,229 and the most efficient ones grow over the long run. Differential fitness can be observed 
both on the psychological and the social level. Memes compete for the memory within an 
individual; some cultural variants are easier to remember than others because they are more 
compatible with innate cognitive biases. In this sense, they would be more imitated than other 
variants.230 However, they also compete with memes from different cultures, and more efficient 
memes (cultural traits that provide better results to their carriers) are more likely to spread.231 This 
might be construed as a war between two tribes that are culturally similar and that use slightly 
different weapons: tribe A warriors use bronze swords, and tribe B warriors use iron swords. 
Assuming that iron spears are better, tribe B would have better odds to win the war, and as a 
consequence, would kill more warriors and slowly increase the proportion of iron swords (and the 
cultural traits needed for their production) in the population of ‘weapons’.  																																																																																																																																																																																								
which are divided into thousands of other separate denominations. See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How 
Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize the Social Sciences. p. 28. 
227 See Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1986). Cultural Evolution. American Zoologist, 26(3), 845-855.  
228 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize 
the Social Sciences. p. 33. 
229 Memes, here, refer to an idea first expressed by Richard Dawkins in his The Selfish Gene. According to him, memes 
are the analogous of genes, but in the domain of cultural evolution. 
230 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize 
the Social Sciences. p. 31; Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed 
Human Evolution. p. 75. 
231 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 207. 
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If this picture is correct, then culture meets the three conditions needed for Darwinian 
evolution. However, this does not mean that culture evolves via the same mechanisms that cause 
biological evolution. According to the gene-culture coevolutionary theory – which is also known as 
dual inheritance theory –, many evolutionary forces act on both inheritance systems, such as natural 
selection, mutation and drift.232 However, cultural evolution is also subject to culture-specific 
evolutionary forces, which Richerson and Boyd call decision-making forces, which derive from the 
psychological mechanisms involved in learning cultural traits and their transmission to others. Our 
cognition is not content neutral, it is biased toward learning certain beliefs and ideas instead of 
others, and these biases affect how culture evolves and what range of cultural possibilities are 
compatible with our innate psychology. As Morten Christiansen et al. state, “cultural evolution does 
not take place in a biological vacuum but is shaped by biological constraints arising from the nature 
of our thought processes, pragmatics, perceptuo-motor constraints, and cognitive limitations on 
learning and processing.”233 
These biases evolved because they allowed for the most effective ways to cope with the 
natural and social environments; they are fast and frugal heuristics nested within our minds that 
enable us to make decisions quickly. Some of these biases may have been selected under the same 
circumstances that shaped our capacity for faithful imitation discussed above. For instance, 
Richerson and Boyd argue that the very evolutionary forces that selected the ability to imitate might 
have induced the evolution of a conformity bias, i.e., the tendency to adopt those beliefs, norms and 
desires that are common in the community to which one belongs.234 The tendency to imitate made 
our species capable of quickly copying the behavior of others; the conformist bias influences us to 
imitate the most common cultural traits in our communities.  
Richerson and Boyd also discuss other biases that induce the evolution of particular 
cultural variants instead of others, such as content-based biases, which can result either from the 
cost-benefit calculation of alternative memes or from the very structure of our cognition, and which 
favor the learning of particular types of cultural traits instead of others. There is also a model-based 
bias, the predisposition to imitate either prestigious individuals (prestige bias) or individuals similar 
to oneself.235,236 the 19th century, the role of model-based imitation in explaining social dynamics 																																																								
232 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 70. 
233 See Christiansen, M., Chater, N. and Reali, F. (2009). The Biological and Cultural Foundations of Language. 
Communicative & Integrative Biology, 2(3), 221-222.  
234 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 121. 
235 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 70. 
236 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 70 
(“By imitating the successful, you have a chance of acquiring the behaviors that cause success, even if you do not know 
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had already been revealed by the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, who opposed Émile Durkheim’s 
claim that sociology should not focus on individuals to explain society, because social facts have an 
objective existence independent of individuals and are intrinsically organized in the cultural 
domain. Tarde believed to the contrary, that social facts are not transmitted from the social group 
as a collective but from one individual to another through imitation.237  
It is important to note that, insofar as Gabriel Tarde believed that imitation played a 
major role in explaining social dynamics, he also did not believe that biology had anything to offer 
to sociological theory. He agreed with Auguste Comte that sociology is established upon biology – a 
hypothesis that resembles E. O. Wilson’s concept of consilience. However, he did not think that this 
meant the precedence of biology over the sociological domain:  
 
Auguste Comte set forth a law concerning the hierarchy of sciences which, if it were 
true without exception, would fully justify the support sociology asks of biology. In 
his view, all the sciences from arithmetic to social science, passing via mechanics, 
physics, chemistry, and the science of living things, are ranked by the decreasing 
simplicity and generality of their subjects, the lowest ranks having the simplest and 
most general subjects. It follows that each science must lean on the one 
immediately below it, and not vice versa, since the lower science studies those 
elementary realities whose more complex groupings are encompassed by the higher 
one. . . . Now all this is true, but on one condition: that the successive realities—the 
subjects of the successive sciences—be superimposed like geological formations of 
which the highest is most recent and could have been formed only through a 
transformation or a combination of lower preceding layers. Let us suppose, 
however, that at a certain level of this scientific stratification there appear entirely 
new facts comparable to the hot springs of high mountains, which, cutting through 
all the lower layers, rise up from beneath even the lowest solid layer of earth. And 
grant that the appearance of consciousness, of the self, on the highest levels of the 
living world is a marvelous spring of this sort: can the science concerned with this 
phenomenon, which is not reducible to surrounding or preceding ones and is, 
though the highest, only conditioned but not engendered by them, can this science 
be regarded as having a more complex and more special subject than all the 
others? On the contrary, it may be highly probable that, revealing a hidden reality, 
perhaps the simplest and most lofty of all sciences, psychology, has more to teach its 
lower sisters than vice versa. And this would also be the case for sociology if there 
were any reason to think that the social phenomenon—which is essentially 																																																																																																																																																																																								
anything about which characteristics of the successful are responsible for their success. If you can accurately imitate 
everything they do, you ought to be a success too, at least insofar as success is based on culturally transmissible 
characters.”). Although these cognitive biases underlie much of what we usually call ‘rationality’ and they typically help 
us to get to the correct answers in most situations, it is also important to keep in mind that they also cause us to commit 
many mistakes. For instance, social psychology studies show that we are subject to self-deception (over optimism, 
overconfidence, self-attribution bias, confirmation bias, hindsight bias, cognitive dissonance and conservatism bias) and 
heuristic simplification that cause information processing errors due to framing, categorization, anchoring, availability 
bias, cue competition, loss aversion, mood, hyperbolic discounting, and ambiguity aversion. See Montier, J. (2002). 
Darwin's Mind: the Evolutionary Foundations of Heuristics and Biases. SSRN Electronic Journal.  
237 Tarde, G. (1969). On Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers (Clark Ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. p. 4. 
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psychological—is itself more general than it seems. Are there not, in fact, some 
rather specious reasons for this view? Was it not by assimilating organisms to 
society and not society to organisms that the clearest (or least obscure) light was 
thrown on the great secret of life? Conceived of as an association of cells or as a 
federation of cellular societies or colonies, the living body becomes for the first time 
penetrable to man’s probing. Much more than natural selection, the cellular theory 
puts us on the road to an explanation of the vital enigma.238 
 
In sum, Gabriel Tarde argues that, as a higher science, sociology can teach more to 
biology than it could learn from it. Tarde’s argument, however, misses the point. The French 
sociologist confuses the science and its object of study. He confuses biology (the science) with biology 
(the studied subject) and sociology with society. By not being conscious of this misunderstanding, 
Tarde feels authorized to posit that sociology is more complex than the biological sciences, and thus 
it can teach more to biology than learn from it.  
However, Comte’s hierarchy of sciences is not a theoretical but an ontological 
assumption. Biological sciences are foundational to sociology because the biological world underlies 
the very possibility of sociality. This confusion can be observed in the statement that sociology 
helped the understanding of biology because the application of sociological concepts (association of 
cells and federation of cellular societies) to the biological world shed light on cellular theory. This is 
not a direct application of sociological concepts in biological theory, but a sociological metaphor to 
describe biological phenomena.  
His thesis could justify saying the opposite as well: one could say that biological theories 
are foundational to sociology because using concepts such as “social organism,” or understanding 
society as if it had a “head” and a “body,” have been used in social theory. One should remember 
that Durkheim refers to “organic solidarity” as a central concept of his sociology, but this would be 
simply a metaphorical use of concepts borrowed from biology, and not a biological theory of 
society. In this sense, Tarde’s example cannot be read as a sociological theory of biology, as he 
suggests. It is also useful to acknowledge that Tarde’s thesis on imitation as the source of social facts 
confuses the social domain with the cultural domain. Sociology is thus understood as a science that 
studies social facts; but what is a social fact? Following his theory, social facts are things such as “a 
word in a language, a religious rite, a trade secret, an artistic process, a legal provision, a moral 
maxim.”239  But each one of these examples is a cultural token; thus, the object of sociology is 
culture, not society.  																																																								
238 Tarde, G. (1969). On Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers. pp. 79-80. 
239 Tarde, G. (1969). On Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers. p. 115. 
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There are many kinds of societies that are not studied by sociology, but by archaeology, 
biology and anthropology – such as the societies of eusocial insects or chimpanzees (which are 
studied by biologists) or the social environments in which our hominin ancestors evolved, which are 




2.2.3. The Evolution of a Normative Mind: Gene-culture Coevolution and the 
Cognitive Foundations of Large-scale Altruism 
 
Some of these cognitive biases are directly related to the moral psychology that underlies 
moral and legal systems. For instance, David Sloan Wilson, Rick O. Gorman and Ralph R. Miller 
performed psychological experiments through which they discovered that we are prone to recall 
social norms and normative information.240 We are innately equipped with a ‘normative mind’ that 
relies on a cognitive architecture founded on specific heuristics for evaluating the 
rightfulness/wrongfulness of concrete situations.241 It should thus not surprise us that every known 
human society is based on normative systems, insofar as our minds are biased to interpret the world 
morally.242  																																																								
240 See O'Gorman, R., Wilson, D. S. and Miller, R. R. (2008). An Evolved Cognitive Bias for Social Norms. Evolution 
and Human Behavior, 29(2), 71-78.  
241 See Almeida, F. (2013). As Origens Evolutivas da Cooperação Humana e suas Implicações para a Teoria do Direito 
Revista Direito GV, 17(1), 243-268.  
242 This statement does not mean that our mind only interprets the world in a moral sense. There is evidence that we 
have innate knowledge about many particular features of our social and natural environment. Some psychologists 
suggest that our mind has engraved within it many naïve theories about the world: a “folk physics,” i.e., an innate 
comprehension about the rules that govern the physical world; a “folk biology,” an implicit understanding about the 
organic world; and a “folk psychology,” our natural capacity to explain and predict the behavior of others based on an 
account regarding their inner mental states. See Churchland, P. S. (2008). The Impact of Neuroscience on Philosophy. 
Neuron, 60(3), 409-411.  In addition, it is important to note that the neurological sciences have demonstrated that many 
of our moral judgments are grounded in mental processes that depend on the correct functioning of our brain to 
produce morally expected behavior. See Moll, J. and de Oliveira-Souza, R. (2007). Moral Judgments, Emotions and the 
Utilitarian Brain. Trends In Cognitive Sciences, 11(8), 1-3.  Brain lesions and tumors may affect our behavior, as has been 
documented. One famous example of the potential of a tumor to contribute to the cause of violent behavior is the case 
of Charles Whitman. Until 1963, he had displayed an exemplary behavior, but then his behavior began to change for 
the worse; a former Mariner, he was court-martialed, lost his scholarship at the University of Texas, and began 
assaulting his wife. By this time, he began writing in his diary increasingly about having violent thoughts and a growing 
desire to shoot other people. On August 1, 1966, he brutally killed his wife and mother, just before he went to the 
University of Texas, where he killed fourteen persons and wounded thirty-one others before being killed himself by a 
police officer. Before these events, Whitman left a note where he expressed his regret and a desire to have his brain 
studied after his death in order to evaluate if there was anything wrong with it. And he was right. The autopsy revealed 
a glioblastoma brain tumor that affected his hypothalamus and his amygdala – regions usually associated with behavior 
control, impulsive aggression and violence. See Batts, S. (2009). Brain Lesions and their Implications in Criminal 
Responsibility. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 27(2), 261-272. Consider the case of a forty year-old man who had always 
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The features displayed by our normative mind are fundamental to understanding the 
evolution of human societies and their social institutions. The first point to be considered is that 
evolution does not work out new adaptations from scratch; it always refashions older structures to 
fulfill its own purposes.243 In this sense, it is reasonable to assume that we share with other primates 
many of their mental structures that cope with the social environment; thus, we are, like them, 
capable of engaging in altruistic behavior with our family (kin selection) and of sympathizing with 
non-related individuals in situations that favor direct reciprocity. We cooperate with those who 
show pro-social behaviors toward us, and we punish those who do not (altruistic punishment). 
According to gene-culture coevolutionary theory, the combination of altruistic 
punishment and faithful imitation led to the return of group selection as a mechanism to explain 
cooperation in large-scale societies. Even George Price, one of the first biologists who discredited 
group selection, thought that it might work as an evolutionary mechanism under very strict 
conditions. To succeed, group selection depended on the assumption that between-group selection 
is weak when compared with within-group selection. However, the possibility that individuals from 
one group could migrate to another erodes between-group variation and leads to genetic 
homogeneity between individuals of different groups and to the strengthening of within-group 
selection against between-group selection.244 If groups were genetically equivalent, because the 
natural selection forces were acting upon individuals (and not groups), then variation between 





displayed normal sexual behavior and suddenly began feeling sexual desire toward children. He was arrested and 
sentenced to either attend a rehabilitation program for the sexually addicted or face jail. Although he had the desire to 
stop his impulses, he could not control his will and misbehaved again. Just before the new sentencing, he felt a strong 
headache and had balance problems, and was sent to the hospital. Neurological examination identified a brain tumor in 
his right orbitofrontal cortex, which is involved in the regulation of social behavior. The tumor was removed and the 
man released. Some months later, he was caught secretly collecting child pornography and, by this time, he was also 
feeling strong headaches. Another neurological exam revealed the tumor recurrence. See Mackintosh, N. (Ed.). (2011). 
Neuroscience and the Law. London: The Royal Society. pp. 15-16. Moreover, not only tumors cause misbehavior. 
Underdeveloped brain structures and even brain injuries may also cause such offensive behavior. Psychopathy, for 
instance, is a disorder that involves the reduced capacity to feel guilt, empathy and attachment to others. 
Neurophysiological studies have identified two dysfunctional brain regions in psychopaths: the amygdala and 
ventromedial cortex, which are related to care-based morality. See Blair, R. J. R. (2007a). Aggression, Psychopathy and 
Free Will from a Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 25(2), 321-331. ; Blair, R. J. R. 
(2007b). The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and Psychopathy. Trends In Cognitive Sciences, 
11(9), 387-392.  
243 See Beatty, J. and Desjardins, E. C. (2009). Natural Selection and History. p. 242. 
244 See Panchanathan, K. and Boyd, R. (2004). Indirect Reciprocity Can Stabilize Cooperation Without the Second-
Order Free Rider Problem. p. 501. 
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2.2.3.1. Moralistic Punishment and Imitation Strengthen Cultural Group Selection 
 
Altruistic punishment and faithful imitation made it possible for selection among 
different groups to become stronger than the selection forces acting within group. Imitation leads to 
the spread of cultural variations inside a specific group. Nevertheless, if migration is possible, an 
individual who comes from a different group will likely bring part of their former society’s culture to 
their new home. Their beliefs would soon be imitated by their new co-members and spread through 
their new group – which would lead to the mixing-up of different cultural sets within each 
population –, and the pressures for selection between different groups would be weakened.  
Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd assume that this problem was solved as a result of our 
ancestors’ capacity not only to imitate but also to imitate selectively. Their innate psychology was 
able to identify symbolic markers (signs that identify a group, such as clothing styles, dialect 
particularities, social customs, badges, and so forth) and to imitate those with whom they shared the 
same tokens. This ability might have evolved as the result of rapid cultural adaptation. Cultural 
evolution allows for rapid cultural adaptation to different environments. In this situation, it pays 
more to selectively imitate the local population, which is a more reliable source of information about 
which strategy is adaptive, than to follow what immigrants do.245 Knowing how to identify the 
symbolic markers shared by the local population – and trying to imitate them – would increase the 
odds of adopting the adaptive behavior. Language has also played an important role in this scenario 
because it allows for the reliable transmission of symbols across a population.246 																																																								
245 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 212. 
246 In Pleistocene, our hominin ancestors began to evolve a larger neocortex and to live in larger groups. Homo habilis 
(2.5-1.9 million years BCE) lived in societies consisting of eighty individuals; Homo erectus (1.8 million–143,000 years 
BCE) lived in groups of 100-120 members; archaic humans (Homo heidelbergensis, Homo rhodesiensis and Homo neanderthalensis 
– 600,000–35,000 years BCE) lived in groups of 120-140 members. According to Robin Dunbar’s projections, based on 
the proportional size of the neocortex, Homo sapiens would be able to live in communities consisting of 150-160 
individuals – almost three times the average size of a chimpanzee society. The increase in group size required more than 
larger brains to monitor free riding, it also required new monitoring strategies. Among great apes, the most diffused 
strategy to keep regular surveillance over the behavior of others is through social grooming, a process that demands trust 
and develops bonds among members. But the habit of regularly removing dirt and parasites from another’s fur is costly. 
It takes a lot of time that could have been spent in more crucial activities, such as having sexual intercourse or searching 
for food; and it exposes the individual to the threat of being attacked by a bully, because the groomed animal achieves a 
relaxed and quite defenseless state. Based on these costs, grooming is used in primate groups to develop bonds among 
their members and to evaluate friends and foes (who would not spend a lot of useful time to groom whom they dislike). 
However, the time spent in grooming grows in parallel with group size. See Lehmann, J. and Dunbar, R. (2009). 
Network Cohesion, Group Size and Neocortex Size in Female-Bonded Old World Primates. Proceedings of the Royal Society 
of London. Series B, Containing papers of a Biological character. Royal Society (Great Britain), 276, 4417-4422.  In small groups, 
there is no need to spend much time grooming, but it can take a lot of time in larger groups – and the activity may begin 
to interfere with engaging in other activities. As expected, there is ethnological evidence about the time spent in social 
bonding among primates: in smaller groups of monkeys, there is less time dedicated to grooming than in larger groups 
of chimpanzees and gelada baboons. See Dunbar, R. (2003). The Social Brain: Mind, Language, and Society in 
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In this sense, a predisposition to cooperate with those who share the same cultural 
background helps induce variation between different groups. This calls for the following question: 
How could this variation be maintained over a long period of time? Imitating the local population 
instead of immigrants may be sufficient when there is only a small set of immigrants; however, if 
they become a large part of the local population, it will be progressively harder to identify the most 
widespread symbolic markers that indicate whom to imitate and, as a result, the mixing-up between 
groups would inevitably happen. 
Richerson and Boyd argue that this problem has been solved in the course of our 
ancestors’ evolution through a social mechanism: moralistic punishment. Our ancestors were 
already capable of engaging in reciprocal relationships in which altruistic punishment could solve 
first-order and second-order free riding. However, altruistic punishment relies on face-to-face 
relationships and on a psychological trait – memory of past interactions –, which allows for the 
stability of relatively small communities.  
Conversely, moralistic sanctions may be directed against those who do not follow the 
same beliefs, moral rules and behavioral codes of the majority. It is not important to remember who 
did what to whom in order to punish a free rider, but only to monitor who follows the symbolically 
shared behavior of the community. Additionally, moralistic sanctions are not necessarily applied by 
the individuals who were harmed by someone; they can be applied by third parties and—when 
societies get much more complex than hunter-gatherer groups—by social institutions. This feature 
also solves the second order free-riding problem because the costs of punishment are spread across 
the entire population and becomes greatly reduced for each altruistic individual when compared 
																																																																																																																																																																																								
Evolutionary Perspective. Annual Review of Anthropology, 32, 163-181.  However, language allows for the monitoring of 
behavior at a certain distance without interrupting other crucial activities, which can lead to reducing the time spent in 
grooming. Indeed, there is also ethnological evidence about increasing vocal communication as the average size of the 
groups of primates increases. The gelada baboons, which spend almost twenty percent of their time in grooming, are 
also the non-human species that show the most complex vocal communication and that live in the largest natural groups 
of primates. See Aiello, L. C. and Dunbar, R. (1993). Neocortex Size, Group Size, and the Evolution of Language. 
Current Anthropology, 34(2), 184-193.  (“These data can thus be interpreted in terms of a progressive need to supplement 
existing forms of social cohesion with more efficient vocally based ones as group sizes increased. At the earliest stage, 
tone and emotion would be the essential components of vocalization; information content would not necessarily be 
important. The function of this type of enhanced vocalization would be vocal grooming, an expression of mutual 
interest and commitment that could be simultaneously shared with more than one individual. In fact, this process is 
already observable at a rudimentary level in extant primates. Richman . . . has pointed out that gelada vocalization has 
a number of features that were once considered distinctive features of human speech: fricatives, plosives, and nasals, 
labials, dentals and velars, as well as rhythmic, melodic, and conversational properties involving highly synchronised 
bouts with intense emotional overtones. It may be no coincidence that geladas live in the largest naturally occurring 
groups of any non-human primate (mean group size 115 animals). These vocal properties, which converge so uncannily 
on human speech, appear to supplement grooming as a mechanism for social bonding. Although geladas cannot be said 
to have evolved language, they may provide a model for the earliest stages in its development.”). 
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with the benefits of cooperation in large-scale societies.247  
Whereas selective imitation and symbolic marking pave the way for cultural variation 
between different groups, moralistic punishment maintains it over time. By punishing individuals 
who adopt different memes, it does not allow between-group cultural traits to be mixed-up, which 
assures that group-selection is stronger than within-group selection.  
However, there is a side effect to this solution. Although moralistic punishment is a 
plausible mechanism to maintain large-scale cooperation, it does not only maintain group-beneficial 
memes, but can also stabilize any type of cultural trait. There are customary sanctions for those who 
rob or commit murder, but also for those who do not follow useless rules, such as dress codes or 
etiquette. Is the stabilization of cooperation in large groups also just a side effect of moralistic 
punishment? The answer to this question demands an understanding of both cultural evolution and 
of our moral cognition.   
As far as the story goes, our capacity to cooperate in large-scale societies relies on the 
capacity of faithful and selective imitation that led to symbolic marked societies. Thus far, we have 
focused only on two of the necessary conditions for characterizing a system as evolutionary: 
inheritance and variation. There is also a need that variants relate to differential fitness. Different 
replicators must affect the behavior of their carriers in such way that they improve or decrease the 
odds of transmitting those memes to their heirs. A genetic system is evolutionary because genes 
cause their carriers to adopt different behaviors. Because some behaviors are adaptive, the genes 
related to them increase their odds of being transmitted to the next generation. The same occurs 
with memes. Cultural variants which increase the adaptability of the person who adopts them to the 
challenges posed by their natural, social and cultural environments also increase the odds of these 
behaviors being transmitted to others. 
By now, the theoretical necessity of taking multiple levels of evolutionary systems into 
account must be clear. A cultural trait that negatively affects the biological fitness of their carrier 
cannot spread through the entire population because either the population will become extinct or it 
will abandon that meme before that happens. Imagine a population that consists 100% of Catholic 
priests and nuns who are fully committed to their faith and their vows of chastity. Assuming there is 
no immigration to this community, it will be doomed to extinction unless they refrain from their 
commitment of following Catholic rules about sexual intercourse between clerics. In this case, 
cultural evolution is not biologically adaptive.  																																																								
247 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 200. 
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Conversely, groups that adopt fitness-enhancing memes would be more successful in 
spreading these memes and their members’ genes than other groups who did not do the same. 
Competition between groups might lead to this scenario. Not surprisingly, the ethnographic and 
archaeological data indicate that warfare and competition over natural resources are common in 
contemporary foraging and hunter-gatherer societies. In war, memes that promoted more 
cooperative groups could lead to an important advantage over groups whose members were selfish 
and unable to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the group. Of course, development is not only 
about cooperation; cultural traits such as better weaponry and better strategies would also matter. 
However, considering a ceteris paribus scenario, larger groups typically do better in conflict with 
smaller groups. And larger groups can only emerge if they can deal efficiently with first and second 
order free-ridings—in other words, if they can sustain large-scale cooperation.  
Of course, this would result in group selection. There is variation between groups 
(caused by selective imitation associated with symbolic markers), cultural inheritance (the 
transmission of cultural variants from one generation to the next) and differential fitness (different 
memes affecting the odds of survival and reproduction of the group).  
In this sense, the evolution of cooperation in large-scale societies is not just a side effect 
of moralistic punishment, but a bio-cultural adaptation to an evolutionary problem posed in the 
Pleistocene to our ancestors. The “cultural” side of this adaptation refers to group-cultural fitness 
because it increases the odds that the frequency of that group’s memes rises over time. Its 
“biological” side refers to the coevolution between our innate psychology and culture.  
So far, I have highlighted the cultural aspects of this equation. Culture evolved as an 
adaptation to cooperation problems posed by our ancestors, who had large brains and could cope 
with progressively larger societies. This imposed a selective pressure not only for even larger brains 
but also for cultural solutions to selective problems. Culture became an inheritance system of its 
own—an autopoietic system that refers only to its own elements in order to reproduce itself and 
maintain its stability, which indicates that even more complex brains had to evolve to address the 
new cultural environment. These brains should be not only capable of monitoring the behavior of 
other individuals but also of imitating the most common behaviors in a given population. In 
addition, these brains should be able to engage in relationships with symbolic markers, and to use 
these markers as a reliable source of information to enhance cooperation and to punish those who 




2.2.3.2. The Moral Grammar Wired in the Normative Mind 
 
Engaging in such sophisticated tasks demands a sophisticated brain. A “blank slate” 
brain, with no innate information, might not be suited for such tasks. Thus, Leda Cosmides and 
John Tooby have criticized what they consider a generalized assumption made by social scientists—
the Standard Social Science Model.248 This model assumes that the human mind consists of 
general-purpose and content-independent learning and reasoning mechanisms, i.e., a blank slate 
that is incapable of responding asymmetrically to different types of input. However, there is 
evidence that our mind relies on different mechanisms to accommodate diverse types of input.249 
Although there is controversy about the nature of these mechanisms, there is little or no doubt 
about the fact that our mind has engraved within it innate information that helps processing specific 
inputs from different domains (visual cues, social relations, and interpretations about the physical 
and biological world, among others).  
It is important to clarify the sense in which I am using the term ‘innate’. First of all, it 
does not entail that the feature to which it is related is fully determined by the genes of a being or 
that it remains unchanged during its life. Some innate features can only come into existence through 
ontogeny, although they are genetically specified. The metamorphosis of a butterfly might be a 
good example to illustrate this. All the four stages of its life cycle (egg, caterpillar, pupa and butterfly) 
are innately encoded in the insect’s genes from the beginning, but it does not mean that the insect 
remains unchanged. Every stage unfolds within the ontogeny of a particular insect.250 Second, many 
innate skills and features can only emerge within an adequate environment. Michael Tomasello, for 
instance, suggests that, although based on innate cognitive features of our minds, human linguistics 
skills can only develop in specific social environments.251 Research by Michael Owren and Michael 
Goldstein also suggest that although language acquisition is innate, it can only be fully developed 
during ontogeny. According to them, “while the rapid pace of speech ontogeny can suggest 
innateness, the learning required for becoming a fully competent speaker of a language extends well 
into middle childhood or beyond”.252  As a result, innateness does not entail inevitability insofar as 																																																								
248 See Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (Eds.). (1992). The Adapted Mind. pp. 23-24. 
249 See Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. p. 41. 
250 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 106. 
251 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking (Kindle ed.). Cambridge (MA): Harvard University 
Press. p. 146. 
252 See Owren, M. J. and Goldstein, M. H. (2008). Scaffolds for Babbling: Innateness and Learning in the Emergence of 
Contexually Flexible Vocal Production in Human Infants In Oller and Griebel (Eds.). Cambridge (MA): The MIT 
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much depends on how a being relates to its (social or natural) environment. 
Noam Chomsky’s theory of language acquisition may be the best example of how this 
mechanism might work. According to Chomsky, a blank slate brain would not be able to learn a 
new language from scratch if it did not have enough innate information about which aspects of the 
language it should focus on to extract its syntactic structure and apply it to other linguistic stimuli. 
This argument, known as the poverty of stimulus (hereinafter “POS”), aims to explain how very 
young children can learn language and be so competent with respect to its use because they are 
exposed to limited positive data from which they could extract the structure of a particular 
language. Because the external stimulus is not enough to explain our competence to engage in 
linguistic learning, it is assumed that our mind has innate information about how it should organize 
the linguistic inputs it receives into a universal grammar based on universal principles of language. 
Noam Chomsky formulates the POS argument in these terms: 
 
[…] a single language can provide strong evidence for conclusions regarding 
universal grammar. This becomes quite apparent when we consider again the 
problem of language acquisition. The child must acquire a generative grammar of 
his language on the basis of a fairly restricted amount of evidence. To account for 
this achievement, we must postulate a sufficiently rich internal structure – a 
sufficiently restricted theory of universal grammar that constitutes his contribution 
to language acquisition.253 
 
The universal grammar, in Chomsky’s definition, is “the study of the conditions that 
might be met by the grammars of all human languages”.254 This statement can be understood in at 
least two senses. First, the universal grammar can be conceived of as the underlying logical structure 
that constrains every possible language. Although sometimes Chomsky might appear to sustain such 
a formalist view, he develops a second approach, linked to an innatist hypothesis, according to 
which the universal grammar is hard-wired in the architecture of the human mind, selected as a 
result of evolution.255 
According to Chomsky and Steven Pinker, this grammar is based on a distinction 
between principles and parameters.256 Principles are a finite set of fundamental features valid for all 
possible natural languages, and parameters are a finite set of binary instructions that determine how 
the principles are structured in a particular language. For instance, one universal principle might be 
that a sentence must have a subject; a specific language could parameterize this principle by locking 																																																								
253 In Chomsky, N. (2012). Poverty of Stimulus: Unfinished Business. Studies in Chinese Linguistics, 33, 3-16.  
254 In Chomsky, N. (2012). Poverty of Stimulus: Unfinished Business. p. 112. 
255 See Chomsky, N. (2012). Poverty of Stimulus: Unfinished Business. p. 85. 
256 See Pinker, S. (2010). The Language Instinct. New York: Penguin Books. 
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in the subject at the beginning of the sentence, while another language could place it at the end of 
the sentence. Alternatively, one language might admit a hidden subject, whereas another does not. 
Parameters work like binary switches that set how a particular principle functions in a given 
language.  
The universal grammar hypothesis has been subjected to some criticism, especially on 
the grounds that some languages present features that challenge features that were once thought to 
be universal. Probably the most well-known objection is advanced by Daniel L. Everett based on his 
studies about Pirahã, a language spoken by natives of the Brazilian Amazon. According to Everett, 
Pirahã morphosyntax display specific properties not found in any other known language. This 
would be evidence that “some of the components of so-called core grammar are subject to cultural 
constraints, something that is predicted not to occur by the universal-grammar model”.257  Nevis et 
al., however, criticize Everett by showing that the morphosyntactic features held as unique of Pirahã 
are shared with other languages and, thus, do not support his claim.258 In addition, it should be 
acknowledged that even if some features of the universal grammar are to be shown as not universal, 
or particular to specific languages, they do not pose an argument against Chomsky’s hypothesis, 
since many features have been shown to be structurally universal.259 
The universal grammar argument is a powerful framework for linguistic studies because 
it can account both for the particular features of the known languages and for the ubiquitous 
features that characterize them. Portuguese, Japanese and English are very different languages, but 
they nonetheless display features that can be posited as linguistic universals.260  
A similar contention might be made for the normative domain. Although John Rawls 
has not explored this insight more deeply, he recognizes that moral competence is analogous to 
linguistic competence. By explicitly citing Chomsky’s theory of language acquisition, he 
acknowledges that our ability to engage in moral reasoning cannot be explained solely by means of 
the assumption that we learn moral principles from our everyday experience. We can make sense of 
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all the moral data we receive in our daily interactions because we have an innate sense of fairness.261 
Based on Chomsky’s account of language and on John Rawls’ linguistic analogy, the 
legal scholar John Mikhail elaborated a theory of moral cognition and intuitive jurisprudence. 
According to Mikhail, untutored adults and even small children are capable of moral reasoning: 
they are “intuitive lawyers, who are capable of drawing intelligent distinctions between superficially 
similar cases, although their basis for doing so is often obscure.”262 In fact, recent research has 
shown that even babies younger than one year of age prefer people who engage in pro-social 
behaviors than those who engage in antisocial behaviors263 and that children between seven and 
eight years old are prone to egalitarian behavior with respect to those who belong to their group.264 
Thus, moral theory must address a poverty of moral stimulus issue: even though children in their 
first year have not been exposed to sufficient perceptual inputs to derive moral principles from 
them, they nonetheless do engage in moral reasoning.265  
In parallel with Chomsky’s linguistic theory, Mikhail proposes that moral cognition is 
also based on the distinction between universal principles and local cultural parameters. According 
to Mikhail, “an adequate moral grammar must include several . . . concepts and principles,” which 
he enumerates as the following: (i) natural liberty, (ii) prohibition of battery and homicide, (iii) self-																																																								
261 See Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. pp. 41-42 (“A useful comparison here is with the problem of describing the 
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described by these psychological principles. The theory of evolution would suggest that it is the outcome of natural 
selection; the capacity for a sense of justice and the moral feelings is an adaptation of mankind into its place in nature. 
As ethnologists maintain, the behavior patterns of a species, and the psychological mechanisms of their acquisition, are 
just as much its characteristics as are the distinctive features of its bodily structures; and these patterns of behavior have 
an evolution exactly as organs and bones do. It seems clear that for members of a species which lives in stable social 
groups, the ability to comply with fair cooperative arrangements and to develop the sentiments necessary to support 
them is highly advantageous, especially when individuals have a long life and are dependent on one another. These 
conditions guarantee innumerable occasions when mutual justice consistently adhered to is beneficial to all parties.”). 
262 See Mikhail, J. (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition. Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press. p. 102. 
263 See Bloom, P. (2010, May 01). The Moral Life of Babies. The New York Times; Bloom, P. (2013). Just Babies. New 
York: Crown Publishers. 
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preservation, (iv) the moral calculus of risk, (v) the rescue principle, and (vi) the principle of the 
double effect.266 Mikhail derived these principles from actually observing how people think when 
they are faced with moral problems.267 His task is not useless and has yielded many interesting 
results; taking an evolutionary perspective is useful in conceiving of the features that universal moral 
grammar principles should embody.  
If this account regarding the emergence of cooperation is broadly correct, we should 
expect the universal moral grammar to be based on principles structured on the evolutionary history 
of our social psychology. It is not unreasonable to assume that many of these principles would rely 
on the logic of more ancient evolutionary principles of cooperation that are based on strong 
emotional ties related to the observance of kin selection and the logic of reciprocal altruism. 
However, this moral grammar would also be based on more recent evolutionary features linked 
with symbolic marking, cooperation directed to group members and suspicion of outsiders, and 
norm-based reasoning.  As a result, I assume that our normative mind, equipped with an innate 
moral grammar, would possess at least the following social tribal instincts: (i) a predisposition to take 
care of our kin and engage in reciprocal relations; (ii) altruism and empathy; (iii) a psychological bias 
to punish free riders and to reap social benefits; (iv) egalitarianism; and (v) a bias to identify with 
symbolic markers. But is there any evidence that we, humans, possess these instincts?  
The first set of principles should be based on our primate inheritance. The cooperative 
behaviors of chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas may be reasonably explained with reference to kin 
selection and reciprocal altruism. They take care of their infants, tend to cooperate more and 
empathize with genetically close members of their groups, and they engage in reciprocal 
relations.268 With respect to reciprocation, they are capable of calculating whether it pays better to 
cooperate or to free ride and to punish freeloaders. These principles are firmly tied to emotional 
responses that are triggered when they are facing specific social situations and must decide what to 
do based on a moral evaluation of a concrete situation. Our minds are likely based on similar 
emotional and psychological dispositions.269  
We also have a psychological disposition to be altruists and to feel empathy for others. 
There is even some evidence that our disposition to empathize is related to our primate inheritance. 
For example, an experiment devised in the 1960s showed that rhesus monkeys preferred to suffer 																																																								
266 See Mikhail, J. (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition. pp. 132-149. 
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hunger rather than to secure food by imposing electric shocks on other monkeys – at least a partial 
evidence that these monkeys display some concern toward the well-being of others.270 If gene-
culture coevolutionary theory is right, human beings would be altruists not only with genetically 
related persons (kin selection) or with individuals with whom they have successfully interacted in the 
past (reciprocal altruism), but also with strangers. A psychological experiment devised by Daniel 
Batson supports this claim.  In the experiment, two groups observed a woman (Elaine) receiving 
electric shocks. Batson requested the first group to write their personal impressions of the 
experiment in a piece of paper, with the explicit purpose to stimulate an empathetic relationship 
between them and Elaine. The second group was requested to observe the situation from an 
objective perspective. Right before the electric shock (which were simulated!), Batson informed to 
both groups that Elaine was very sensible to shocks due to traumas suffered in her childhood, a 
circumstance that made the experiment particularly painful, and offered the participants an 
opportunity to replace her. The conclusions were quite interesting: in the control group, only one in 
five persons volunteered to replace her, but in the first group, everyone offered help. According to 
Batson, the results can be explained because there is an intimate link between altruism and 
empathy. When someone feels empathy toward another person, they act as an altruist even if they 
do not earn anything as a consequence. This is part of our social psychology.271 
A second group of social tribal instincts is related to the practice of moralistic 
punishment and a predisposition to reap social rewards. Some experiments devised by the Austrian 
economist Ernst Fehr suggested that people have a strong inclination to punish free riders.  
In a first experiment,272 the participants were randomly divided into groups of four 
persons and each individual received an amount of money ($10) which could be retained or equally 
shared among the other group members. The experimenters would add 40% of the shared 
contributions to the money pool and divide it equally among all players. This structure is endowed 
with a powerful incentive to free riders: although everyone ends up better when everyone 
contributes, every player gets an even better result when he does not share his received amount and 
the other players do so. For instance, if one player retains his $10 and the other players share their 
money, the total amount to be shared will be $ 42,00 ($30 from the three other players and $12 
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added from the experimenters); but the selfish player will get the best results, because he will earn 
the initial $10 plus $10.50 from the division, earning a total of $22.50, while the altruists would get 
only $10.50. This dynamic led to the following results: in the first rounds, the players shared much 
money to the common pool, but as soon as free riders started to contribute less and less and earn 
more, contributions declined. By the tenth round, the contributions almost stopped. The 
participants would prefer to earn less in the game rather than see free riders profiting. In another set 
of experiments, Fehr added another stage to the original experiment: the players could reduce the 
payoff of any other player by paying a small amount of his own money. In other words, they could 
pay to harm others. The result of this small change was that they started to punish free riders, what 
raised the amount of shared money in the next rounds. Commenting this result, Fehr and Gächter 
stated that “the punishment of non-cooperators substantially increased the amount that subjects 
invested in the public good”.273  
 Following Richerson and Boyd’s hypothesis,274 the second set of principles has evolved 
as the result of our distinct evolutionary history and is the product of multi-level selection. These 
principles consist of tribal instincts that support identification and cooperation in large communities 
and are related to symbolic marking, indirect reciprocation, cooperation directed to group members 
and suspicion of outsiders, and norm-based reasoning. Adherence to these principles requires 
obedience to group beliefs and values, acquisition of the most diffused memes within a community, 
and punishment of those who fail to acquiesce to the moral standards.  
Although the first set of principles relies on more substantive rules (“take care of your 
offspring,” “punish free-riders,” and “return favors to your friends”), the second set of principles is 
based on more procedural meta-rules, such as “obey the rules of your community,” “cooperate with 
those who share the same symbolic markers as yours,” “learn the standards of your group,” and so 
on. In this sense, the tribal instincts prepare our minds to set how the first-order principles should be 
stabilized by the cultural parameters of a particular community, working exactly as Chomsky’s 
principle-and-parameters would expect to operate. 
In addition, it is notable that instincts based on these principles appeared more recently 
in our evolutionary path, superimposed on our psychology without eliminating those based on 
reciprocal altruism and kin selection.275 As a result, it is plausible to assume an intrinsic conflict 
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between these two sets of instincts and the principles they rely on.276 Sometimes, loyalty to the group 
may demand that someone expose their own family, or, conversely, concerns about the welfare of 
their offspring may cause a parent to break the law; this conflict is inherent in our moral psychology 
because conflicting judgments arise from different cognitive processes that follow contrary 
deontological assumptions. 
Another difference between the functioning of these mechanisms in other primates and 
in humans is related to the sense of fairness. Great apes, such as gorillas, bonobos and chimpanzees, 
are strictly hierarchical. Their social system is based on frequent struggles for status and depends on 
specific dispositions toward the adoption of domination and/or submission cues. However, rank 
status is not stable; a strong subordinate can always depose the alpha male and replace it in the 
hierarchy. Although there is an innate disposition to respect rank, there is thus also an innate 
aversion to being subordinate.277  
Nevertheless, the social structure of contemporary hunter-gatherer societies, which are 
considered by anthropologists to be societal models of prehistoric human communities, appears to 
be intrinsically egalitarian.278 As Woodburn states, “what is perhaps surprising is that these societies 
systematically eliminate distinctions—other than those between the sexes—of wealth, of power and 
of status. There is here no disconnection between wealth, power and status, no tolerance of 
inequalities in one of these dimensions any more than in the others.”279 This seems to be an 
anomaly for those who try to explain human sociality from an evolutionary perspective: how could 
the social structure of our ancestors be so different from that adopted by the great apes? Traditional 
anthropologic studies typically attribute their egalitarianism to material circumstances, such as food 
scarcity and the impossibility of storage – due to either technological reasons or social factors, such 
as nomadic life or social pressure to impose the immediate sharing of food.280  
The anthropologist Christopher Boehm pursued a different approach to explain this 
anomaly. According to Boehm, although these causal factors must be taken into account, it is also 
necessary to consider the role of our social psychology and its evolutionary roots to explain 
egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer groups. Hunter-gatherer bands and tribes display substantial 
variation regarding their economic conditions, cultural traits, and ways of life. Some are sedentary 																																																								
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and others nomadic; some are involved in small trade networks, whereas others are pastoralists 
whose lives depend solely on their cattle. In some of these groups, membership is quite stable over 
time, whereas other bands tolerate migration. After studying 48 hunter-gatherer societies in Africa, 
Asia, Australia, the Mediterranean/Mideast, North America, New Guinea, Oceania and South 
America, Boehm found that the only pervasive traits that all of these communities share are 
egalitarianism and small size.281   
Boehm’s hypothesis holds that our ancestors became egalitarian based on cultural 
reasons that favored the natural selection of an egalitarian mind. However, how could such 
psychology evolve on the basis of a hierarchical mind? Boehm’s answer to this evolutionary puzzle is 
quite subtle: egalitarianism cannot be understood in this context as absence of hierarchy, but as 
reversed hierarchy. We are used to thinking about political hierarchy as a social form of 
organization where an elite group rules the rest of the society. Egalitarianism among contemporary 
hunter-gatherers is the opposite – not the absence of hierarchy, but a hierarchical system in which 
society imposes its political will on its “ruler” through a variety of strategies. An autocratic leader is 
monitored by public opinion and his authority may be eroded through criticism or ridicule. In 
extreme cases, harsh sanctions can be applied, such as deposal, ostracism, or even assassination.282  
The “reversed hierarchy” hypothesis assumes that our ancestors had certain cognitive 
pre-adaptations that enabled them to reverse the hierarchical behavior that typifies our primate 
lineage. Among such pre-adaptations, Boehm highlights the importance of political and actuarial 
intelligence, the skill to communicate, and the ability to live in moral communities.  
However, of special importance to the hypothesis is the ability to engage in social 
hierarchies, knowing when to respect a superior and when to rebel against them and subvert the 
rank. Even subordinate chimpanzees (who live in a strictly hierarchical society) occasionally rebel 
against alpha males and disrupt the rank. However, Boehm suggests that a tendency to defy power 
was stronger in the human lineage than in other primates due to the regular use of weapons. 
Rebelling against an alpha male is very risky among chimpanzees because the alpha male is usually 
the stronger individual; thus, the alpha has a strong corporal advantage against its peers.  
With weapons (particularly projectile weapons, such as a spear or bow and arrow), 
weaker individuals can balance the odds against a stronger opponent. In this scenario, being 																																																								
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physically stronger is not such an advantage against a skilled adversary who knows how to manage a 
lethal weapon efficiently. Boehm argues that the regular use of weapons balanced power between 
stronger and weaker individuals and increased the odds of resistance against a bully leader. This was 
an important step toward egalitarianism because primate hierarchy substantially relies on 
differences in physical strength.283  
There is evidence that human ancestors were already capable of handling weapons by 
400,000 or 500,000 years BCE,284 and Boehm assumes that egalitarianism might have been 
established sometime between 500,000 and 250,000 years BCE. In his Hierarchy in the Forest,285 
Boehm was cautious about the genetic implications of egalitarianism. He thought that the balance 
of power between subordinate individuals and tribal chiefs caused by the diffused use of weapons 
should have been strong enough to establish egalitarianism socially without requiring any strong 
genetic change in our moral cognition, although he recognizes the same could have had some 
impact on other physical aspects of our nature, such as dentition, body size differences between man 
and women and hair loss on the body.286 In his new book, Moral Origins,287 Boehm seems to have 
changed his mind on this issue. Although he insists egalitarianism appeared first as a political 
invention backed by weaponry, life in egalitarian communities could have pressed for the social 
selection of an egalitarian moral cognition over the long term:  
 
This theory is basically political in that I have tied this strong selection force closely 
to the advent of egalitarian social orders. These hypotheses provide a very large 
window during which punitive social selection could have operated to make us 
moral, and these social orders could have begun to develop at any time in the 
course of human evolution, really. However, for today’s definitive type of 
egalitarianism to have flourished, it would have been necessary for human social 
and political intelligence to become powerful enough for subordinates to decisively 
curb the alphas in their bands.288 
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It is reasonable to believe that egalitarianism is a feature of our innate moral psychology, 
and not solely the result of a political innovation that spread through cultural transmission. First, it 
is necessary to consider the fact that egalitarianism is ubiquitous among contemporary hunter-
gatherer societies spread all over the world. If it were just a cultural meme not founded on our 
psychology, we should expect to find many hunter-gatherer tribes that adopted a highly hierarchical 
structure. Additionally, as Boehm acknowledges, our ancestors have been egalitarians for at least 
250,000 years – enough time for natural selection to wire such a trait into our minds. There is 
neurological, 289  ethnographic and psychological evidence 290  that inequality aversion develops 
relatively early in childhood and is pervasive in human social experience.  
Egalitarianism, however, does not mean that every member of the band is considered an 
equal. Instead, it means that the hierarchy is inverted. Instead of being a pyramid in which the top 
is narrow, its base is large and the tribal chief exerts power over his peers, the reversed hierarchy 
adopts a social structure in which the community actively controls the chief through formal and 
informal means of monitoring and punishment. If egalitarianism began as a political invention in 
the Pleistocene, it might have stabilized itself in our mind through the action of natural selection 
over thousands of years. In time, this principle of our moral grammar may also have neutralized 
many of our hierarchical instincts, enabling the possibility that, under the right circumstances, we 
actually may see each other as equals.  
Assuming that the scenario built so far is at least reasonable; it is feasible to conceive of 
the structure of human moral grammar as the expression of principles related to the following 
mechanisms that embody the solutions to the cooperative dilemmas faced by our ancestors: (i) kin 
selection; (ii) reciprocal altruism and altruistic punishment of free-riders; (iii) indirect reciprocity 
based on allegiance and respect to moral norms via symbolic marking, monitoring and moralistic 
punishment of those who do not acquiesce to them; and (iv) egalitarianism based on reversed 
hierarchy and on the constant surveillance of those who attempt to impose their will on others. It is 
also assumed that all these solutions to cooperative dilemmas are nested within our minds as a result 
of natural selection responding to many different environmental and social problems.  
A last body of evidence shows that we, humans, also have an innate predisposition to 
cooperate with those who share the same symbolic markers with us, reinforcing Richerson & Boyd’s 
thesis. The psychologist Henri Tajfel formulated an experiment in which he showed that people 																																																								
289 See Dawes, C. T., Loewen, P. J., Schreiber, D., Simmons, A. N., Flagan, T., McElreath, R., Bokemper, S. E., 
Fowler, J. H. and Paulus, M. P. (2012). Neural Basis of Egalitarian Behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
109(17), 6479-6483.  
290 See Fehr, E., Bernhard, H. and Rockenbach, B. (2008). Egalitarianism in Young Children 
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tend to trust more those who are associated with the same symbolic cues as their own, no matter 
how arbitrary they are. Tajfel showed paintings from Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky and asked 
them to indicate which artist they appreciated more. Subsequently, he divided them arbitrarily in 
two groups, insinuating that the division had been based on the above mentioned preference. Then, 
he gave an amount of money to the participants and asked them to share part of it with the 
members of one of the groups. Even though they had not had any previous contact with the other 
participants, a larger amount of money was shared with the members of their own group, suggesting 
a predisposition to cooperate and trust more those who share the same symbolic markers in 
uncertainty situations – what confirms the dual inheritance theory predictions.291 
The anthropologist Francisco Gil-White also presented evidence about how our 
psychology operates when evaluating symbolic markers. According to him, we tend to use an 
essentialist cognitive approach to evaluate symbolic tokens, similar to how we evaluate animal or 
plant species. When evaluating the members of a same species, people tend to assign properties 
which are transmitted from parent to offspring.292 In one of his experiments, developed within a 
population of Kazakhs and Mongols, he showed that both reasoned in an essentialist fashion. For 
instance, when asked about the nationality of a son of a Mongol father raised in a Kazakh 
community, both would say that the child was a Mongol. This happened, according to him, because 
we have an innate psychological predisposition to reason according to natural kinds: his hypothesis 
was based on the idea that “human cognition is innately designed for intuitive processing of ethnies 
as natural living kinds”.293 Individuals classify other persons in regard to essential properties, 
dividing them according to salient cultural labels. 
There is also much evidence concerning the neurological bases of moral foundations, 
what gives some support to the thesis of an innate moral grammar. The psychologists Jorge Moll, 
Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, for instance, summarized research correlating brain regions 
especially dedicated to social behavior – in particular “the acquisition of social knowledge and 
dispositions towards normal social behavior”294, highlighting the role of the ventromedial and 
prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex, and other brain structures in 																																																								
291 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 222; 
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination. Scientific American, 223(5), 96-102. ; Tajfel, H. and Billic, M. 
(1974). Familiarity and categorization in intergroup behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10(2), 159-170.  
292 Gil-White, F. J. (2001). Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the Human Brain? Essentialism in Our Cognition 
of Some Social Categories. Current Anthropology, 42(4), 515-553.  
293 In Gil-White, F. J. (2001). Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the Human Brain? Essentialism in Our 
Cognition of Some Social Categories. p. 26. 
294 In Greene, J. D. and Haidt, J. (2002). How (and Where) does Moral Judgment Work? Trends In Cognitive Sciences, 
6(12), 517-523.  
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supporting normal moral reasoning.295 Research has shown how moral judgments can be affected 
by magnetic fields,296 that we can preview criminal recidivism accurately by studying the level of 
activity in the anterior cingulate (a brain region associated to impulse control),297 and that emotions 
and reason are intertwined in the process of moral reasoning.298 
All this provides support for the moral grammar hypothesis. John Mikhail’s approach 
regarding moral grammar should be understood as a psychological attempt to devise the specific 
principles that structure the logic of the mechanisms described above. The principle of natural 
liberty, which is described as a libertarian principle299, states that an individual should be free to 
decide whether to act (or not) unless a specific course of action is forbidden or obligatory. It is 
reasonable to assume that this principle embodies the logic of egalitarianism, of indirect reciprocity 
and of symbolic marking. It holds that no one [an egalitarian assumption] should be obligated to act 
against their will unless their action violates a moral standard held as mandatory by their 
community (a moral norm adopted by the community as part of its identity, a feature of symbolic 
marking that, unless heeded, leads to moralistic punishment, as predicted by indirect reciprocity). In 
the same sense, the other principles devised by John Mikhail should also be read as innate rules 
selected as proximate psychological causes of evolutionary responses to social dilemmas. 
 
2.2.4. Multilevel Selection Foundations of Human Normative Behavior and 
Cooperation in Large-Scale Societies 
 
These sophisticated features of the human mind enabled the possibility of life in larger 
communities rather than those that might have been otherwise sustained in the Pleistocene. The 																																																								
295 See also Moll, J. and de Oliveira-Souza, R. (2007). Moral Judgments, Emotions and the Utilitarian Brain; Zahn, R., 
Moll, J., Krueger, F., Huey, E. D., Garrido, G. and Grafman, J. (2007). Social concepts are represented in the superior 
anterior temporal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104, 6430-6435. ; Moll, 
J., de Oliveira-Souza, R. and Zahn, R. (2008). The Neural Basis of Moral Cognition: Sentiments, Concepts, and 
Values. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), 161-180.  Manuela Fumagalli and Alberto Priori offer an 
excellent review of contemporary research in Fumagalli, M. and Priori, A. (2012). Functional and Clinical 
Neuroanatomy of Morality. Brain, 135(Pt 7), 2006–2021.  
296 Young, L., Camprodon, J. A., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A. and Saxe, R. (2010). Disruption of the right 
temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.  
297 Aharoni, E., Vincent, G. M., Harenski, C. L., Calhoun, V. D., Sinnot-Armstrong, W., Gazzaniga, M. S. and Kiehl, 
K. A. (2013). Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
110, 6223-6228.  
298 Jeurissen, D., Sack, A. T., Russ, A. R. B. E. and Pascual-Leone, A. (2014). TMS affects moral judgment, showing the 
role of DLPFC and TPJ in cognitive and emotional processing. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 8(18), 1.  
299 See Mikhail, J. (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition. p. 133. John Mikhail’s libertarian principle relates to individual 
autonomy, not a full embracement of a libertarian moral philosophy. 
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anthropologist Pierre Clastres, for instance, reports that some Tupi, Tupinamba and Guarani 
villages might have supported, on average, more than 400 natives.300 However, even if these villages 
seem huge when compared with the social world of chimpanzees and of our hominin ancestors, 
they are extremely small when we consider the size of ancient cities and civilizations and of 
contemporary societies, which are relatively stable societies consisting of millions of individuals. 
How could sophisticated societies be built upon those psychological constraints? In other 
words, how could the human anomaly be explained? Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd present this 
puzzle in the following manner:  
 
How does cultural evolution engineer ancient Rome or modern Los Angeles 
starting with human raw material originally designed for societies, at most, on the 
scale of the cattle camps of the southern Sudan? The size, degree of division of 
labor, and degree of hierarchy and subordination of Rome and Los Angeles are 
orders of magnitude beyond the range of the most complex foraging societies.301  
 
Larger societies such as those displayed by ancient civilizations could not have evolved 
in the Pleistocene. The climatic constraints of that geological era were hostile to the development of 
agriculture and foraging societies could not sustain large populations because of insufficient food 
production.302 However, in the Holocene, the geological era of the last 11,600 years, the relative 
climatic stability made agriculture almost inevitable – in such a way that it was independently 
invented in at least ten occasions in different regions of the world.  
Increased food production as a result of the invention of agriculture allowed larger 
societies to become sustainable. The evolution of sizeable societies led to an evolutionary (cultural) 
race between increasingly large groups, which led to the invention and stabilization of many cultural 
adaptations. Early large groups had an obvious advantage over smaller groups because they could 
assemble larger armies, and, in technologically similar confrontations, larger typically means 
mightier. Later, the first agricultural societies likely dominated smaller hunter-gatherer groups and 
replaced them. In the second stage, the confrontation between larger agricultural societies led to the 
selection of those communities that were structured more efficiently based on division of labor, the 
evolution of certain institutions, the rise of hierarchical differences among social groups, and more 
productive economies that allowed for some economies of scale.303  																																																								
300 See Clastres, P. (1989). Society Against the State (Hurley, Santiago and Stein, Trans.). New York: Zone Books. p. 87. 
301 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 229. 
302 See Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R. and Bettinger, R. L. (2001). Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but 
Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis. American Antiquity, 66(3), 387-411.  
303 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 230. 
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However, how could the human mind address such large societies? Richerson & Boyd 
propose an elegant solution to this puzzle: large-scale societies were organized in such a way that 
they could simultaneously emulate small ancient foraging groups and allow for hierarchical 
differences, obedience to superiors and efficient labor division.304 Societies that might have achieved 
the institutional means to stabilize the conflict between social organization and human psychology 
by using our moral grammar as a foundation for their social structures would have substantial 
advantages in competition with societies whose institutions were in strict conflict with our innate 
moral grammar. 
In this sense, our moral psychology is a necessary foundation of functional social 
institutions. However, this statement should not be taken naïvely; many social structures may be in 
real conflict with our inner moral psychology. The principles of our moral grammar are egalitarian, 
but history shows that we have lived (and unfortunately still live) amidst many hierarchical societies 
in which inequality is pervasive. Thus, the relationship of adequacy between institutions and our 
moral psychology is quite imperfect: “Our social institutions should resemble a well-broken-in pair 
of badly fitting boots. We can walk quite a ways in the institutions of complex societies, but at least 
some segments of society hurt for the effort.”305 
As a solution to this conflict, gene-culture coevolution theorists propose three 
mechanisms that might function as “workarounds” to stabilize institutions that are in conflict with 
our innate nature: (i) command backed up by force, (ii) legitimacy through symbolic-based 
solidarity, and (iii) segmented hierarchies. 
These elements are well known to legal theorists. First of all, command backed up by force, or 
institutionalized coercion, is a societal solution built on our innate tendency to apply moralistic 
punishment. In prehistoric hunter-gatherer societies, every individual would be entitled to apply 
moral sanctions on free riders and nonconformists and, in extreme cases, the whole community 
could be assigned the task.306 However, in more complex societies, such as the large empires of 
																																																								
304 According to Peter Richerson & Robert Boyd: “If we are correct, the institutions that foster hierarchy, strong 
leadership, inegalitarian social relations, and an extensive division of labor in modern societies are built on top of a 
social "grammar" originally adapted to life in tribal societies. To function, humans construct a social world that 
resembles the one in which our social instincts evolved. At the same time, a large-scale society cannot function unless 
people are able to behave in ways that are quite different from what they would be in small-scale tribal societies. Labor 
must be finely divided. Discipline is important, and leaders must have formal power to command obedience. Large 
societies require routine, peaceful interactions between unrelated strangers. These requirements necessarily conflict with 
ancient and tribal social instincts, and thus generate emotional conflict, social disruption, and inefficiency”. In 
Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 230. 
305 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 231. 
306 See Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the Forest. p. 172. 
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antiquity, with inhabitants numbering in the millions,307 the power to apply sanctions had to be 
concentrated in social institutions suited to the job, as a result of specialized processes that enabled 
the emergence of more efficient societies.308 Institutions powerful enough to monitor and apply 
sanctions to punish nonconformists typically are accessible to classes and roles that can subvert this 
power for their own benefit, leading to institutional free riding over the subordinate classes of 
individuals, such as merchants, craftsmen, and slaves.  
Richerson and Boyd suggest that this problem might be solved through social 
institutions that could “watch the watchmen”.309 Although they do not explore this theme in more 
detail, this institutional framework might lead to an equilibrium between rulers and those who are 
ruled. This type of institutional arrangement is insinuated in early political philosophy. In his 
Politics, Aristotle argued that a city-state should be organized in such a way that rulers could not use 
power for their own benefit but only for the benefit of the common good.310 Nevertheless, such an 
institutional equilibrium has rarely been observed in the course of human history. Typically, the 
elites use their power and the military for the explicit purpose of benefitting themselves and 
imposing their authority over others. With enough military support, it is possible to control 
nonconformist subordinates through institutional punishment.  
This type of militaristic control comes at a cost. The anthropobiological hypothesis 
discussed thus far assumes that individuals have a strong egalitarian disposition, which leads them 
not to easily accept subordination. When human history is taken into account, this does not seem an 
obvious consideration; academic history typically considers a period of time that covers less than the 
last 10,000 years of human sociality. During this period, our species has lived in strictly hierarchical 
societies, and it is understandably difficult to believe that we have an egalitarian impulse. However, 																																																								
307 The Roman Empire, for instance, had a population of at least 60 million people in the 2nd century CE. The entire 
Greek population was approximately 5 million in the 4th century BCE. Later, in the 13th century, the Mongol empire 
had a population of more than 100 million. See Craughwell, T. J. (2010). The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in 
History. Beverly (MA): Fair Winds. p. 9. 
308 See Parsons, T. (1982). Talcott Parsons on Institutions and Social Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 171. 
309 However, institutionalized coercion creates roles, classes, and subcultures with the power to turn coercion to their 
own narrow advantage. Social institutions of some sort must police the police so that they will act in the larger interest. 
Such policing is never perfect and, in the worst cases, can be very poor. The fact that elites always advantage themselves 
shows that narrow interests, rooted in individual selfishness, kinship, and, often, the tribal solidarity of the elite, exert 
their predictable influence. 
See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 231. 
310 His six-fold classification of constitutional forms is a great example of his reasoning with respect to this issue. The 
government might be based on one ruler, on a few rulers, or on a multitude of rulers. These kinds of government have a 
correct form and a deviant form, depending on how the rulers govern their subjects. If the ruler(s) pursue the common 
good, the government is a correct one – a Kingship, an Aristocracy, or a Polity. However, if it is a corrupt government 
whose power is used to benefit only a particular group, the constitution becomes corrupted – which would happen in a 
Tyranny, an Oligarchy or in a Democracy. See Aristotle. (1928). Politics (Ellis, Trans.). New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 
pp. 203-205. 
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this “hierarchical period” of human history is nothing but a small fraction of Homo sapiens ’ social 
history. When we take into account the last 200,000 (or maybe even 500,000 years, if Boehm is 
correct), our species has been egalitarian for more than 95% of its natural history.  
Even the history of ancient civilizations shows that we are not so easily coerced into 
living in authoritarian hierarchies. The Thracian slave Spartacus commanded a revolt of more than 
70,000 gladiators and slaves against Roman authority; 311  the Byzantine Empire faced the 
population-based Nika riots against the Emperor Justinian; 312  plebeians rebelled against the 
patricians during the Roman Republic;313 peasants revolted against nobles, abbots and kings during 
the Middle Ages;314 and Italian city-states such as Genoa and Venice315 resisted Papal authority in 
the Medieval period, as did the English nobility.316 Although these rebellions did not directly modify 
the structure of the societies in which they occurred, they show a strong human disposition to resist 
subordination.  
The relative stability of strict hierarchical societies over the last 10,000 years despite an 
innate disposition to avoid inequity must be explained. The first element, as already stated, is the 
specialization of the military force controlled by an elite – command backed up by force. However, 
stable civilizations such as the Roman Republic/Empire, or the Han China, relied on more than 
just military strength.  
The second element that explains this stability is hierarchical segmentation. The human 
mind is innately ready to live in a world of face-to-face interaction, not in a hugely complex 
hierarchy-based societal system. The emergence of hierarchies might only be possible in societies 
that simultaneously respected (i) the psychological need to live in a social world where inequalities 
must be coped with and (ii) the fact that differences and inequalities exist and sustain the role-
differentiation demanded by the social division of labor. Psychological dissonance would destabilize 
social structures lacking the first element, and societies without role differentiation could not develop 
enough complexity to survive when confronted with socially stratified societies.  
The solution proposed by Richerson and Boyd aims to achieve both aspirations. Their 																																																								
311 See Green, P. (1961). The First Sicilian Slave War. Past & Present, 20(20), 10-29.  
312 See Greatrex, G. (1997). The Nika Riot: A Reappraisal. The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 117, 60-86.  
313 See Runciman, W. G. (1983). Capitalism without Classes: The Case of Classical Rome. The British Journal of Sociology, 
34(2), 157-181.  
314 See Blickle, P. and Catt, C. (1979). Peasant Revolts in the German Empire in the Late Middle Ages. Social History, 4, 
223-239.  
315 See Greif, A. (1994). On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the 
Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. The Journal of Economic History, 54, 271-287. ; Jones, P. J. (1965). Communes and 
Despots: The City State in Late-Medieval Italy. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, 15, 71-96.  
316 See Berman, H. J. (1983). Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press. pp. 254-255. 
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main thesis is that “top-down control is generally exerted through a segmentary hierarchy that is 
adapted to preserve nearly egalitarian relationships at the face-to-face level”.317 In this sense, 
sociocultural evolution selected social structures that were built on a nested hierarchy of classes and 
roles. Each class was organized as an ancient tribe in which each member had an equal status when 
compared to their own class and whose chiefs would assert their leadership through a negotiated 
equilibrium with their direct subordinates. The hierarchical chain of command can be organized in 
such a way that individuals from higher levels interact with lower level leaders. Explicitly 
authoritarian chiefs attract as much opposition from the upper class as a tribal head might expect to 
face if they tried to profit from communitarian efforts. Because hierarchy is organized in such a way 
that each level maintains its own internal egalitarianism – keeping most face-to-face interactions 
horizontally adjusted – major inequalities are upheld structurally only between different levels of 
organization. This social arrangement allows for structural inequality and avoids the psychological 
cost of dissonance.  
Societies whose institutional arrangements could best stabilize the social need for strong 
and centralized power and the psychological demands of egalitarian relationships were most likely 
more apt both to internally stabilize a highly hierarchical society and to enable the organization of 
armies that consisted of thousands of warriors. The evolution of these societies likely occurred as a 
consequence of internal hierarchy-making processes coupled with military warfare, which is a 
common fact in ancient history that most likely acted as a proxy for natural selection. The most 
efficient societies that adopted hierarchical societal structures relied on our innate moral sense and 
adopted an efficient social division of labor that allowed for specialization, better economic 
productivity and military organization.  
The third element that helps explain the stability of strictly hierarchical societies is 
legitimacy through symbolic group-marking. People accept a subordinate role when they feel that their 
immediate community is egalitarian, and they can also obey their superiors because of the fear of 
punishment for violating normative expectations. However, these foundations can be relatively 
weak if they are the only basis upon which a highly stratified society is settled. If differences are so 
deeply rooted within the social structure, the sense of being part of a fair and egalitarian community 
vanishes and cooperation can only be maintained through fear and violence.  
However, our minds are also adapted to expect a linguistic and symbolic world in which 
different sets of values, norms and beliefs can integrate with innate dispositions and unify local 																																																								
317 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 232. 
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parameters and our universal grammar. As discussed above, much of human sociality derives from 
indirect reciprocity founded on sharing reputations through linguistic communication and on 
symbolic cues that show that an individual belongs to a certain group. Some of these symbolic 
markers are central cultural features of particular societies, in the sense that they convey 
information about how inequities and differences can be explained in such a way that they might be 
considered understandable, justified and even fair features of the community.  
These norms, beliefs and values are spread through the entire social structure via 
imitation and other forms of cultural transmission, stabilizing principles and parameters that might 
be seen at first as highly incompatible, such as egalitarian principles and social structures that admit 
unequal distribution of resources. In a now famous anthropological experiment, Joseph Henrich et 
al. investigated whether this was the case in actual societies.318 If our sociality could be explained 
only through innate moral principles, we should expect the same behavioral standards in similar 
situations. Conversely, if our behavior could be explained only through cultural parameters, a large 
amount of diversity should be expected. We should expect to encounter societies of free riders where 
nothing would be shared, and societies of human angels that shared everything equally. To check if 
any of these extremes might actually happen, Henrich et al. undertook a large cross-cultural study 
of how different people behave when playing ultimatum, public good and dictator games. They 
recruited subjects from fifteen small-scale societies and from a variety of environmental, social and 
economic situations, and found that none of these groups displayed a completely altruistic or 
egoistic behavior, although they did show different patterns of sharing. They stood somewhere in 
between, as one might predict using the universal moral grammar hypothesis as a theoretical 
framework:  
 
These group differences are strikingly large compared to previous cross-cultural 
work comparing ultimatum-game behavior among university students (Roth et al., 
1991). While mean offers in industrial societies are typically close to 44 percent, the 
mean offers in our sample range from 26 percent to 58 percent. Similarly, while 
modal offers are consistently 50 percent in industrialized societies, our sample 
modes vary from 15 percent to 50 percent.319  
 
Additionally, the social psychology literature recognizes a human disposition to 
rationalize inequalities through ideological explanations. According to System Justification Theory, 
																																																								
318 See Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. and McElreath, R. (2001). In Search of 
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people tend to believe that their outcomes and social arrangements are fair and legitimate.320 
Members of disadvantaged groups tend to accept their situation by stereotyping themselves as 
undeserving and accepting responsibility and blame for their unfavorable conditions. In this sense, 
they internalize inequalities as if they occurred as a result of their own dispositions. Conversely, 
members of advantaged groups rationalize the status quo as being fair and deserved; they are in a 
favored position as a result of their dispositions.321  
When observed from the evolutionary perspective favored so far, System Justification 
Theory makes sense. First, it must be taken into consideration that our egalitarianism is based on a 
reversal of hierarchies, not on their absence. Life in hierarchical societies is deeply rooted within our 
moral psychology; egalitarianism based on hierarchical reversal was made possible as a result of 
power equalization between the chief and the other community members who could oppose to their 
power. Before egalitarianism had been stabilized within our hominin lineage, our primate ancestors 
lived in strict hierarchies where lower rank individuals accepted being subordinate. A hypothesis 
consistent both with this evolutionary account and with System Justification Theory would consider 
the internalization of social inequality as a necessary means to avoid cognitive dissonance and the 
psychological costs of not accepting the status quo. Thus, even if humans have a strong bias against 
inequalities, this bias might be triggered only in social situations where subordinate groups have 
enough power to counterbalance the advantaged groups. Otherwise, our minds rationalize the 
situation to avoid cognitive dissonance.  
Second, System Justification Theory is also compatible with cooperation based on 
group-identifying symbolic markers and on the segmentation and stratification of social groups. On 
one hand, the diffusion of legitimatizing rules and beliefs through social imitation, which is 
associated with an innate mind ready for accepting subordination under the right social conditions, 
leads to the acceptance and rationalization of extreme inequalities. On the other hand, our social 
psychology is also prepared to address the distinction between in-groups/out-groups. Typically, this 
distinction works as a proxy to differentiate whom to trust (in-group members) and whom not to 
trust (out-groups). However, when coupled with other psychological dispositions, such as prestige 
bias (imitate the more successful individuals), the disposition to differentiate in-groups and out-
groups might work as a status quo stabilizing force that would lead to the acceptance of a 
subordinate role whenever its reversal is not socially feasible; and the psychological need to 																																																								
320 See Jost, J. T. and Hunyady, O. (2003). The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative Function of 
Ideology. European review of social psychology, 13(1), 111-153.  
321 See Jost, J. T. and Hunyady, O. (2003). The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative Function of 
Ideology. p. 120 
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rationalize and justify one’s condition through elaborated narratives would lead to accepting a 
deeply unfair state of affairs in a segmented and highly hierarchical society.322 
It is important to acknowledge that not only psychologists recognize the role of 
legitimacy in stabilizing social structures. The sociological tradition has debated this issue for a long 
time. The French sociologist Èmile Durkheim, for instance, differentiated between organic and 
mechanical forms of solidarity as distinct means through which legitimacy could establish itself in 
any society. Mechanical solidarity structured cooperation in pre-modern societies based on a shared 
collective identity and on the distinction between insiders and outsiders.323 A communicative 
background in which the collective body constitutes one single moral/sacred community can sustain 
cooperation among the members of a traditional community.324 In pre-modern societies, there is no 
sense in distinguishing between law, morals and religion because those elements had not yet been 
differentiated. However, whenever social structures began to differentiate into functionally unique 
cultural systems,325 legitimacy could no longer be structured on the basis of a shared lifeworld.326  
Durkheim attempts to reconstruct the basis of the legitimacy of complex societies 
through the concept of organic solidarity. Unlike mechanic solidarity, organic solidarity maintains a 
fully integrated society without relying on a socially shared moral blueprint. Organic solidarity is 
founded on the very interdependence of economic and social roles, each with a specific function in 
the social structure. As Philippe Besnard327 states, the proper functioning of organic solidarity 
																																																								
322 According to Jonathan Haidt: “The human mind is a story processor, not a logic processor. Everyone loves a good 
story; every culture bathes its children in stories. Among the most important stories we know are stories about ourselves, 
and these life narratives are McAdams’s third level of personality. McAdams’s greatest contribution to psychology has 
been his insistence that psychologists connect their quantitative data (about the two lower levels, which we assess with 
questionnaires and reaction-time measures) to a more qualitative understanding of the narratives people create to make 
sense of their lives. These narratives are not necessarily true stories – they are simplified and selective reconstructions of 
the past, often connected to an idealized vision of the future. But even though life narratives are to some degree post hoc 
fabrications, they still influence other people’s behaviors, relationships, and mental health”. See Haidt, J. (2012). The 
Righteous Mind. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 4943-4950. 
323 See Tiryakian, E. A. (2008). Durkheim, solidarity, and September 11. In Smith (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Durkheim (pp. 305-321). Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press. pp. 305-321. 
324 See Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. p. 26. 
325 The functionalist sociological theory advanced by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann adopts the term ‘social 
system’ instead of ‘cultural system’ as proposed. Although both terms describe the same sociological phenomenon – 
systems that reproduce themselves on the basis of their own elements – the existence of complex social behavior in other 
animal species indicates that reserving the term ‘social’ solely for the description of human social behavior is misguided. 
As argued above, it is not the fact that we are social that is unique to our species but the fact that we live within a 
cultural background that evolves through the diffusion and differential selection of memes. Many other animal species 
are also capable of living in social systems in which individuals must deal with a social understanding of others, at least 
in a rudimentary sense. All cultural systems are social systems, but many social systems are not cultural. 
326 See Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston 
ed.): Beacon Press. pp. 126-135. 
327 See Besnard, P. (2008). Durkheim’s Squares: Types of Social Pathology and Types of Suicide. In Alexander and 
Smith (Eds.), (pp. 70-79). Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press. 
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requires the interdependent integration of social roles (objective integration) such that there is a 
system of relations between them and that individuals become conscious and accept this 
interdependence (subjective integration). In the same fashion, Talcott Parsons also agreed that the 
social division of labor was required to enable the emergence of more complex forms of sociality so 
that individuals internalized the values and norms required to support the social structure.328 
Evolutionary, psychological and sociological theories approach the problem of 
explaining the legitimacy of social structures from quite different and complementary perspectives. 
An evolutionary approach helps us understand the logic of cooperative behavior among different 
organizational levels. It also leads to comprehending how our social behavior is caused by biases 
and heuristics that have been incorporated into our minds during our evolutionary past. 
Psychological theory provides a strong and plausible link between this naturalistic approach and 
social theory. On the one hand, the interdisciplinary study of social psychology, ethnology and 
Darwinian anthropology allows for the understanding of the evolutionary history of our behavioral 
dispositions. On the other hand, the interaction between social psychology and sociology can 
provide the link between our minds and society by helping to understand the simultaneous 
interactions of biological, psychological and sociological factors that can be fully observed by a 
triangulated theory of human behavior. 
System Justification Theory and gene-culture coevolutionary theory are marvelous 
examples of how multiple levels of theoretical explanation can be integrated into a single naturalistic 
framework. First, such examples are quite compatible with the evolutionary explanations developed 
so far. Christopher Boehm’s theory of the reversed hierarchy can explain the evolution of the 
ambiguous dispositions of humans toward inequality; as primates, we are intrinsically hierarchical 
and inequity aversive. System Justification Theory acknowledges this ambiguity in our behavior by 
positing that we have a psychological need to solve cognitive dissonance in our social life by either 
constructing an equal state of affairs or by admitting the status quo. This ambivalence is required 
both by chimpanzee hierarchic societies and by our social communitarian life; otherwise, the painful 
psychological stress of being a subordinate would destabilize social organization.329 The evolution of 																																																								
328 See Parsons, T. (1982). Talcott Parsons on Institutions and Social Evolution. p. 36. 
329 And, indeed, there is evidence that subordinate chimpanzees are stressed due to being constantly vulnerable to 
aggression from higher-in-the-rank bullies. See Michopoulos, V., Higgins, M., Toufexis, D. and Wilson, M. E. (2012). 
Social Subordination Produces Distinct Stress-Related Phenotypes in Female Rhesus Monkeys. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 
37(7), 1071-1085. There is also psychological evidence that humans are subject to rank-related stress. According to 
Offermann: “Social psychological theory and research in social cognition provide a strong theoretical basis for 
predictions of differences in perspectives of leaders and subordinates on the issue of subordinate stress. As observers of 
subordinates, leaders may make fundamental attribution errors (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984) in attributing stress 
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cultural systems exploits this ambivalence to fulfill its own needs – working in such a way that it can 
follow its own structural logic while simultaneously building cultural workarounds that exploit 
innate constraints of our minds and finesse our social instincts.330 Cultural systems that were 
unavoidably incompatible with the principles that shape our innate moral psychology would not be 
stable, as moral philosophers such as John Rawls331 and Jürgen Habermas332 recognize.  
Second, the theoretical framework proposed thus far also links psychological theory with 
sociology. Cultural systems that can best integrate our psychological need to solve cognitive 
dissonance toward inequality in social patterns with their structural need of hierarchic and unfair 
institutions might be more efficient and would likely be more apt to spread their memes in a 
memetic population.  
In this sense, the psychological perspective can help social theory explain how our 
psychology can cope with huge inequalities and sustain unfair social structures. On the other hand, 
social theory explains how unequal patterns of social structures can emerge through the cultural 
differentiation of social roles and systems. Isolated, these theories cannot lead to the full 
understanding of the emergence of legitimation. By relying only on social facts, a strictly sociological 
approach lacks the understanding of the role of psychological forces that cause individuals to 
acquiesce to social norms and engage in settled cultural realities. Alone, psychological theory cannot 
provide a full account of how culturally based beliefs and norms hijack features of our psychology in 
different cultural backgrounds. Only an integrated and evolutionary theoretical framework can 




responses to the subordinates themselves rather than to the organizational environment (structural and human) in which 
the subordinate works. Furthermore, the workings of self-serving biases (e.g., Gioia & Sims, 1985) to promote favorable 
self-images may inhibit leaders from acknowledging the full impact of their behaviors in producing, maintaining, or 
failing to take action against the stress experienced by their subordinates. Subordinates, as actors, will likely be far more 
aware of the impact of the external organizational environment - including the impact of their leaders - on their stress 
levels. These psychological processes are predicted to be reflected in a consistent pattern of leader underestimation of 
the relationship of their own behaviors to subordinate stress in comparison with the subordinate perspective”. In 
Offermann, L. R. and Hellmann, P. S. (1996). Leadership Behavior and Subordinate Stress: a 360 Degrees View. 
Journal of occupational health psychology, 1(4), 382-390.  
330 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 231. 
331 See Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. p. 429. 
332 See Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Lenhardt and Nicholsen, Trans.). Cambridge 
(MA): The MIT Press. p. 16. 
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Evolution by natural selection occurs in any population to which the principles of 
variation, heredity and differential fitness can be applied.333 It is not only biological entities such as 
genes and biological populations that can be subjected to selection, but also groups such as human 
communities. Indeed, if we assume that the gene-culture coevolutionary theory is correct, natural 
selection acting directly on populations of human groups is directly related to the evolution of many 
psychological traits of our species. 
Although I have briefly discussed how group selection can enable the evolution of the 
social structures needed to sustain cooperation in large-scale societies, based on Richerson and 
Boyd’s account, there is much more to be said on the subject. In this section, I want to explore what 
elements from social contexts could be subjected to Darwinian selection. In other words, what are 
the Darwinian populations of social evolution? 
 
3.1. What is a Darwinian population? 
 
As philosopher Dan Dennett argues, in his Darwin's Dangerous Idea, the notion of natural 
selection is like a universal acid that "eats through just about every traditional concept, and leaves in 
its wake a revolutionized world-view, with most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but 
transformed in fundamental ways".334 Building on the existing knowledge of almost every discipline, 
the answers provided by the Darwinian perspective have transformed them from the inside-out.  
All it takes is that three elements are present: variation, inheritance and differential 
fitness. With these elements, natural selection operates like a mathematical algorithm, 
independently of the material substrate at stake. As Dennett reminds us, there is nothing in 
Darwinian theory that limits itself to the biological domain.335  																																																								
333 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 4; Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, 
T. (2010). Darwin's Conjecture. p. 31. 
334 In Dennett, D. C. (1996a). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. p. 65. 
335 In Dennett’s own words: “Darwin's ideas about the powers of natural selection can also be lifted out of their home 
base in biology. Indeed, as we have already noted, Darwin himself had few inklings (and what inklings he had turned 
out to be wrong ) about how the microscopic processes of genetic inheritance were accomplished. Not knowing any of 
the details about the physical substrate, he could nevertheless discern that if certain conditions were somehow met, 
certain effects would be wrought. This substrate neutrality has been crucial in permitting the basic Darwinian insights to 




3.1.1. The Parameters of a Darwinian Population in Godfrey-Smith's Perspective 
 
But what exactly is a Darwinian population? According to Peter Godfrey-Smith, a 
Darwinian population is a collection of entities that can evolve through natural selection. And a 
Darwinian individual is a member of this particular population.336 Godfrey-Smith's approach is 
particularly interesting because he differentiates paradigm cases from marginal cases of Darwinian 
populations, allowing for a substantial variation in what can be understood as a Darwinian 
population, thus enabling particular adaptations of the evolutionary framework to address features 
of domains other than biology. In this sense, even if social entities are not paradigmatic Darwinian 
individuals, they might still be considered marginal cases. As a matter of fact, Peter Godfrey-Smith 
mentions many examples from biology itself that do not fit the paradigmatic concept but, 
nevertheless, have been considered Darwinian individuals.  
Two particular examples related to inheritance might be of interest to social scientists. 
Inheritance is one of the key elements of Darwinism and, as such, it requires some kind of 
reproduction. But there are some conceptual problems related to what exactly reproduction means. 
There are some unequivocal examples which are, of course, mostly related to sexual reproduction; 
but nature is full of examples of asexual reproduction, especially in the case of some plants and 
colonial organisms.337 As Godfrey-Smith says, some plants can produce new units genetically 
identical to their 'parent'. But is this reproduction or mere growth?  
This example is important to social scientists because the concept of social reproduction 
can lead to many misunderstandings in sociology as well. We could say that many ancient societies 
'reproduced' in an analogous way to the aforementioned plant. Whenever the population of a Greek 
city-state grew more than it could uphold, for instance, its citizens were incentivized to colonize 
other places, taking the culture and social structure of the 'mother' city with them. Is this 
reproduction? Is it growth? In the case of modern societies it is even harder to define. After all, at 																																																																																																																																																																																								
curious flip-flop in it. Darwin, as we noted in the preceding chapter, never hit upon the utterly necessary idea of a gene, 
but along came Mendel's concept to provide just the right structure for making mathematical sense out of heredity ( and 
solving Darwin's nasty problem of blending inheritance). And then, when DNA was identified as the actual physical 
vehicle of the genes, it looked at first (and still looks to many participants) as if Mendel's genes could be simply identified 
as particular hunks of DNA.” In Dennett, D. C. (1996a). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. 
p. 58. 
336 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 6. 
337 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 70. 
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least at country level, it would sound unusual to say nowadays that a country is 'reproducing' in the 
sense of replicating its own structures somewhere else, generating an entirely new unit that 
resembles the old one.  
Another example mentioned by Godfrey-Smith, still related to the issue of reproduction, 
relates to collective entities. Can we say that collective entities reproduce, or is it only the low-level 
entities that constitute them? He mentions the example of a buffalo herd that grows and splits, and 
asks: "Is that herd-level reproduction, or only buffalo-level reproduction?".338  Saying that it is only 
buffalo-level reproduction may seem more obvious, but is that example different from saying that 
human reproduction is just a matter of cellular replication, and not a matter of replicating the 
organization of the human being? After all, a human body might be described as a collective entity 
constituted by cells. Again, this is a useful example for the social sciences, as they usually study 
phenomena related to collective entities that have a relationship with lower-level entities. Think of 
individual members of human societies, for instance. 
Godfrey-Smith assumes that Darwinian populations are way more complex than the 
textbook’s three principles definition, and may admit many intermediate cases. There are standard 
paradigm populations, and marginal cases, and, because of that, he prefers to talk about a family of 
different kinds of Darwinian processes that only share an essential core of minimal features - which 
he calls the minimal concept of Darwinian population.  
In this 'minimal concept', a Darwinian population is "a collection of causally connected 
individual things in which there is variation in character, which leads to differences in reproductive 
output (differences in how much or how quickly individuals reproduce), and which is inherited to 
some extent".339  Any Darwinian population is (i) a collection of causally connected individuals; (ii) 
these individuals display variation in character; (iii) these variations lead to reproductive differences; 
and (iv) these differences are inherited.  
Besides that, different Darwinian populations can display other properties, which may 
account for the differences between paradigmatic and marginal Darwinian cases. On one hand, 
paradigmatic populations are the subset of cases that satisfy beyond any doubt the minimal criteria. 
These are the cases most often studied by scientists, because they lead to novelty and "give rise to 
complex and adapted structures".340  On the other hand, marginal Darwinian populations are those 
that only have a partial Darwinian character, for they do not satisfy all the minimal requirements 																																																								
338 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 70. 
339 Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 39. 
340 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 41. 
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entirely, but only approximately.341 
Godfrey-Smith proposes that the Darwinian family of populations can be better 
understood graphically, with the aid of a spatial form of representation in which each dimension 
stands for the range of meaningful Darwinian features.342 A particular population would occupy a 
specific point in that space depending on how its features are graphically represented. The minimal 
criteria would occupy a large proportion of the chart, accounting for the paradigmatic cases and 
fading into the marginal ones.  
The first dimension of this chart would be Heredity (H). Although every evolutionary 
process is an inheritance system, we need to make a distinction between high-fidelity systems and 
those systems in which inheritance is "very noisy and unreliable".343 Biological evolution ranks high 
in this dimension because genes are enormously reliable. On the opposite side, the cultural 
evolution of traditional societies that rely solely on oral communication is intrinsically limited 
because the replication of cultural traits depends on the individual memory of its members. The 
invention of writing gave power to cultural evolution because it strengthened the fidelity of memetic 
transmission.344  
Variation (V) is the second dimension of the spatial chart proposed by Godfrey-Smith. 
Although evolutionary systems depend on the reliable inheritance of particular characteristics, 
heredity cannot be perfect; the inheritance system must provide some room for variation. 
Nonetheless, not every variation is qualified to be subject to selection. They must be slight in extent, 
exploring phenotypic regions close to the current state of the system. Otherwise, a wide range of 
variations over short periods of time would undermine the possibility of cumulative selection.345  
A third feature is the degree of competitive interaction with respect to reproduction (α), a requisite 
that accounts for the causal connection between individuals, one precondition of the minimal concept 
of Darwinism. Evolutionary change depends on the fact that some variants of the specified 
population are sorted out and others – the selected ones – prevail.  This is the conceptual core of 
selection. The α parameter represents the degree of competition binding two populations. When α is 																																																								
341 In Godfrey-Smith’s words: “At the other end of things, we can also identify a category of marginal Darwinian 
populations. This is not a category of cases within the boundaries of the minimal concept; rather, these are populations 
that do not clearly satisfy the minimal requirements, but do approximate them. They have a partially Darwinian 
character”. In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 41. 
342 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 43. 
343 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 44. 
344 For a deeper discussion on the subject, see Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. pp. 205-210. According to 
Susan Blackmore, writing led to the “externalization of memory”, allowing cultural evolution to overcome the 
“limitations of biological memory”. See Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. p. 98. 
345 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 47. 
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high, the growth of one competing population affects negatively the other. For example, we might 
think of two populations of bacteria that consume the same resources and share the same 
environment. If population A grows, it reduces the amount of available resources for population B, 
thereby affecting its reproductive success. When α is close to zero, there is no competitive interaction 
between the considered populations.346 Paradigmatic Darwinian populations are those where α is 1, 
which means that there is a direct relationship between the growth of a population and the 
reproduction of the other.  
Another feature of the Darwinian landscape is Fitness and Intrinsic Character (S), which 
accounts for the "extent to which differences in the reproductive output of a population depend on 
intrinsic features of the members of the population"347. In order to explain this feature, Godfrey-
Smith explores a thought-experiment that can be described in the following terms: Assume that we 
can correctly assign the causes of all births and deaths in a given population. We can determine that 
some of them occur as a result of extrinsic factors related to the environment, like a lightning bolt or a 
random fire, or due to intrinsic factors related to the features displayed by the individuals, such as 
their strength, speed or intelligence.  
When S is low, the survival rate of a specific individual is more closely related to 
extrinsic factors than to their own qualities. An individual survives because they are lucky, and that 
is all there is to be said. If a lightning bolt strikes and kills individual A, leaving individual B alive to 
produce their offspring, no factor other than mere randomness can be held responsible for that 
result. This is what biologists call evolutionary change caused by drift.  Darwinian evolution occurs 
when S is high, which means that an individual survives and leaves more offspring because they 
have some specific attribute that is useful in that environmental context. If a lion attacks a herd of 
deer and a slow deer is caught, the others survived because of their speed, an intrinsic factor. 
Darwinian populations, such as this one, score high on S. 
Obviously, extrinsic factors do count in Darwinian evolution, but, in low S cases, all that 
matters are extrinsic factors. Intrinsic qualities make no difference for reproductive success at all. 
On the opposite side, in high S cases, the intrinsic features of individuals are deemed responsible for 
the differential fitness that slowly accumulates and generates adaptive features.  
 
The idea is not that high-S cases take place in some sort of vacuum. The 
environment, together with the state of the population, determines which intrinsic 
features are worth having and which are not. The distinction, again, is between 																																																								
346 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 52. 
347 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 53. 
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cases where given an environmental context, intrinsic features make the difference 
and those where they don’t. Success due to camouflage or a good mating call count 
as high-S, for example, even though what counts as camouflage or a good mating 
call depends on context.348 
 
A fifth concept discussed by Peter Godfrey-Smith refers to continuity (C), which is 
displayed when small changes in phenotype entail small changes in fitness.349 Building on Sewall 
Wright's metaphor of landscape350 to represent the relationship between organismic properties and 
fitness, Godfrey-Smith describes fitness as a function of the features of an organism. In order to 
facilitate the understanding, we can represent a simple fitness landscape using the following function 





This chart exemplifies a fitness landscape. Fitness varies according to organismic 
properties, in such way that valleys (Vx) represent areas of low fitness whereas mountains (Mx) 
account for areas of high fitness. In Darwinian populations, low variation in organismic properties 
implies in a low variation of their fitness, or, in more graphic terms, a smooth landscape. On the 
opposite side, we have a rugged landscape when similar properties are associated with a broad variety 
of fitness values.351   
The continuity property of a system (C) corresponds to the smoothness of the landscape 
associated to it. A higher C property means a smoother fitness landscape. Darwinian populations 																																																								
348 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 54. 
349 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 57. 
350 For a criticism to this approach, see Pigliucci, M. and Kaplan, J. (2006). Making Sense of Evolution. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
351 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 57. 
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are usually set in smooth landscapes because they manifest continuity from one state to the other. 
Since variation occurs in close organismic properties, change will not occur in "leaps" to distant 
properties.  As a result, in a smooth landscape, variation and inheritance will culminate in a slow 
process of climbing to the regions around the mountains of the landscape. In a rugged landscape, on 
the other hand, small variations will not lead to any increase in fitness, as the mountains are so 
distant that almost no variation can bring a population to climb them. Only random situations 
would lead populations to a fitness mountain. 
 
There is a standard story about the importance of smoothness in fitness landscapes. 
An evolutionary process with good sources of variation and high-fidelity 
inheritance will tend to climb hills in the landscape. Populations will not tend to sit 
exactly on top of a peak, but form a cloud around and on it. The peak ascended 
will not necessarily be the highest one in the landscape, but a local one that first 
attracts the population. In a rugged landscape, the peak ascended will usually not 
be an especially high one, as most points in the landscape are close to low peaks, 
separated from higher ones by valleys. Without special mechanisms operating (a 
finely-tuned mix of selection, migration, and drift), a population cannot traverse a 
valley to reach other peaks.352  
 
Paradigm Darwinian processes usually display high values of H, C and S. But Godfrey-
Smith acknowledges that even those cannot be perfectly at high. For instance, if heredity is exactly 
1, it means that the offspring is perfectly like their parents. In this case, however, there can be no 
variation and, as a result, no evolutionary change.353  
I would like to highlight an interesting feature of the Darwinian model proposed by the 
biology philosopher. His perspective is not static: as certain population evolves, it obviously changes 
the involved organisms, but it also modifies how the system evolves itself. In this sense, the evolution of a 
system brings about new entities that affect the evolutionary dynamics of the whole system, thus 
affecting the values of H, V, C and S for the next generations, suppressing one dimension or 
another, and even de-Darwinizing some parts of the system.354  																																																								
352 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 58. 
353 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 66. 
354 According to Godfrey-Smith: “I will introduce one other heuristic role for the spatial treatment. As a population 
evolves, it not only changes the organisms that comprise it, but changes how it will evolve in the future. This can be 
visualized as movement in the space. Such movement is not always self-propelled; sometimes the evolution of one 
Darwinian population drives another. One example is the evolution of the vertebrate immune system. Here, whole-
organism evolution has given rise to a suborganismal Darwinian process that is engineered to adapt effectively to the 
environment of viruses and bacteria that an organism confronts. Evolution at the whole-organism level has shaped 
parameters like S and H for the cellular components of the immune system, giving them the properties associated with a 
powerful Darwinian process. But it is also possible for one population to curtail or suppress another, with respect to its 
Darwinian properties, to move it away from paradigm status. Germ lines and other features of reproduction in complex 
organisms act to suppress or ‘‘de-Darwinize’’ the evolutionary activities of key parts of the system. The vertebrate 
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Understanding this argument will prove to be essential to understanding the model of 
sociocultural evolution I will construct in the next sections. The evolutionary dynamics produces non-
Darwinian entities or, at least, marginal Darwinian cases. But we need not look into examples from human 
societies in order to understand this point; Godfrey-Smith's evolutionary model demonstrates how 
this happens even in strict biological processes, and understanding this might be an interesting 
proxy to appreciate the evolution of social and cultural entities. 
Godfrey-Smith's purpose is to explain, from a Darwinian perspective, how high-level 
entities can emerge out of lower-level ones. How can an organ emerge out of cells? Or how can a 
body emerge out of organs? His major point is that the larger entity is not only 'composed of' the 
lower entities, but it is an organization in its own right. A human individual is a collection of cells, 
entities with their own evolutionary history, but a human population might also be a Darwinian 
population in its own right. How can this happen? 
In order to address this problem, Godfrey-Smith links reproduction to individuality. 
Reproduction, as I have reviewed, is at the core of Darwinian processes, because there can be no 
such thing as evolution without Heredity (H). But what exactly is reproduction? This is a far more 
difficult question. A standard biology textbook description of reproduction would be that it involves 
the production of new individuals which are roughly similar to their parents. Also, reproduction is 
to be distinguished from other concepts, such as growth and the birth of a new individual without 
the existence of parent beings.355 
The complication presented by Godfrey-Smith lies in the fact that, even in biology, 
things are far from this textbook definition. In different organic species, what counts as reproduction 
may vary a lot and put into question the very nature of the distinctions between 
reproduction/growth and high-level/low-level entities. And the kind of reproduction seen in the 
system at stake affects the very evolutionary properties of that system. 
Firstly, he mentions as an example some organisms that reproduce themselves through growth. 
"Many organisms (various plants, animals, and fungi) create what look like new individuals by 
growing them directly from old ones. The new structure may then detach or stay attached".356 He 
mentions the example of apple trees: "Separation can also be imposed; all the 'Red Delicious' apple 
trees in the world are ramets derived from one apple tree that lived in Iowa".357 Other examples are 																																																																																																																																																																																								
immune system is engineered to perform a powerful evolutionary search, but somatic evolution is generally engineered 
to fail”. In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 66. 
355 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 69. 
356 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 71. 
357 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 71. 
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"marine invertebrates, such as corals, anemones, and ascidians".358 Some biologists have argued 
that these cases should count as mere growth, instead of reproduction, because they only involve the 
production of new clones.359 
The second set of problems mentioned by Godfrey-Smith concerning the issue of 
reproduction concerns the emergence of collective entities. This point is of particular interest to 
social scientists, because, as it has been argued from Mandeville to Hayek, collective entities are 
made up of individual parts – an assumption also present in the biological thought. Godfrey-Smith 
proposes that problems with collective entities emerge out of the relationship between individuality 
and reproduction and, in order to discuss this point, he focuses on the distinction between colonial 
forms of organization and symbioses.360  
On one hand, colonial organisms, such as algae, sponges and corals, are defined as 
"physically connected groups but without elaborate division of labor, and often with the retention of 
some capacity to live independently"361. Colonies do not have functionally differentiated organs; 
they are better described as an aggregate of quite independent individuals rather than an individual 
organism in its own right.  
On the other hand, symbioses are not only physically connected groups, but also 
functionally integrated entities. Despite often being members of different biotic kingdoms, they achieve 
such a level of integration that they can lose their individual capacity of living on their own. The 
evolution of the eukaryotic cell, a significant step forward in the evolution of life on Earth, is 
mentioned as "the most widespread symbiosis of all".362 The reproduction of symbiotic beings can 
occur separately (such as with lichens, where fungi and algae reproduce independently) or, when the 
integration has reached a high level of entanglement – as it occurs with the eukaryotic cell –, it 
occurs as if there was only one organism. 
A third set of problems refer to what Godfrey-Smith defines as "chimeras and mosaics", 
which challenge the assumption that individual organisms are "both genetically unique and 
genetically uniform".363 An example mentioned by him in relation to the oak tree can show how 
things can be really exceptional. The development of a new branch in oak trees results from cell 
division in their apical meristem, which can suffer mutations that are passed on to the successor 
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359 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 72. 
360 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 73. 
361 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 73. 
362 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 74. 
363 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 75. 
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cells. As a result, despite belonging to the same tree, the branches of a same old oak tree that have diverged 
decades or centuries ago may be genetically different from each other.364  Another mentioned example is 
chimerism, which relates to the phenomenon where the reproduced entity displays two sets of 
genotypes as a result of the fusion between them – as seen in marmosets and may even happen in 
humans.365 There is also mosaicism, which involves internal change (such as mutation or adaptation 
of the immune system, which changes itself to identify and respond to infections). 
 These problems challenge the textbook definition of reproduction, and Godfrey-Smith 
seeks to overcome them by proposing a new approach that admits a plurality of reproduction modes 
that can be part of a Darwinian process. According to him, there are three reproductive 
relationships that could, in principle, generate Darwinian individuals: collective entities, simple 
reproducers, and scaffolded reproducers. 
Collective entities are those composed of parts that have within them the capacity to 
reproduce. Godfrey-Smith mentions cases such as the aforementioned buffalo herd and other social 
groups, multicellular organisms, not-so-tight symbiotic associations and colonies. In these cases, the 
collective entity reproduces itself via the reproduction of its low-level components. The herd (and 
the colonies) produces other herds through its individual members, which produce other members 
that will be part of the herd, and which, depending on its size, can split and generate another herd. 
Multicellular organisms (such as ourselves) reproduce themselves through cellular reproduction (the 
reproduction of somatic cells maintains the organism's autonomy and the reproductive cells 
generate other collective individuals). 
Simple reproducers are the elements embedded in collective entities that are able to 
reproduce. It is worth-noting that some collective entities are built upon other collective entities, but 
at some level it will be possible to isolate "the lowest-level entities that can reproduce largely (...) 
using their own machinery"366. The paradigm example that is mentioned is a bacterial cell which 
does not depend on the reproduction of lower-level entities in order to replicate. In this sense, one 
could roughly say that a human group is a collective entity composed of humans (another collective 
entity) made up by internal systems, organs (collective entities as well) and cells (simple reproducers).   
Godfrey-Smith also introduces a third set of replicating entities, the scaffolded reproducers. 																																																								
364 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 76. 
365 “Chimerism is seen in spectacular form in the marmosets, but it is turning out to be much more common than had 
been thought. In humans, pregnancy induces a slight degree of chimerism in women that probably lasts for decades 
(Rinkevich 2004). Sometimes humans are massively chimeric because they are products of two fertilization events whose 
embryos merge and produce just a single baby.” In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural 
Selection. p. 76. 
366 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 87. 
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These entities reproduce themselves as part of the replication of larger units, however producing an 
evolutionary lineage in their own right. Viruses and chromosomes are the examples mentioned by 
the philosopher, which replicate through a cellular machinery that is external to itself.  
 
Examples here include viruses and chromosomes. As part of cell division, a 
chromosome is copied; a new one is made from the old. The chromosome cannot 
do this with its own machinery, or even largely with its own machinery. It is more 
accurate to say that the chromosome is copied by the cell. Despite this, the new 
chromosome does have a particular parent chromosome. At least, a very newly 
formed chromosome has one parent chromosome; in organisms like us, there will 
then be crossing-over,which in effect gives a chromosome two parents. The 
examples of ‘‘formal’’ reproduction discussed in the previous chapter fall into the 
scaffolded category.367  
 
In a certain sense, it can be said that Peter Godfrey-Smith abandons the replicator 
paradigm invoked in the second chapter. As I have argued, a long evolutionary tradition has been 
discussing the level in which natural selection takes place, and many scholars have argued that only 
low-level entities can be said to replicate (e.g. Dawkins)368.   
But how do these widely different entities relate to each other? Peter Godfrey-Smith 
approaches this problem by referring to a huge difficulty in the social science fields that have 
attempted to apply an evolutionary framework to understand social evolution. As discussed, one 
way to conceive of social evolution is to understand it as a result of cultural evolution – and culture 
is conceived of as a set of individual traits (memes, cultural variants, etc.) transmitted through 
mechanisms of social learning, especially imitation.369 In Godfrey-Smith’s framework, cultural 
variants could be understood as scaffolded reproducers, since they need external machinery (v.g., 
brains, communication among individuals needed to transmit them) in order to reproduce. 
However, cultural evolution might also involve reproduction in higher levels, such as in the level of 
social organizations, like businesses, courts or churches, and in even higher levels, such as whole 
cities, countries and social systems. In Godfrey-Smith’s perspective, these entities might be 




367 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 88. 
368 See, e.g., Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene. 
369 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. 
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3.1.2. Reproduction and Collective Entities according to Godfrey-Smith 
 
What counts as reproduction for a collective entity? With the purpose of addressing this 
question, Godfrey-Smith introduces three categories: bottlenecks (B), germ lines (G), and Integration 
(I).  
Bottlenecks are the degree of division between two generations. 370  Reproduction involves the 
production of a new individual (offspring) similar and causally connected to another (parent). One 
cell produces another, and the bottleneck degree is high in this case because we can easily identify 
the divide between generations. When a parent dog has some puppies, we can clearly see the 
differences between one generation and the other.  
Bottlenecks are evolutionarily relevant because they force a developmental reboot at 
each generation. When reproduction occurs, the offspring starts from zero; it has to grow and 
develop from scratch, what opens an opportunity for mutations to affect the organization of the 
organism and to transmit new genes to future generations.371 As a result, bottlenecks are important 
to produce variations affecting the basic organization of an organism.  
The parameter B is high when reproduction strictly divides generations, as it occurs in 
cellular reproduction or even in human reproduction. When B is low, new individuals can be 
understood as a mere continuation of their parents. In nature, this usually happens among some 
kinds of plants, such as the aspen, which grows out of ramets genetically, being basically clones of 
their parents. These ramets limit the degree of reorganization the offspring will develop when 
compared to their parents and, although they have their own organization, they only display a 
partial reboot of the system's structure.372 But B can be even lower, as it occurs when the above-
mentioned buffalo herd grows and splits; there is no reorganization at all in the collective unit, 
although there is reproduction. 
The second parameter related to reproduction, germ line (G), is the degree of 
reproductive specialization of the parts of a system, or whether it displays a distinction between 
germ and soma elements. When G is high, the collective entity reproduces itself through specialized 
elements (germs) that are implicated in the replication of the entire collective structure, while the 
other elements (soma) are unable to reproduce the system. We, humans, like all other mammals, 
have specialized cells involved in our reproduction (our gametes) while all other cells are somatic, 																																																								
370 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 91. 
371 See Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). 
Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 91. 
372 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 92 
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unable to produce another animal.373 This is not the only case, though; worker bees are "somatic 
cells" of a beehive, while the queen stands for its "germ cell". The beehive counts as a collective 
individual in its own right. On the other hand, sponges have a low G because they do not have this 
distinction; every individual cell can produce an entire colony.  
The third parameter is integration (I), which tracks the degree of interdependence 
displayed within the collective entity. Godfrey-Smith states that integration covers many features, 
such as "the extent of the division of labor, the mutual dependence (loss of autonomy) of parts, and 
the maintenance of a boundary between a collective entity and what is outside it".374 Complex 
multicellular organisms display a high level of integration, because there is a huge division of labor 
amongst the various organs performing different functions and a high extent of mutual dependence 
between each element of the system, while also maintaining a boundary between the organism and 
its environment.  
In order to organize the role of each of these elements in reproduction, Godfrey-Smith 
affirms that high values of the three parameters entail clearer (paradigm) cases of reproduction, 
while low values are associated to marginal cases.375 Systems that display high bottlenecks are closer 
to reproduction than to mere growth; high germ lines and integration implies that reproduction 
takes place in the collective level, and not as a result of "lower-level reproduction plus organization 
of the results".376   
When reproduction occurs at the higher levels, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the 
de-Darwinization of the lower-levels. This result derives from the integration between the Darwinian 
parameters (H, V, S, C and α) and the parameters related to reproduction in collective entities (B, 
G, and I). In a nutshell, Godfrey-Smith argues that the emergence of collective reproducers as 
Darwinian Individuals results from the suppression of evolution (de-Darwinization) in their lower-
level elements.  
Collective reproducers are composed by lower-level reproducers (either other collective 
reproducers or simple ones). A human group can be a Darwinian population in its own right, 
composed by human individuals, which on their turn can be seen as a collective reproducers 
composed of individual reproducers (cells) that also form a particular Darwinian population by 
themselves. We have, in this example, three analytic levels: the cellular level, the human body and 
the human group. Each one of these levels is composed of Darwinian populations. However, the 																																																								
373 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 92. 
374 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 93. 
375 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 94. 
376 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 94. 
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evolution of collective reproducers is only viable when the collective level organizes the lower-levels 
in such a way that their reproduction does not erode evolution in the higher-levels.  
Consider the relationship between the cellular level and the human body. As Darwinian 
individuals, cells reproduce themselves, vary and are selected. In principle, those cells that replicate 
faster and pass on their own genes to the offspring are more prone to be selected in the Darwinian 
process. Nonetheless, this might be bad for the collective body they are a part of – as a matter of 
fact, this is exactly what cancer is, the disorderly reproduction of cells.377 In order to avoid this, the 
body must somehow inhibit cellular reproduction, organizing it in order to structure its (the body) 
own replication.   
For this to be feasible, collective replicators must suppress lower-level evolution, blocking 
subversion from their lower-level components. Godfrey-Smith proposes that, in order to solve this 
problem, higher-level entities "de-Darwinize" the replication of their low-level components via some 
mechanisms. 
The first of those is related to the bottlenecks (B), which guarantee some uniformity in 
the offspring cells378. When an individual starts its own development out of one single cell (as it 
happens in the case of the human zygote), the resulting cells will be close to genetic clones of the 
original; the bottleneck limits variation (V) and reduces the force of evolutionary competition at the 
cellular level. 
The second mechanism is associated to Germ Lines (G). The presence of specialized 
kinds of cells (somatic and germ) de-Darwinizes the low-level populations because the only cells that 
have heritable properties in the long term are those in the germ line. The other cells (soma) have 
limited long-term heritable properties, since their influence is confined within the collective entity, 
whereas the germ line reproduces the entire collective entity.  
Please note that Godfrey-Smith's approach is based simultaneously on a bottom-up and 
a top-down process. The replication of the collective reproducer is based on processes happening in 
its lower level elements (G), but the collective entity itself is organizing those elements for its own 
purposes, de-Darwinizing their processes of change. No collective reproducer is independent of the 
underlying logic of its lower-level components, but the low-level entities are so dependent on the 
collective structure that they almost lose their independence. 
 
 																																																								
377 See Axelrod, R. M. (2006). The Evolution of Cooperation. 
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 130 
3.1.3. Levels, Transitions and Multilevel Selection  
 
In the second chapter, I argued that group selection played a major role over the course 
of human evolution, as a result of the gene-culture coevolutionary process.  
My point can be summarized in the following terms. Kin selection and direct reciprocity 
sustained cooperation in our primate lineage, relying on a mind capable of recognizing cues in the 
environment that reasonably identified both who is member of a kin group and who is a reliable 
cooperator. Both mechanisms are able to suppress free-riders, either by not allowing altruism to be 
directed to those who would not contribute to the spread of the donor's genes (kin selection), or by 
limiting altruism to benefit other cooperators and by punishing free-riders (reciprocal altruism). 
Nonetheless, both mechanisms are limited because either they impose constraints on the genetic 
profile of the cooperators, despite allowing for cooperation in a huge group (kin selection), or they 
impose constraints on the size of the group, despite allowing for cooperation in a genetically diverse 
community (reciprocal altruism).379 
The social and environmental pressures of the late Pleistocene facilitated the evolution 
of culture as a means to overcome these constraints.380 The climatic instability of the Pleistocene 
favored the evolution of species able to adapt their behavior to moderately unstable environments, 
through the imitation of the most common behavior in a group. Culture (cultural accumulation381) 
might have been a by-product of this process, which also led to the expansion of the size of hominin 
groups, now organized not only via psychological processes acting only at the individual level, but 
also via group-level processes resulting from the sharing of a cultural background.  
Culture and cultural accumulation also enabled the evolution of larger societies. Instead 
of relying on the individual memory of past interactions as a cue to separate cooperators from free-
riders, the evolution of culture enabled the separation of outsiders from in-groups as a cue for 
cooperation – or indirect reciprocity. Instead of punishing free-riders based solely on individual 																																																								
379 See Nowak, M. A. and Highfield, R. (2011). SuperCooperators. 
380 See Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (2005b). Why Does Culture Increase Human Adaptability? In Boyd and 
Richerson (Eds.), The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (pp. 35-51). New York: Oxford University Press. 
381 It is important to distinguish between culture and cultural accumulation. As previously stated, I adopt here the 
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forms of social transmission”. In Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed 
Human Evolution. p. 5. Many animal species, such as chimpanzees, Japanese monkeys and even dolphins and some 
birds also display culture in some sense. See Martínez-Contreras, J. (2011).  O modelo primatológico de cultura; 
Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. However, only humans display the more sophisticated ability of cultural 
accumulation. Unlike other animals, which do not build on the acquired cultural variants, we are capable of doing so, in 
such a way that culturally transmitted knowledge slowly accumulates over time. See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. 
(2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. pp. 48-54.  
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monitoring, now the whole group is held responsible for applying sanctions on outsiders and free-
riders – a process possible because some specific instincts have been selected at the psychological 
level (the tribal instincts hypothesis).382 The path to a legal system is now open, because the whole 
group can be organized through the observance of culturally shared norms.  
The evolution of culture also opened the path to cultural group-selection, because it 
created conditions for the 'Darwinian algorithm' to operate at a higher group level. Given a certain 
isolation of cultural groups and the presence of mechanisms such as conformist transmission and  
moralistic punishment, variation, heredity and differential fitness can also be applied at the cultural 
level. Different groups share distinct cultural traits (variation), which are replicated to subsequent 
generations (heredity), and different memes affect the replication odds of a group (differential 
fitness). This is a product of multilevel selection processes, because the stability of the higher cultural 
level is built upon some specific psychological traits, adapted to life in human cultural groups. 
This discussion can also be linked with Godfrey-Smith's perspective, because human 
groups can be understood as collective reproducers. From this premise, it can be inferred that the 
evolution of culture produced a new evolutionary level – new Darwinian individuals – in our 
natural history. Natural selection acts both on the levels of human individuals and whole human 
groups simultaneously. 
Before approaching this subject, however, it is necessary to elucidate how Godfrey-
Smith relates the evolutionary transition to new Darwinian individuals and the emergence of new 
evolutionary levels.  
According to him, the hierarchical organization of the biological world involves parts 
and wholes. "Genes, roughly speaking, are parts of chromosomes, which are parts of cells. Cells are 
parts of multicellular organisms, which are parts of social groups and subpopulations within 
species".383 Furthermore, each of these 'parts' can reproduce and, as a consequence, can be 
understood as a Darwinian population in their own right. I will argue that the Godfrey-Smith’s view 
can be developed to explain also the evolution of human societies. 
One result of this reasoning is that cases of multi-level selection can be defined as the 
nesting of Darwinian populations within other Darwinian populations.384 In all these nested levels, 
there are evolving populations. Nonetheless, Godfrey-Smith does not think that there is a replicator 
accountable for reproduction in each of these levels; as a matter of fact, he urges us to abandon the 																																																								
382 See chapter 2 for a discussion about the evolution of social tribal instincts. 
383 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 109. 
384 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 110. 
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'gene-eye view', because there might be only one replicator nested within many layers of 
evolutionary levels, the latter acting as interactor.385 According to him, we should focus on what 
unit is the selected one in a particular evolutionary level. If we are working at the cellular level, the 
cells are the evolutionary units; when we focus on the level of a whole organism, that might be the 
evolutionary unit. As he states, "questions about the ‘unit’ of selection are not ambiguous; the units 
in a selection process are the entities that make up the Darwinian population at that level".386 
But how do low-level Darwinian populations bring about the emergence of high-level 
Darwinian populations? In other words, how does the transition between low-level and high-level 
entities happen? This theme has been discussed under the label of 'transitions in evolution', at least 
since John Maynard Smith and Szathmáry's The Major Transitions in Evolution.387 According to them, 
the increase of complexity in the course of evolution is the result of major transitions in the 
transmission of genetic information between generations.388 Some examples include the origin of 
eukaryotes, genetic codes (both RNA and DNA), and multicellularity.  
In each of these transitions, lower level entities have somehow enabled the evolution of 
higher level entities despite the fact that natural selection was acting strongly on the lower levels in 
order to select the units that would be better fit at that level, possibly disrupting stability at the 
higher level. In other words, evolution at the lower levels usually selects free riders that gather the 
benefits of cooperation while returning little to the other units at that level. As posed by Smith and 
Szathmáry:  
 
Given this common feature of the major transitions, there is a common question we 
can ask of them. Why did not natural selection, acting on entities at the lower level 
(replicating molecules, free-living prokaryotes, asexual protists, single cells, 
individual organisms), disrupt integration at the higher level (chromosomes, 
eukaryotic cells, sexual species, multicellular organisms, societies)?389  
 
We cannot assume that higher level units emerge because of benefits obtained in the 																																																								
385 In his own words: “So cases of ‘multi-level selection’ are simply those where a system contains Darwinian populations 
at different levels, all evolving. It is significant, then, that much of the literature in this area has not applied a view of this 
kind. Sometimes the reason is the adoption of the replicator approach. This view holds that questions about ‘levels’’ and 
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process. First, there must be entities at some level that act as replicators—entities that are faithfully copied. Second, 
there must be entities—perhaps the same, perhaps different—that act as ‘interactors’ or ‘vehicles.’ These are the entities 
whose interaction with their environment leads to the differential copying of the replicators. There may be a hierarchy 
of such interactors, all with different effects on the copying occurring at the replicator level.” In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. 
(2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 111. 
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387 See Smith, J. M. and Szathmáry, E. (1997). The Major Transitions in Evolution. 
388 See Smith, J. M. and Szathmáry, E. (1997). The Major Transitions in Evolution. p. 3. 
389 See Smith, J. M. and Szathmáry, E. (1997). The Major Transitions in Evolution. p. 7. 
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remote future since free riders would subvert integration to their own interests long before the 
benefits would be reaped.  
Smith and Szathmáry's answer to this problem is based on three possibilities: kin selection, 
contingent irreversibility and central control.390 The first case is kin selection. In most transitions, the 
higher level entity begins with one or a few cells which divide themselves and produce other cells 
with a high degree of genetic relatedness, a procedure that suppresses free-riding (see chapter 1). A 
multicellular organism begins its life from a single fertilized egg in which all cells are genetically 
identical.391  
Another possibility is contingent irreversibility, or path dependence. 392  Some 
evolutionary products, even after a long time, cannot revert to become simpler beings due to inertia 
and other accidental reasons, but not because of natural selection per se. Smith and Szathmáry 
mention the irreversibility of the mitochondria393 as an example; although it was  originally 
composed of prokaryotes, its current composition wouldn't allow it to be reversed to its former state, 
because all its genes are contained in the nucleus – thus, it now exists as a higher level entity, 
irreducible to its former state. A third possibility is central control. Organization can be maintained 
through the existence of a central feature that keeps low level integrity, suppressing free-riders. The 
central control does not need to be conscious of its role; it might arise as a result of natural 
selection.394  
The transition from low level to higher level entities shares two other features: division of 
labor and the emergence of new mechanisms of information transmission.  
Division of labor is favored by the natural selection of new Darwinian individuals 
because specialized units can be more efficient than units that perform all the functions needed by 
the whole system. The division of labor in prokaryotes and eukaryote cells is one example 
mentioned by the authors. In prokaryotes, there is no separation between the genetic nucleus and 
the cytoplasm, a feature that imposes difficulties in sustaining more complex forms of life. In 																																																								
390 See Smith, J. M. and Szathmáry, E. (1997). The Major Transitions in Evolution. pp. 8-9. 
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eukaryotes, the separation between the nucleus and the metabolic cytoplasm allowed the 
recruitment of other organelles through symbiosis, enabling even further specialization. The division 
of labor between sexes is another typical example, observed in many species. Typical mammal 
males are bigger and stronger than females and, as a result, they can specialize in the protection of 
the band. Females, on their turn, specialize in nourishing the offspring. If there was no such division 
and each individual performed both functions, the number of sustainable offspring would be 
certainly lower because the time dedicated to their protection would be discounted from the time 
dedicated to raising the youngsters.395 
A last feature of transitions entails the emergence of new ways of information 
transmission. When a new system emerges out of lower level systems, new forms of transmitting 
information are also unfolded. The origin of the genetic code is a paramount example: long before 
DNA and RNA, information-based hereditary systems such as autocatalytic systems already existed, 
but DNA increased the efficiency of replication. Also, eukaryotes and prokaryotes transmit their 
regulative states hereditarily, not based on changes in DNA sequence but due to changes in the 
process of methylation, which produces different phenotypes out of the same genetic content.396 The 
human language would be another paramount example of how information transmission is one of 
the features of the emergence of a new system.397  
Peter Godfrey-Smith reads Smith and Szathmáry's major transitions as major 
evolutionary events that fundamentally change the character of evolution (a broad sense of "major 
transitions"), and instead adopts Richard Michod's398 perspective, designated as "transitions in 
individuality" to refer to transitions that lead to new kinds of biological individuals (in a narrow 
sense of the term). Richard Michod’s, John Maynard Smith’s and Eörs Szathmáry’s perspectives are 
not so different to justify a distinction between a broad and a narrow sense of the term "transition". 
The very examples of new Darwinian individuals mentioned by Godfrey-Smith are also examples 																																																								
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alluded to by Smith and Szathmáry – the evolution of the eukaryotic cell and the evolution of 
multicellularity.399 
So, how do new Darwinian individuals come out to be? By developing a standard 
model, Godfrey-Smith proposes that a new Darwinian individual emerges when a fundamental 
change occurs in the status of collective entities.  They start to come to light as an association of 
different reproducers that could be said to reproduce marginally at the collective level. For instance, 
a collection of independent cells starts to clump together, although reproducing autonomously. 
Later on, the different reproducers might connect their reproductive form to the collective unit, 
gaining integration at the higher level, losing their autonomy and forming a Darwinian entity closer 
to the paradigmatic case. By losing reproductive autonomy, the low-level components of the new 
individual are also partially de-Darwinized.  
Their evolution then becomes associated with the evolution of the whole collective 
reproducer: "Their independent evolutionary activities are curtailed, constrained, or suppressed by 
what is happening at the higher level - a partial 'de-Darwinizing' of the lower-level entities".400 This 
could be, for example, what happened in the evolutionary origins of eukaryote cells; one prokaryote 
might have enveloped another, and both continued to replicate independently at first, while 
remaining attached together. Later on, the functional differentiation between the parts (through the 
separation of the nucleus and cytoplasm) led their reproductive fate to be intrinsically shared. 
But how does the higher level entity suppress free-riding at the lower levels? As John 
Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry propose, one such mechanism is kin selection. If lower level 
entities share their fates in such a way that the profits reaped by one unit also benefits the others, 
then altruism – cooperation at the lower level – might emerge. Kin selection can be organized through 
bottlenecks that force every generation at the collective level to begin anew from lower-level entities 
genetically identical.401  
A second possibility is the existence of germ lines and the division of labor between soma and 
germ.402 This alternative protects the collective against a particular kind of subversion that could 
arise in the kin selection possibility. Without the distinction between germ and soma, every unit of 
the system could compete with the others to be the basis of the next generation. Even if kin selection 
ensures genetic identity, there is always the possibility of a mutant cell that could do better by 
subverting the resources to its own benefit. The germ/soma distinction limits the extent of the 																																																								
399 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 122. 
400 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 122. 
401 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 123. 
402 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 123. 
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damage of such a mutant unit because the somatic low level units cannot produce a high level 
collective reproducer at all. 
 Another way to suppress free-riding at the lower-levels would be a mechanism devised 
by Smith and Szathmáry, the central control. If one of the low-level units has control over the 
reproduction of the collective system, it can be seen as a functional unit of the collective individual. 
Even if there is no bottleneck or germ/soma distinction, whenever a unit of the system controls the 
reproductive logic of the entire system, low level competition can be suppressed, aligning the 
reproductive benefits of every layer of the system. 
The purpose of this section was to introduce some concepts in order to organize the 
discussion about Darwinian evolution. Rather than adopting the textbook definition based on 
variation, heredity and differential fitness, Godfrey-Smith proposes a multidimensional perspective 
based on Heredity, Continuity, Variation, Intrinsic Fitness, and Reproduction, which, on its turn, is 
based on three other variables, Bottlenecks, Germ Lines, and Integration. In the next section, I will 
refer to these concepts in order to understand how the Darwinian framework could be applied to 
understand sociocultural evolution. After all, are there Darwinian populations at the sociocultural 
level? 
 
3.2. Sociocultural Darwinian Populations 
 
So far, I have described Peter Godfrey-Smith's idea of Darwinian population and how it 
relates to the emergence of collective entities out of low-level units. Now it is time to bring this 
discussion closer to the sociological thought, in order to support the claim that, pretty much like the 
concept of function, the idea of Darwinian population is a formal concept which both sociology and 
biology can rely on in order to explain the emergence of complex phenomena. 
In order to complete this task, I will begin by discussing a parallel between biology and 
sociology in relation to the emergence of complexity. My objective is to demonstrate that the issues 
discussed in both fields concerning the emergence of order from low-level components are really 
similar, and, as such, the discussions from one domain can be profitable to the other. As a result, 
Godfrey-Smith's discussion on Darwinian populations might be understood as a formal discussion 
concerning Darwinian populations as such, and not only as biological entities. The next three 
subsections present the results of an effort to apply Godfrey-Smith's theoretical approach to entities 
of the sociological domain.  
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The first two subsections describe the problem of emergence in sociology and show how 
the questions debated in the sociological domain are similar to those discussed in biology and 
epistemology. The second subsection is an attempt to use Luhmann's systemic theory as a bridge 
between sociological theory and biology. In order to do so, however, I have to reconstruct its 
theoretical framework in order to make it compatible with Darwinian theory – a necessary step 
towards the third subsection, in which I refer back to Godfrey-Smith's Darwinian Population's 
parameters in order to argue that human societies are full-blown Darwinian individuals and, as 
such, are subject to evolution. 
 
3.2.1. The problem of Emergence in Sociology 
 
The relationship between the individual and collective orders is a fundamental issue in 
both the biological and sociological domains.403 If the previous discussions showed the relevance of 
the subject for biology and one possible perspective to solve the issue in that domain, the debate 
now known as the micro-macro link404 has been pervasive in sociological thought since its inception. As 
the sociologist Keith Sawyer states: 
 
The relationship between the individual and the collective is one of the most 
fundamental issues in sociological theory. This relationship was a central element in 
the theorizing of the 19th-century founders of sociology, including Weber, 
Durkheim, Simmel, and Marx, and was essential, if implicit, in many 20th-century 
sociological paradigms, including structural functionalism (Parsons [1937] 1949, 
1951), exchange theory (Blau 1964; Romans 1958; Romans 1961), and rational 
choice theory (Coleman 1990). In recent years, this relationship has become known 
as the micro-macro link (Alexander et al. 1987; Ruber 1991; Knorr-Cetina and 
Cicourel 1981;Ritzer 2000).405 
 
 
Much of this discussion has been labeled under the notion of emergence, based on the idea 
that higher-order [collective] phenomena, although built upon networks of individual action, are 
not reducible to lower-level processes.406  As Tony Lawson says, "an emergent entity, where 																																																								
403 See Sawyer, K. R. (2001). Emergence in Sociology: Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Some Implications for 
Sociological Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 107(3), 551-585.  
404 See Alexander, J. C. (1987). The Micro-Macro Link. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
405 In Sawyer, K. R. (2001). Emergence in Sociology: Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Some Implications for 
Sociological Theory. p. 551. 
406 It is important to add that the idea of emergence is not to be confused with the concept of causation. I assume that 
there is a weak sense in which low level entities are causally linked to higher level emergent entities. First of all, the 
existence of the lower level entities is a necessary condition for the emergence of the higher level ontological reality. By 
assuming this, I do not claim that the causal link between levels establish an ontological priority of the lower levels over 
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addressed, is usually found, or anyway held, to be composed out of elements deemed to be situated 
at a different (lower) level of reality to itself, but which have (perhaps through being modified) 
become organised as components of the emergent (higher level) entity or causal totality".407 
But what exactly does emergence mean? Paul Humphreys' discussion on the subject, 
although more focused on the domain of physics, is clarifying.408  First, he states that emergence is more 
than supervenience. Supervenience entails an ontological relationship in which the low-level properties 
of a system determine its higher level properties.409 But since the relationship between levels is one 
of necessity, there is no reason to abandon the lower level and assume the ontological reality of the 
higher level. As a result, the higher level is absolutely reducible to the lower ontological levels. 
Massimo Pigliucci summarizes Humphreys' argument against supervenience in the following terms: 
 
Humphreys claims that while accounts deploying supervenience often do so with an 
anti-reductionist aim, supervenience itself is no big foe of reductionism, for two 
reasons: (i) “If A supervenes upon B, then A is nothing but B’ talk”; and (ii) “if A 
supervenes upon B, then because A’s existence is necessitated by B’s existence, all 
that we need in terms of ontology is B.” I think that’s just about right, which 
explains why I’ve always felt that supervenience is an interesting philosophical 
concept, but has little to do with the debate about reductionism.410  
 
Instead of supervenience, Humphreys proposes that emergence is a concept needed to 
explain the relationship between different ontological layers. According to him, emergent 
phenomena display six features.  
First, emergent systems are novel. They exhibit new properties that did not exist before, 
or that, in the lower levels, gave rise to the emerged level. As such, the emergent system instantiates 
"a previously uninstantiated property".411 Second, a phenomenon is emergent if they are qualitatively 
different "from the properties from which they emerge". The third criterion is absence at the lower levels, 
for logical or nomological reasons. I would add that ontological reasons also hamper the possibility 																																																																																																																																																																																								
the higher ones, but that it constraints the ontological possibilities of the emergent system. This position could be 
contrasted with a stronger one, in which the emergent system is causally determined by its low-level components, being 
a merely epiphenomenal reality. See, e.g., Kim, J. (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 95(1/2), 3-36. ; Emmeche, C., Køppe, S. and Stjernfelt, F. (1997). 
Explaining Emergence: Towards an Ontology of Levels. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine 
Wissenschaftstheorie, 28(1), 83-119. ; Sawyer, K. R. (2004). The Mechanisms of Emergence. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 
34(2), 260-282.  
407 In Lawson, T. (2013). Emergence and Morphogenesis: Causal Reduction and Downward Causation? In Archer 
(Ed.), (pp. 61-84). Lausanne: Springer Science. p. 61. 
408 See Humphreys, P. (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience. Philosophy of Science, 64, 337-345.  
409 For a discussion on the subject, see von Kutschera, F. (1992). Supervenience and Reductionism. Erkenntnis, 36, 333-
343.  
410 See Pigliucci, M. (2012). Essays on Emergence, Part III.  Retrieved from http://goo.gl/Tqhosk. 
411 See Humphreys, P. (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience 
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of a lower level displaying properties of the emergent system. Fourth, there is a nomological difference:  
different laws apply to the distinct levels and, as such, the phenomena at the higher level respond to 
different laws and present different dynamics from the phenomena at the lower level. Fifth, 
emergent properties result from the interaction among its constituents. And sixth, emergent 
phenomena are holistic in the sense that they are properties of the entire system, irreducible to the 
local properties of its constituents.412 
I take as a premise that the sociological reality is emergent in this sense, and it displays 
all the features highlighted by Humphreys. Social entities (either entire social systems or social 
entities) display novel features, which do not exist in their constituting parts. A legal system, for 
example, is a feature that exists in society, not in the constitutive individuals of a social group. Social 
entities are qualitatively different from individuals as well, and social properties (such as 'legitimacy', 
or 'social integration', for instance) are absent at the lower ontological levels.  
Also, the understanding of a social system, or of a social entity, demands different 
theoretical accounts than those needed to explain individual behavior. Take the different 
perspectives from economics, sociology and psychology as an example of how distinct the 
theoretical approaches are. Even if microeconomics seeks to explain economic processes based on 
an account of how individuals behave, their analytical tools are grounded on the results of the 
interaction, not on the cognitive processes explaining individual behavior. Take the concept of 
equilibrium in game theory, for example: equilibrium can only be attributed to a social situation, 
not within each player in a game context. Social entities also emerge from the interaction at lower 
levels. A business firm can be defined as an association of individuals with the purpose of developing 
an economic activity. Individuals interact, perform specific constitutive acts, and establish the 
organization, which performs acts in its own right. Finally, social phenomena can be also described 
as holistic. Being a constitutional democracy, for example, is a property of the whole society, 
irreducible to any of its constitutive components. 
So far, so good. Sociological entities can be said to be emergent. But acknowledging this 
point leaves us with the question: how does sociological entities emerge from their individual 
components? In order to address this issue, I will focus on Keith Sawyer's answer to this problem, 
not because his answer is particularly relevant, but because he performs a thorough evaluation of 
contemporary sociological theories that try to solve the problem of emergence.   
According to Keith Sawyer, although contemporary sociology has focused on the 																																																								
412 See Humphreys, P. (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience 
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problem of emergence, the answers provided are contradictory and unsatisfactory. In order to 
support this claim, he mentions methodological collectivists, like Margaret Archer,413 who proposes that 
collectives possess emergent properties irreducible to individuals; and methodological individualists, who 
assume that collective properties are ultimately reducible to individual properties.414 After an 
exhaustive review of both positions,415 Sawyer concludes that both perspectives are doomed to fail 
because they do not properly address four issues related to social emergence: realism, causation, 
mechanism, and irreducibility.416  
In regards to realism, Sawyer states that individualist emergentists sustain that emergent 
social properties are not real, but mere theoretical constructs that need a low level explanation 
reducible to individual interactions. On the opposite side, collective emergentists support social 
realism, accepting the claim that social structures are autonomous from individuals. 417  The 
individual perspective is untenable because it does not acknowledge the causal role of social 
properties on individual behavior; while a strong collective approach is usually criticized for 
sustaining a social ontology entirely autonomous from individuals.418   
The second issue relates to causation. Methodological collectivists assume the existence of 
social properties that cause other social and individual facts. A paramount example of this 
perspective is Durkheim's concept of social fact. Individualists reject this approach on the grounds 
that all causes are reducible to individual interactions and, as such, there are no social facts.  
According to Sawyer, collectivists are wrong because they usually assume that social 
entities are ontologically autonomous from lower level entities – but, as such, they would not be able 
to have causal power over them. Individualists, on the other hand, are wrong because they reject 
the very possibility of downward causation of social facts on individuals – an empirically odd 
position.  However, Sawyer shows an intermediate position, sustained by non-reductive 
individualists. They conceive of social causation as a feedback process through which social 
properties can be imposed on individual properties insofar as their causal force relies "on its 																																																								
413 See Archer, M. S. (1996). Culture and Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Archer, M. S. (2000). Being 
Human: the Problem of Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Archer, M. S. (Ed.). (2013). Social Morphogenesis. 
Lausanne: Springer Science & Business Media. 
414 See Hayek, F. A. (1998). Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
415 On the side of methodological collectivists, Keith Sawyer reviews the sociological theories proposed by Peter Blau, 
Roy Bhaskar, Margaret Archer, Douglas Porpora, and Kyriakos Kontopoulos. As representatives of methodological 
individualists, Sawyer reviews the theories advanced by Axelrod, Coleman, Epstein, Axtell, Homans, Hayek and 
Menger. My purpose, here, is not to provide a full review of these authors, but to summarize and evaluate Sawyer’s 
critique. In order to see his thorough review of these authors, See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as 
Complex Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 63-99. 
416 See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 90. 
417 See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 90. 
418 See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 91. 
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individual-level supervenient base".419 
In what concerns the mechanism through which emergence arises, collectivists and 
individualists can find common ground according to Sawyer. For both, individual interaction is of 
paramount importance. Margaret Archer claims that, over time, interactions produce supervenient 
social structures that impose constraints on individual behavior. The idea of social morphogenesis 
entail that the social structures of the present emerged out of past interactions, but organize current and 
future individual action:  
 
Archer argued that it is emergence over time – morphogenesis – that makes 
emergent structural properties real and allows them to constrain individuals. 
Current social structures emerged from the past actions of individuals such that 
they cannot be explanatorily reduced to actions of current individuals.420 
 
An example from individual methodologists comes from Robert Axelrod's tournament 
mentioned in chapter 2. A cooperation structured around tit-for-tat strategists can emerge in a given 
population out of the interaction among individuals using different strategies. As a result, the 
population can be spatially organized (a group property) in clusters where tit-for-tat strategists 
cooperate with each other and isolate others. 
The last challenge to emergentists is related to irreducible complexity. There can be a 
huge disjunction between processes happening at lower-levels and higher-levels simultaneously. The 
same processes happening at the individual level can lead to different results in the higher level. This 
– again according to Sawyer's reading – is a challenge both for individualists, who do not accept the 
idea of irreducible complexity, and for collectivists, who have not yet defined the properties of 
systems likely to display irreducible high level emergent properties.421 
Although Sawyer rightfully identifies the issues at stake, he does not offer a convincing 
alternative theory to cope with the problem of emergence. However, he points out some elements 
that are worth-noting in order to build a persuasive postulation on the subject. According to him, 
studying social emergence requires us to focus simultaneously on three elements of analysis: 
individuals, their interactions, and the emergent social properties. 422  In his evaluation, most 
sociologists have focused on one or two of these elements, but not on all three of them. His narrative 
classifies the theoretical positions of 20th century sociology in two main categories concerning this 
problem: the Structure Paradigm and the Interaction Paradigm. Sawyer proposes a new theoretical 																																																								
419 In Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 92. 
420 In Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 83. 
421 See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 94. 
422 See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 191. 
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approach, the Emergent Paradigm.423 
The Structure Paradigm is based on the claim that there are only two levels of analysis: 
individual and social. This paradigm also admits some subdivisions. Structural determinists, such as 
Marxists, social constructivists and structuralists424 admit that structures are foundational and that, 
as a result, individual action is fully determined by sociocultural structures. According to them, 
society is the main ontological entity, and individual action – and ultimately even individual nature – 
is determined by social structures.425 Causation is a top-down process.  
Methodological individualists point out to the opposite relationship between the individual 
and the social domain: individual actions and beliefs determine the social structure. Everything in 
the social domain is determined by lower-level properties and, as such, causation is conceived of as a 
strict bottom-up process. Examples of these positions are microeconomic perspectives based on 
rational choice and game theory.426  There are also hybrid theories, which admit causation in both 
ways, such as Parsons' structural-functionalism and Archer's morphogenetic social realism.427 To 
Sawyer, however, all hybrid theories end up falling on either the Structure Paradigm or the 
Interaction Paradigm. 
The Structural Paradigm fails, according to Sawyer's reading, because it does not 
incorporate any theory about how what happens in the lower levels of reality connects to social 
reality. This is not an unexpected result, since the ontological basis of social reality is either assumed 
to rely on higher-level processes (structural determinists), or to exist merely as a supervenient 
structure with no downward causal power (methodological individualists). As a result, it does not 
explain how structures emerge, because they are either assumed to exist as such from the beginning, 
or to not exist at all428.  
The second perspective concerning the level of analysis is the Interaction Paradigm. 
Instead of focusing on the individual/social dichotomy, this standpoint focuses on interactions as its 																																																								
423 It is important to note that Sawyer’s distinction between paradigms should be understood as a didactic artifact to 
group widely different sociological perspectives in order to contrast them with his own approach. Only by assuming this 
benevolent perspective it is possible to ignore some grotesque implications of his classification scheme. For instance – as 
we will see –, he classifies the Frankfurt School as having a Structural Paradigmatic perspective, whereas he considers 
Habermas (a member of the Frankfurt School!) a representative of the Interaction Paradigm. Besides that, I think that 
the proposed scheme, as flawed and simplistic as it might be, is useful in highlighting the major issues at stake. 
424 Sawyer includes in the Structural Paradigm, Marx, the Frankfurt School, Levi-Strauss, Bathes, and Foucault. 
425 In Sawyer’s words: “In the 1930s, the Frankfurt School extended these notions by arguing that knowledge itself is 
socially constructed; in the 1960s, French structuralists such as Levi-Strauss, Barthes, and Foucault argued that even our 
concept of the ‘individual’ had been a byproduct of a certain period in capitalism.” In Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social 
Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 193. 
426 See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 195. 
427 See Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. pp. 192-193. 
428 In Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 197. 
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analytical units. According to interactionists, all phenomena – both at the structural and the 
individual levels – derive from networks of interactions. The precursor of this approach was the 
German sociologist Georg Simmel, who explained the whole social order in terms of interaction. In 
a commentary on Simmel's conception of society, David Frisby states that "society is thus composed 
of the ceaseless interaction of its individual elements, a conception that forces Simmel’s sociology to 
concentrate upon human relationships, namely, social interaction".429 Other sociologists included 
by him in this paradigm are Cooley, Mead, Bourdieu and Habermas.430  
Most interactionists’ denial of the ontological status of social structures is flawed, since 
they do not propose any mechanism between social structure and interaction. The claim that only 
interactions matter conflates both social structure and individuals in a continuum flow 
(interaction).431 In doing so, interactionists cannot offer a convincing account of how causation 
between individuals and structures occur, neither of how social structures constrain individuals and 
interactions.  
This is why it sounds odd to group Habermas' theory of communicative action under 
the label of strict symbolic interactionism. Although the German philosopher was deeply influenced 
by Mead's focus on symbolic mediated interaction432, it would be wrong to affirm that he denies the 
ontological status of social structures and individuals. The very distinction between lifeworld and 
system in his theory can only be properly understood if the three levels are considered and not 
conflated into communication. To him, society is conceived of simultaneously both as system and 
lifeworld433. Roughly speaking, system refers to an external-observer’s perspective according to 
which society is a self-regulative autonomous system constituted by subsystems serving a function in 
the maintenance of the whole.434 The internal logic of each system is founded on patterns of 
strategic action based on the pursuit of the subsystem's ends. Lifeworld, on its turn, refers to the 
shared common understandings of members of a particular community, founded not on strategic 
action, but constituted by language and culture (435seen as "the stock of knowledge from which 
participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an 																																																								
429 In Frisby, D. (1992). Simmel and Since. 1992: Routledge. p. 23. 
430 See  Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 199. 
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432 See Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist 
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433 See Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason. p. 118. 
434 See Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist 
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435 As Habermas say, “Language and culture are constitutive for the lifeworld itself”. In Habermas, J. (1987). The 
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understanding about something in the world")436, and constituting communicative action.  In this 
sense, lifeworld refers to the individual interaction dynamics, while system refers to how a structure 
is produced on the grounds of strategic action. 
A way to solve the dichotomy between the Structural Paradigm and the Interaction 
Paradigm is what Sawyer defines as the Emergent Paradigm437, an attempt to overcome the 
deficiencies of both paradigms. According to his account, the Interaction Paradigm fails for 
rejecting the structural level of analysis, while the Structural Paradigm rejects symbolic 
communication and interaction. The Emergent Paradigm, as proposed by Keith Sawyer, tries to 
build on these deficiencies and to reconcile both the Interaction and Structural Paradigms by 
proposing that "structural properties can be said to emerge from collective micro foundations of 
action"438 while acknowledging that structures also impose downward constraints on individuals. 
As a result, he proposes two new intermediate levels of analysis between micro-
sociological and macro-sociological processes: stable emergents and ephemeral emergents. As a result, his 
account is based on five levels. The first two levels embody the Micro-sociological level, involving 
psychological processes (Level A) - such as intentions, beliefs, individual memory and cognitive processes 
-, and interaction (Level B) among individuals. The Meso-sociological level includes two other 
analytical levels, involving both ephemeral emergents (Level C) - such as interactional context and 
structure, status assignments and participation structure -, and stable emergents (Level D) - including 
shared social practices, collective memory and group subcultures. And, finally, there is the Macro-
sociological level (Level E), where infrastructure and written texts affecting social structure are taken 
into account. 
These levels interact in a complex manner, designated as the circle of emergence.439 The 
focal point of the process lies on the intermediate levels - B, C, and D -, leaving both individuals (A) 
and social structures (E) almost as epiphenomena resulting from the process. Although Sawyer 
explicitly states that there is a downward causation flow going from social structures to individuals, 
he barely theorizes about how this happens. Likewise, the role of individuals in the process of 
emergence is unconvincing, since he splits the concept of individual into two elements: its 
biological/psychological universal components, which he denies having any role in sociological 
explanation, and its social psychological nature, the part of individual personality subjected to 																																																								
436 In Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason. p. 138. 
437 See  Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 210. 
438 In  Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 210. 
439 See  Sawyer, K. R. (2005). Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. p. 219. 
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change due to the socialization processes.440 Although Sawyer also admits a role for psychological 
processes in social emergence, he also does not explore it properly. 
According to him, interaction (B) between individuals generates ephemeral emergents (C), 
which last only while the interaction is taking place.441 Conversation is one such example of 
ephemeral emergence, given the fact that a conversation can only be established through collective 
action caused by the interaction amongst individuals, while at the same time imposing constraints 
on that interaction. When a conversation is happening, many limits are imposed on individual 
action, such as the subject of the conversation and the proper acceptable responses to each 
communicative act. These constraints are fluid, however, depending on a continuing negotiation 
between the participants, and the emergent level ends as soon as the encounter is over. 
The third level (D) accounts for stable emergents, which is related to the shared history of a 
group, emergent elements that last more than one encounter.442 They include collective memory, 
group learning and peer culture, including the culture and language of an entire society. Stable 
emergents can have different degrees of stability, from weeks or months (such as slangs or jokes) to 
entire generations (such as the group’s history).  
The circle of emergence entails causation across all these levels. Structures constrain 
individuals, but, on the other hand, they are also indirect products of their interaction with one 
another, mediated across ephemeral and stable emergents. Ephemeral emergents can endure and 
become stable emergents, able to be crystalized and to cause structural changes. Structures can also 
constrain ephemeral emergents, by providing a contextual background that pre-selects the kinds of 
interaction that can occur in a given environment. For instance, being in a work environment such 
as an office or a manufacturing plant (material structure) limits the kinds of interaction between the 
workers.  
Some points should be noticed on Keith Sawyer's theory of emergence.  
Firstly, Sawyer's Emergentist Paradigm is mostly synchronic and only marginally 
diachronic. His account explains how social structures emanate from individual action across the 
many layers of sociological analysis in a given time, but it does not explain why social structures and 
ephemeral/stable emergents change over time. He acknowledges the influence of the past in 
structures and stable emergents, but does not explain why they are stable at all – the reason why 
they are selected as a structure.  																																																								
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Second, his account does not provide a good account on how to connect sociology to a 
naturalistic approach. Although Sawyer acknowledges that some psychological features are 
universal and the product of evolutionary processes, he is silent on the subject of how this 
psychological structure imposes enabling/limiting constraints on the kinds of social structures that 
can emerge.  
As such, Sawyer's contribution is an interesting, but incomplete step forward in building 
an emergent sociological theory. He is right in pointing out to the need for a multilevel theory that 
takes into account causation across all levels, and he is also right to indicate the epistemological 
limits of the sociological theories developed so far, but his proposal also has some deficiencies. Both 
limitations, as I will argue, can be overcome if we introduce a missing element in his formulation: 
the evolutionary approach, capable both of explaining why structures are maintained over time and 
of proposing a naturalistic framework to account for sociological problems. This is not a naïve 
statement based on some presumed superiority of biology over sociology, but a conclusion that 
derives from assuming that Darwin's natural selection framework of explanation can be applied to 
any complex system composed of entities that display variation, heredity and differential replication.  
In chapter 2, I called attention to gene-culture coevolution, a specific theory about 
human evolution according to which Darwinian principles can be applied to understand the nature 
of human sociality. According to the explanation developed in that chapter, the fact that we, human 
beings, are capable of transmitting culture and accumulating cultural variants over time, and that 
we enclose ourselves in culturally segregated groups, has enabled natural selection to work at the 
level of cultural groups. The mode of cultural cooperation, based on some tribal instincts that 
enabled us to live in cultural groups, transformed human bands in natural selection units, displaying 
variation (cultural traits vary among groups), heredity (cultural variants are transmitted within 
groups from generation to generation) and differential replication (human groups displaying certain 
traits are more or less prone to replicate their structure to future groups).  
As a result, we can attempt to use Darwinian theory in order to understand explain the 
evolution of cultural and sociological entities. Richerson and Boyd's gene-culture coevolution 
theory, however, was never aimed at explaining more than cultural evolution as it happens in small 
cultural groups – or, at best, in large groups based on a culturally homogenous ethos, such as most 
civilizations in Antiquity.  But the path opened by their theory can lead to destinations not explored 
by them. If we take into account developments recently made in sociological theory, we can attempt 
to delineate a multilevel selection sociological theory that can be used to understand the evolution of 
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modern society.  
Now, I will refer to a broadly different theoretical approach: Luhmann's systems theory.  
My point is that, reinterpreted through the lenses of dual inheritance theory, his framework leads to 
an evolutionary understanding of social evolution that takes into account the reciprocal implications 
between psychological processes, individual interaction based on the transmission of cultural 
information, the construction of groups, and the emergence of institutions, structures and social 
systems. Based on this reformulated approach of his thought, I will argue that the systems theory, 
reformulated through the lenses of the gene-culture coevolution theory, can be conciliated with 
Peter Godfrey-Smith's perspective in order to provide a good starting point for the elaboration of a 
theory of sociocultural Darwinian populations. 
 
3.2.2. Luhmann's Theory as a Bridge between Sociology and Psychology 
 
A major task of the theory of sociological emergence is to explain how social entities 
emerge from interactions among agents that relate to each other based on their psychology. 
Traditional sociology is not suited for the conciliatory task of unifying these theoretical fields 
because it naïvely assumes that social facts can only derive from other social facts and that human 
psychology cannot play any definite role in explaining the logic of human societies. As Émile 
Durkheim says, "when the individual has been eliminated, society alone remains."443 According to 
Durkheim, minds cannot impose any constraints on the collective consciousness of a society:  
 
Collective representations, emotions, and tendencies are caused not by certain 
states of the consciousnesses of individuals but by the conditions in which the social 
group, in its totality, is placed. Such actions can, of course materialize only if the 
individual natures are not resistant to them; but these individual natures are merely 
the indeterminate material that the social factor molds and transforms. Their 
contribution consists exclusively in very general attitudes, in vague and 
consequently plastic predispositions that, by themselves, if other agents did not 
intervene, could not take on the definite and complex forms that characterize social 
phenomena.444  
 
Of course, Durkheim does not represent the entire sociological tradition. Even during 
his time, he faced strong opposition from his major rival, Gabriel Tarde, another French sociologist. 
Tarde accused Durkheim of adopting a scholastic ontology because his assumption that society did 																																																								
443 See Durkheim, È. (1962). The Rules of the Sociological Method. Glencoe: Free Press p. 102. 
444 See Durkheim, È. (1962). The Rules of the Sociological Method. pp. 105-106. 
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not depend on individuals implied that taking individuals out of society would leave everything 
unchanged.445 Tarde adopted an atomistic path to address this issue: society is no more than the 
sum of its parts. In his view, social action was caused by the interaction of individuals who imitated 
behaviors that later on became internalized in the form of beliefs and desires. As a result, ideas 
propagated from mind to mind.446 Sociology was recast as a collective psychology, the result of the 
communication of cultural elements that emerged from individual minds (intra-mental psychology) 
and were then transmitted to other individuals through imitation. However, even if he considered 
that understanding, psychological law was an important part of sociology, and Tarde also followed 
Durkheim’s strict fission between the natural world and culture.447 
In an endeavor to overcome the atomistic and holistic approaches, systems theory 
attempted to take an alternative route. Its starting point is the Parsonian theorem of double 
contingency – the idea that social action is ultimately indeterminate because the action of one 
individual (ego) depends on the action of the other (alter). An expectation about how the alter will 
behave must occur before the ego decides its course of action. Therefore, social action is 
indeterminate.448 Game theory attempts to solve this problem via the concept of equilibrium, which 
is achieved when every agent behaves rationally and no better outcome could be rationally 
expected.449 Talcott Parsons followed a different path. According to him, double contingency can be 
solved through the assumption of consensus resulting from a shared symbolic system that provides 
values and normative orientation to guide human action.450 According to Luhmann, this approach 																																																								
445 Terry Nichols Clark, professor at the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago, in the introduction of 
Gabriel Tarde on Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers, comments on this point in the following terms: 
“Durkheim posited as the essentially social fact not that which was imitated, but that which was exterior to the 
individual and imposed on him through a sort of constraint. Firmly committed to the position elaborated by his 
professor, Boutroux, that sciences developed on successive emergent levels, and that the basic principles of a science 
must be found distinctly on its ‘own level’, Durkehim refused to accept that sociological principles should be grounded 
in psychology. Sociology as a distinctive science, he held, must take as its object of study social facts; and these social 
facts must find their causes as well as their consequences in other distinctly social facts. An apparently logical extension 
of this reasoning, which Tarde as well as Durkheim occasionally drew, was that the subject matter of sociology, being 
exterior to each individual, was consequently outside of all members comprising a given social group. But such a 
conclusion was absurd: take away all individual members of a group, and the essential sociological characteristics 
remain. This was, Tarde held, the necessary consequence of Durkheim’s postulates, and it generated nothing more than 
the ‘scholastic ontology’s the medieval philosophical realists. In opposition to the doctrine that the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts, Tarde held that the whole is equal to no more than the sum of its parts; he labeled himself, when 
forced to do so, a philosophical nominalist”. In Tarde, G. (1969). On Communication and Social Influence: Selected 
Papers. pp. 16-17. 
446 See Tarde, G. (1969). On Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers. p. 96. 
447 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2002). Culture is Part of Human Biology: Why the Superorganic Concept Serves 
the Human Sciences Badly. In Goodman and Moffat (Eds.), Probing Human Origins (pp. 1-113). Cambridge (MA): 
American Academy of Arts & Sciences. p. 62. 
448 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 103. 
449 See Rapoport, A. (1970). N-person Game Theory. Mineola: Courier Dover Publications. p. 63. 
450 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. pp. 104-105. 
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is flawed because it assumes an a priori difference between the biological and psychological 
structures of the subjects of action (alter/ego). This difference, however, cannot be taken for granted 
because it occurs only as a result of the differentiation within the dynamic action system and not 
prior to it.451  
Rather than focusing on actions of specific individuals, systems theory concentrates on 
communication as a means of overcoming double contingency in a more determined state of affairs. 
Double contingency means indeterminacy in the sense that no agent can reliably trust in the action 
of alters. To solve this problem, systems theory assumes a difference between psychic systems 
(individual psychology) and the social system.452 Focusing only on what happens within individual 
psychology is insufficient because no one has direct access to the content of another’s mind; one 
mind is a black box to another. However, when social action occurs, each agent can trustfully 
coordinate his actions with the actions of others because he understands the cognitive and 
normative expectations towards his behavior. These expectations are grounded in shared knowledge 
that enables the possibility of mutual understanding through communication.453  
Luhmann recognizes the necessary role of individual psychology in establishing the 
foundations for the emergence of social systems by stating an important but unfortunately not well-
developed hypothesis. According to Luhmann, “Psychic and social systems have evolved together. 
At any time the one kind of system is the necessary environment of the other. Persons cannot 
emerge and continue to exist without social systems, nor can social systems without persons.”454 
This is a true advancement when compared with the sociology of Durkheim, Tarde and Parsons, 
who gave little importance to the codependence between mind and society.  
In this sense, Luhmann’s systems theory lays important theoretical foundations for 
understanding how psychological and sociocultural processes interact and produce social evolution. 
Communication is a process that occurs only in social systems and never inside an individual’s 
mind. Psychic systems and social systems operate through different processes: the former creates 
links between thoughts, while the latter links communications. The links between psychic systems 																																																								
451 Parsons had in mind (in a fairly rough sense) subjects of action, who confront one another with self-determined (not 
just naturally given) needs, and who depend on one another for the satisfaction of their needs. But this account of the 
problem leaves its flank open to attack. One would have to ask what these subjects of action (actors, agents) designated 
as ego and alter really are if what constitutes their ‘organism’ (latter ‘behavioral system’) and ‘personality’ is 
differentiated only within the action system, and is not given in advance to the system. And one would have to ask how 
contingency is to be understood if all determinate order emerges only within the problematic of double contingency. See 
Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 105. 
452 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 108. 
453 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. pp. 322-324; Luhmann, N. (2014). A Sociological Theory of Law. pp. 31-
40. 
454 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 59. 
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and social systems occur through language, as part of a structural coupling that translates thoughts 
into communications and vice-versa.455 Nonetheless, each of these systems is operationally closed; 
their internal operations refer only to communications that occur inside each system, and not to 
operations that occur in its environment, such that psychic systems and social systems constitute 
part of each other’s environments.456 In this sense, social systems are considered autopoietic because 
their development is possible through the reciprocal relations amongst the intrinsic communications 
that are selected within the domain of each system and that can only refer to processes that occur in 
other systems in its own terms.457 
Two important concepts in systems theory ought to be explored in order to understand 
their exact meaning to the purposes advanced herewith. The first point to be noticed is that the idea 
of autopoiesis does not entail that a system is closed within its own environment, but that it observes 
its environments according to its own criteria. Its operations can be directed to itself (self-reference) 
or to its environment, including other systems (hetero-reference), but always according to its internal 
communicative standards. 458  When a social system observes another, it translates the 
communications happening inside that system according to its own criteria. An economic 
transaction is read by the legal system as a contract backed by legal rules, while the economic 
system understands the same transaction according to the exchange advantages for the involved 
agents. 
The other important concept is interpenetration.  When a psychic system observes 
communications happening within a social system, it translates its meanings to patterns 
understandable in terms of consciousness. Even if psychic systems do not participate in 																																																								
455  See Maurer, K. (2010). Communication and Language in Niklas Luhmann's Systems-Theory. Pandaemonium 
Germanicum (Online), 16.  
456 As Gunther Teubner says: “Socio-biologists insist that social evolution is biological. They thus fail to take account of 
the autonomy of social systems and their evolution. As we saw in chapter 3, it is the essence of social and legal 
autopoiesis that society and law represent emergent systems of communication. Although these have an organic and 
psychic basis, they are self-referentially closed in their mode of operation. Biological evolutionary mechanisms can thus 
have no direct impact on social or legal development. Socio-legal evolution, defined as the interplay between variation, 
selection, and retention, can occur only if the corresponding mechanisms have emerged within the communicative 
sphere. The unit of social or legal evolution is neither the human individual nor a grouping of individuals nor a 'selfish' 
gene, but society or law itself as a system of communication. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that 
genuine biological evolution and genuine social evolution might reciprocally influence each other. However, any such 
influence can be conceived only as a reciprocal relationship between autonomous systems which evolve according to 
their own logic. It is not 'biocultural' evolution in the sense of the biologically determined social development described 
by Biihl. What we are talking about here is co-evolution”. In Teubner, G. (1993). Law as an Autopoietic System. p. 52. 
457 See Teubner, G. (1993). Law as an Autopoietic System. pp. 29-30. 
458 As Luhmann says: “(…) the system can use its own operations to distinguish itself from its environment. It can 
communicate about itself (about communication) and/or about its environment. It can distinguish between self-
reference and hetero-reference, but it has to be done by an internal operation”. In Luhmann, N. (1995b). Why Does 
Society Describe Itself as Postmodern? Cultural Critique(30), 171-186.  
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communication, they are connected to it because both consciousness and communication are based 
on meaning as a unit of operation. As a result, psychic systems and social systems can be causally 
connected through interpenetration, while being both autopoietic in nature: 
 
Interpenetration presupposes the capacity for connecting different kinds of 
autopoiesis – here, organic life, consciousness, and communication. It prevents 
autopoiesis from becoming allopoiesis; it produces relationships of dependency that 
evolutionarily prove their worth by being compatible with autopoiesis. This makes 
it easier to understand why the concept of meaning must be employed on such a 
high theoretical level. Meaning enables psychic and social system formations to 
interpenetrate, while protecting their autopoiesis; meaning simultaneously enables 
consciousness to understand itself and continue to affect itself in communication, 
and enables communication to be referred back to the consciousnesses of the 
participants. Therefore the concept of meaning supersedes the concept of the 
animale sociale. Not the property of a specific kind of living being, but the referential 
wealth of meaning enables the formation of societal systems through which human 
beings can have consciousness and life.459 
 
The Luhmannian systems theory can provide a solid foundation for an evolutionary 
sociological theory that seriously takes into account the role of psychological processes as a 
precondition for the evolution of social systems precisely because he acknowledges interpenetration 
as an important process, causally connecting both psychological and social levels. As a result, 
systems theory provides a sophisticated account on the relationship between individual psychology 
and society.  
 To be fair to his legacy, Luhmann does not hold that social evolution is completely 
independent of psychological processes, but that mental operations can only affect what happens in 
society through the conversion of thoughts into communications via language – a structural 
coupling that bridges the gap between minds and social systems – and other forms of 
interpenetration and operative couplings460.  
As a result, any influence of psychological processes must be understood, from a 
sociological perspective, in terms of constraints and background noise.461 But these constraints, I will 
argue, pose important questions for the understanding of social organization. There is much 
evidence, gathered from different fields – anthropology, ethnology, sociobiology, evolutionary 
biology, sociology, population genetics, and behavioral ecology – that support the claim that social 
																																																								
459 In Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 219. 
460 See, e.g., Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 219; Luhmann, N. (2004). Law as a Social System. pp. 381-382. 
461 Noise is to be understood here in a technical sense, as unorganized information. See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social 
Systems. p. 83. 
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structures actually reflect many features of our minds.462 As I will argue, this is not a coincidence, 
but a consequence of evolutionary constraints imposed by our minds in the process of sociocultural 
evolution. 
It is clear that Luhmann’s theory opens the possibility for such a reading of how 
psychological processes interpenetrate and, by doing so, enable operations at higher social levels. 
Luhmann himself did not pursue this path, but he left the door open for such a theoretical attempt. 
And, as I will argue, following this road seems to fit well with the theoretical framework of gene-
culture coevolutionary theory.  
As I see it, Luhmann’s theory is a true advancement in comparison with other 
sociological theories in relation to the way it sees the relationship between mind and society. 
Durkheim, Mead, Boas and others adopted the separation thesis, according to which social 
processes are almost entirely autonomous vis-à-vis mental operations.463 Luhmann also accepts the 
autonomy of social systems, but unlike them he acknowledges that psychological processes coevolve 
with social systems and, as a result, impose constraints on them (and are constrained by them as 
well).   
The empirical evidence is clearly stacked against the separation thesis and in support of 
the claim that our minds impose constrains on human societies. As discussed above, human minds 
have some innate knowledge from the beginning regarding what a society should be. The evidence 
presented thus far shows that the human mind expects to live in a social world where there are 
strong ties among genetically related individuals, free riders are punished, reciprocal relations are 
respected, cooperation is mediated through the identification of in-group members (who deserve to 
be trusted), and out-groups (who are to be treated suspiciously). We also display a sense of fairness 
based on inequity aversion and suspicion towards those who try to climb the ladder of social rank to 
exploit others. Not surprisingly, all human societies display these features to a certain extent. If 
social systemic operations were really so independent from mental operations, we should expect far 
more diversity among societies than we actually have.  
One might object to this statement by maintaining that human societies do display far 																																																								
462 See, e.g., Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (Eds.). (1992). The Adapted Mind; Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in 
the Forest; Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (2007). Culture, Adaptation, and Innateness. In Carruters, Laurence and 
STICH (Eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 23-38). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bloom, P. 
(2010, May 01). The Moral Life of Babies; Bloom, P. (2013). Just Babies; Cochran, G., Hardy, J. and Harpending, H. 
(2006). Natural history of Ashkenazi intelligence. Journal of biosocial science, 38(5), 659-693. ; Cochran, G. and 
Harpending, H. (2009). The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution (Kindle ed.). New York: 
Basic Books. 
463 See Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1992). The Psychological Foundations of Culture. In Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 
(Eds.), The Adapted Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 22-43. 
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more diversity than would be expected if they depended on innate and universal features of our 
minds. However, that would not be a particularly good response. According to gene-culture co-
evolutionary theory, the universal features of our social mind (the principles of our universal moral 
grammar) are entangled with particular cultural elements of each society. Additionally, this theory 
allows substantial room for independent sociocultural evolution, which might lead different societies 
to follow divergent evolutionary paths. However, the breadth of diversity that might emerge from 
the separation thesis would be far greater than what we actually have. We should expect societies in 
which there would be no punishment for violating social norms, where people cooperated more 
with out-groups than with their peers, and where individuals would prefer to be treated unfairly 
than to receive their fair share for their efforts. Notably, there is no evidence about the existence of 
these types of societies, and if the absence of such evidence is not a definitive proof to support the 
empirical truth of the gene-culture coevolutionary theory, it at least backs the claim that the 
reproduction of social systems does depend on certain innate features of our psychology.  
Of course, it would be naïve to accuse Luhmann of not having moved in the proposed 
direction. The very hypothesis of the universal moral grammar was still being developed in 1998, 
the year that Luhmann died. Furthermore, much evidence about gene-culture coevolutionary 
processes has been discovered in the last decade. Multilevel selection theory, which lays much of the 
foundations required for this theoretical framework, has been accepted as a feasible possibility only 
in recent decades. Neurological evidence regarding the dependence of our moral behavior on 
specific brain processes was also not uncontroversially available to him.  
Even if this does not mean that Luhmann’s theory should be abandoned, it does indicate 
that it must account for these facts. In this section, I propose three main ways in which Luhmannian 
sociology should be adjusted to be compatible with the new scientific knowledge about the 
relationship between mind and society. It must incorporate the following as major tenets of systems 
theory: (i) the understanding that minds impose constraints on the evolution of cultural systems; (ii) a 
micro-sociological theory of the evolution of culture; and (iii) multilevel selection. Finally, I will 
discuss Luhmann’s account of Darwinian theory, with the purpose of reconciling his autopoietic 
vein with a more strict Darwinian approach. Luhmann himself had some intuitions about these 
themes, as demonstrated by certain isolated discussions in his writings. Thus, in some sense, the task 
is to further develop those intuitions and not to debunk his sociological framework, which has 
significant value for social theory. 
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3.2.2.1. The Biological Constraints of Cultural Evolution 
 
The first task is to incorporate the fact that minds impose constraints on the evolution of 
cultural systems. Luhmann himself used the concept of constraint to account for the fact that 
different social systems impose reciprocal limits on the evolutionary possibilities of one another. 
Whenever a new system is formed, it constructs a boundary between itself and its environment, 
constraining its own possibilities for further evolution. It gains deepness but loses scope and width. 
When law differentiates itself from morality, religion and politics, these domains escape the realm of 
legality, but law itself gains more possibilities for internal evolution and for increasing its own 
complexity. As Luhmann states: 
 
On the one hand, reproduction is subject to the conditions for connectivity; it must 
be able to suit a situation. On the other, it offers possibilities for forming within the 
system a new system having its own system/environment difference – perhaps a 
system that will last longer than the initial one. (…) Settled system differentiations 
stabilize the possibilities for reproduction by constraining conditions on the 
comprehensibility of communication and the suitability of behavioral modes. But 
the meaning surpluses that must be produced alongside provide ever further 
chances for innovative systems formation; in other words, they provide the chance 
to include new differences and new constraints and thus to increase the ability to 
constrain the initial situation via differentiation. Only thus can system complexity 
increase.464 
 
Here, Luhmann refers to internal differentiation, which “connects onto the boundaries 
of the already-differentiated system and treats the bounded domain as a special environment in 
which further systems can be formed.”465 Internal differentiation occurs when similar systems 
differentiate from similar ones – as it occurs when society differentiates itself into social systems such 
as law, religion, science, economy, among others. Each system creates a boundary between itself 
and the other social systems, thus limiting its own evolutionary possibilities. They are similar 
because they reproduce through communication; thus, their differentiation is built onto comparable 
semantic patterns. 
However, there is also external differentiation, which happens when systems emerge 
from different ontological systems. Luhmann distinguishes among three different types of 
autopoietic systems: living systems, psychic systems, and social systems. Living systems (brains, cells, 
organisms, etc.) operate upon media that exist in the natural world, such as pressure, temperature, 
proteins, and other living beings. Psychic systems operate through consciousness, which consists of 																																																								
464 In Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 189. 
465 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 189. 
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all thoughts and feelings that have meaning for an individual. Finally, social systems operate by 
means of communication.466  
The distinction between internal and external differentiation processes leads us to ask 
how social systems could emerge from psychic and living systems. This is an evolutionary question 
that demands the type of explanation sketched out in the first two sections above. However, this 
response entails enormous consequences for systems theory: it must acknowledge that the very 
autopoietic logic of social systems does depend on psychic processes.  
When considering internal differentiation among social systems, Luhmann accepts that 
different systems impose reciprocal constraints on one another’s evolutionary possibilities. The 
evolution of law changes the environmental selection dynamics regarding religion, politics, economy 
and other social systems, limiting and blindly directing their evolution (and vice-versa). Luhmann 
also distinguishes between two processes of differentiation: horizontal and hierarchic. When systems 
are horizontally differentiated, they impose constraints on other systems via the contact between 
each system’s boundaries. Hierarchical differentiation, on the other hand, imposes another type of 
constraint, which is akin to a containment process. A system that differentiates itself into two 
subsystems imposes constraints on each one of them in the sense that the internal logic of each is 
dependent on the parent system’s logic. When law differentiates itself into legal subsystems (such as 
trade law, criminal law, or environmental law), each subsystem has both an internal logic that 
maintains its differentiation, and an abstract and shared logic that identifies them as legal 
subsystems.  
The type of constraint that psychic systems impose on social systems is akin to the limits 
imposed through hierarchical containment. However, while containment implies that a social 
system and its subsystems share the same means of reproduction – communication – the constraints 
imposed by psychic systems on social systems are of a different order. As Luhmann says, psychic 
systems cannot communicate with social systems; the only transitive connection between them can 
only be established through language, which converts thoughts into communications and vice-versa. 
Luhmann is correct in positing that language is a structural coupling between psychic systems and 
social systems.467 But we must also establish a second distinction, making a differentiation between 																																																								
466 See King, M. and Thornhill, C. (2006). Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Politics and Law. p. 4; Luhmann, N. (1986). 
The Autopoiesis of Social Systems. In Geyer and van der Zouwen (Eds.), Sociocybernetic Paradoxes. London: Sage. p. 172. 
467 It is important to highlight that language is not the only means through which psychic systems and social systems 
relate to each other. Psychic systems also interpenetrate social systems, being a precondition for their very existence. As 
Evan Knodt states, “no social system could exist without the environment of conscious systems”. In Luhmann, N. 
(1995a). Social Systems. p. xxvii There are also operative couplings within and between different systems. See 
Luhmann, N. (2004). Law as a Social System. pp. 41-42. 
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culture and society. As discussed above, conceiving of social systems as ‘social’ is misleading because 
it undermines the distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘society’.468  We should then reformulate the 
concept of social system as sociocultural system – a system which encompasses cultural transmission 
embodied within a particular social structure.469 And this is an important distinction because there 
are many other animal species that engage in social behavior without the emergence of ‘social 
systems’. Ants, bees and termites live in highly complex societies, vampire bats engage in reciprocal 
relationships and chimpanzees have a very complex social life in which most of their communitarian 
behavior is fully regulated through innate dispositions.  
In each of these cases, the structural coupling between individual psychology and social 
reality was mediated not through language but through individual minds. My point is not that one 
mind connects to another in these cases, but that the social problems can be solved by resourcing to 
innate dispositions nested within the mind of each individual as a result of a natural selection of 
behavioral dispositions. A bee, a vampire bat or a chimpanzee can engage in complex social 
behaviors not because they can create an autonomous and autopoietic system through language, 
but because they can solve double contingency by using a mental heuristics that enables them to 
accurately interpret cues from their environment (including their social world). As a result, their 
social world is ontologically constrained by their minds.  
By mixing up the concepts of ‘social’ and ‘cultural’, Luhmann could not see this 
difference. And the same happens in human sociability: our ancestors became cultural beings 
because the distinction between the social and cultural domains turned out to be stringent. Our 
ancestors’ social lives were completely determined by their innate psychological dispositions (their 
universal moral grammar). Their minds were the structural coupling that enabled a bridge between 
their biology and the social world – which is pretty much what happens in other animal societies. 
However, when cumulative culture became a salient adaptation that solved the problem of social 
life in large groups, the psychic systems had to cope with the complexity of culture in a different 																																																								
468 Professor Marcelo Neves, a former Luhmann student and a known specialist in his school of thought, has sustained 
that there is a logical fallacy of ambiguity here. According to him, I only changed the use of the terms ‘culture’ and 
‘social’ in order to criticize Luhmann because he does not use my proposed meaning of these concepts. My argument 
goes deeper than that, though. My claim is that it is not possible to conflate culture within the social structure without 
losing a useful distinction. In her foreword of Luhmann’s Social Systems, for instance, Eva M. Knodt categorically states 
that the German sociologist conceptualizes of “the social in terms of a meaning-processing system of communication”. 
See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. xxix Social systems are “meaning systems”, in this sense See Luhmann, N. 
(1995a). Social Systems. p. 37. Here I follow W. G. Runciman’s distinction between the social and cultural domains of 
evolutionary selection, which highlights the fact that ‘social’ relates to the normative structure that underlies the process of 
‘cultural’ evolution, which, in Luhmannian terms, would be related to meaning. Luhmann is aware of this, but he 
conflates both domains (‘normative structure’ and ‘meaning’) in the concept of ‘social system’. See Runciman, W. G. 
(2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. 
469 I will return to this point in subsection 3.2.2.4 (Luhmann’s Darwin: Reconciling Autopoiesis and Evolution). 
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way. Cultural evolution imposed quicker changes than those previously seen in social environments; 
our ancestral minds were innately equipped with dispositions to address stable societies, not with 
rapid change. If a universal moral grammar could bridge the gap between psychic systems and 
stable social environments, it is a flawed and outdated solution to cope with the increasingly 
changing cultural world. Language was selected as a useful adaptation to bridge this gap – not 
between psychic systems and society but between minds and culture.  
As Luhmann believed, language is the means through which social communications is 
linked with individual minds, and can affect or be affected by them. However, this is only part of the 
necessary explanatory scheme because this proposition only explains how psychic systems cope with 
culture, while remaining blind to the moral grammar that is necessary for social life. In this sense, it 
is the interplay between innate mental dispositions and language that fills the gap between biology, 
culture and society. If the gene-culture coevolutionary hypothesis is correct, our universal moral 
grammar has become sensible to particular aspects of local cultures. Thus, it differentiated itself 
between a core of universal principles and a multitude of culturally adapted normative assumptions 
(parameters). Our primate ancestors could rely only on universal principles because their minds did 
not have to cope with the problem of cultural diversity. In the last 200,000 years, we became 
capable of living in cultural systems because our minds bridged the gap between an innate 
psychology and a cultural lifeworld. Universalism/particularism are two codependent and pervasive 
sides of the same coin in the human social experience. 
As a result, human psychic systems impose ontological constraints on cultural evolution. 
First, the structures of human societies must be compatible with the innate social expectations of our 
minds. Otherwise, psychological distress would lead to social disruption. Even if cultural variants 
could describe an infinite amount of possible societies, only a small set of these would be compatible 
with our mental dispositions because of the decoupling between the cultural and social domains; 




3.2.2.2. Systems Theory and Microsociological Evolution 
 
The second way in which Luhmannian sociology must be adjusted is related to the 
dependence of cultural evolution on psychological processes. Cultural evolution relies on 
psychological dispositions related to language acquisition and cultural transmission. As discussed 
above, the transmission of cultural variants obeys certain rules that are nested within our 
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psychology, which affects the probability of selecting some cultural traits instead of others. For this 
reason, we could hypothetically conceive of a society where individuals do not take care of their 
children or where individuals kill their peers indiscriminately, but we cannot find a single society 
where this does actually happen. These cultural standards would be so incompatible with our innate 
social predispositions that their diffusion would be highly improbable.  
According to Luhmann, social systems are autopoietic, which means that the legal 
system – as any other social system – is circularly structured. It is self-referential because it can be 
observed as a system of rules in which each of its elements refers to legal rules in order to establish 
its validity. When law differentiated itself from other social systems, its validity became independent 
of extra-legal features of the world (i.e., natural law or morality). It is also self-productive because it 
produces its own components. Although political, moral, religious and economic factors affect the 
creation of legal rules, a particular normative standard does not become a legal rule as a result of 
the influence of other social systems, but because it is produced in accordance with other legal rules 
(e.g., the legislative procedure) to become part of the legal system.470 
Even if Luhmann recognized that social systems coevolved with psychic systems, the 
reproduction patterns of law are deemed intrinsic to itself (self-reference). This feature of systems 
theory could lead to a misunderstanding according to which the autopoiesis of a social system makes 
the system independent of any elements outside itself. If systems theory would claim that, it would 
confront the entire logic of evolutionary reasoning. When a higher level of reality emerges from a 
lower one, it remains continuously connected to it through mechanisms that are extrinsic to the 
higher level. Consider DNA replication as an example. DNA has embedded information on how to 
build an entire organism from scratch. However, DNA cannot replicate itself from scratch unless 
under rare and still barely known conditions, such as those that led to the emergence of life. Its 
information is only useful if it can be translated by ribosomes into proteins, and DNA can only 
reproduce itself because it needs external structures. This process allows the connection of living 
systems to chemistry, and it depends on structures that are outside DNA, such as ribosomes and 
tRNA. 471  The entire biological system can be considered autopoietic but only because its 																																																								
470 In this respect, one could evoke Herbert L. Hart’s thesis regarding the relationship between primary and secondary 
rules. Primary rules govern conduct and secondary rules allow for the creation, modification, extinction and 
adjudication of legal rules – as well as for the recognition of a specific normative pattern as a legal one. See  Hart, H. L. 
(1994). The Concept of Law. pp. 79-99. In addition, Luhmann refers to self-observation as another feature of 
autopoietic systems, but the objectives of this article urge us to focus on self-reference and self-production. See 
Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 301. 
471 Frank, J. and Spahn, C. M. T. (2006). The Ribosome and the Mechanism of Protein Synthesis. Reports on Progress in 
Physics, 69(5), 1383-1417.  
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reproduction depends on a connection to structures that are outside itself and that have also been 
selected in an evolutionary process.472 These structures are part of the autopoietic chain because 
their existence also depends on DNA, but they are also outside the chain because they are structures 
necessary to the reproduction of DNA, which is the paradox of autopoiesis. 
Systems theory accounts for this kind of phenomena by referring to the concepts of 
penetration and interpenetration. The former concept accounts for the situation in which one 
system “makes its own complexity available for constructing another system”.473 As a result, one 
system enables the very possibility of constructing another system. In this sense, social systems 
presuppose psychic systems as a given reality, insofar as no social system can exist without psychic 
systems. The existence of psychic systems is a necessary precondition for the emergence of social 
systems. In interpenetration, the process occurs reciprocally: both systems enable one another: “the 
receiving system also reacts to the structural formation of the penetrating system, and it does so in a 
twofold way, internally and externally”.474 As a result of interpenetration, both systems develop 
increased interdependencies and also greater degrees of freedom, enabling further evolutionary 
possibilities. This is precisely what happened in the course of gene-culture coevolution; the evolution 
of culture fostered the evolution of a much more complex mind, capable of coping with a 
progressively more intricate cultural background. The coevolutionary process resulted in both more 
complex minds and cultures and, later on, in evolved social systems. 
Although Luhmann’s theory acknowledges the relevance of both penetration and 
interpenetration in what concerns the relationship between psychic systems and social systems, it 
has not delved into the details of how it has happened. As a result, Luhmannian systems theory can 
conceive of autopoietic social systems without giving much attention to low-level explanations of 
how systemic reproduction occurs and without paying sufficient attention to the microscopic 
evolutionary level of cultural replication. Even if it recognizes that mind and society coevolved and 
that there is a structural coupling between them through language, this link always appears to be 
treated as a secondary process in social evolution – even if this is not the case. In systemic 
approaches, for instance, what matters for understanding law is how courts apply the law, how 
judges and lawyers argue about the law, how congress enacts new statutes that are incorporated into 																																																								
472 In the same fashion, Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen do not think that self-organization theories – such 
as autopoiesis - are a real alternative to Darwinian evolution. (“Self-organization may be necessary to explain the 
emergence of a number of complex phenomena, such as the formation of new species in nature. But, in the absence of 
selection, there is little chance of the development of increasingly complex structures.”). In Hodgson, G. M. and 
Knudsen, T. (2010). Darwin's Conjecture. p. 52. 
473 In Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 213. 
474 In Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 213. 
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the law, and how the Constitution links the law with other social systems. Even if penetration and 
interpenetration between psychic systems and social systems are acknowledged, theorization about 
them has been scarce – and, as a result, nothing that happens inside the human mind is considered 
as an important part of legal evolution. At best, it is considered a vague and abstract constraint. 
Nevertheless, cultural evolution depends on human minds as much as DNA replication 
relies on structures that are outside itself and that have been naturally selected. To accommodate 
this point, sociology must incorporate a theory about how cultural evolution actually occurs in the 
micro level of individual interaction – where the role played by the mind becomes essential.  Even if 
penetration and interpenetration between psychic systems and social systems are acknowledged, 
theorization about them is still underdeveloped. However, I propose that Richerson and Boyd’s 
approach to cultural evolution offers a theoretical possibility to develop a theory of how 
interpenetration between psychic systems and social systems occurred in the evolutionary timeline. 
Their theory links human psychology and cultural dynamics by acknowledging that culture is not 
only a holistic feature of human sociality but also a micro-evolutionary process based on the social 
transmission of information, from individual to individual.475 Culture is retained and evolves in a 
multilevel process that is related both to biological and cultural fitness. As discussed above, culture is 
a biological adaptation that helped our ancestors solve many of their environmental and social 
problems. Memes that made our ancestors so unfit that they could not reproduce would not last for 
long because their biological substrate (humans) would cease to exist.476 Early societies that adopted 
cooperation-favoring memes would have better odds to survive both culturally and biologically 
because such memes would simultaneously allow for the efficient transmission of culture and for the 
genetic reproduction of its members.  
So, in a sense, culture can be examined as a natural adaptation to be explained through 
natural selection processes. However, culture is also affected by the way our mind works. In this 
sense – and systems theorists would agree with this – our psychology is part of the environment of 
cultural systems (and vice-versa). The fact that our psychology relies on simple heuristics that shape 
its way to learn and transmit memes to others is an important element to be considered. Thoughts 
that are so incompatible with the principles of our universal moral grammar would hardly seem 
attractive to our minds. As a result, our innate psychology would hardly select them as potential 
candidates to be transmitted to social systems through language.  																																																								
475 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 5. 
476 This does not mean that I disregard the existence of maladaptive cultural traits. Instead, the point is that societies 
where they are widely spread will face the risk of extinction if the reproductive rate falls below the rate of immigrants. 
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That is one of the reasons why features such as parental care, nepotism, reciprocity, 
free-rider punishment, and inequity aversion – which comprise much of our universal moral 
grammar – are so pervasive in human societies. Our psychology stochastically selects thoughts that 
are compatible with these moral assumptions. This operation occurs even before these thoughts are 
transmitted to social systems through language. Of course, there is also an influx of information 
from social systems to our minds, and it is processed through our innate psychology. Culture likely 
affects the functioning of our psychology, but not to the point that the latter is completely molded by 
the former. Durkheim was plainly wrong: individual nature is not – as he believed – merely the 
indeterminate material molded and transformed by the social factor. But, to acknowledge this fact, 
we must look at the micro-sociological aspects of cultural evolution.   
 
3.2.2.3. Systems Theory Must Take Multilevel Selection Processes into Account 
 
The third way in which systems theory must be reformed is a consequence of the need 
to take social microdynamics into account. Any evolutionary theory of culture must rely on a 
multilevel selection procedure if it is to be used to really explain social evolution. In fact, Luhmann 
himself anticipated this in many ways although he has not developed its major consequences for 
systems theory. For instance, he acknowledged that psychic systems and social systems coevolved: 
“Psychic and social systems have evolved together. At any time the one kind of system is the 
necessary environment of the other”477 and “[b]oth kinds of systems emerge by the path of co-
evolution”.478  
By acknowledging the coevolution of psychology and social systems, Luhmann suggested 
a simultaneous evolutionary process between those systems. Nonetheless, mind and culture do not 
relate among themselves solely on the basis of coevolution. They are also codependent with one 
another; culture can only be replicated by using minds, and our minds are fully adapted to life in a 
cultural background. In this sense, much of the evolutionary pressures they face are imposed on 
both systems and demand integrated solutions in both the cultural and psychological systems in the 
way predicted by the gene-culture coevolution theory. The example of the evolution of cooperation 
discussed above can be understood as such: cultural systems faced an evolutionary pressure that 
demanded more sophisticated solutions to cope with socially complex environments, and this 
process has also selected minds suited for the task of coping with increasingly elaborated cultural 																																																								
477 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 59. 
478 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 98. 
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frameworks. However, minds are not infinitely flexible; they impose constraints on how culture 
evolves, and those cultural systems that better explore these psychological features for their own 
benefit are more suitable for evolutionary selection. To fully explain sociocultural evolution, a 
sociological theory must take into account that these coevolutionary processes are happening 
simultaneously at each level: (i) the psychological processes that occur in the preselection of 
particular memes before the linguistic output takes place; (ii) the cultural processes that further select 
among those preselected memes and intrinsically drive cultural evolution; and (iii) the rebound 
effect of the selected memes on the evolution of genes related to our psychology.  
This multilevel approach highlights another similarity between Luhmannian analysis 
and memetic theory. Although memes depend on the way our minds function, they also explore our 
psychology for their own benefit; memes that do this better replicate themselves more efficiently and 
thus will spread more quickly in a particular population.479 Some memes, however, replicate better 
when they are associated with other particular memes. They can group themselves and, as a group, 
may reproduce themselves more efficiently than if they were alone. This is what Susan Blackmore 
calls memeplexes or meme-complexes.480 In systemic terminology, a meme should be understood as 
a particle of meaning. A social system might be conceived of as a memeplex – a full body of memes 
that replicate better as a group than individually and that follows its own evolutionary and 
developmental logic. Communication can be conceived of as memetic replication, i.e., the process 
through which a meme replicates itself in a memeplex. Here, systems theory can offer much to 
memetic theory because it enables a better sociological understanding of systemic evolution than 
memetic theory has done so far. In Luhmannian terminology, memes could be understood as the 
smallest particles of communication. 
In this sense, both theories complement one another. On the one hand, memetics 
explains the microevolutionary processes of cultural evolution under a perspective that allows for 
the interaction between mind and culture; and on the other hand, systems theory focuses on 
macroevolutionary sociological processes that admit enough circularity to integrate with the 
microsociological processes of cultural evolution.  
In order to incorporate multilevel processes into the theoretical framework of system’s 
theory, another assumption in Luhmann’s thought must be adjusted. According to him,  
sociological theory should stop inquiring the relationship between the parts of a system and the 
system as a whole and replace the distinction between part/whole by another distinction, 																																																								
479 See Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene. p. 195. 
480 See Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. p. 19. 
 163 
system/environment481 – a paradigmatic shift he believes to have already happened back in the 
1950s. Later on, he proposes a further redefinition of this paradigmatic change in sociological 
theory, based on the incorporation of autopoiesis. As Eva Knodt, in the preface of Social Systems, 
states: 
 
General systems theory is the result of two subsequent paradigm shifts, which 
moved the problem of order from the fringes of metaphysical speculation to the 
center of scientific research. In the first of these shifts, initiated by the German 
biophysiologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the mid-1950's, the metaphysical 
distinction between part and whole was replaced by the distinction between system 
and environment. In consequence, the results of biophysiological research could be 
systematically related to developments in cybernetics (Norbert Wiener), 
information theory (Claude Shannon), and computer design (Alan Turing, J. von 
Neumann). In a second shift, the system/environment distinction was redefined 
within a general theory of self-referential systems. With insight into the recursive 
closure of systems that use their own output as input, cybernetics was forced to 
abandon the classical input/output model, together with its emphasis on mastery 
and control.482  
 
Multilevel selection theories, nonetheless, can incorporate both the insights of the 
system/environment distinction and the theory of self-referential systems (autopoiesis). In order to 
do so, they accept a dual-mode two-way causation model, in which the lower ontological layers of 
the system simultaneously affect the higher levels and are constrained by them. Instead of a top-
down approach such as the one accepted in Luhmann’s theory, it provides a coevolutionary model 
in which all layers of the system are reciprocally and causally implicated. This is not to say that we 
should abandon the distinctions between part/whole and system/environment, or the level of 
analysis proposed by self-referential systems theory, but multilevel selection theory can account for 
all these reference models without losing its internal coherence. 
One inspiration to construct such a theoretical model would be to integrate Luhmann’s 
theory with Jonathan Turner’s Theoretical Principles of Sociology. In a three volume masterpiece, 
Turner aims to formulate a grand sociological theory based on a multilevel analysis of social reality. 
Each volume is dedicated to the evolutionary dynamics of a specific social level: (i) macro-level social 
reality, composed of socially differentiated systems, whole societies and inter-societal systems; (ii) meso-
level social reality, which concerns corporate units such as businesses, organizations, and communities; 																																																								
481 According to Luhmann: “Traditional theory conceived complex systems as ‘wholes’ made out of ‘parts.’ The basic 
idea was that the order of the whole accounts for qualities the isolated parts could never possess on their own. Recent 
systems theory, as I see it, has abandoned this traditional approach by introducing an explicit reference to the 
environment.” In Luhmann, N. (1982). The Differentiation of Society (Holmes and Larmore, Trans.). New York: Columbia 
University Press. p. 257 
482 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. xxi. 
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and categoric units, which differentiate individual members by making status-identifying distinctions 
(e.g., gender, social class, ethnicity); and (iii) the micro-level social reality, composed of individual 
interactions, either through focused face-to-face encounters in which individuals interact directly with 
each other, or through unfocused interactions, which occurs when individuals act through the social 
space without maintaining direct contact, but assuming the other as a social reference.483  
The Theoretical Principles of Sociology is part of an even more ambitious project that seeks to 
explain human sociality in a two-staged scenario. Firstly, in his On the Origins of Societies by Natural 
Selection, Jonathan Turner and Alexandra Maryanski propose a naturalized theory of the emergence 
of human societies that takes into account the evolutionary links between the social structure of the 
great apes (gorillas, bonobos, orangutans and chimpanzees) and the structure of human societies, 
assuming that our cognitive abilities that lay the foundations for complex social structures have 
evolved from the common ancestors with the other great apes.484 In this book, Turner and 
Maryanski provide the evolutionary foundations of microdynamic processes that depend on the 
structure of human emotions. According to them, some human emotions create the necessary 
conditions for the emergence of the meso-level and the macro-level of social reality: (i) enhancement of 
positive emotions that create emotional bonds with other individuals, social organizations and cultural 
symbols; (ii) interpersonal attunement, the human capacity to create social bonds and coordinate actions 
through mutual understanding and role-playing; (iii) rhythmic synchronization and rituals, which 
enhance group solidarity through emotional bonding in cultural rituals; (iv) exchange of valued resources, 
based on an innate capacity for reciprocal interactions; (v) positive/negative sanctions, which strengthen 
social bonding between individuals and their communities; (vi) symbolizing and totemizing social 
relationships, which is a capacity to moralize relationships and create a marked distinction between 
loyalists and outsiders.485 This is a diachronic perspective that intents to explain how, in evolutionary 
time, complex social structures emerged based on the biological evolution of our emotions.  
Secondly, Turner's Theoretical Principles of Sociology adopts a synchronical approach, in which 
he focuses on explaining how the meso-level and macro-level social realities emerge from 
microdynamic interactions. Here, biological evolution is taken for granted as a background 
																																																								
483 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. New York: Springer; Turner, J. H. (2010b). 
Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 2. New York: Springer; Turner, J. H. (2012). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 
3. New York: Springer. 
484 See Turner, J. H. and Maryanski, A. M. (2008). On The Origin Of Societies By Natural Selection. Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers. pp. 65-78. 
485 See Turner, J. H. and Maryanski, A. M. (2008). On The Origin Of Societies By Natural Selection. pp. 82-87. 
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assumption in a scenario where sociocultural evolution takes place.486 Turner presents his work as 
an evolutionary approach to social theory, and elaborates an explanation of social change based on 
mechanisms that operate on each level and, as a result, select specific social structures. 
The first level of analysis proposed by Turner is microdynamics, and it is based on 
interactions among individuals.  Based on Erving Goffman, Turner classifies these interactions in a 
continuum between focused and unfocused encounters – the former being episodes where 
individuals are interacting face-to-face with other individuals, whereas the latter occurs when 
individuals are aware of each other’s presence but interact without face-to-face engagement.487  
Encounters are embedded within meso-level structures (corporate units) and their 
culture (categoric units) – defined as a "symbol system created by actors to coordinate and legitimate 
activites"488. Corporate units are social structures displaying division of labor and organized to 
achieve established goals, and categoric units are categorizations used to distinguish persons – such 
as age, gender, race, affiliation, income, among others.  Corporate units are also embedded within 
macro-level structures (institutional domains, such as economy, religion, politics, law). 
Although culture is transmitted between individuals489, being mainly a microdynamic 
process, communication is affected both by top-down and bottom-up events. Norms, values and 
routines of corporate units constrain and structure interactions at the micro-level (top-down), but 
individual interactions can also influence the culture of organizations at the meso-level (bottom-
up).490 
Encounters, in Turner's perspective, are the material basis "from which the meso and 
macro realms of social reality are constructed".491 In time, particular combinations of encounters 
can affect the structure and the culture of meso structures and, later, affect macro structures. Turner 
mentions the following examples of how changes in microdynamics can lead to an important 
reshaping on the global structure of a society: 
  
For example, if workers in particular types of corporate units remain unhappy, they 
may organize into another type of corporate unit, such as a union or a social 
movement organization, to change the terms of their embeddedness. To take 
another example, members of a particular categoric unit, such as one built upon 
race and ethnicity, may become sufficiently angry at their level of day-to-day 																																																								
486 As discussed in chapter 2, this is incompatible with the tenets of the dual inheritance theory because it denies that 
social structures and culture affect the course of human biological evolution. 
487 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 4. 
488 In Turner, J. H. (2012). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 3. p. 216. 
489 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 50. 
490 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 49. 
491 In Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 8. 
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treatment by others in encounters that they organize to change the stratification 
system and the institutional domains that have discriminated against them.492 
 
According to Turner, microdynamic processes are subjected to specific forces that drive 
individual encounters: ecological forces, demographic forces, status/role forces, cultural forces, 
motivational forces, and emotional forces. 
The second layer of analysis in Turner's comprehensive framework is macrodynamics. 
Here, Turner's evolutionary thinking is brought to the foreground. According to Turner, the 
ancient human settlements of the Pleistocene were organized in societies where the macro-social 
realm did not exist. Following evolutionary anthropology (specially the aforementioned Christopher 
Boehm’s account), he states that in archaic human societies the only institutional domain was 
kinship, with sexual and familiar division of labor, organized along two corporate units, the nuclear 
family and the band.493 After the settlement of bands, population growth turned out to be possible, 
leading to pressures for new forms of production, military defense and political/legal regulation. 
These factors, along with conflict between different populations and ecological challenges caused by 
population growth, have also led to selection pressures that caused the evolution of macro-level 
structures adapted to cope with these problems.494 
Starting with Herbert Spencer and Émile Durkheim's sociological accounts, Turner 
develops a theory about how selection operates at the macro-social domain. From Spencer, he 
proposes two types of selection at the social domain: (i) Darwinian selection, based on the idea that, as 
a population grows, the density of individuals increase and, as a result, there is an escalating process 
of competition for resources in which the most fit actors and organizations survive and reciprocate; 
and (ii) functional selection, which results not from growth, but from the need to find new solutions to 
new problems, "forcing actors to develop new sociocultural formations in order to survive in an 
environment".495  
According to his reading of Durkheim, the French sociologist conflated those two kinds 
of selection, by assuming that the competition associated with population growth led to functional 
specialization. Despite this, Turner identifies Durkheim with the Darwinian selection process, 
stressing the role of competition caused by population growth. Spencerian selection (functional 
selection), in its turn, is more likely to produce institutional innovation, for being able to respond to 																																																								
492 In Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 8. 
493 See chapter 2. 
494 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 21-22. 
495 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 24. 
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new ecological or social challenges.496  
Spencerian selection operates as a result of evolutionary forces acting on the social 
domain. The first of these forces is, as previously mentioned, population growth. As the populace 
grows, pressures arise for solutions of coordination problems, including resource distribution and 
regulation.497 This situation ignites institutional elaboration and differentiation, thus raising an 
evolutionary process of functional differentiation. Other important forces are distribution, regulation, 
and reproduction.498 The macro-level of social reality results from Spencerian selection operating at 
the level of populations of individuals and corporate units reacting to the new ecological/social 
challenges. This level is constituted by institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and inter-societal 
systems. 499  Following Turner's framework, this brief exposition will first elucidate the forces 
underlying macrodynamic evolution and, then, explore the constitution of the macro-social level. 
Along the population, other important forces in the macrodynamic realm are 
distribution, regulation, and reproduction. In the functional account exposed in the first section of 
this chapter, these forces would account for the social needs referred by Malinowski and Radcliffe-
Brown. Turner's perspective, however, is more productive because it starts from an organic 
metaphor inbuilt in those sociological theories, delimiting the difference between social entities and 
organisms. Also, by referring to forces instead of needs, Turner enables the use of the evolutionary 
framework in a more productive way, by slicing social reality in layers and demonstrating the forces 
that cause evolutionary change in each social level. 
Since the purpose of the thesis is to focus on the impact of evolutionary theory on the 
understanding of legal evolution, most of this account will focus on regulation and reproduction. 
Nonetheless, it is important to state that distribution forces refer to the underlying factors affecting the 
dynamics of distributive infrastructure within a society, including markets and exchange 
dynamics.500  
Regulation as a force alludes to how actors (individuals or corporate units) are 
coordinated, constrained and controlled by other actors who are entitled to have the power to do 
so.501 Turner differentiates between two dimensions of power: (i) consolidation of its four bases and 
(ii) centralization.  
																																																								
496 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 27. 
497 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 32. 
498 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 41-104. 
499 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 105-332. 
500 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 67. 
501 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 84. 
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Consolidation refers to the four bases of political power – coercive, administrative, 
material incentives and symbolic. The coercive base of power refers to the Weberian political power 
capacity of imposing legitimate physical coercion upon others. Coercion must be centralized in a 
few actors in order to be effective, since "the more widespread the distribution of coercive capacities 
in non-governmental actors across a population, the more tenuous is the basis of coercive power".502 
As Weber, Turner also assumes that political power cannot count solely on coercion; it must be 
based on a legitimate basis, otherwise resentments can overcome the political order. 
The second basis of power consolidation relates to administrative power, i.e., the spread of 
power through corporate units that implement the political decisions concerned. Different social 
structures depend on distinct kinds of administrative power, ranging from more authoritarian ones, 
in the cases of dictatorships or highly stratified societies, to more democratic ones, such as in the 
constitutional democracies where power is diffuse and exerted through units that are themselves 
monitored by others, as it happens in the institutional separation of powers.503   
The third basis of consolidation refers to the material incentive base of power, or the 
incentives used to punish or reward regulated behavior, as it happens when a government gives tax 
incentives to businesses in order to reduce the unemployment rate.  The fourth feature refers to the 
symbolic base of power, or the symbols that legitimate the use of power, such as moral codes, consensus 
over values and ideologies.504 
In Turner's account, the effectiveness of power consolidation to respond to selection 
pressures depends on the degree of consolidation in all four bases of power.505 A highly consolidated 
center of power demands that political power is capable of imposing coercive measures through 
political administrative units; is capable of incentivizing certain behaviors through the use of 
material incentives; and is symbolically legitimate. In order to respond to an economic crisis, for 
instance, the political power must be able to redirect material incentives in order to overcome the 
economic challenge, often relying on its symbolic legitimation and coercive power. 
The second dimension of power is centralization, which usually results from consolidation 
itself. Legitimating symbols, for example, is usually directed to the administrative units competent 
for exerting coercive measures and manipulating material incentives in order to promote the desired 
behavior.  
Besides regulation, another important force in the macro-social realm concerns 																																																								
502 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 85. 
503 See Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. pp. 125-145. 
504 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 87. 
505 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 88. 
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reproduction, which is a feature needed in any evolutionary approach but that has been so far 
unsatisfactorily theorized. What do we mean when we say that societies reproduce? Unlike 
biological entities, social units (usually) do not produce offspring in any meaningful sense. The cases 
where offspring are produced are exceptions, as it happened with the Greek colonies, founded due 
to the growth of the population in the city-states, or as it happens nowadays in businesses whose 
management model is based on franchises.  
According to Turner, reproduction operates at two different levels. The first level refers 
to the reproduction of the biological basis of human societies – human biological reproduction as 
such. The second level is related to the socialization of individuals in the symbolic systems necessary 
for their inclusion in social structures and to the regulation of socio-institutional relations.506 In this 
sense, reproduction is related to the maintenance of structural stability at the macro-level, based on the 
cultural reproduction occurring at the lower levels. It is no surprise that Turner explicitly refers to 
Dawkins and his proposed memetic transmission as the foundation of social reproduction: 
Social structures cannot be reproduced unless their “memes,” as Richard Dawkins 
(1976) termed cultural information, are passed on to individuals who ultimately 
interact in ways that create and sustain the social structures and cultures regulating 
these structures. As individuals learn relevant cultural information, they also learn 
how to use this information when behaving and interacting in a wide variety of 
situations – as well as explored in detail in Vol. 2 on microdynamics.507 
 
The institutional basis of reproduction shifted alongside functional differentiation 
processes. At first, hunter-gatherers organized social reproduction through parental education and 
the transmission of tribal customs across generations via oral tradition. As societies became more 
complex, knowledge became specialized in distinct institutions, such as economy, law, politics, 
religion, among others. As a result, each institutional domain developed distinct educational 
methods to formally educate its members within its own internal culture, but a new institutional 
domain arose as well, with the purpose of transmitting much of the cultural toolkit to the subsequent 
generations: education.508  
The forces of distribution, regulation, and reproduction affect the macro-level structures 
within a society, influencing the dynamics of its elements – the institutional domains.   
The Institutional domains are close to the social systems in Luhmannian sociology.509 They 																																																								
506 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 99-100. 
507 In Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 99. 
508 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 100-101. 
509 Notice, however, that the concepts of institutional domain and social system are not the same. Social systems include 
interactions and communications outside corporate units. Nonetheless, for the sake of the argument, I will treat both as 
synonyms, in the wider sense adopted by Luhmann. 
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are defined as “sets of corporate units engaged in activities that resolve problems of adaptation 
facing a population; and like all structures that have evolved as adaptive responses, they represent 
efforts to deal with selection pressures on populations”.510  Notice that institutional domains, like 
social systems, are not corporate units, but a set of corporate units facing specific problems. In this 
sense, they are modular, being responsible for coping only with problems related to their domains, 
such as economy, politics, law and religion. As institutional domains differentiate from one another, 
they develop their distinctive culture, based on the sharing of a generalized symbolic media specific to that 
system (a point explicitly derived from Luhmann’s social theory511), an ideology through which values 
are spread through the corporate units and institutional norms that embody generalized expectations 
on how actors should behave.512  
New institutional domains emerge because the micro- and meso-level structures 
(individuals and corporations) have to deal with new selection pressures resulting from the 
environment. What counts as environment is quite broad, including internal forces (population 
growth or even the emergence of new institutions that can bring about new challenges to existing 
structures) and external forces (such as war or ecological relations between societies).513 As a result of 
these novel selection pressures, a new institutional domain emerges with its own culture (generalized 
symbolic media) and corporate actors. 
 
For each domain, there is typically a core set of corporate actors that not only forge 
the structural template for elaboration of new types of corporate units but also the 
symbols – generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and norms – that regulate 
actions and transactions within a domain. There is almost always an 
entrepreneurial quality to the actions of these core actors as they seek to control 
material resources and, thereby, build new corporate units and symbol systems that 
allow for some degree of autonomy from the corporate units and the culture of 
other institutional domains (Abrutyn 2009a, b).514  
 
Turner’s explanation of the differentiation process is almost Luhmannian. According to 
him, when a new institutional domain emerges, it gains in autonomy and creates boundaries that 
isolate its internal logic from other domains.515 
The process of institutional differentiation comes with an increasing necessity of 
integration of the new social systems. According to Turner, institutional domains can be integrated 																																																								
510 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 13. 
511 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 37. 
512 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 116-121. 
513 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 37. 
514 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 106. 
515 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 106. 
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via two mechanisms: cultural integration and structural integration. 
Cultural integration arises as a process of containment, similar to the aforementioned 
process of hierarchical differentiation between psychology and social systems. When an institutional 
domain differentiates itself from an already existing domain, its internal culture, albeit autonomous, 
is constrained by the preexisting structures. As a result, the culture of novel social systems is 
integrated within the culture of the broader society, which works as a meta-cultural basis of 
integration. 
 
As corporate units act to reduce selection pressures, they create new symbol systems 
or modify existing ones, and in so doing, they contribute to the development of an 
intra-institutional culture, which, in turn, allows for the elaboration and 
differentiation of an institutional domain. Yet, the emerging culture of a domain or 
the transformation of the culture in an existing domain is generally constrained by 
existing values and meta-ideologies at the societal and, at times, by the culture of 
inter-societal level formations.516 
 
Here, too, there is a coevolutionary process in place. As new systems arise, they are not 
only constrained by the background of preexisting  cultural information, but they also change the 
meta-culture to which they were adapted at first, imposing new challenges to already existing 
institutions.517 As a result, societal-level culture is redefined in order to be compatible with emerging 
cultures – in a process similar to what the philosopher John Rawls calls overlapping consensus. 
Here, it is important to note how Turner uses the concept of culture in his theoretical 
framework. According to him, as above mentioned, culture is a "symbol system created by actors to 
coordinate and legitimate activities"518. It is a straightforward definition, but one that may leave 
many doubts concerning its methodological clarity. From a systematic reading of the three volumes 
of his Theoretical Principles of Sociology, it is possible to understand the concept as a multidimensional 
frame that embodies two different senses. 
At microdynamics level, culture is broadly defined as the result of a meme-like process. 
Culture is stored in brains as memes (or cultural traits) and transmitted through processes of social 
transmission such as imitation, and teaching, pretty much in the same sense of Richerson & Boyd’s 
definition (see chapter 2). But culture is more than that; cultural transmission among individuals 
forms networks that produce culture as an emergent property of both meso- and macro-structures. 
As a result, the concept of culture adopted by Turner encompasses both atomistic and holistic 																																																								
516 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 123. 
517 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 123. 
518 In Turner, J. H. (2012). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 3. p. 216. 
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concepts of culture. It incorporates phenomena as distinct as meme-like transmission; the 
Habermasian concept of lifeworld519, encompassing the informational background presumed in 
communication processes; and ideologies, values and the generalized symbolic media of particular 
institutional domains.520 This is an informational concept of culture that – in my own view – can be 
adjusted to the Luhmannian framework, since the German sociologist, albeit not discussing the 
concept of culture as a foundation for understanding social evolution, understands social systems as 
meaning systems whose operations are instantiated through communications. 
 Besides cultural integration, there are also structural mechanisms of institutional 
integration among different institutional domains.521  The most important of these mechanisms is 
structural interdependence. As units and institutional domains differentiate, their specialization entails the 
need of maintaining intricate relationships with other domains in order to maintain its internal 
operations. Part of these relationships entails what Luhmann defines as structural couplings, or 
translations that one social system performs in order to cope with the communications of other 
systems. Turner highlights, besides these, other kinds of operations between systems that denote 
structural interdependence. Two examples might clarify this point: a business firm is an economic 
meso-level unit, organized through the symbolically generalized media of money; but in order to 
perform well its own operations, the firm must count on employees who were educated in 
universities, a meso-level unit from the education system. A court operates through the symbolically 
generalized media of law, but in order to perform its operations it needs money to pay for its expenses 
and also to obtain officials from specialized units of the education system (law schools). 
Turner’s theory might be an important contribution to systems theory because it works 
within a part/whole paradigm that is essential to Luhmann’s evolutionary framework. Without 
adopting such a distinction, Luhmann’s theory remains useful for theoretical discussions at the 
																																																								
519 According to Jürgen Habermas, culture is part of the lifeworld, and is defined as “the stock of knowledge from which 
participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about 
something in the world” ⁠. In Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason. p. 138. 
520 Similarly, Hodgson and Knudsen define culture as the “shared habits of thought and behavior prevalent in a group, 
community, or society”. See Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2010). Darwin's Conjecture. p. 182. 
521 I will not discuss here some structural mechanisms proposed by Turner, because they will not be fruitful for the 
forthcoming discussion, such as structural segmentation and structural differentiation. The first one refers to the fact that certain 
institutions segment their internal positions in other similar positions. This is a form of structural integration that is 
internal to the institutional domain, but the issue at stake is a different one, and it concerns to integration between 
different domains. The second one refers to the very meaning of institutional differentiation; structural differentiation 
results from Spencerian selection that leads to the formation of new kinds of units, structured along different principles 
of organization. See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 126-128. Other 
mechanisms that will be overlooked are structural inclusion, structural overlapping and structural mobility. See Turner, 
J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 131-136. 
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macro-level, but cannot provide a micro-level/meso-level account through which coevolutionary 
processes of social emergence can occur. Turner provides an important augment to Luhmann’s 
social systems theory, allowing us to understand Luhmann’s evolutionary insight – the subject of the 
next section. 
 
3.2.2.4. Luhmann's Darwin: Reconciling Autopoiesis and Evolution 
 
In his widely comprehensive theoretical body of work, Luhmann attempts to build a 
theory of society on many different grounds,  ranging from cybernetics (von Foerster) to information 
theory (Claude Shannon), computer design (Turing and John von Neumann),  mathematics (George 
Spencer-Brown), social systems theory (Parsons), among many others. In a late theoretical shift, he 
advanced a theory of social evolution which incorporated elements from autopoietic theory 
(Maturana and Varela) and Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory. I want to focus, here, on this last 
point. 
Reading Luhmann through the lenses of Darwin is an odd enterprise because – as I will 
attempt to demonstrate – autopoietic theory and Darwinism seem to be somehow contradictory 
and, despite that, Luhmann tries to build his theory on both theoretical accounts. In this section, I 
will highlight two major features on which Luhmann’s autopoiesis and Darwinism seem to be 
incompatible evolutionary approaches, based on three major points:  
(i) what is the role of Luhmann’s concept of restabilization in Darwinian theory? This 
questions brings a related point –  
(ii) the absence of a fitness-like concept in Luhmannian theory, which is replaced by the 
very concept of restabilization, is a problematic one when seen through the lenses of Darwinism; and 
(iii) how can autopoiesis be compatible with a variation-inheritance-differential fitness 
style of explanation if it lacks population thinking? 
 
Luhmann’s Darwin is a strange one. As Geoffrey Winthrop-Young notes, “Luhmann, 
faced with the challenge of ‘combining’ Darwinian theory with the theory of autopoiesis, provides 
contradictory assessments of the former”.522 In order to understand why it is odd to combine these 
theories into one, it is important to first understand Luhmann’s account of Darwin and some 
elements of Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis theory. 																																																								
522 See Winthrop-Young, G. (2003). On a Species of Origin: Luhmann's Darwin. Configurations, 11(3), 305-349.  
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Luhmann explored the nature of evolution in many of his books.523 Nonetheless, his 
most complete account on the subject was written in the third chapter of his final two-part work, 
Theory of Society.524 In this chapter, Luhmann explains evolution as a product of three elements: 
variation, selection, and restabilization.525  
The first two elements, variation and selection, are roughly understood in the same vein 
as in traditional Darwinism. Since Luhmann is concerned with evolution in the social domain, 
variation is understood as variation in the social context. According to him, variation is related to 
modification in the system’s communication elements. At this point, Luhmann even acknowledges 
the similarity of his theory and evolutionary theories of culture, explicitly citing the work of Peter 
Richerson and Robert Boyd, who conceive of variation as change in the cultural variants.526 Besides 
that, Luhmann does not focus his attention on the lower-level mechanisms that produce variants – 
such as cultural mutation and guided variation527 –, but only states two points. First, errors in 
transmission are not held as important in order to be considered in his theory of cultural evolution, 
because they are usually so unimportant that they do not find an opportunity to be selected. I would 
disagree with him, insofar as errors in transmission often generate novel cultural variants that can be 
further replicated and selected by social structures.528 Second, he argues that evolutionary variation 
in the social domain results from the communicative process itself - “evolutionary variation comes 
about only where linguistically successful meaning proposals are called into question in the 
communication process or flatly rejected.”529 
Variation, in this sense, is intrinsically related to selection, because the process of 
communication is one in which variation is produced but that also rejects some variants.530 
However, the evolution of certain social structures – as in biological evolution – has split the 
functions of variation and selection; variation is being produced as a result of communication, while 
selection occurs as the result of societal processes occurring in social structures.  																																																								
523 On this point, see Luhmann, N. (1982). The Differentiation of Society; Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems; 
Luhmann, N. (2004). Law as a Social System. 
524 See Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society; Luhmann, N. (2013). Theory of Society (Barrett, Trans.  Vol. 2). Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
525 See Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 259. 
526 See Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 272. 
527 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 69. 
528 According to Mesoudi: “People tend to copy ideas, beliefs, skills, and knowledge from other people in a rough- and-
ready way, often grasping the gist of an idea but filling in the details themselves in ways that change the information, 
akin to mutation.”  Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and 
Synthetize the Social Sciences. p. 62. 
529 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 276. 
530 See Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. pp. 277-278. 
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The separation of these evolutionary functions is already ensured by their relating 
to different components of the societal system: variation to elements, that is, 
communications, and selection to structures, that is, the formation and use of 
expectations.531 
 
As a result, every social system selects produced meanings (memes/cultural variants) 
according to its own criteria (symbolic generalized communication media). Communication 
processes produce these variants, which are further selected by structures associated to each social 
system.532  
Restabilization - the last element is Luhmann’s evolutionary scheme – concerns the fact 
that the selected elements provide certain stability for the system.533 As a matter of fact, Luhmann 
himself recognizes that this third element, restabilization, can be conflated within selection, at least in 
the biological domain.  
 
In the evolution-theoretical literature, too, selection and stabilization are often 
combined in a single concept. The talk is then of “selective retention” or 
“stabilizing selection.”133 This was plausible as long as biology, not to mention 
economic theory, understood selection to be natural selection by the environment 
and the outcome to be “optimal fit.” Stability was described as “equilibrium,” 
which used homeostatic mechanisms to balance out disturbances and reestablish a 
state of equilibrium.534 
 
He rejects this approach in favor of a dynamic one, in which the function of 
restabilization can be distinguished from selection. Restabilization, to Luhmann, can be defined as 
“sequences of building structural changes into a system whose operations are structurally 
determined; and it takes into account that this also takes place through variations and selections, but 
always through operations of the system itself”.535 The very idea underneath restabilization is that 
some variations occurring within the social system can lead to instability.  
The existing social structures are unable to cope satisfactorily with the demands from 
the variation surplus produced within communication processes. Further variation and selection can 
provide structural changes either within the system, or producing new differentiated systems which 
can cope with the new demands.536 These novel structures can restabilize societal functions, which 																																																								
531 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 286. 
532 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. pp. 287-290. 
533 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 292. 
534 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 292. 
535 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 294. 
536 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. pp. 294-295. 
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can proceed with its internal operations again. This is the heart of the aforementioned Spencerian 
selection. 
Luhmann explicitly mentions the French Revolution as a major example of a 
restabilization process:  
 
In 1789, unrest in Paris was observed as “revolution” and described with a concept 
especially modified for the purpose. The consequences could be neither stopped 
nor controlled, and can probably best be described as a hundred years of failed 
follow-up revolutions, which, however, succeeded in transforming the French 
political system into a representative democracy. Codification of law, the 
abandonment of the economy to effectual intrasystemic forces, secularization in the 
religious field, privatization of the great families were also compensatory 
developments that can be understood as restabilizing revolutionary innovations.537 
 
Luhmann’s description of the evolutionary process might sound odd to a Darwinist. At 
first sight, his three elements – variation, selection and restabilization – do not fit well in the 
neodarwinian paradigm, which is characterized by three sufficient conditions: variation, 
inheritance, and differential fitness.538 Selection is the result of the algorithmic process.539 As the 
evolutionary biologist Richard C. Lewontin states: 
 
The principle of natural selection as the motive force for evolution was framed by 
Darwin in terms of a "struggle for existence" on the part of organisms living in a 
finite and risky environment. The logical skeleton of his argument, however, turns 
out to be a powerful predictive system for changes at all levels of biological 
organization. As seen by present-day evolutionists, Darwin's scheme embodies 
three principles (Lewontin 1) :  
1. Different individuals in a population have different morphologies, physiologies, 
and behaviors (phenotypic variation).  
2. Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction in 
different environments (differential fitness).  
3. There is a correlation between parents and offspring in the contribution of each 
to future generations (fitness is heritable).540 
 
Of the three Darwinian elements, Luhmann’s description lacks two: differential fitness 
and inheritance. Instead, he replaces them with selection and restabilization.  Luhmann himself 																																																								
537 Luhmann, N. (2012). Theory of Society. p. 293. 
538 See Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human Culture and Synthetize 
the Social Sciences. p. x; Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 39; Richerson, 
P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. pp. 204-209; Richerson, 
P. J. and Boyd, R. (1984). Natural Selection and Culture. BioScience, 34(7), 430-434. ; Okasha, S. (2006). Evolution and 
the Levels of Selection. p. 216; Lewontin, R. C. (1970). The Units of Selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 1, 
1-18.  
539 Dennett, D. C. (1996a). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. pp. 48-60. 
540 Lewontin, R. C. (1970). The Units of Selection. p. 1. 
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acknowledged this, but he thought that restabilization could be fused with selection only in static 
systems, such as economic theories of equilibrium. Nonetheless, I do not think this is the case. 
Restabilization should be better understood within Luhmannian theory in the same sense as 
adaptation at the social level – as an evolutionary product that is selected precisely because it 
performs a function. When certain innovations take place that disrupt social organization, social 
structures have to reorganize lower-level entities. Otherwise, functional integration at the systemic 
level might be disrupted. In this sense, restabilization is not a condition for evolution to happen, but 
the very product of evolutionary change at the structural systemic level.  
As a result, restabilization is not only equivalent to selection in static systems, but also in 
dynamic ones. But it is a selectionist account in a sense slightly different from Luhmann’s usage. 
According to Luhmann, the agent of selection is structure. Communications provide variation, and 
structures select among the surplus of produced meaning (cultural variants/memes). Restabilization 
is a different kind of selection, insofar as it refers to selection at the level of structures. When 
restabilization occurs, novel social structures – and not meaning units – are selected. 
The example mentioned by Luhmann is perfect to illustrate this point. According to 
him, Revolutionary France faced the risk of disintegration during the disturbances occurred in 
Paris. In that particular moment, many possible cultural variants were being transmitted within the 
early public sphere of Paris. Political ideals ranging from Rousseau to Locke, the news about the 
political abuses coming from inside the royal palace, the 1776 American Revolution and its newly-
born constitution (1787) – all these memes were being transmitted in both formal and informal 
means, creating a surplus of meaning possibilities that could be structurally selected later on.541  
These memes were not only cultural in the sense that they carried information about 
how individuals should behave; they also embodied social content, given the fact that they carried 
information about how polity should be organized. The disturbances of the Revolution led to a 
situation where a particular subset of these memes was selected as the foundation for new kinds of 
institutions, including representative democracy, the codification of law and secularization. Over 
time, this new set of institutions proved to be stable enough within the new social framework and 
capable of dealing with the new challenges, having been selected as the social structure. 
It is important to note three different kinds of selection operating here: cultural, social, and 
structural selection.  
The first kind was already discussed in the second chapter. Natural selection can act on 																																																								
541 Darnton, R. (2003). George Washington's False Teeth. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 25-75. 
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cultural variants, changing the cultural composition of a population as a result of the effects of the 
cultural trait on its adopters. Unlike natural selection acting on biological traits, which selects 
individuals possessing traits that leads to higher biological fitness, cultural selection selects individuals 
adopting cultural variants that, for this very reason, become more prone to be imitated by others. It 
is important to notice that Richerson & Boyd distinguish cultural selection from biased 
transmission.542 In biased transmission, individuals adopt certain cultural traits for reasons unrelated 
to the effect of the cultural trait on their behavior, but to certain psychological biases. In their own 
words: 
 
Biased transmission occurs because people preferentially adopt some cultural 
variants rather than others, while selection occurs because some cultural variants 
affect the lives of their bearers in ways that make those bearers more likely to be 
imitated.543  
 
Usually, theorists studying memetic and even gene-culture coevolution limit themselves 
to cultural selection, and attempt to explain social evolution only on the grounds of cultural 
evolution. Nonetheless, this perspective is rather simplistic, because there are social dimensions 
which are not easily reducible to culture, either conceived of as a result of social interactions, as 
Richerson and Boyd and memeticists propose, or conceived of as a holistic or phenomenological 
concept, encompassing the background stock of knowledge in the lifeworld (as Habermas proposes, 
for instance).  
This issue is at the heart of the aforementioned critique of the Luhmannian term “social 
system”, envisaged as a meaning-processing system. There can be complex animal societies entirely 
organized on genetic foundations, with no strict need of a meaning-system like language to organize 
them. Of course, this is not to say that meaning is not relevant to understand the social structure of 
human societies, but to state the need of something more than the concept of meaning, culture or 
meme to understand its organization.  																																																								
542 Cultural evolution is subjected to different sets of forces, ranging from random forces (cultural mutation and cultural 
drift) to the natural selection operating on cultural populations, and including what Richerson and Boyd call decision-
making forces – guided variation and biased transmission. Guided variation refers to nonrandomic changes in cultural 
traits  which are transmitted to others, such as invention or adaptive modification of preexisting cultural variants. Biased 
transmission encompasses content-based bias (the probability that individuals are cognitively more likely to remember and 
pass along some cultural variants instead of others), frequency-based bias (the probability that individuals will adopt the 
most frequent/most rare trait. An example is the aforementioned conformity bias), and model-based bias (the adoption of 
cultural variants based on the attributes of individuals who exhibit that trait). Cultural selection, then, refers to the 
adoption of certain cultural traits due to the evolutionary dynamics imposed by biased transmission. See Richerson, P. J. 
and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 69-79. 
543 In Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 69. 
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The Cambridge historical sociologist W. G. Runciman proposes that, besides culture, 
the study of social evolution urges us to take into account social selection, i.e., the evolutionary 
processes of social practices “which define mutually interacting institutional roles”.544 According to 
him, while cultural evolution concerns acquired behavior, where agents imitate or learn from other 
agents, social evolution concerns imposed behavior, “where the agent is performing a social role 
underwritten by institutional inducements and sanctions”.545 
Social selection and cultural selection are usually entangled, as the model-based bias 
demonstrates. This psychological bias makes individuals more prone to imitate and learn the cultural 
traits displayed by individuals performing certain social roles. For sure, social roles carry meanings 
that can be described and evaluated in the cultural domain, but they also display some properties 
that emerge out of the memetic sphere and that can be only understood as practices which embody 
behavioral-patterns formally and normatively imposed by institutions. As Runciman asserts: 
 
Not only does natural selection explain more about human behaviour than the 
overwhelming majority of twentieth-century sociologists were willing to concede, 
but the heritable variation and competitive selection of information which affects 
behaviour in the phenotype is a process which operates also at both the cultural 
level, where the information is encoded in memes – that is, items or packages of 
information transmitted from mind to mind by imitation or learning – and the 
social level, where it is encoded in rule governed practices which define mutually 
interacting institutional roles.546  
  
The most obvious example often mentioned as cultural transmission is the role of a 
schoolteacher who spreads memes through a community of youngsters.547 Even if youngsters learn 
the memes taught by the teacher through a dynamics of cultural transmission, most evolutionary 
cultural studies neglect a presupposed fact concerning the very status of the teacher. They highlight 
the fact that children obey the teacher, but forget that the very existence of the teacher demands an 
institutional structure in which there is a role for tutors that perform the practice of instructing 
youngsters.  
Of course, there is nothing essentially cultural about the function of roles. Other animals 
also display social structures with a fairly structured system of roles, such as bees, in which there is a 
genetically-based division of labor between the queen, workers, and drones.  Nonetheless, culture 
enhances the social possibilities of functional specialization because it enables the cultural definition 																																																								
544 Runciman, W. G. (2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. p. 3. 
545 Runciman, W. G. (2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. p. 8. 
546 Runciman, W. G. (2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. p. 3. 
547 Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1986). Cultural Evolution. p. 851. 
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of roles, which are not only biologically selected, but also culturally selected. Some roles are favored 
by cultural selection because they respond better to psychological biases than other roles.  
It is no surprise that the teacher example is so obvious, then: if, as argued by Richerson 
and Boyd, among others, there is a cognitive disposition to learn from individuals that display some 
specific traits (model-based bias), then we should expect that some individuals them will attract 
attention from others and spread some memes more efficiently than others. This might be the case 
of teachers and other influential persons, and would be a case of cultural selection of roles, in which 
biased transmission favors the transmission of cultural traits acquired from some individuals instead 
of others. Notice that certain roles, while culturally defined, also favor the spread of other cultural 
variants, thus embodying what Runciman calls meme-practice coevolution.548 This point is overlooked by 
Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen, who distinguish between memes and practices 
(understood as routines within organizations) in order to explain organizational evolution.549 
Runciman presents a second possibility for the evolution of practices: the social selection of 
roles. While the cultural selection of roles is a bottom-up process, the social selection of roles assumes 
the emergence of social reality out of the cultural domain – a process the British sociologist 
designates as “the transition from culture to society”.550 As there is a selection process in the cultural 
domain involving variation between memes, cultural inheritance and differential fitness of cultural 
traits, there is a parallel evolutionary process in the social domain which also embodies the three 
Darwinian preconditions. Within any society, there is variation in practices (roles), inheritance 
through the replication of roles within institutions, and differential fitness of roles, insofar as roles 
affect the differential rate of survival of the institutions in which they are contained. 
 
After the transition from culture to society, societies of increasingly divergent kinds 
evolve out of the heritable variation and competitive selection of practices in the 
same way that after the transition from nature to culture, cultures of increasingly 
divergent kinds evolve out of the heritable variation and competitive selection of 
memes.551 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that Runciman fuses two different categories of 
selection within social selection. First, there is the social selection of practices (roles), a process 
occurring at the meso-level of society. Organizations compete and, depending on the differential 
fitness provided by their internal “package” of roles in the competition process, they “survive” and 																																																								
548 Runciman, W. G. (2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. p. 45. 
549 Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2010). Darwin's Conjecture. p. 140. 
550 Runciman, W. G. (2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. p. 145. 
551 Runciman, W. G. (2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. p. 145. 
 181 
continue being part of the social system, while other organizations perish.552    
Nonetheless, Runciman also proposes that selection occurring as a result of inter societal 
interaction is also a form of social selection. According to him, situations such as “the imposition of 
the practices of a stronger society on the population of a weaker one” or when “the rulers of a 
central, metropolitan society are able to exercise effective domination over one or more peripheral 
societies” are also described by him as social selection.553 But this is a different issue. Social selection 
occurs as a result of the differential fitness that practice confers to meso-level organizations. But 
when a whole societal system – defined as an integrated structure of institutional domains554  – 
influences another system of its own kind, or comes to an end while other societal systems persist, 
this often happens not because of social or cultural selection. Its other meso-level organizations 
might be well functioning, but the functional relation between institutional domains (social systems) 
might not be as well structured as in the surviving societal system. In other words, the functional 
structure of the whole societal system might be selected at the societal level, as a result of its more 
efficient organization.  
This is what I call structural selection. As in both cultural and social evolution, societal 
evolution occurs as a result of variation, heredity and differential fitness at the level of social 
structures. Different societal systems display distinguished functional structures (variation); 
reproduce them through the replication of their culture and their social institutions that maintain 
the operation of the social systems (inheritance);  and the structural relationship between social 
systems is capable of conferring to the whole societal system differential advantages over other 
societies (differential fitness).  
The British historian Niall Ferguson offers a similar structural selection-like explanation 
– although not in the same terms –  to make intelligible what he sees as the great divergence 
between the Western world and “the rest”. 555  Although China and India dominated world 
economic history until 1500, since then, the economic growth of the West quickly outpaced their 
development. Ferguson resorts to six main factors underlying this “great divergence”: competition 																																																								
552 As Hodgson and Knudsen exemplify: “The competitive selection of cohesive groups such as firms is due to their 
differential properties in a common environment. In turn, these differential properties of firms partly emanate from the 
organized structure of the firms as a whole and are not due merely to the aggregate properties of the individuals in the 
firm, taken severally. Structured and cohesive interactions between individuals within the firm give rise to, and are 
properly regarded as, properties of the firm. These are a cause of differential profitability and, thus, differential 
replication of the firm's routines resulting from competitive selection”.Hodgson, G. M. and Knudsen, T. (2010). 
Darwin's Conjecture. p. 173. 
553 Runciman, W. G. (2009). The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. p. 145. 
554 Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. p. 216. 
555 Ferguson, N. (2011). Civilization: the West and the Rest. New York: Penguin Books. p. 9. 
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(decentralization of political and economic life), science, property rights and the rule of law, 
medicine, the consumer society and the work ethics.556 While one of the invoked factors –work 
ethics – might be embodied within Western culture, all the others can only be properly understood 
as institutional domains (science, law, medicine, economics and politics) structurally organized as 
social systems. Not only is the development of these institutions as such at the core of Ferguson’s 
explanation557 but also the very functional integration between them. 
Structural selection is not independent on lower-level operations. As a matter of fact, 
social structure can be conceived of as an emergent level that results from lower-level interactions 
on the micro- and meso-levels. Nonetheless, it is not only the product of a bottom-up process of 
emergence, since societal structure also affects the lower-level dynamics. As a result, we have to add 
another layer to understand sociocultural evolutionary dynamics: it is a result of meme-practice-structure 
coevolution. 
Now we can return to Luhmann’s concept of restabilization. Instead of being an 
evolutionary condition, it is a product of social evolution. Restabilization occurs when a societal 
structure adapts itself to its environment, reorganizing its internal elements in a way that conforms 
and enables itself. As such, it can be conceived of as meme-practice-structural coevolution; all three 
levels must be reorganized as a result of the selection of a new social structure in order to maintain 
societal integrity. 
Understanding restabilization as meme-practice-structural coevolution also solves the 
second problematic issue I highlighted in Luhmannian evolutionary theory: the absence of a fitness-
like concept. In memetic theory, memes are selected because they have differential fitness in the 
cultural domain and, as such, are better replicated.558 There is nothing like a fitness-like concept in 
Luhmannian communication. Or is there? In Luhmann’s perspective, each social system operates 
through symbolically generalized communication media, developed within each system “to increase the 
likelihood of the successful continuation of communication”.559 Each system develops its own 
specialized communication media, reinforcing its own capacity to generate new communicative 
variations and to refine its own internal capacity to select outcomes. What counts as acceptable 																																																								
556 Ferguson, N. (2011). Civilization: the West and the Rest. p. 12. 
557 The decentralization of political and economic life empowered both, fostering competition within both domains and 
structuring both the political and economic competitive processes that bolstered their internal consistence as different 
social systems. ⁠ The scientific revolution and the subsequent industrial revolution could not have happened without the 
cultivation of institutions such as universities and the protection of private property (including intellectual property). See 
Ferguson, N. (2011). Civilization: the West and the Rest. p. 288. 
558 See Blackmore, S. (2000). The Meme Machine. p. 84. 
559 See Moeller, H.-G. (2006). Luhmann Explained: from Souls to Systems. Chicago: Open Court. p. 26. 
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communication varies within each system. A meme/practice can be held acceptable within the 
economic system because it furthers the circulation of money560, whereas being rejected by the legal 
system because it does not conform with the legal standards (as an example, think of illegal 
profitable activities, such as drug dealing).  On the opposite side, an acceptable legal activity can be 
rejected within the economic domain for not being profitable at all.  
These theoretical examples show that, although Luhmann himself does not describe his 
own theory in these terms, there is a concept of differential fitness inbuilt within his evolutionary 
perspective, both in the low-level of memes/practices and in the macro-structural level. Selection, to 
him, occurs at the lower level, within each social system. Memes and practices are selected because 
they conform with the internal criteria adopted by each specific social system. However, selection 
also occurs in the macrostructural domain, as the restabilization – or meme-practice-structure 
coevolutionary selection – of the entire societal system. Understood in this way, his social theory can 
be accepted as a Darwinian theoretical framework from the beginning. 
The last question concerns autopoiesis, a central concept in his later writings. In a 
nutshell, the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela devised the concept in 
order to “explain how biological systems such as cells are a product of their own production”.561 A 
being (or a system) is autopoietic if it produces the very conditions necessary for it to continue being 
itself – a system that reproduces and maintains its own internal organization as a result of its own 
operations.562 An autopoietic system not only produces itself (self-production), but it is also self-
organized, self-maintained and self-referential.563   
 
An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the 
components that: 1) through their interactions and transformations continuously 
regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produce them; and 
2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by 
specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.564 
 
How is evolutionary change related to autopoiesis? The first point to be noted is that, 
according to Maturana and Varela, evolution is not considered essential for the comprehension of the 																																																								
560 Money is the symbolically generalized communication media of the economic system. See Luhmann, N. (2012). 
Theory of Society. pp. 207-208. 
561 See Moeller, H.-G. (2006). Luhmann Explained: from Souls to Systems. p. 12. 
562 In Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. p. 
82. 
563 See Teubner, G. (1993). Law as an Autopoietic System. p. 18. 
564 In Varela, F. J. (1979). Principles of Biological Autonomy. New York: Elsevier/North-Holland. p. 13. 
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living organization dynamics, but only to understand its historical transformation. Evolution, 
according to them, is interpreted as the “result of that aspect of their circular organization which 
secures the maintenance of their basic circularity, allowing in each reproductive step for changes in 
the way this circularity is maintained”.565 For evolution to occur, the living system must suffer an 
internal change without losing its own identity, maintaining its “fundamental circular 
organization”.566  The basic circularity is maintained in the course of evolution; what changes is how 
the basic circular process is maintained. 567  New forms of organization also imply different 
predictions about the environmental niche where the organism lives. When the produced offspring’s 
novel organization is not capable of interacting with its niche in a way that it maintains its own 
integrity, the new system disintegrates. Otherwise, it maintains its internal circular organization and 
persists.  
Evolution, to Maturana and Varela, is based on the concept of natural drift, which is the 
maintenance of the living organism’s autonomy and coherence.568 Evolution is simply the structural 
drift that comes out as the result of the continuous structural coupling (adaptation) between different 
organisms which keep linked through a population network. 
 
What is natural drift and how does it characterize evolution? Since the dynamics of 
the environment may be erratic, the result in terms of evolution is a natural drift, 
determined primarily by the inner coherence and autonomy of the living organism. 
(…) Evolution does not pursue any particular aim – it simply drifts. The path it 
chooses is not, however, completely random, but is one of many that are in 
harmony with the inner structure of the autopoietic unit.569 
 
Maturana and Varela reject the idea of differential fitness. According to them, either a 
living being is adapted or not, and as a result no one can talk about degrees of fitness. In their own 
words, “this description of adaptation as variable (…) is inadequate”.570 Instead of differential 
fitness, they talk only of differential survival – a serious mistake, since the concept of differential 
fitness is relative (not absolute), accounting for the structural differences between individuals which 
provide them with only slight advantages that over time change the population genetic pool.571   
This stance on the subject makes sense within autopoietic theory because, although 																																																								
565 In Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition. p. 11. 
566 In Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition. p. 12. 
567 See Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition. p. 12. 
568 According to them, “(…) evolution is a natural drift, a product of the conservation of autopoiesis and adaptation”. In 
Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1987). The Tree of Knowledge. Boston: Shambhala. p. 117. 
569 In Podgórski, J. S. (2014). Humberto Maturana’s View on the Theory of Evolution. From Autopoiesis to Natural 
Drift Metaphor. Ecological Questions, 13(1), 1-7.  
570 In Maturana, H. R. and Varela, F. J. (1987). The Tree of Knowledge. p. 114. 
571 See Lewontin, R. C. (1970). The Units of Selection. p. 1. 
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acknowledging that evolution occurs in a network of beings interconnected due to reproduction, it 
focuses on the autopoietic system as such, consequently not relying on population thinking.572 As a 
result, it cannot see the role of differential fitness within an evolutionary framework, because it is an 
adequate concept to understand evolution within populations. One individual is better adapted than 
other because we can compare them, and we can do so only if our perspective looks at a population 
of individuals rather than concentrating on the ontogeny of a single individual, as autopoietic theory 
does.  
Maturana and Varela also reject the very idea of natural selection in favor of natural drift. 
Instead of being selected by the environment, the living organism couples its internal structure with 
the environment, and both are changed in the process. There is a continuous coevolutionary dance 
between organism and the environment, and the living being is not only a passive actor in the 
process, but an active one.573 There is no fixed environment that selects living beings, but one which 
is also being selected through the interaction with living organisms. Selection occurs only as a 
description of the process, but it is not understood as an evolutionary mechanism in its own right.  
But would this be a rejection of natural selection as such? I do not think this is the case. As a 
matter of fact, the idea that organisms also build their own environment is not a rejection of 
Darwinism. An important strand of contemporary Darwinian theory is niche construction, a field that 
studies the processes through which organisms build their own environment, which also acts as a 
selector.574 Richard Dawkin’s The Extended Phenotype also denotes how individuals improve their rate of 
survival through the engineering of their own environment.575 What Maturana and Varela reject is 
(i) the idea that the environment is fixed and (ii) that the organism is passive in the evolutionary 
process. But this criticism can be easily accommodated within a Darwinian framework.  
Also, natural drift is not an alternative to natural selection, but a view of the 
evolutionary process from the stand point of an autopoietic system. Most of the novelties claimed by 
Maturana and Varela are backed on their concern about the maintenance of autopoiesis though 
different structures that arise over time, not on the variation produced within a specific population. 
From this viewpoint, evolution can only be seen as drift because their observing point of view 																																																								
572 According to Jacek Podgórski: “Natural drift refers to the history of living systems on Earth, that is, the history of the 
arising, conservation, and diversification of lineages through reproduction, and not of populations (Maturana & Varela 
1987; Lewontin 1991)”. In Podgórski, J. S. (2014). Humberto Maturana’s View on the Theory of Evolution. From 
Autopoiesis to Natural Drift Metaphor. p. 85 
573 See Podgórski, J. S. (2014). Humberto Maturana’s View on the Theory of Evolution. From Autopoiesis to Natural 
Drift Metaphor. p. 85. 
574 See, e.g., Odling-Smee, F. J., Laland, K. N. and Feldman, M. W. (2003). Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in 
Evolution Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 176. 
575 See Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype. p. 200. 
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cannot take into account what is going on outside the autopoietic system and, as such, they cannot 
provide an explanation based on the environmental pressures that select specific traits already 
produced by the variation in the genetic pool. This is not to state that the environment determines 
the entire course of evolution, because what is selected depends intrinsically on the variation 
available within the population. Rather than offering a critical approach to Darwinism, Maturana 
and Varella reinforce it when they affirm this point. 
Lacking the population point of view, Maturana and Varela can see only structural drift 
and that some structures are kept structurally coupled with their environment, but cannot provide 
reasons to explain why this happens at all. This explanation is natural selection, and it requires a 
population account in order to be correctly understood, because all its elements – variation, 
differential fitness and inheritance – demands us to focus on the population, not on a single 
individual. As a result, the challenge posed by autopoiesis to standard Darwinism is weaker than 
some assume it to be.576  
Maturana and Varela’s perspective should be better understood as a theory about the 
ontogeny of a living system, not about evolution. This does not mean that autopoietic theory is 
incompatible with Darwinism, but that both theories are concerned with different issues. On one 
hand, autopoiesis focuses on how evolved organisms maintain their homeostasis within their 
ontogeny and how evolution maintains autopoiesis in different evolved structures. Evolutionary 
theory, on the other hand, concentrates on phylogenetic issues, explaining how variation, heredity 
and differential fitness produce novel beings through natural selection. Autopoiesis concerns 
synchronical processes, encompassing the life cycle of individual organisms, while Darwinism 
focuses on diachronic processes occurring in the evolutionary time frame. 
This is why it seems so odd to understand Luhmann’s simultaneous reference both to 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory and to Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis. Social systems are not only 
autopoietic; their structure also evolves. Nonetheless, the strangeness of understanding social 
systems in both ways can be dissipated when a multilevel selection framework is coupled with the 
application of Peter Godfrey Smith’s concept of Darwinian populations applied to the societal level 																																																								
576 In this sense, I disagree with Escobar’s approach on the theme, who thinks that the challenge posed by Maturana 
and Varela to Darwinism is a serious one. According to him: “If we add to this mechanism the denial of those notions 
mentioned above, the conceptual challenge to Darwinism becomes evident. The theory of autopoiesis attempts to 
provide an explanation of the phenomenology of living systems in which core Darwinian notions turn out to be mere 
descriptive notions used by the observer to deal with biological phenomena, not notions with actual empirical referents”. 
In Escobar, J. M. (2012). Autopoiesis and Darwinism. Synthese, 53-72.  Escobar cannot understand Darwinian elements 
as empirical referents because, by accepting Maturana and Varela’s assumptions, he does not accept the population 
level as an empirical one. There is no reason to agree with him, however, if we can build theoretical models to 
understand processes happening at the population level. 
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of analysis. Darwinian populations can be understood both as individual units operating as 
autonomous beings and as the result of nested evolutionary processes. The task of understanding 
sociocultural evolution through the lenses of Godfrey-Smith will be developed in the next section, 
with the explicit purpose of explaining the evolution and the inner logic of social structures. 
 
3.2.3. Human Societies as Darwinian Individuals 
 
So far, this chapter has served two purposes. The first one was to present Peter-Godfrey 
Smith's approach with respect to the kinds of entities that can evolve in the Darwinian sense, which 
can be classified as simple reproducers, scaffolded reproducers and collective entities. Evolution 
produces all these kinds of reproduction entities and, more specifically, creates new kinds of 
reproducers nested within other reproducers. One individual is usually composed of nested 
evolutionary parts, as it happens, for instance, among human individuals. One man/woman is 
constituted by groups of cells organized in a certain way, and cells are Darwinian individuals in 
their own right. But within cells, the chromosomes are scaffolded reproducers, and, as such, are also 
Darwinian individuals. As a result, a single human being is constituted by various population levels 
of nested Darwinian individuals, such as chromosomes (scaffolded reproducers), cells (simple 
reproducers), and the entire 'human being' (a collective reproducer). 
In this section, I have developed so far two ideas. First, I have described the problem of 
emergence in sociology, based mainly on the account provided by Keith Sawyer, who defined this 
theoretical puzzle as one related to the relationship between the microssociological level of 
individual interaction among human beings, and the mesosociological level which defines and 
contextualizes individual interactions while being influenced by the macrosociological level, which 
includes in particular the social structure.    
Then, I explored Luhmann's systemic theory as an important theoretical framework that 
could be used to build an evolutionary sociological theory taking emergence into account. Despite 
acknowledging its potential to address such a difficult task, I pointed out some problems in 
Luhmann's theory that should be resolved before making any effort to provide a naturalistic theory 
of sociological emergence. More specifically, I proposed four main points that needed revision 
within systems theory:  
(i) the need to incorporate within its framework the fact that minds impose constraints 
on the evolution of sociocultural systems;  
(ii) the absence of low-level theorization requires systems theory to take into account 
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microlevel evolutionary processes, such as the theory of cultural transmission provided by Peter J. 
Richerson and Robert Boyd;  
(iii) the lack of acknowledgement that multilevel selection processes are needed in order 
to explain social evolution, taking into account human psychology, the cultural level of analysis and 
the social structure in a two-way causation process. In order to understand this point, however, 
systems theory must reincorporate the part/whole distinction along with the system/environment 
binary code. Jonathan H. Turner's Theoretical Principles of Sociology, which implicitly takes both 
distinctions, could be an inspiration for this task; 
(iv) the need to reconcile autopoiesis and standard evolutionary theory, reframing 
Luhmann's theory as a Darwinian one. 
The task of this subsection is to unify these two themes, constructing a theory about 
sociocultural Darwinian populations, based both on Peter Godfrey-Smith's proposal and the 
Luhmannian theory, reframed under the above mentioned lines. 
The first point to be noticed is that Peter Godfrey-Smith himself attempted to address 
the issue of cultural evolution in the last chapter of his Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection.577 
Although some of the insights developed in this chapter are useful, I do not think the challenge was 
successfully undertaken by Godfrey-Smith. 
According to him, cultural evolution can be modeled as Darwinian populations in 
several different ways, which could be classified under two main categories.578 The first of these is an 
individualist approach, which describes a population of biological individuals adopting cultural 
phenotypes which are then passed on to their biological descendants.579 Under Cavalli-Sforza’s 
scheme,580 the only form of cultural transmission would be vertical, as a consequence of teaching 
and imitation.581 Godfrey-Smith acknowledges the limits of this perspective: 
 
The role of this first option is limited in obvious ways. It cannot capture cases where 																																																								
577 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. pp. 147-164. For an insightful 
discussion of Godfrey-Smith’s proposal on this point, see Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and Transitions in 
Individuality. Contrastes Revista Internacional de Filosofia, 18, 203-220.  
578 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 150. 
579 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 150. 
580 See Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1986). Cultural Evolution 
581 According to Godfrey-Smith: “In the case of culture there are several ways in which Darwinian populations might be 
recognized. I will divide these into two main options. The first is the simplest. The entities said to make up the 
population are ordinary biological individuals, such as people, and culture is treated as an aspect of their phenotype. 
People have cultural properties (skills, vocabularies, habits), and they vary in these properties. When people reproduce, 
their offspring often resemble the parents with respect to these features, as a consequence of teaching and imitation. And 
some people reproduce more than others. The result is evolutionary change”. In See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). 
Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 150. 
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people copy behaviors from people other than their parents. (It only handles 
‘‘vertical’’ as opposed to ‘‘horizontal’’ and ‘‘oblique’’ transmission.) So it may seem 
that we need a notion of a ‘‘cultural parent’’ as opposed to a biological one. Those 
you copy, with respect to a particular trait, are your cultural parents with respect to 
that trait. Individual people are still seen as the members of the Darwinian 
population, but they are now linked by a non-biological parenting relation.582 
 
A second individualistic possibility is not focused on the biological population of 
individual bearers of cultural traits, but considers the very cultural variants as Darwinian 
populations in their own rights – akin to a memetic style approach. Memes reproduce through 
imitation and other forms of social transmission. According to Godfrey-Smith, "the second 
approach is to see instances of cultural variants as making up their own Darwinian populations, 
connected by reproduction. Your father’s, or your best friend’s, Catholicism might be the parent of 
your Catholicism".583 
Another possibility is that cultural evolution occurs at group-level. Here, too, Godfrey-
Smith proposes two descriptions – a biological perspective, where groups display cultural 
phenotypes which are transmitted to offspring groups, or an autonomous cultural approach, where 
the Darwinian individual is a group-level package of cultural variants (such as memeplexes).584 
 
It could be argued that human groups have cultural phenotypes that are 
transmitted to offspring groups (Henrich and Boyd 1998, Sterelny, forthcoming), or 
that group-level cultural variants themselves (such as forms of political 
organization) may make up a pool of reproducing entities.585 
 
In an article reviewing Peter-Godfrey Smith’s proposal concerning cultural evolution, 
Paulo Abrantes examines the first option, concerning the hypothesis that cultural groups can be 
conceived of as Darwinian populations.  
First of all, Abrantes considers that the evolution of cultural groups as Darwinian 
populations would require that the lower-level units of the group – cultural variants adopted by 
individuals – would be de-Darwinized, decreasing the amount of variation (V) within the group.586   
Richerson and Boyd propose three psychological mechanisms for decreasing variation 
within a group: conformist bias, moralistic punishment and sensitivity to symbolic markers. In 
chapter 2, I described the role of these three mechanisms in maintaining group cohesion and 																																																								
582 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 150. 
583 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 150. 
584 I would say that this second approach is similar to Luhmann’s systemic perspective. 
585 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 151. 
586 See Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and Transitions in Individuality. p. 209. 
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diminishing cultural variation within the borders of the cultural group.  Conformist bias plays a role 
in suppressing variation because individuals tend to imitate the most common cultural package 
within the group, therefore reducing the population of alternative memes. Moralistic punishment, 
coupled with symbolic marking, would lead the group to apply sanctions against those who adopt 
alternative cultural variants, therefore reducing cultural variation within the frontiers of the band, 
even if individuals migrate between groups.587  
According to Abrantes, these mechanisms can reduce variation within the group, but in 
order to conceive of cultural groups as a paradigmatic Darwinian population we need to show how 
they fare with relation to the other criteria proposed by Godfrey-Smith – specially reproduction and 
inheritance, and explore "the role played by selection at the group level in shaping a (possible) new 
evolutionary dynamics".588 
Multi-level selection processes can be defined in two major ways – what has been called 
by Okasha589 MLS1 and MLS2. In MLS1, while individuals are the selected units and the structure 
of the group affects group-member’s fitness,  the group fitness is just the sum of the group-member’s 
fitness.  In MLS2, while in MLS2, groups are the selected individuals and they possess features that 
affect their fitness. In this sense, it is possible to truly  identify group-fitness. According to Abrantes, 
Richerson and Boyd refer to multilevel selection in the first sense (MLS1) because they do not 
accept that reproduction, inheritance and adaptations occur at the group level. 590  Instead, 
individuals display and transmit cultural traits which affect competition between groups – but the 
traits are characteristics of individuals, not groups.  
This seems to be a particularly precise reading of Richerson and Boyd's theory. As a 
matter of fact, they reject what they call the "superorganic concept" due to the fact that they do not 
understand culture – or cultural adaptations, or institutions – as features of the group, but as 
features socially transmitted from one individual to another, having no existence in their own right.  
 
Suppose we define culture as follows: Culture is information capable of affecting 
individuals’ phenotypes, which they acquire from other conspecifics by teaching or 
imitation. In the taxonomy of definitions of culture, ours is in a category that 
emphasizes the psychological aspects of the phenomenon (Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn, 1952).  (...) If we think of human culture as a part of human biology in 
this way, we simply do not need to try to unpack what “superorganic” could 
																																																								
587 For a review of the evidence in favor of these social psychological features, see chapter 2. 
588 See Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and Transitions in Individuality. p. 210. 
589 See Okasha, S. (2006). Evolution and the Levels of Selection. p. 56 




This is not to say that they reject group selection, but that the selected features are 
cultural variations present at the individual level, not a bundle of group-level features. If one group 
displaces another because it has more efficient weapons, this is the result of individual action which 
produced better military equipment, not because of a group-level adaptation. 
Paulo Abrantes points out that, in principle, Godfrey-Smith's proposal brings another 
reason to reject a MLS2 kind of process leading to group-level evolution: the fact that the concept of 
reproduction can hardly be applied at the level of groups. In order to be a Darwinian population in 
its own right, groups must "vary, reproduce, and inherit features from other groups"592 and display 
a concept of fitness applicable at the group-level.593 Do cultural groups exhibit these features? 
Abrantes demonstrates that Godfrey-Smith himself adopts a flexible concept of 
reproduction that could be embraced in order to cover the case of cultural groups. Indeed, Godfrey-
Smith admits that, even in biology, it is hard to sustain a firm distinction between differential 
reproduction and differential persistence. As a result, he suggests a "permissive attitude"594 towards 
the concept of reproduction. Paulo Abrantes builds on this perspective to propose modalities of 
reproduction at the cultural group-level: 
 
Godfrey-Smith acknowledges, however, that the borders between differential 
reproduction and differential persistence are fuzzy. Given the «permissive attitude» 
(2009, p. 91) he embraces in other hard cases, we are authorized to come up with 
modalities of reproduction appropriate to cultural groups, that might underwrite a 
conceivable TI in the human lineage, fueled by cultural inheritance (cf. ibid. pp. 
84-6; Dennett 2011).  
In the case of cultural groups, the literature mentions, effectively, besides growth 
and persistence, other modalities of group reproduction that might circumvent 
Godfrey-Smith’s appraisal of the Darwinian status of a BPg population, such as 
group fission and colonization.595  
 
Abrantes also puts forward a way of explaining how a MLS2 cultural group596 could 
																																																								
591 In Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2002).  Culture is Part of Human Biology: Why the Superorganic Concept Serves 
the Human Sciences Badly. p. 63. 
592 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. pp. 118-119. 
593 See Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and Transitions in Individuality. p. 213. 
594 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 91. 
595 See Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and Transitions in Individuality. p. 213. According to Abrantes, the term 
‘BPg’ refers to group-level cultural phenotype. 
596 MLS1 and MLS2 refer to the causal processes involved in the production of certain kinds of individuals. It would not 
be precise to describe a group as MLS1 and MLS2. However, to avoid repetition, I will refer to MLS1 groups as those 
whose emergence can be explained through MLS1 mechanisms, that is, as a result of  the sum of the group-member’s 
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emerge. Based on Okasha, he claims that MLS1 can be a first stage on the emergence of a MLS2 
Darwinian individual. This proposal entails a diachronic approach towards the evolution of cultural 
groups as Darwinian individuals.597 In the first stages, MLS1 mechanisms would drive the transition 
of cooperative groups, and in the last stage MLS2 processes would stabilize them as Darwinian 
individuals. 
The Brazilian philosopher even sketches how this process might have worked in the 
course of human evolution.598 First, kin selection and reciprocal altruism stabilized cooperation 
between individuals in small family groups and non-kin groups. These mechanisms are MLS1 
mechanisms because they sustain cooperation among the members of the group, and do not 
produce any adaptation at the group level. As a matter of fact, they only work because of their 
influence on the selection of a particular psychology that impacts individual behavior, guiding 
persons to cope with their family members (kin selection) and with reciprocating non-kin individuals 
(reciprocal altruism). As extensively reviewed in the second chapter, human ancestors and other 
primates such as chimpanzees, gorillas and bonobos are capable of living in groups built upon these 
principles. 
However, kin selection and reciprocal altruism are not able to structure cooperation in 
large cooperative groups. The emergence of larger bands demanded other psychological 
mechanisms, as proposed by the dual inheritance theory. In larger societies composed of genetically 
unrelated members, direct reciprocity could not sustain cooperation. Indirect reciprocity, on the 
other hand, based on the punishment of free-riders by the group  – and not solely by the harmed 
individual, as it happens in direct reciprocity – could be a mechanism to enhance cooperation in 
larger groups. Tribal social instincts and the evolution of culture provide the tools for sustaining 
cooperation at this level, as a result of conformity bias, moralistic punishment, and symbolic 
marking.  
It is important to notice that all these mechanisms are based on human individual 
psychology. Even so, they set the stage for MLS2 processes to emerge. Conformity and the 
moralistic punishment of outsiders and those who do not accept the same symbols of a group 																																																																																																																																																																																								
fitness. In MLS2 groups, we can talk of group-fitness resulting from groups properties. As a result, ‘MLS1/2 groups’, 
from now on, should be understood as groups whose evolution can be explained through MLS1 or MLS2 processes. 
597 According to Paulo Abrantes: “MLS2 is usually considered a necessary mechanism in the final stages of the process, 
in which a new kind of individual emerges – in our hypothetical case, a paradigmatic DP of human groups. But one 
cannot invoke MLS2 from the beginning since an individual, with their hierarchical organization, has first to be set up 
through mechanisms acting at the lower levels (Okasha, ibid., p. 229)”. In Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and 
Transitions in Individuality. p. 214. 
598 The following is a development of Abrantes’ argument. See Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and Transitions 
in Individuality. p. 214. 
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contain variation within groups and further variation between groups, therefore creating the 
conditions for group selection to work and produce cultural groups as Darwinian individuals in their 
own right. As Abrantes says: "in this stage, mechanisms for suppressing internal variation and for 
conflict mediation have to be in place and a new modality of group-level reproduction emerges".599  
Each of these transitions scores differently in terms of the parameters proposed by Peter 
Godfrey-Smith.600 Family and small non-kin groups score high in inheritance fidelity (H). Most 
inheritance occurs at the biological level and even when cultural transmission occurs, it is 
maintained by the strong ties related to kinship and limited immigration.601 Variation (V) within 
groups is high, and – again – mostly related to genetic transmission. Nonetheless, variation (V) 
between groups is low, because the genetic profile of different populations is similar and there is 
little cultural variation between groups due to the lack of cultural accumulation over time. This is 
one of the reasons why selection does not occur at the group level; variation is high within groups, 
but not between groups, therefore not providing the foundations for the emergence of group-level 
characteristics.  
The relationship between fitness and intrinsic properties (S) is also more related to the 
individual level than to the group. As a result, groups survive or perish as a result of the intrinsic 
features of its members, and not of group-level characteristics. As a matter of fact, there is little to be 
said concerning the intrinsic properties of a group apart from its size. Ceteris paribus, larger groups 
displace smaller groups, but size, in this context, is more a function of the individuals’ reproductive 
success than a group-level feature per se. 
Godfrey-Smith also emphasizes three reproduction-related parameters, bottleneck (B), 
reproductive specialization (G) and overall integration of the collective entity (I). Kin-related bands and 
small non-kin groups score low on each of these parameters. There is no bottleneck – defined as "a 
narrowing that marks the divide between generations". 602  Although these groups can split, 
producing novel groups, it is often hard to say which group is the parent or the offspring. These 
groups resemble buffalo herds, the example mentioned by Godfrey-Smith; as a buffalo herd, family 
groups and small non-kin groups reproduce themselves as a result of reproduction at the lower level 																																																								
599 In Abrantes, P. (2013). Human Evolution and Transitions in Individuality. p. 214. 
600 I will not comment on parameter C because I do not think it is a particularly important parameter in the context of 
comparing human kinds of groups. 
601 Even among chimpanzees aggression towards foreigners is an established fact. See Mitani, J. C., Watts, D. P. and 
Amsler, S. J. (2010). Lethal Intergroup Aggression Leads to Territorial Expansion in Wild Chimpanzees. Current biology : 
CB, 20(12), R507-508.  Concerning cultural variation among chimpanzees, see Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W. 
C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., Tutin, C. E. G., Wrangham, R. W. and Boesch, C. (2001). Charting 
Cultural Variation in Chimpanzees. Behaviour, 138(11/12), 1481-1516.  
602 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 91. 
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of its individual members. Also, there is no reproductive specialization at all (G), nor overall 
integration at the level of the collective entity (I), insofar as the group can "reproduce" as a result of 
mere splitting. Unless all the group-members performing a necessary sociological function within 
the group decide to leave, the group suffers nothing in terms of its persistence as a result of 
migration. In more consolidated Darwinian individuals, integration can be so tight that the loss of 
autonomy of its parts might lead to such high dependence that the death of a part can lead to the 
disintegration of the whole individual. 
This description of family groups and small non-kin groups, based on Godfrey-Smith's 
parameters, leads to one conclusion. In these groups, the evolutionary pressure is directed to the 
group-members, not to the band as an evolutionary individual in its own right. As a result, the band 
exists only as a bundle of individuals. In this sense, bands are a very marginal case of Darwinian 
population. 
Large cooperative groups are composed of members possessing a more sophisticated social 
psychology – capable not only of cooperating with relatives and with those who reciprocate, but also 
based on shared symbolic markers and in the moralistic punishment of free-riders and outsiders. 
This social psychology also enables cultural evolution based on imitation and on conformity bias.   
If familiar groups and small non-kin bands are at best highly marginal cases of 
Darwinian groups, large cooperative groups are an intermediate case. They score well in the V 
parameter. Variation is generated as a result of cultural selection and other evolutionary forces 
operating at the lower level of cultural transmission (cultural mutation, drift, decision-making forces 
and natural selection)603, and is maintained via moralistic punishment, conformist bias, symbolic 
marking and cultural accumulation. These cultural groups also score high in the H parameter; the 
cultural pool transmitted from one generation to another is maintained relatively stable also as a 
result of these mechanisms. 
The S parameter (the relationship between fitness and intrinsic properties) is low, due to 
the fact that group fitness is related to the properties of their individual members, and not to 
intrinsic group-level features. Although individuals in these groups adopt cultural traits and 
practices that enhance the identity of the group as a collective entity more integrated than the loose 
small non-kin groups and families, there is still no group-level feature that could account for an 
adaptation. As such, the group survives or perishes as a result of cultural traits, abilities, and 
inventions developed and transmitted at the group-member level.  																																																								
603 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 69. 
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Concerning reproduction, the first large cooperative groups also score low in the B 
parameter (bottleneck). While group reproduction happens because of its persistence over time, it is 
common that some communities split and form new groups out of older ones.604 But these groups 
simply continue the development of the older ones from which they have split, not reconstructing 
their ontogenetical path of development and establishing a clear division between parent and 
offspring groups.605  
Concerning the parameter G (germ lines), the ancient hunter-gatherer culturally-
organized groups usually score low. Although groups can now be conceived of as a network of 
cultural traits, culture is transmitted only in informal networks, with no specialized institution. Only 
later, with the development of chiefdoms, some individuals became specialized in maintaining and 
transmitting the tribal memes to youngsters, thus keeping the cultural identity of the tribe over 
time.606 But within hunter-gatherer tribes, usually no such specialization exists and customs, habits 
and other cultural variants are transmitted through networks of communications and rituals 
involving all members of the group.607  
Large cooperative groups also score high in parameter I – integration. By relying on symbolic 
markers as authentic and genuine foundations for cooperation and distinguishing in-groups from 
outsiders, the members of these groups share what H. Patrick Glenn calls chtonic traditions, a belief 
system that embodies communitarian identity and which is transmitted orally through the network 
of its own individual members.608  
As Godfrey-Smith states, integration means (i) mutual dependence of parts, (ii) division 
of labor, and (iii) the maintenance of a boundary between the collective and what is outside it.609 A 
cooperative group unified through symbolic marking and the sharing of a common cultural ground 
achieves this third integrative purpose, because symbols are a reliable means of distinguishing 
insiders from outsiders, thus institutionalizing a boundary that encloses the group not only as a 
collective entity possessing a particular package of memes spread through the individual minds of its 																																																								
604 See Flannery, K. and Marcus, J. (2012). The Creation of Inequality: How Our Ancestors Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery, and 
Empire (Kindle ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 80. 
605 Some groups establish a distinction between older groups and newer ones, as Flannery and Marcus acknowledge, but 
not affecting the developmental path of the younger group, which starts as a mere development of the senior one. See  
Flannery, K. and Marcus, J. (2012). The Creation of Inequality: How Our Ancestors Set the Stage for Monarchy, 
Slavery, and Empire. p. 106. 
606 See Flannery, K. and Marcus, J. (2012). The Creation of Inequality: How Our Ancestors Set the Stage for 
Monarchy, Slavery, and Empire. p. 74. 
607 See Clastres, P. (1989). Society Against the State. p. 150; Walsh, R. (1989). What is a Shaman? Definition, Origin 
and Distribution. The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 21(1), 1-11.  
608 See Glenn, H. P. (2010). Legal Traditions of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, USA. pp. 63-66. 
609 See Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 93. 
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members, but also as a cultural system in its own right (a memeplex).  
Being closed units, large cooperative groups pave the way for the evolutionary transition 
to groups as entities resulting from MLS2 evolutionary processes, possessing group-level traits in 
their own right. The evolution of large cooperative groups gave rise to a selective pressure on 
individuals possessing particular tribal social instincts but, more than that, it established the 
preconditions for the selection of cultural groups as collective Darwinian individuals.  
One further point should be noted about integration and the evolution of large 
cooperative cultural groups. The evolution of symbolically marked groups through group selection 
presupposes another psychological disposition, which Tomasello calls "collective intentionality".610 
Instead of depending only on their own perspective (individual intentionality), the members of a 
particular group also reason through an "objective" perspective assumed as a standpoint shared 
among the group. As Michael Tomasello states: 
 
The [...] group-mindness among all members of the cultural group (including in-
group strangers) was based on a new ability to construct common cultural ground 
via collectively known cultural conventions, norms, and institutions. As part of this 
process, cooperative communication became conventionalized linguistic 
communication. In the context of cooperative argumentation in group decision 
making, linguistic conventions could be used to justify and make explicit one's 
reasons for an assertion within the framework of the group's norms of rationality. 
This meant that individuals now could reason "objectively" from the group's agent-
neutral point of view ("from nowhere"). Because the collaboration and 
communication at this point were conventional, institutional, and normative, we 
may refer to all of this as collective intentionality.611 
 
As I see it, collective intentionality can be understood as a selected individual trait (the 
capacity to reason through the cultural standards accepted by the group) that enhances the cohesion 
of the group as an entity, enclosing it from the bottom-up perspective of its individual members.  
But how did collective intentionality evolve? Tomasello proposes that this psychological 
feature evolved from earlier psychological dispositions, such as the capacity of anticipating what 
others will do and manipulate them according to that knowledge, as devised in the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis (individual intentionality) and the ability of coordinating attention with other 																																																								
610 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 6. It should be noticed that Tomasello is 
focused on discussing the evolution of human social psychology related mainly to Pleistocene. He acknowledges that he 
has “given only cursory attention to humans after agriculture and all of the complexities arising from the intermixing of 
cultural groups, from literacy and numeracy, and from institutions such as science and government”. In Tomasello, M. 
(2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 152. I hope that this dissertation can be a small contribution 
concerning the understanding of the evolution of cooperation in the Holocene, specially after the arisal of more complex 
societies. 
611 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 5. 
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individuals in order to pursue results desired by both (joint intentionality), producing what he calls a 
"we" intentionality (collective intentionality) within particular contexts. 612  According to his 
hypothesis, the second step occurred long ago,613  evolving out from the primates’ ability of 
gathering attention to produce group-desired goals, insofar as some (but not all) psychological traits 
proposed by his theory can be observed in other primates. 614  The third step (collective 
intentionality) most likely evolved within human populations already living in cultural groups, 
probably after 100,000 years ago.615 According to Tomasello, in a coevolutionary process, human 
psychology developed the ability to engage in action based in pre-existing agreements present within 
the group's cultural background.616 
Symbolic markers are only one aspect of collective intentionality, and it is related to 
group identification and the differentiation between "us" and "them". As Tomasello says, 
"individuals thus began to understand themselves as members of a particular social group with a 
particular group identity – a culture – based on a we-intentionality encompassing the entire 
group".617 In a certain sense, collective intentionality allowed the evolution of a second concept of 
culture. From the individualistic perspective based on the transmission of features from one person 
to another, culture can now be also conceived of as the background stock of information.618  
Tomasello's account is largely compatible with Richerson and Boyd's account of the 
evolution of large cooperative groups. As a matter of fact, I would say that the members of 
Richerson and Boyd's cultural groups are fully capable of collective intentionality. They organize 
their social lives based on the cultural ‘common ground’, what is only possible when collective 
intentionality takes place.  
Nonetheless, collective intentionality is only one requisite for the emergence of human 
societies as fully Darwinian collective individuals. Richerson & Boyd reject the very idea of 
superorganicism (the idea that society is a superorganism supported by culture) founded solely on 
																																																								
612 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 32. 
613 According to Tomasello, joint intentionality most likely “evolved in Africa before the split between Neanderthals 
and modern humans and so characterized both species”. In Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human 
Thinking. p. 141. In this sense, according to the author, Homo heidelbergensis was probably able to display joint 
intentionality. Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 36. 
614 See Buttelmann, D., Schütte, S., Carpenter, M., Call, J. and Tomasello, M. (2012). Great Apes Infer Others's Goals 
Based on Context. Animal cognition, 15(6), 1037-1053. ; Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 
43. 
615 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 141. 
616 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 38. 
617 In  Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 82. 
618 In Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason. p. 138. 
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collective intentionality – individuals operating on the assumption that their individual beliefs are 
part of a commonly shared pool of beliefs.619 In order to achieve such an evolutionary possibility, a 
certain social structure must arise above culture: for them, social evolution creates institucional 
work-arounds that respect our social instincts, evolved for life in the small-sized communities of the 
Pleistocene, while building an entirely new set of institutions.620 These work-arounds, as mentioned 
on chapter 2, are based on coercive dominance, segmentary hierarchy and symbolic legitimacy. 
While Richerson & Boyd reject superorganicism based solely on culture, they embrace the concept 
to describe societies possessing a particular set of institutions which instantiate the work-arounds 
needed to lay the foundations of a complex society on humansocial psychology. Although they still 
refer to these institutions as “cultural innovations”, I would say that they are not only cultural, but 
also a structural feature of more complex societies.  
To be sure, a sociologist such as Luhmann also rejects the idea of viewing society as an 
organism. But the reasons why he and Richerson & Boyd reject the organismic metaphor are very 
different. Luhmann rejects it for methodological reasons, since he sees living systems just as 
instantiations of a more comprehensive cybernetic approach. There are living systems, as there are 
psychic systems and social systems, all operating within their own domains. Richerson & Boyd reject 
the organismic metaphor based solely on cultural transmission because they see culture just as an 
individual trait, never as a trait that can be attributed to a group: 
 
Culture is a major aspect of what the human brain does, just as smelling and 
breathing are what noses do. Culture-making brains are the product of more than 
two million years of more or less gradual increases in brain size and cultural 
complexity. During this evolution, culture must have increased genetic fitness, or 
the psychological capacities for it would not have evolved. Indeed, anthropologists 
long interpreted much of culture in adaptive terms (e.g., Steward, 1955). Rather 
than a neat, narrow boundary between innate and cultural processes that can be 
characterized by a short list of simple biological constraints on human behavior, we 
imagine a wide, historically contingent, densely intertwined set of phenomena with 
causal arrows operating in both directions. If we think of human culture as part of 
human biology in this way, we simply do not need try to unpack what 
'superorganic' could possibly mean.621 
 
In this sense, as Richerson and Boyd see it, cultural groups can be Darwinian marginal 																																																								
619 See, e.g., Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2002).  Culture is Part of Human Biology: Why the Superorganic Concept 
Serves the Human Sciences Badly. pp. 62-63. 
620 See Richerson, P. and Boyd, R. (1999). Complex Society: the Evolutionary Origins of a Crude Superorganism. 
Human Nature, 10(3), 253–289.  
621 In Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2002).  Culture is Part of Human Biology: Why the Superorganic Concept Serves 
the Human Sciences Badly. p. 63. 
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individuals evolved only through the MLS1 evolutionary process, never through the MLS2. They 
would need to rely on more than cultural traits in order to sustain the kind of institutional stability 
needed to structure the evolutionary process acting on the social group as a whole.  
Collective intentionality paved the road for the transition between MLS1 evolved 
communities and MLS2 evolved societies from the standpoint of our social psychology. It was a 
necessary condition (although not a sufficient one) for the evolution of more complex societies, since 
it enabled us to bridge the link between culture and social structure. Richerson & Boyd's concept of 
culture entails that information transmitted from individual to individual concerns technology, 
beliefs or weapons relative to and usable by persons, but not information attributes concerning the 
whole group structure. By taking collective intentionality into account, Tomasello allows us to bridge the 
link between persons and the community.  
To be fair to Richerson & Boyd's theoretical work, their discussion about institutional 
work-arounds almost faces this issue. According to them, these work-arounds are cultural innovations. 
For sure, the institutionalization of coercion and hierarchy demand the diffusion of many cultural 
beliefs. But they are more than a cultural innovation; they are a structural objective feature of society, 
irreducible to the beliefs of its members.  
Norms are an obvious example of cultural innovation that achieves this structural status. 
Although embodied within the minds of each member of the group, norms also achieve an existence 
of their own. When individuals evaluate if others are complying with the rule-system, they are 
addressing the group standard, an objective standard of rules, and not simply the rule-as-they-
remember-it. This normative system is part of the group’s identity and, as such, escalates from the 
individual mind to becoming a feature of the group. Other members expect the rules to be obeyed 
and sanctions to be applied when transgression occurs.622 Of course, part of the existence of the rules 
system is due to the fact that individual minds remember it and reinforce it, just as part of the human 
organism's existence is due to each cell doing its own work. The group's normative system emerges 
as a structure in its own right, acquiring and ontological status per se. 
The system of rules is only one feature that can be attributed to the group as such, and 
irreducible to the level of individual beliefs. The structure of government, for instance, is another 
feature irreducible to individual beliefs transmitted from one individual to another. Individuals can 
only expect that the expected position holders occupy the roles, but the network of positions and the 
interconnection between them are a social feature irreducible to beliefs.  																																																								
622 See Luhmann, N. (2004). Law as a Social System. p. 9. 
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Although irreducible to beliefs, these features are connected to them by means of 
collective intentionality. Cultural practices, through the "we intentionality", can turn some features 
of the community publicly known, including its structure. As Chwe argues, the main function of 
public events is to turn fundamental communal issues into public knowledge, encouraging others to 
conform.623 Tomasello states, then, that an important function of "we intentionality" is to produce 
public conventions and, through them, create institutional reality – the ontological realm of 
collective entities.624 
 
In the limit, some conventional cultural practices turn into full-blown institutions. 
Obviously, the dividing line is fuzzy, but a basic prerequisite is that the cultural 
practice is not a solo activity but is in some sense collaborative, with well-defined, 
complementary roles. But the key feature distinguishing cultural institutions is that 
they comprise social norms that do not just regulate existing activities but, rather, 
create new cultural entities (the norms are not regulative but constitutive).625 
 
The philosopher John Searle explored this issue better through the formula "X counts as 
Y in context C".626 According to him, we humans are capable of reasoning within the rules of 
institutional intentionality, accepting a background agreement on the rules concerning how to act 
on a given situation. In a chess game (context C), the piece (X) counts as a king (Y). According to 
Tomasello, the ability to reason institutionally derived from collective intentionality. We create 
institutions and, by creating them, we also constrain and raise new possibilities of action.  
My argument goes further than Tomasello's. Collective intentionality not only raised the 
possibility of reasoning through institutions, such as playing games or following the rules of a legal 
code. Unlike Tomasello627, I sustain that collective intentionality also raised the possibility that, by 																																																								
623 See Chwe, M. S.-Y. (2003). Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination and Common Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
624 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 89. 
625 See Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 89. 
626 See Searle, J. R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press. p. 28; Searle, J. R. (2010). Making the 
Social World: the Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 96. 
627 Tomasello rejects the idea that social reality is irreducible to lower-level phenomena in the long term, as a stable 
feature of human sociability. According to him, shared intentionality is only short-term irreducible, existing only during 
the interaction between two or more individual agents. In his own words: “A list of open questions at this point would 
be quite long. But two particularly big ones are these: First is the nature of the jointness  of collectivity or “we-ness” that 
characterizes all forms of shared intentionality. Many theorists subscribe to something like an irreducibility thesis (e.g., 
Gallotti, 2012) in which such things as joint attention and shared conventions are irreducibly social phenomena, and 
attempting to capture them in terms of the individuals involved, and what is going on in their individual heads, is 
doomed to failure. Our view is that shared intentionality is indeed an irreducibly social phenomena in the moment— 
joint attention only exists when two or more individuals are interacting, for example— but at the same time we may ask 
the evolutionary or developmental question of what does the individual bring to the interaction that enables her to 
engage in joint attention in a way that other apes and younger children cannot. And so for us this means that something 
like recursive mind-reading or inferring— still not adequately characterized, and in most instances fully implicit— has 
to be a part of the story of shared intentionality. From the individual’s point of view, shared intentionality is simply 
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creating institutions, institutional reality created a world of its own. A system of rules, or a 
government, are group-features, irreducible to the beliefs of individual group-members. They are 
created and maintained by collective intentionality, as background agreements which people 
assume in order to live their lives. Although originally constructed from bottom-up processes, and 
maintained through processes of conventionalization, they are kept as group-features, and, as such, 
they can be selected as group-features per se. 
Now, I can return to Godfrey-Smith's scheme. If Abrantes is right, Richerson & Boyd's 
large cooperative groups are not yet full Darwinian collective entities because they do not possess 
group-level features. They can evolve through group selection as MLS1 entities, which solves the 
problem of free-riding due to being capable of symbolic marking and moralistic punishment, as well 
as having some social tribal instincts such as shame and guilt. The member of these groups could 
not, however, be capable of collective intentionality and of producing conventional institutions.  
The paramount example of MLS1 group selection is Nuer’s conquest of the Dinka, 
which has been used as an example of cultural group selection.628 These two peoples lived together in 
the marshes of southern Sudan, used the same technologies and derived from the same ancestors. 
The only differences, according to the standard reading, were related to their cultures. The Dinka 
maintained small herds of cattle, which were frequently slaughtered and eaten, while the Nuer kept 
larger herds and only used their derived products, such as milk. The Dinka lived together in small 
encampments constrained by geography, while Nuer tribes could grow indefinitely. According to 
the anthropologist Raymond Kelly, 629  these differences resulted from specific features of the 
wedding systems of both tribes, which adopted a net transfer system of livestock from the groom's 
family to the bride's relatives. Among the Nuers, the minimum payment was about 20 heads of 																																																																																																																																																																																								
experienced as a sharing, but its underlying structure, reflecting its evolution, is that each participant in an interaction 
can potentially take the perspective of others taking her perspective taking their perspective, and so forth for at least a 
few levels. But this, as they say, is a point on which reasonable people may disagree”. In Tomasello, M. (2014). A 
Natural History of Human Thinking. p. 152. I disagree with Tomasello because his approach is bottom-up; from the 
standpoint of someone describing social institutions by observing individual psychology, social reality only existis in a 
particular moment when interaction occurs. From the standpoint of someone observing processes happening both 
within individual social psychology, low-level interactions, their effects on social institutions and especially the effects of 
social interactions on the behavior of individual agents, it is unreasonable to assume that higher-level social reality only 
exists during short-term interactions. The volume of interactions, shared assumptions and institutional constraints to 
behavior is so high that we can identify the societal domain as an ontological level in its own right – without denying 
that this ontological layer is connected to processes happening in lower-level lawyers.  
628 See, on the subject, Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human 
Evolution. pp. 23-25. See also Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. pp. 151-152; 
Abrantes, P. and Almeida, F. (2011). Evolução humana: a teoria da dupla herança. In Abrantes (Ed.), Filosofia da Biologia 
(pp. 261-295). Porto Alegre: Artmed, p. 278-279. 
629 See Kelly, R. (1985). The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of an Expansionist System. Ann Harbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
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cattle, while the Dinka had no minimum acceptable amount (and even allowed credit!). As a result 
of the subsistence and dowry practices, the Nuers maintained larger herds even in tough times, 
while a Dinka family, sometimes, could not receive a single cow for an entire generation.630 Over 
time, the practices adopted by the Nuer sustained larger populations and led their tribes to expand 
at the expense of the Dinka. As Richerson & Boyd state:  
 
Nuer victories were routine because their tribes were larger. Nuer armies of fifteen 
hundred men easily defeated Dinka armies numbering about six hundred. The 
Nuer were able to recruit larger armies because their tribes were larger and 
because warfare typically occurred during the dry season, when Nuer 
encampments were larger. Notice that the Dinka did not adopt Nuer practices 
before they were conquered and assimilated, nor did they develop innovative 
military institutions to check the Nuer expansion.631  
 
The Nuer’s conquest of the Dinka did not occur as a result of any group-level feature, 
but as a result of Nuer members possessing and transmitting specific memes concerning dowry and 
subsistence practices instead of others, which affected the survival rate of the group.   
Compare the Nuer’s conquest of the Dinka with the Roman conquest of Europe. The 
Roman Empire was not sustained solely on a belief-system, but on a specific structure of 
government that allowed the control of conquered peoples, a structured legal system and a 
functional economy.632 Rome had societal features – features possessed by the group, the whole 
Roman Empire, not by its individuals – in such a way that no other archaic society possessed, 
allowing for the characterization of the Roman Empire as a Darwinian individual in its own right. 
But how did this transition – from “large cooperative groups” to entities such as the Roman Empire 
– happen?  
The transition to cultural-groups-as-Darwinian-individuals (subjected to MLS2 selection) was 
stabilized after individuals evolved collective intentionality and cultural accumulation coupled with social 
differentiation, and as a result produced group-level adaptations. At the lower level, this ability 
provided agents with a more cohesive capacity of acting as members of the group, obeying the rules 
of the band. At the group level, collective intentionality allowed for the evolution of group-features 																																																								
630 See Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 24. 
631 In Richerson, P. J. and Boyd, R. (2008). Not by Genes Alone: how Culture Transformed Human Evolution. p. 25. 
632 See, e.g., Runciman, W. G. (1983). Capitalism without Classes: The Case of Classical Rome; Wieacker, F. (1981). 
The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and Western Legal Thought. Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review, 4(2).  Note that saying that Rome had a more complex societal structure does not entail that it 
was adapted to everything. As a matter of fact, its structure could not stand the test of time, especially because slavery 
could not sustain the Empire economically and the fragmented government structure ultimately fractured the cultural 
integration (or, as Peter Turchin calls, collective solidarity) of the Empire. See Turchin, P. (2003). Historical Dynamics: 
Why States Rise and Fail. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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(including group-level adaptations) that could be selected as such. The structuration of government, 
rule systems (instead of moral codes based on personal violations of reciprocal altruism), and role-
based stratification are all features that can be attributed to the group level, and as such are 
irreducible to individuals. As a result of this process, natural selection could work at the level of the 
group, selecting group-level features - more specifically, particular social structures.  
Collective social entities, as full-blown Darwinian individuals, are MLS2 entities. They 
possess not only cultural properties at the group level (background information on which the group 
members can rely their daily activities), but also structural properties resulting from their 
institutional integration.  
How would these entities fare in terms of Godfrey-Smith parameters? First of all, as in 
Large Cooperative Groups, low-level entities are de-Darwinized. Although individuals compete, their 
interaction is structured by culture and social structure on producing cooperative outcomes. As a 
result of punishment and conformity psychological bias, cultural variation within communities is 
low, while it is high between different groups. The parameter H (Heredity) is also high, insofar as 
social control monitors information transmission processes. In more sophisticated societies, the 
education system provides the leveling of information to all youngsters, ensuring the maintenance of 
a minimum core of cultural identity background.633  
So far, there is little difference between full-blown human societies as Darwinian 
individuals and the large cooperative groups described by Richerson and Boyd. Things begin to 
change when we take a closer look at parameter S. In large cooperative groups, S is low, because 
group fitness is related to individual properties, and not group properties more widely. In MLS2 
evolved human societies, S is high because they display structures at the group level that are directly 
responsible either for their selection vis-a-vis other societal groups or for their persistence over time.  
Concerning reproductive parameters, the B (Bottleneck) parameter is also low, because 
complex societies usually do not generate a visible “narrowing that marks the divide between 
generations”.634 However, complex societies can score high in parameter G (germ line). The 
education system of most industrialized societies, for instance, is responsible for replicating most of 
the low-level culture and preparing youngsters to occupy specific roles in specialized institutions 
later in their lives. By doing so, the educational system acts as a memetic germ line, a systemic 
institution specialized in educating individuals on basic information that allow them to potentially 
participate in all institutional domains. As Jonathan Turner states: 																																																								
633 See, e.g., Callan, E. (1997). Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
634 In Godfrey-Smith, P. R. (2009). Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. p. 91. 
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[…] by the time agrarian societies appeared in human evolutionary history, some 
5,000–8,000 years ago, kinship began its evolution back to nuclear families typical 
of hunter-gatherers and increasingly became the institutional domain for 
reproduction.  
However, as the number and variety of corporate units and their respective cultures 
differentiated, social reproduction became ever-more complex, requiring that each 
generation learn more than could be taught within kinship. At times, knowledge 
was imparted within distinctive corporate units of differentiating domains such as 
economy, polity, and religion. Yet, selection pressures continued to push on actors 
to forge new structures for socializing individuals into the cultural storehouses of 
highly differentiated institutional domains and distinctive types of corporate units 
within these domains. 
Under these pressures, education as an institutional domain began to evolve; and 
over the last 200 years, this domain differentiated internally, while gaining 
increased autonomy from other institutional domains.635  
 
Last, but definitely not least, MLS2 selected human societies also score high in 
parameter I - integration, for two reasons. Large cooperative groups score high in this parameter 
because they can be unified by culture both due to psychological biases (such as conformity), social 
tribal instincts and a psychology capable of engaging in reciprocal relations, as well as due to 
moralistic punishment. As Parsons sustained, social integration is enabled by the respect of 
individual actors for the moral authority of a binding value system.636   Actors become able to play 
roles within the social system because they are educated within the cultural system’s values.637 In 
more complex societies, where cultural consensus cannot be assumed as a starting point, law can 
provide such systemic enclosure because it creates institutional mechanisms that reinforce 
adherence to a common societal structure. As we will see, integration can also be assumed within 
more developed human societies that can be featured as full-blown Darwinian individuals. 
Similarly to Habermas, Parsons also conceives of culture as a repository of symbolic 
information to individuals, and, as such, it is a group-level feature in evolutionary terms. Although it 
is an emergent property derived from individual interaction through which persons transmit 
information concerning their beliefs, values, abilities, among others, over time much of this 
information becomes a repository on which individuals can rely on in order to pursue their own 																																																								
635 Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 100-101. 
636 See, e.g., Habermas’ account of Parsons on the subject: “This social integration demands of individual actors respect 
for a moral authority upon which the validity claim of collectively binding rules can rest. Parsons is already developing 
here the idea of a morally imperative - and in this sense ultimate-value system, which is, on the one hand, embodied in 
social norms and, on the other, anchored in the motives of acting subjects”. In Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of 
Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist Reason. p. 207. 
637 As Jonathan Turner acknowledges, this is a major theme in Parsons’ work. See Turner, J. H. and Maryanski, A. M. 
(1979). Functionalism. San Francisco: Phoenix Publishing Services. p. 74. I will return to this point on chapter 4. 
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goals. This is not only a result of individual action and memory (which generate ephemeral 
emergents), but it is also a result of socially developed structures that hold the group’s informational 
repository, embodying group culture within reliable sources such as libraries, books, museums, and 
other anchors.638  As a result, literature, architecture and other physical structures can further more 
integrated societies because they create corporeal arrangements (stable emergents) that embody 
symbolic meanings which help fostering group values at the individual level. 
Although large cooperative groups could be integrated by means of cultural transmission 
at the lower-societal level (individual interaction), the transition to societies as full-blown Darwinian 
individuals also generates another form of integration – not between cooperating individuals, but 
between functional institutions.  This is the second reason for human societies scoring high in the 
Integration (I) parameter. This is what Jonathan Turner calls institutional integration.639  
The emergence of different institutions entails the generation of different social systems 
possessing varying cultural codes and performing independent functions. Over time, this 
differentiation pattern might cause societal disintegration. Societies possessing social structures 
better adapted for integrating institutions from different domains would have an advantage over 
other societies, which would disintegrate or persist in a lower differentiated level of complexity – 
what is, according to Niall Ferguson's reading, exactly what happened to Eastern societies in the 
beginning of Modern times.640 
However, within societies able to cope with institutional integration and, as a result, 
capable of sustaining and fostering systemic differentiation, each institutional domain produces a 
particular memetic Darwinian selection system, producing and selecting its cultural variants 
according to its own criteria. However, neither culture as a broad interpenetrating influence from 
the lifeworld, nor the institutionalized cultural codes of fragmented institutions are capable of 
granting societal cohesion.641 At first, these pressures are low because much of the institutional 
integration is granted by a common cultural ground provided specially by religion and most 
institutions are still not functionally differentiated; but within advanced agrarian societies and, most 
particularly, within industrial and post-industrial societies this can be a huge problem to be dealt 
with.642   																																																								
638 See, e.g., Anastasio, T. J., Ehrenberger, K. A., Watson, P. and Zhang, W. Individual and Collective Memory Consolidation 
(Kindle ed.). Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
639 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 125-146. 
640 See, generally, Ferguson, N. (2011). Civilization: the West and the Rest; Ferguson, N. (2012). The Great Degeneration: 
How Institutions Decay and Economies Die. New York: Penguin. pp. 21-34. 
641 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 193-199. 
642 See Turner, J. H. (2010a). Theoretical Principles of Sociology, Volume 1. pp. 217-223. 
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I will return to this problem in chapter 5, when I will argue on the special role of 
Constitutions in the maintenance of integration in highly differentiated societies. For now, I want to 
point out that social structure plays a fundamental role in maintaining high institutional integration 
in more complex societies compared to the large cooperative groups studied by Richerson & Boyd. 
In a sense, social structure is a relational property, since it emerges from the interactions between 
individuals, groups and institutions and, more than that, social structure emerges from the 
interaction between the institutional domains (social systems) within a given society, but cannot be 
reduced to them.643 Over time, however, as the interaction pattern between social systems starts to 
be taken as expected, it is presumed to regulate the expectations concerning the functioning of one 
social system towards the other. As Luhmann says: “When one realizes that social structures are 
expectational structures, one can link this theoretical advance with systems theory. Expectations 
come into being by constraining ranges of possibilities. Finally, they are this constraint itself”.644 As 
a result, social structures are both the practices that produce themselves and the outcome of their 
self-production.645 
 
* * * 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide reasons to sustain that human societies 
came to be paradigmatic Darwinian populations, using as reference the criteria provided by Peter 
Godfrey-Smith. This transition entailed two consequences: the first one is that human societies 
became subject of natural selection in MLS2 mode. The most refined social structures allowed for 
the persistence and more internal development and complexity in relation to other societies, thus 
being more prone to selection. The second consequence – a corollary of the first – is that, as a result 
of MLS2 natural selection, societal features could emerge, turning out to be adaptations at the 
societal level.  
Based partially on Luhmannian sociology, chapter 4 will be based on the argument that 
law is one of these adaptations. Law reinforces social structure by stabilizing normative 
expectations, but this brings about a diachronic question: how has law stabilized normative 
																																																								
643 Notice that here are adopted two different concepts of social structure. The first one is related to the structural 
properties within a particular social system, while the other is concerned with the structure of the societal system as a 
whole. In the following discussion, I will focus on the second sense of the term. 
644 See Luhmann, N. (1995a). Social Systems. p. 292. 
645 In a sense, this is what I understand by Gidden’s dual theory of structure. See Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of 
Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. pp. 25-28. 
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expectations in such different historical realities throughout human history? This question will bring 
us back to the end of chapter 2, when I claimed that all ancient human societies in the late 
Pleistocene were egalitarian. As we will see, the beginning of the Holocene brought a whole 
different scenario. Instead of egalitarian, most societies in the last 10,000 years have been hugely 
marked by inequality. Why has this happened? And, more specifically, what role has law played in 
keeping inequality in these societies?  
These questions will set the background assumptions for the last chapter, when I will 
consider the opposite pattern that seems to arise with the advent of constitutionalism and its 
ideology of freedom, autonomy and equality. Nowadays, most Western societies are constitutional 
democracies (or at least claim to be)646 and, once again, egalitarianism seems to be a valuable 
feature of our political systems.  But how did we get from egalitarian hunter-gatherers to 
inegalitarian empires and kingdoms, and then returned to an egalitarian ethos? Is it really a return, or 
is it something else? In order to address these issues properly, it is of fundamental importance to 
understand the role of law in regulating normative expectations in each societal moment. This is the 
subject to be discussed in the next chapter. 
  
																																																								







In an influential paper regarding the implications of evolutionary thinking to legal 
regulation, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg argued that “as the science stands today, 
evolutionary biology offers nothing to law” and that “only systematic misrepresentations or lack of 
understanding of the relevant biology, together with far-reaching analytical and philosophical 
confusions, have led anyone to think otherwise”.1329 They ask rhetorically whether one should 
expect “law and evolutionary biology’’ to “have the lasting power and impact of, say, law and 
economics, or will it go the way of deconstructionism and Critical Legal Studies (CLS), both of 
which faded from the scene in roughly a decade or less?” And their answer is sharp: “the ‘law and 
evolutionary biology’ fad should have a shelf life at least as short as deconstruction’s”. 1330 
Evolutionary psychology has delivered no consistent and unequivocally confirmed results thus far – 
the argument goes – and institutions do not require a complete understanding of human behavior to 
regulate successfully. Leiter and Weisberg also dismiss the pursuit of consilience between social and 
natural sciences as an epistemological ideal.1331  
However, the consistency of any legal theory should not be evaluated for the sake of its 
success in being used by the community of judges and lawyers. Neither CLS nor deconstructionism 
aimed to provide a new foundation for legal practice, but both led us to deeper understandings of 
the law and of many of law’s unspoken premises. Similarly, taking evolutionary biology into account 
when analyzing the law can enlighten the way in which we see many features that were previously 
hidden. If evolutionary psychology seems to have delivered no consistent and unequivocally 
confirmed results – as Leiter and Weisberg argue – it has the merit of at least having successfully 
noted the demise of the rationality assumptions upon which most of law and economics theory relies 
on. We human beings are not so rational as rational choice theories assume. The psychological 
biases involved in our reasoning affect us all the way down to how we behave, how we interpret the 
law and how we judge the behavior of others. 																																																								
1329 See Leiter, B. and Weisberg, M. (2009). Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far) Irrelevant To Legal Regulation. Law 
and Philosophy, 29(1), 31-74.  
1330 In  Leiter, B. and Weisberg, M. (2009). Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far) Irrelevant To Legal Regulation. pp. 
33-34. 
1331 See Leiter, B. and Weisberg, M. (2009). Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far) Irrelevant To Legal Regulation. pp. 
54-62. 
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It is true that evolutionary psychology and the other biological sciences have not yet 
unequivocally explained the many aspects of our complex social behavior. However, they have the 
merit to have shown that social scientists – and legal theorists among them – must think about the 
consequences of not taking into account the evolved aspects of our psychology that affect rationality 
and the way humans behave. Although in a still underdeveloped ongoing research program, its 
premises are already being tested within the domain of legal practice. There is evidence regarding 
the influence of psychological biases in how judges think1332 and about how our predisposition to 
behave according to law and morality is affected by the proper functioning of our brain because 
lesions and tumors can induce us to behave in antisocial ways.1333  
These findings are important for law because they call into question many factors that 
had been overlooked by legal theory and that impact the normal functioning of legal institutions. 
That a judge’s impartiality can be affected by something as naïve as a dice number1334 or that even 
experienced magistrates can be influenced by extraneous factors such as fatigue and hunger1335 is 
something that must be taken into account by legal theory. None of these studies could have been 
developed without relying on the assumption that psychological and biological factors play an 
important role in legal practice.  
Furthermore, taking an interdisciplinary perspective leads to a better understanding of 
how legal institutions evolve over time and remain deeply rooted in human nature. Even if there is 
much to be learned about human psychology, it is simply not an option to wait before incorporating 
the knowledge we currently have into legal theory; otherwise, institutions will continue to rely on 
assumptions and models that have been proven false, such as the rational actor model assumed by 
the economic analysis of law. By taking into account the knowledge accumulated by scientific fields 
as diverse as social and evolutionary psychology, Darwinian anthropology, and neuroscience, 
among others, scholars can develop better legal theories because they will be relying on more 
accurate models of human social behavior.  
Obviously, the hypotheses generated by this evolutionary paradigm can only embody a 																																																								
1332 See Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J. and Wistrich, A. J. (2007). Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases. 
Cornell Law Review, 93, 1-44.  
1333 See Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI 
Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. Science, New Series, 293(5537), 2105-2108. ; Yang, Y. and 
Glenn, A. L. (2008). Brain Abnormalities in Antisocial Individuals: Implications for the Law. Behavioral Sciences and the 
Law, 26, 65-83.  
1334 See Englich, B., Mussweiler, T. and Strack, F. (2006). Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 32, 188-200.  
1335 See Danziger, S. (2011). Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(17), 
6889-6892.  
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tentative project that follows, accordingly, a Popperian approach to scientific thought. Brian Leiter 
argues that this is a failure that characterizes any attempt to apply evolutionary thinking to legal 
thought, but the fact is that every scientific and historical explanation is tentative. Scholars and 
scientists can only hope to do the best with the data they have at the moment, and the best they can 
do is to make theoretical sense of the available evidence. It is not by ignoring data from other 
sciences that we can hope to design better institutions. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler’s1336 
attempt to apply behavioral economics to understand and design legal institutions and Jon Hanson’s 
situationist approach regarding the implications of social psychology to understand market 
manipulation1337 and torts1338 are prominent examples of how to undertake this enterprise.  
In addition to using social behavioral and evolutionary sciences to design better 
institutions, there is a less pragmatic sense in which this interdisciplinary approach can benefit social 
and legal theory. It can provide a broader account about the very nature and function of law and of 
the role law has played in the sociological, cultural and natural evolution of mankind. We are 
acquainted with historical thinking in law, but legal philosophy has yet to cross the Rubicon 
between man and other animals. Except for certain studies conducted by anthropologists and social 
psychologists, almost no study has seriously attempted to understand the impact of our animal 
nature on our social behavior and on the evolution of institutions.  
Still, there is a need for more interdisciplinarity. Usually, when legal scholars talk about 
interdisciplinary research, they mean taking into account the contributions from fields such as 
sociology, history and anthropology. However, findings and theories from biology, neurology, 
psychology (and so many other conceivable fields) can also contribute to the advancing of legal 
theory. By this, I do not mean to take for granted – as Edward O. Wilson did – that social theory 
must abdicate its own epistemology in favor of the natural sciences, but that all fields must talk in 
order to produce a truly interdisciplinary approach, taking each science’s contribution seriously.  
This dissertation can be understood as a tentative attempt to reframe the development 
of constitutionalism within evolutionary thought by adopting this epistemological instance. I have 
tried not to establish naïve and direct implications between our biological/psychological nature and 
the tenets of constitutionalism; instead, I sought to offer a rather complex description of how 
biology, culture and institutions may have interacted in such a way that constitutionalism resulted as 
a feasible evolutionary achievement.  																																																								
1336 See Thaler, R. H. and Sunstein, C. (2009). Nudge. New York: Penguin. pp. 65-71. 
1337 See Hanson, J. and Kysar, D. A. (1999). Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation. 
Harvard Law Review, 112(7), 1420-1572.  
1338 See Hanson, J. and McCann, M. (2007). Situationist Torts. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 41, 1345.  
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In order to do so, I aimed to put biology, sociology, anthropology and legal theory in 
contact, without taking for granted the superiority of any of these individual approaches. As I see it, 
evolutionary theory turns this endeavor into a real possibility, insofar as it helps us understand the 
evolution of complex structures taking into consideration the full scope of intricated relations 
between many ontological levels – the biological, the psychological, the cultural, the social and, as I 
have been arguing, the socio-structural. Evolutionary theory can help us understand the interaction 
of so many different ontological levels without assuming the precedence of one level over the others. 
Maybe the answer developed here will be regarded over time as a false hypothesis about how this 
interaction occurred, but at the very least I believe in its merit of having posed some methodological 
and substantive questions that should be addressed by the community of legal scholars. 
Of course, I do not mean that constitutionalism can be only explained by recourse to 
such view. Nonetheless, I have tried to explain constitutionalism as part of a solution to a much 
wider and longstanding problem in our history as a species – how can we cooperate at all?  
Since human prehistory, we have devised many ways to cope with the problem of 
cooperation. Psychological biases selected as a result of kin selection and reciprocal altruism fostered 
collaborative action between relatives and egalitarian exchange-based interactions. Later on, 
between 200,000 - 500,000 years ago, our species became increasingly capable to reason in terms of 
culturally-transmitted information, and cooperation in cultural communities became an evolutionary 
possibility not only as a result of specific cultural causes, but also as a consequence of the evolution 
of specific psychological traits such as the ability to reason through language and imitate (and the 
related conformity bias), the faculty of engaging in symbolic marking, and moralistic aggression.   
As Richerson and Boyd have demonstrated, these psychological biases can explain, from 
a naturalistic perspective, much of what happened in human history in terms of our ability to 
cooperate in increasingly larger societies. However, modernity brought more cultural, institutional 
and social complexity than we have ever faced before in human history. The lack of cultural 
homogeneity and the explosion of heterarchical functional specialized social systems, in a process 
precisely detailed by Hauke Brunkhorst, Luhmann and Marcelo Neves, demands a more complex 
approach.  
If we desire to understand the emergence of constitutionalism from the standpoint of a  
theory of cooperation that takes into account evolution and the fact that we, humans, are at once, 
biological, social and cultural beings, then we must understand constitutionalism within a 
comprehensive framework that takes into account theories about all these elements.  This is what I 
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have attempted to do and I hope to have succeeded at least partially in bringing novel questions to 
illuminate constitutional theory. 
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Síntese detalhada da tese em português 	
Título da tese em português -  Constituição: a Evolução de uma Estrutura Social 
 
 
O surgimento das sociedades modernas, estruturadas sob o estado de direito, é um enigma 
evolutivo que demanda explicação. Além das contingências históricas, filosóficas e sociológicas, as 
modernas democracias constitucionais também são uma constituição institucional improvável 
quando observadas a partir das lentes das modernas teorias da cooperação na biologia.  
O Homo sapiens é a única espécie animal capaz de cooperar em larga escala sem a 
necessidade de parentesco entre os agentes, possibilitando a interação de uma vasta quantidade de 
indivíduos não aparentados geneticamente. Mais que isso, a espécie humana também é capaz de 
cooperar em ambientes institucionais e culturais complexos; nossas interações não são baseadas 
apenas em nossa natureza biológica, mas também em crenças compartilhadas culturalmente e 
construídas por meio de instituições e sistemas sociais complexos.  
Essa é uma questão enorme a ser explicada do ponto de vista de uma perspectiva evolutiva. 
Os cientistas sociais usualmente assumem que a sociabilidade humana resulta da história 
institucional, social e cultural. Mas por que essas instituições existem e como regulam as sociedades 
humanas de forma a possibilitar a cooperação em larga escala típica de nossa espécie? 
Recentemente, teorias da coevolução gene-cultura têm se debruçado sobre essa questão e proposto 
respostas convincentes sobre a emergência das instituições humanas, considerando-as o resultado da 
coevolução entre características psicológicas inatas da mente humana e o ambiente cultural.  
Contudo, ainda que essas teorias sejam capazes de explicar a cooperação em sociedades 
como as pré-modernas, ainda não podem explicar a manutenção da cooperação em sociedades 
funcionalmente diferenciadas como as modernas democracias constitucionais. A fragmentação 
contemporânea trouxe circunstâncias sociológicas inéditas no curso da história humana: ao 
contrário das sociedades pré-modernas, as sociedades modernas possibilitaram a cooperação em 
condições muito diferentes, prescindindo do consenso sobre determinados valores culturalmente 
compartilhados. 
Mas como o rompimento com as condições de sociabilidade pré-modernas pode ser 
explicado? A fim de responder essa questão, assume-se que uma abordagem evolutiva é um bom 
ponto de partida. A teoria da evolução pode compreender como as sociedades humanas se 
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tornaram o que são hoje, oferecendo uma abordagem consiliente entre as ciências naturais e sociais. A 
tese geral a ser sustentada é a de que o constitucionalismo é uma adaptação evolutiva a 
circunstâncias histórico-sociológicas que demandaram a emergência de instituições capazes de 
acomodar a diversidade, o pluralismo e a complexidade típicas da modernidade. 
Com essa proposta, discuto, na primeira seção, os compromissos epistemológicos 
assumidos em uma abordagem evolutiva do direito. Na segunda seção, abordo as bases evolutivas 
do comportamento pró-social humano, com destaque para as bases psicológicas do comportamento 
moral e normativo que possibilitaram o surgimento das primeiras sociedades humanas - os bandos 
igualitários de caçadores-coletores do Pleistoceno. 
Na terceira seção, discute-se como as sociedades humanas podem ser compreendidas como 
unidades evolutivas, a partir da obra Darwinian Populations, de Peter Godfrey-Smith. O intuito é 
demonstrar, a partir da filosofia da biologia e da teoria dos sistemas (Luhmann), que sociedades 
humanas evoluem no sentido darwinista, a partir da tricotomia herança-aptidão-seleção. A quarta 
seção, por sua vez, discute a ideia de função, a fim de denotar como esse conceito pode aproximar 
sociologia e biologia; e, além disso, explicita a função do direito na construção das sociedades 
estratificadas pré-modernas.  Na quinta seção, discute-se o papel do constitucionalismo na reversão 
da tendência à estratificação nas sociedades complexas, promovendo a cooperação no nível das 
interações individuais e a integração dos sistemas sociais em uma sociedade complexa. 
 
1. Constitucionalismo, Evolução e Teoria Social: uma abordagem integrada 
 
Uma abordagem evolutiva do direito oferece novas perspectivas para a compreensão da 
dinâmica jurídica, possibilitando enxergar problemas teóricos que dificilmente seriam observados à 
luz de teorias distintas. Mas o que, exatamente, significa adotar uma abordagem evolutiva? 
Quando se fala em 'evolução', no direito, usualmente adota-se um sentido menos técnico, 
para descrever como o direito 'evolui' de um sistema jurídico menos primitivo para um mais 
complexo. A história e evolução do direito, nesse sentido, é compreendida como o desdobramento 
hegeliano do direito para atingir seu completo potencial. Normalmente é o sentido utilizado por 
acadêmicos que se referem à evolução da democracia, dos direitos humanos e das demais 
instituições jurídicas.  
Do ponto de vista da teoria evolutiva, contudo, isso é um erro. A evolução não é 
simplesmente história, mas a compreensão da mudança por meio de um processo de seleção em 
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populações que apresentam variação e herança de características. Assim, adotar uma abordagem 
evolutiva a fim de explicar processos de emergência e mudança de instituições políticas e jurídicas 
implica que não as consideremos tão-somente como o resultado da história - ainda que a explicação 
evolutiva seja um tipo de explicação histórica também. É preciso identificar e explicar como 
mecanismos de seleção, variação e herança atuaram na produção das instituições cuja evolução se 
pretende explicar. 
Mas é possível aplicar a teoria evolutiva para explicar os processos de mudança das 
instituições jurídicas? Uma primeira objeção a esse projeto poderia ser apresentada da seguinte 
forma: a teoria da evolução, tal como exposta por Darwin, foi delineada para explicar fenômenos 
biológicos, não sociais. Dessa forma, não há como aplicar a teoria darwinista para explicar 
fenômenos jurídicos. Essa é uma objeção legítima, mas equivocada. Processos darwinistas não são 
limitados ao mundo biológico: presentes as condições previstas pela teoria, é possível aplicá-la para 
compreender a evolução de uma miríade de contextos.   
Reconhecer isso nos leva ao principal ponto desta seção: em que medida a teoria evolutiva 
pode contribuir para compreendermos como o constitucionalismo emergiu e evoluiu?  
Com vistas a responder a essa questão, é importante notar que, embora não seja tão 
popular hodiernamente, há uma longa tradição na teoria jurídica de utilizar a perspectiva evolutiva 
como ponto de referência. Ainda no século XIX, por exemplo, o jusfilósofo alemão Friedrich Karl 
von Savigny advogou uma jurisprudência organicamente progressiva, em defesa do common law 
contra o movimento pela codificação. Seu argumento era baseado em uma teoria dos estágios do 
desenvolvimento do direito, construída sobre uma abordagem da evolução biológica tal como 
compreendida antes de Darwin propor sua teoria da evolução por seleção natural. Para Savigny -- 
que mais tarde seria considerado o Darwin do Direito --, a evolução progressiva do direito derivava 
do costume e da jurisprudência, em oposição à legislação. 
No século XIX, também é possível destacar as contribuições do jurista inglês Henry 
Maine, que também se baseava em uma ideia de que o direito evolui por meio de estágios 
sequenciais e graduais -- passando de um sistema jurídico baseado em decisões reais, que evoluiria 
para um sistema de direito costumeiro e, por fim, para o direito codificado.  
Nessas abordagens, contudo, a evolução é compreendida como desenvolvimento histórico. 
Nem Savigny nem Maine compreendiam a evolução social e jurídica como produto da variação e 
seleção de características de uma data população, como em Darwin.  
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Explicitamente influenciado pela teoria darwinista, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. acreditava 
que o direito era o produto do efeito cumulativo das decisões judiciais, e não do planejamento 
racional do legislador. De acordo com ele, o direito é como uma forma de vida orgânica que evolui 
por meio da seleção natural. Em The Common Law, onde Holmes explora a história da 
responsabilidade legal e a história dos contratos, destaca-se como as normas jurídicas variam ao 
longo do tempo como se tivessem sido produzidas aleatoriamente e então selecionadas por decisões 
judiciais sem que houvesse nenhuma racionalidade atuando aprioristicamente.  
Muitas outras obras poderiam ser mencionadas, como as contribuições de Arhur Corbin, 
Robert Clark, Paul Rubin, George Priest e, mais recentemente, Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser, 
Richard Posner e Friedrich Hayek. Embora todas tenham seu lugar na história, o propósito aqui 
não é de esmiuçá-las, mas tão-somente o de destacá-las como parte de uma tradição respeitável do 
pensamento jurídico. 
Apesar disso, explicações evolutivas do direito têm sido relegadas a espaços marginais de 
pesquisa há algum tempo, talvez por não estar tão claro quais os benefícios epistemológicos da uma 
abordagem. Por que invocar a evolução darwinista para explicar o fenômeno jurídico? E, mais 
importante para os propósitos do artigo, por que precisamos de uma perspectiva evolutiva para 
compreender o constitucionalismo? 
Em primeiro lugar, o Darwinismo impõe um grande desafio para todas as ciências sociais. A 
lógica darwinista, baseada em variação, herança e aptidão, é um modelo atraente não apenas para 
a biologia, mas também para as ciências sociais. Assim como animais e plantas, sociedades e 
sistemas sociais e culturais também evoluem -- e, como será discutido mais adiante, apresentam as 
mesmas características dos sistemas biológicos: variação, herança e aptidão.  
Além disso, a abordagem darwinista oferece uma perspectiva consiliente, pois considera que 
sistemas complexos emergem de sistemas mais simples, cuja estrutura precisa ser compreendida a 
fim de definir a relação causal entre as unidades menos complexas e a sofisticação do sistema. Os 
sistemas culturais e sociais dependem intrinsicamente de eventos que ocorrem em níveis ontológicos 
inferiores, como a interação entre indivíduos, que por sua vez depende de processos psicológicos e 
orgânicos. Ao longo do texto, espero mostrar como o constitucionalismo depende de processos 
explicáveis não apenas pela ciência política, sociologia e história, mas também com a biologia, 
antropologia e etologia.  
Em terceiro lugar, a evolução possibilita que revisitemos problemas antigos da filosofia 
jurídica a partir de uma perspectiva diferente. Questões relacionadas ao direito natural, ao uso 
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legítimo da força e ao papel das normas na regulação do comportamento podem ser discutidas a 
partir de novas lentes, levando em conta discursos científicos que usualmente são esquecidos em 
discussões jurídicas. 
Por fim, a perspectiva evolutiva possibilita que observemos em problemas legais e 
constitucionais questões que emergiram anteriormente em nosso passado evolutivo. O direito e o 
constitucionalismo estruturam a cooperação de maneira sofisticada nas sociedades humanas, mas 
muitas das questões com que lidam também apareceram em outros estágios da evolução da 
cooperação. Por exemplo, todas as estruturas de cooperação que surgiram no curso da evolução 
biológica -- do surgimento das células eucarióticas ao combate ao câncer, e mesmo a hierarquia 
social de primatas -- podem ser compreendidas a partir de dilemas de caroneiro (free-rider) estudados 
pela teoria dos jogos. 
 
2. De Primatas Hierarquizados a uma Espécie Igualitária: as Origens da 
Cooperação Humana 
 
Entre todas as espécies animais, o Homo sapiens é a única cuja vida social é regulada por 
sistemas morais e jurídicos. Mas como isso ocorreu? Há apenas um milhão de anos -- pouco tempo 
em termos evolutivos --, o Homo erecuts não dispunha de nada como um sistema normativo operando 
a partir de princípios culturalmente compartilhados. Há 200.000 anos, quando os primeiros Homo 
sapiens caminharam sobre a terra, apenas rudimento da vida cultural e de códigos morais poderiam 
ser encontrados. Como uma transição tão aguda ocorreu ao longo de tão pouco tempo? 
Esta seção tem por objetivo explorar algumas explicações recentes do comportamento 
normativo de nossa espécie, a partir da seguinte questão: como pode a evolução produzir a 
cooperação? E, mais especificamente, como a espécie humana se tornou capaz de produzir sua 
sociabilidade baseada em normas sociais? 
Embora a imagem mais popular da evolução tenha enfatizado a luta pela sobrevivência e 
que apenas os mais fortes sobrevivem, Charles Darwin também destacava o papel da cooperação na 
evolução biológica. Em uma passagem famosa de A Descendência do Homem, Darwin sustentou que 
virtudes como a coragem, o altruísmo e a lealdade poderiam evoluir porque os grupos cujos 
membros tivessem tais qualidades teriam vantagem competitiva em relação a grupos compostos por 
indivíduos mais egoístas.  
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Darwin pensava, portanto, que traços individuais benéficos ao grupo poderiam evoluir por 
seleção natural. Embora biólogos como Ronald Fisher, J. B. Haldane e Sewall Wright  tenham 
buscado nos anos 1930 desenvolver essa tese -- mais tarde conhecida como seleção de grupo --
,  desenvolvimentos teóricos posteriores a desacreditaram. A partir da década de 1960, biólogos 
como George C. Williams, Robert Trivers, John Maynard Smith e David Lack construíram 
modelos teóricos capazes de explicar o comportamento altruísta recorrendo apenas à seleção 
individual. A cooperação poderia ser totalmente explicada a partir da seleção natural atuando sobre 
indivíduos -- e, mais especificamente, genes --, e não grupos. 
George C. Williams, por exemplo, sustentava que muitos comportamentos animais 
complexos poderiam ser explicados levando em consideração tão-somente o nível genético: um 
gene é selecionado não por ser adaptativo para o indivíduo ou para o grupo, mas porque produz 
indivíduos capazes de maximizar a representação do gene nas gerações futuras. Essa abordagem, 
centrada no gene (gene's eye view), se tornou bastante popular após a publicação de The Selfish Gene por 
Richard Dawkins em 1976.  
Entre as contribuições teóricas dessa perspectiva destaca-se a explicação do 
comportamento altruísta e a cooperação entre agentes autointeressados, fundada em dois 
mecanismos: a seleção de parentesco (kin selection) e o altruísmo recíproco. 
A seleção de parentesco foi proposta em 1964 por W. D. Hamilton. Segundo o biólogo, os 
genes de um indivíduo podem se espalhar mais eficientemente em uma população se causarem 
comportamentos que aumentem a aptidão (fitness) de indivíduos geneticamente aparentados. Se 
tanto o doador de um ato altruísta quanto o recipiente forem geneticamente próximos, faz sentido 
que ambos cooperem. Nessa circunstância, os esforços conjuntos aumentam a probabilidade de que 
os genes do doador -- que também são compartilhados  com o recipiente -- sejam transmitidos para 
a próxima geração. 
Para incorporar a seleção de parentesco à teoria evolutiva, Hamilton propôs o conceito de 
aptidão inclusiva (inclusive fitness), à luz do qual o sucesso genético de um agente está relacionado não 
apenas a sua habilidade de se reproduzir e disseminar seus próprios genes (aptidão individual), mas 
também os genes de indivíduos aparentados geneticamente (aptidão inclusiva). 
Esse mecanismo provou-se capaz de explicar o altruísmo em vários contextos biológicos, 
desde a cooperação entre as células de um organismo até o comportamento social dos insetos sociais 
como abelhas e formigas. Nesses exemplos, o alto grau de identidade genética entre os agentes 
amolda-se perfeitamente às exigências da seleção de parentesco. Células de um mesmo organismo 
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são clones perfeitos umas das outras e, entre insetos sociais, a semelhança genética entre os 
indivíduos de uma mesma população pode chegar a 75%. 
Além disso, a seleção de parentesco pode explicar comportamentos em outras espécies 
animais, como o investimento parental e a tendência ao nepotismo. Embora seja capaz de explicar 
a cooperação em larga escala, como uma população de células ou uma colmeia, o mecanismo é 
incapaz de explicar como a cooperação pode surgir entre indivíduos não-aparentados. 
O altruísmo recíproco, também conhecido como reciprocidade direta, propõe-se a explicar 
a cooperação entre indivíduos geneticamente não-aparentados. Em 1971,  Robert Trivers propôs 
que a cooperação também poderia emergir se indivíduos interagissem por uma quantidade 
indefinida de tempo, tornando provável que o recipiente de um ato altruísta retorne o favor ao 
doador no futuro. Para que isso ocorra, contudo, os indivíduos precisam ter a capacidade cognitiva 
de lembrar do resultado das interações passadas para decidir se irão cooperar ou não com 
determinado agente. Caso um agente decida sempre cooperar, se torna suscetível à exploração por 
caroneiros (free riders). Para evitar isso, se o agente tiver a capacidade de decidir optar por cooperar 
ou não, pode punir caroneiros que o exploraram no passado. A reciprocidade direta depende, 
assim, da punição altruísta.  
Embora seja capaz de explicar a cooperação entre agentes não-relacionados 
geneticamente, o altruísmo recíproco é incapaz de sustentar a cooperação em populações grandes 
demais. Em primeiro lugar, grupos muito numerosos tornam difícil a punição dos caroneiros 
porque sempre é possível que eles se tornem seletivos, explorando agentes com os quais não 
interagiram no passado e, por isso, não estão cientes de sua propensão egocêntrica. Ainda que 
possam ser punidos ocasionalmente, estatisticamente continua a fazer sentido explorar os demais e, 
como resultado, a aptidão dos caroneiros tende a superar a dos altruístas caso a população aumente 
demais.  
Também há evidências empíricas de que esse mecanismo também explica o 
comportamento de determinadas espécies, como o compartilhamento de sangue entre os morcegos 
vampiros e o grooming entre chimpanzés. Segundo Trivers, o altruísmo recíproco poderia inclusive 
explicar certos aspectos do comportamento humano, como a amizade, a agressão moral contra 
transgressores e sentimentos como simpatia, culpa e gratidão. 
Em que pese tenham explicado a emergência da cooperação em várias situações, os dois 
mecanismos propostos por teorias centradas no gene são incapazes de explicar a cooperação em 
populações grandes compostas por indivíduos não aparentados -- justamente  o caso das populações 
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humanas, que formam uma enorme rede de cooperação composta por milhões (ou bilhões) de 
indivíduos.  
Com o intuito de oferecer uma explicação convincente para esse problema teórico, um 
terceiro mecanismo foi proposto: a reciprocidade indireta. Ao contrário do altruísmo recíproco, que 
registra apenas as interações passadas com um determinado agente, esse mecanismo induz a 
cooperação porque os membros de um grupo observam as interações passadas de agentes com 
terceiros, consolidando socialmente a reputação dos agentes. A punição passa a ser aplicada 
socialmente, e não apenas diadicamente, pois os agentes passam a não cooperar, punindo 
indivíduos que exploraram outros agentes no passado. Trata-se de um desenvolvimento importante, 
essencial nos sistemas jurídicos e morais: a evolução da punição aplicada por terceiros como uma 
resposta à violação de normas sociais. 
A reciprocidade indireta é mais efetiva que a punição altruísta no estabelecimento da 
cooperação em grupos maiores porque o free rider pode ser punido por qualquer agente que conhece 
sua reputação, e não apenas pelos que foram prejudicados por sua ação no passado. Mas a 
reciprocidade indireta também é problemática, pois é sujeita ao problema do free riding de segunda 
ordem: os agentes podem ser inclinados a cooperar (o que resolve o free riding de primeira ordem), 
mas não estarem dispostos a arcar com os custos de punir os agentes desonestos. Assim, se 
beneficiariam da da punição aplicada por outros sem pagar o preço. 
De acordo com Richerson & Boyd, esse problema poderia ser resolvido adequadamente 
pela seleção natural se a punição moralista (aplicada por terceiros) fosse comum e as punições 
suficientemente severas, uma vez que cada agente raramente teria que punir outros indivíduos, 
tornando a predisposição a punir muito menos custosa quando comparada com os benefícios da 
cooperação viabilizada por ela. 
Embora seja escassa a evidência da reciprocidade indireta em outras espécies animais, não 
há dúvidas de sua relevância nas sociedades humanas. A aplicação de normas sociais, por exemplo, 
depende da sanção aplicada por terceiros -- como ocorre nos modernos sistemas jurídicos. Mas por 
que a reciprocidade indireta é tão rara na natureza, embora uma parte essencial da cooperação 
humana? 
A teoria da coevolução gene-cultura alega que parte da resposta a essa questão relaciona-se 
ao fato de que a reciprocidade indireta demanda mais capacidades cognitivas que a reciprocidade 
indireta, dada a necessidade de que os agentes se lembrem das interações passadas de outros agentes 
com terceiros, e não apenas consigo. Mas como essas capacidades cognitivas evoluíram? 
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Compreender esse ponto é essencial para entender as forças evolutivas que atuaram na produção 
das habilidades cognitivas que nos tornaram capazes de agir e raciocinar normativamente. 
Na linhagem dos primatas, a seleção natural produziu e refinou estruturas cognitivas 
capazes de dar lastro a uma psicologia moral particular. Os demais primatas lidam com seu 
ambiente social a partir de viéses cognitivos que evoluíram a partir da seleção de parentesco e do 
altruísmo recíproco. Há abundante evidência de que chimpanzés e bonobos, por exemplo, 
cooperam preferencialmente com indivíduos aparentados (seleção de parentesco) e, além disso, 
também interagem a partir do modo esperado pelo altruísmo recíproco. 
Todavia, a evolução dos pressupostos cognitivos necessários à reciprocidade indireta 
demandam uma mente mais sofisticada, que teria evoluído apenas na linhagem hominina. De 
acordo com a hipótese da inteligência maquiavélica, os cérebros primatas se tornaram 
progressivamente maiores para lidar com a complexidade da vida social em grupos maiores. E a 
necessidade de viver em grupos compostos por mais indivíduos decorreria do fato de que, no 
confronto entre grupos de tamanhos distintos, grupos maiores tendem a se sobressair. Assim, 
haveria uma pressão evolutiva para a vida em grupos maiores; todavia, a estabilização de 
comunidades grandes somente seria possível caso seus membros fossem portadores de uma 
psicologia suficientemente sofisticada para superar as limitações da seleção de parentesco e do 
altruísmo recíproco. 
De acordo com Richerson & Boyd, proeminentes defensores da teoria da coevolução gene-
cultura, a sofisticação mental de nossos ancestrais eventualmente levou à evolução de duas 
capacidades psicológicas essenciais para o surgimento da reciprocidade indireta: a capacidade de ler 
mentes (compreender intenções e estados mentais de outros agentes) e imitar. A capacidade de 
imitação é relevante porque é uma estratégia evolutivamente estável para lidar com ambientes 
moderadamente estáveis como os do Pleistoceno, de aproximadamente dois milhões de anos até 
cerca de 10.000 anos atrás. 
Os humanos, por meio da imitação, podem acumular a cultura e transmiti-la por meio da 
linguagem, gradualmente acumulando soluções para problemas ambientais e culturais. Assim, a 
imitação propiciou a emergência de um novo sistema evolutivo, o cultural, ao qual se aplicariam 
todos as condições do modelo teórico darwinista: variação, herança e aptidão.   
De fato, as evidências em estudos culturais apontam pela presença dessas condições na 
dinâmica cultural. Em primeiro lugar, há evidência a respeito da variação cultural tanto a respeito 
do mesmo traço cultural (por exemplo, diferentes tipos de flecha), mas também entre diferentes 
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tipos de traços culturais quanto entre os conjuntos de elementos culturais de populações distintas 
(v.g., linguagens distintas). Além disso, também é possível falar em herança de traços culturais, por 
meio da transmissão cultural vertical (quando um pai ensina algo aos filhos), oblíqua (informação 
transferida de um membro de geração anterior para um membro não-aparentado de geração 
posterior) ou horizontal (informação transferida por membros da mesma geração). Por fim, a 
adoção de traços culturais distintos induz a diferenças em aptidão entre indivíduos. 
Apesar de se caracterizar como sistema evolutivo, a cultura está sujeita a forças evolutivas 
próprias, muitas vezes distintas das aplicáveis à evolução biológica. De acordo com a teoria da 
coevolução gene-cultura, muitas dessas forças atuam sobre ambos os sistemas de herança, como a 
seleção natural, a mutação e a deriva. Outras, porém, aplicam-se apenas à evolução cultural, como 
as forças de tomada de decisão, derivadas de viéses psicológicos envolvidos no aprendizado cultural 
e em sua transmissão para outros. A evolução desses viéses pode ter evoluído como fruto de 
processos evolutivos relacionados à capacidade humana de imitar e lidar com um ambiente 
eminentemente cultural. Importa ressaltar que tal perspectiva encontra respaldo na sociologia de 
um teórico como Gabriel Tarde, que via na capacidade de imitação um papel fundamental na 
dinâmica social. 
Vários dos viéses cognitivos presentes na psicologia humana se relacionam diretamente 
com a psicologia normativa necessária para a interação em sistemas morais e jurídicos. Vários 
experimentos dão sustentação à tese de que a psicologia humana é constituída, entre outros, por 
uma estrutura cognitiva capaz de avaliar normativamente situações concretas. Há evidência, por 
exemplo, de que a mente humana é inclinada a lembrar com mais facilidade de normas sociais do 
que outras informações. 
Essa arquitetura cognitiva é construída sobre elementos psicológicos mais antigos, 
decorrentes da evolução da psicologia dos ancestrais humanos. Assim, a estrutura normativa 
subjacente à psicologia humana evoluiu a partir da seleção de parentesco, do altruísmo recíproco e 
da reciprocidade indireta. De acordo com a teoria da coevolução gene-cultura, esses elementos, 
aliados à capacidade para imitar, favoreceram a seleção de grupo como um mecanismo que tornou 
possível a cooperação em larga-escala entre indivíduos não-aparentados, típica das sociedades 
humanas. 
Segundo Richerson & Boyd, a imitação torna possível a difusão de variantes culturais no 
interior de um grupo específico. Contudo, a possibilidade de migração entre grupos distintos 
diminui a pressão seletiva sobre cada grupo, porque levaria à difusão de variantes culturais entre 
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grupos, diminuindo a variação cultural entre grupos. Para Richerson & Boyd, esse problema foi 
resolvido em razão da capacidade de nossos ancestrais imitarem seletivamente os comportamentos 
adotados pela população local e codificados em variantes culturais (marcação simbólica), o que 
aumentaria as chances de adotar o comportamento adaptativo do que imitar o comportamento de 
imigrantes.   
A predisposição de cooperar com aqueles que adotam as mesmas variantes culturais é um 
forte indutor da variação entre grupos. A manutenção dessa variação ao longo do tempo em 
sociedades maiores, contudo, é difícil, pois essas condições tornam progressivamente mais difícil 
identificar as variantes culturais dominantes em uma dada população. Com isso, a migração entre 
grupos levaria progressivamente à difusão de variantes culturais entre grupos, diminuindo as 
diferenças culturais entre comunidades humanas distintas. Segundo Richerson e Boyd, esse 
problema é resolvido mediante a punição moralista - sanções morais aplicadas a aqueles que não 
adotam as mesmas crenças e comportamentos da maioria. Ao contrário do altruísmo recíproco, em 
que a própria vítima pune o transgressor, a punição moralista é aplicada por terceiros, como a 
própria comunidade ou, em sociedades mais complexas, instituições sociais específicas. Como 
resultado, a punição moralista mantém a variação entre grupos, ao possibilitar a punição de 
indivíduos adotando diferentes memes (variantes culturais) e induzir a homogeneização simbólica. 
Com isso, sociedades adotando culturas diversas começam a seguir um caminho evolutivo próprio, 
diferente das demais (path dependence). 
A manutenção da variação entre grupos torna possível que a seleção natural atue entre 
grupos (não entre indivíduos), selecionando comunidades inteiras que se mostrem mais adaptadas 
ao ambiente, aí incluídas as pressões seletivas impostas por outras comunidades. A competição entre 
grupos poderia levar à seleção de grupos cujas práticas culturais fossem mais eficientes para a 
sobrevivência no confronto com outras comunidades. E, de fato, os registros etnográfico e 
arqueológico indicam a competição por recursos naturais e a guerra como uma constante nas 
sociedades de caçadores-coletores. 
A seleção de grupo, segundo Richerson & Boyd, teria levado gradativamente à evolução de 
uma psicologia moral cada vez mais sofisticada, adaptada à vida em comunidades maiores. Como 
resultado da competição entre grupos, as comunidades tenderiam a crescer mais, exigindo uma 
psicologia cada vez mais sofisticada.  
John Mikhail sustenta que essa psicologia seria caracterizada por uma gramática moral 
universal capaz de lidar com a complexidade desse cenário. Essa ideia deriva da teoria da aquisição 
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linguística delineada por Noam Chomsky, segundo o qual a rapidez com que crianças aprendem 
uma linguagem decorre de uma arquitetura cognitiva preparada para a aquisição de elementos 
linguísticos. De acordo com ele, nossa mente possui informação inata a respeito de como organizar 
os inputs linguísticos recebidos, baseada em uma gramática universal composta por princípios 
universais que se amoldam a parâmetros locais dados culturalmente.  
De acordo com Mikhail, a cognição moral funciona de modo análogo, a partir de 
princípios gerais inatos derivados da história evolutiva humana. Se essa perspectiva estiver correta, 
deveríamos esperar que a estrutura da gramática moral universal fosse fundada tanto em emoções 
compartilhadas como outros primatas e relacionadas com a lógica operacional da seleção de 
parentesco e do altruísmo recíproco, quanto em traços psicológicos evoluídos mais recentemente e 
associados à marcação simbólica, à cooperação com membros do próprio grupo (e suspeita quanto 
a estrangeiros), além do raciocínio normativo. Assim, seria de se esperar que a gramática moral 
universal fosse caracterizada ao menos pelos seguintes instintos sociais tribais: uma predisposição ao 
cuidado parental; altruísmo e empatia; tendência a punir trapaceiros; igualitarismo (fundado na 
reversão das hierarquias primatas e no monitoramento estrito dos líderes do bando); e um viés a 
adotar e cooperar com aqueles que compartilham dos mesmos marcadores simbólicos.  
De acordo com Richerson & Boyd, essa psicologia inata, evoluída provavelmente entre 
500.000 e 200.000 anos atrás, possibilitou a evolução de comunidades de ampla escala, compostas 
por milhares de indivíduos não aparentados.  Essas comunidades seriam organizadas 
institucionalmente de forma a emular comunidades menores, mais parecidas com os grupos 
pequenos do Pleistoceno, e que tornariam possível a institucionalização de diferenças hierárquicas, 
da obediência a superiores e da divisão do trabalho. Sociedades capazes de estabilizar as demandas 
por maior complexidade social utilizando a gramática moral universal como fundamento para sua 
estrutura social decerto teria vantagem competitiva em relação a sociedades cujas instituições 
estivessem em conflito estrito com nossa psicologia normativa. 
Evidentemente, muitas estruturas sociais estão em evidente conflito com nossa psicologia 
moral. Se a gramática moral universal é igualitária, por um lado, por outro é um fato histórico que 
muitas sociedades humanas são estritamente hierárquicas e desiguais. Como resolver essa tensão? 
Segundo Richerson & Boyd, três mecanismos podem ter atuado para estabilizar instituições em 
conflito com nossa natureza inata: (i) o uso da força; (ii) a legitimação por meio da solidariedade 
fundada na marcação simbólica; e (iii) a estruturação de hierarquias segmentadas). 
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O uso da força, estruturado na forma de coerção institucionalizada, é uma solução 
fundada na tendência à punição moralista. Em sociedades mais complexas que as comunidades pré-
históricas, o poder de aplicar sanções se concentrou em instituições particulares, capazes de punir 
free-riders e não-conformistas.  Esse tipo de controle, contudo, é dificilmente ajustável a nossa 
psicologia moral igualitária e avessa a hierarquias. Não por menos, a história mostra diversas 
revoltas contra o poder institucionalizado mesmo na Antiguidade, como a revolta de gladiadores 
sob a liderança de Spartacus, a revolta de Nika ou mesmo a resistência de plebeus contra patrícios 
na República romana. 
Mas não apenas a coerção institucionalizada seria capaz de explicar a estabilidade de 
sociedades maiores que as do Pleistoceno. Outro elemento envolvido nesse processo é a hierarquia 
segmentada. Nossa psicologia é preparada para lidar em um mundo de interações pessoais, não de 
um sistema socialmente e culturalmente complexo. A emergência de hierarquias, nessas condições, 
somente seria possível em sociedades que simultaneamente conseguissem respeitar a necessidade 
psicológica de viver em sociedades igualitárias e a existência de desigualdades necessárias para a 
divisão social do trabalho. Dissonância cognitiva poderia desestabilizar sociedades em que falta o 
primeiro elemento e sociedades sem diferenciação de papéis dificilmente desenvolveria a 
complexidade necessária para confrontar sociedades estratificadas socialmente. 
A solução proposta por Richerson & Boyd visa realizar ambas as aspirações. De acordo 
com eles, o controle hierárquico é exercido por meio da divisão da sociedade em segmentos que, 
embora organizados hierarquicamente entre si, seu interior mantém as relações igualitárias no nível 
da interação face-a-face. Embora haja uma hierarquia social de classes e papéis, cada classe é 
organizada em torno de unidades segmentárias organizadas de modo a lembrar uma tribo ancestral 
igualitária. A desigualdade se estrutura entre classes, de modo a possibilitar a divisão social do 
trabalho e a especialização, que induziria maior produtividade econômica e organização militar. 
O terceiro elemento indicado pelos autores para explicar a estabilidade de sociedades 
hierárquicas é a legitimação por meio da marcação simbólica. A imitação e outras formas de 
transmissão social ajudam a apresentar as desigualdades de forma que elas pareçam ser traços 
compreensíveis, justificados e mesmo equitativos da comunidade.   
Essa abordagem interdisciplinar, que leva em conta tanto elementos biológicos e 
psicológicos quanto sociológicos e antropológicos, pode auxiliar na compreensão do modo como 
estruturas sociais se acomodam a nossa psicologia (e vice-versa), possibilitando uma abordagem 
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evolutiva integrada que possibilita compreender as interações recíprocas entre genes, psicologia, 
instituições e sociedades. 
 
3. Populações Darwinistas e Teoria Social 
 
A evolução por seleção natural ocorre em qualquer população a que os princípios da 
variação, herança e aptidão possam ser aplicados. A evolução darwinista pode ser observada não 
apenas em entidades biológicas, mas também em entes como as sociedades humanas, como 
delineado pela teoria da coevolução gene-cultura. Nessa seção, pretendo explorar mais a ideia de 
que entes socioculturais possam ser objeto da evolução darwinista, a partir da proposta do filósofo 
da biologia Peter Godfrey-Smith, que investiga as propriedades de uma população darwinista em 
seu Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. 
De acordo com Godfrey-Smith, uma população darwinista é uma coleção de entidades que 
evolui por meio da seleção natural. E um indivíduo darwinista é um membro desta população 
particular. A abordagem proposta é particularmente interessante por diferenciar casos 
paradigmáticos de casos marginais de populações darwinianas, possibilitando uma variação 
substantiva naquilo que pode ser compreendido como população darwinista e possibilitando a 
adaptação do marco teórico evolutivo em domínios diversos da biologia. Assim, mesmo que 
entidades sociais não sejam indivíduos darwinistas paradigmáticos, podem ainda assim ser 
considerados casos marginais. E o próprio Godfrey-Smith menciona exemplos biológicos que não se 
amoldam ao conceito paradigmático mas, inobstante, têm sido considerados tradicionalmente como 
indivíduos darwinistas.  
Godfrey-Smith assume que as populações darwinistas são mais complexas que a definição 
baseada nos três princípios clássicos (variação, herança, aptidão), podendo admitir muitos casos 
intermediários. Mas, ainda que haja populações paradigmáticas e marginais, todos os indivíduos 
darwinistas compartilham um conjunto mínimo de características, considerado pelo filósofo o conceito 
mínimo de população darwinista. Nesse conceito mínimo, uma população darwinista é considerada (i) 
um conjunto de indivíduos causalmente conectados, que (ii) apresentam variação de traços que, por 
sua vez, (iii) induzem diferenças reprodutivas, as quais (iv) são herdadas.  
Uma população darwinista paradigmática é aquele subconjunto de casos que satisfazem o 
critério mínimo inequivocamente. Populações darwinistas marginais, por sua vez, são aquelas que 
apresentam apenas um caráter darwinista parcial, por não satisfazer inteiramente todos os 
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requerimentos mínimos, mas apenas aproximadamente. De acordo com Godfrey-Smith, esses 
requerimentos podem ser melhor compreendidos por meio de dimensões específicas: 
hereditariedade (H), variação (V), interação competitiva com respeito à reprodução (α), aptidão e 
caráter intrínseco (S) e continuidade (C). Cada população pode variar a respeito de cada uma dessas 
dimensões. 
A primeira dimensão, hereditariedade (H), diz respeito ao fato de que todo processo 
evolutivo é fundado em um sistema de herança. Mas existem sistemas de herança de alta fidelidade, 
como o genético, e sistemas em que a herança é menos confiável. A evolução cultural em sociedades 
tradicionais fundadas na tradição oral, por exemplo, é limitada porque a replicação de traços 
culturais depende da memória individual de seus membros. A invenção da escrita acelera a 
evolução cultural, entre outros fatores, por aumentar a fidelidade da transmissão memética. 
A segunda dimensão é a variação (V). A hereditariedade não pode ser perfeita, ou não 
haveria possibilidade de seleção de variantes diferentes. Mas a variação não pode ser extrema, ou a 
seleção cumulativa seria improvável. Essa dimensão, assim, mede o grau de variação observada em 
uma dada população. Em populações paradigmáticas, a dimensão V admite uma exploração de 
possibilidades em torno do estado corrente do sistema.  
A interação competitiva com respeito à reprodução (α) é a terceira dimensão e diz respeito 
à conexão causal entre indivíduos e ao grau de competição unindo duas populações. Quando α é 
alto em uma população, o crescimento de uma população afeta negativamente o da outra - como 
ocorre em duas populações de bactérias que consomem os mesmos recursos; quando uma 
população cresce, a outra tende a se reduzir. Quando α é muito baixo, não há interação 
competitiva. Em populações paradigmáticas, α está próximo a 1, indicando um alto grau de 
competitividade entre populações. 
A aptidão inclusiva e caráter intrínseco (S) diz respeito ao grau em que diferenças no 
resultado reprodutivo de uma população depende de características intrínsecas de seus membros. 
Quando S é baixo, a taxa de sobrevivência de um indivíduo é mais relacionada a fatores extrínsecos 
(sorte, por exemplo) do que a suas qualidades intrínsecas. Se um raio atinge e mata um indivíduo A 
e B sobrevive e deixa descendentes, a seleção não decorreu de qualquer característica intrínseca. Se 
um leão ataca uma manada e um bovino mais lento é morto, os demais sobreviveram por um fator 
intrínseco, sua velocidade. Populações darwinistas paradigmáticas apresentam um valor S alto. 
A quinta dimensão, continuidade (C), refere-se à situação em que pequenas mudanças no 
fenótipo induzem mudanças pequenas de aptidão. Quando mudanças pequenas no fenótipo 
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induzem mudanças muito significativas de aptidão, apenas situações ambientais aleatórias podem 
levar populações a se tornarem adaptadas ao meio. Populações darwinistas paradigmáticas também 
apresentam um valor C elevado. 
É importante notar que, para Godfrey-Smith, quando uma população evolui, não apenas 
modifica os organismos envolvidos, mas também o próprio sistema como um todo. A evolução de 
um sistema induz o surgimento de novas entidades que afetam toda a dinâmica evolutiva e, como 
decorrência, alteram os valores de H, V, C e S das gerações futuras -- às vezes, até suprimindo uma 
dimensão e mesmo desdarwinizando algumas partes do sistema. Compreender esse argumento é 
essencial para o modelo de evolução sociocultural a ser delineado. A dinâmica evolutiva produz 
entidades não-darwinistas ou, ao menos, casos marginais de populações darwinistas.  
O propósito de Godfrey-Smith é explicar, a partir de uma perspectiva darwinista, como 
entidades complexas podem emergir de entidades de nível mais baixo. Como um órgão pode surgir 
a partir de um conjunto de células, por exemplo? O ponto principal destacado por Godfrey-Smith é 
que a entidade mais complexa (o órgão) não é apenas composto por entidades de baixo nível (a 
célula), mas possui uma organização própria, autônoma em relação às partes do sistema.   
A fim de explicar como isso ocorre, Godfrey-Smith liga reprodução a individualidade. A 
reprodução é central nos processos darwinistas, uma vez que não pode existir evolução sem 
hereditariedade (H). Mas o que é reprodução? Ao contrário do que pode parecer à primeira vista, 
trata-se de um conceito bastante problemático. Nos casos paradigmáticos, reprodução envolve a 
produção de novos indivíduos relativamente parecidos com os pais. Mas, em casos mais marginais, 
a reprodução pode se confundir com outros conceitos, como o de crescimento. "Vários organismos 
(plantas, animais e fungos) criam o que parecem ser novos indivíduos a partir do crescimento direto 
de indivíduos mais velhos. A nova estrutura pode então se separar ou mesmo permanecer ligadas à 
antiga". 
Outro problema diz respeito à emergência de entidades coletivas - um ponto de particular 
interesse para os cientistas sociais, porque, como debatido de Mandeville a Hayek, entidades 
coletivas são constituídas por partes individuais. Segundo Godfrey-Smith, entidades coletivas 
emergem da relação entre individualidade e reprodução.  
Para discutir esse ponto, o filósofo distingue colônias de simbiontes. Colônias, como algas, 
esponjas e corais, são grupos conectados fisicamente, mas sem divisão de trabalho e que, muitas 
vezes, permanecem com a capacidade de vida independente. São um agregado de indivíduos 
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independentes, não um organismo individual em seu próprio direito. Simbiontes, por sua vez, não 
apenas são fisicamente conectados, mas também são entidades funcionalmente integradas.  
Um terceiro conjunto de problemas se refere ao que Godfrey-Smith define como 
"quimeras e mosaicos", que desafiam a crença de que organismos são geneticamente uniformes. Os 
carvalhos, por exemplo, desenvolvem novos ramos a partir da divisão celular em seu meristema 
apical, que pode sofrer mutações que são passadas adiante nas células subsequentes. Como 
resultado, os ramos da mesma árvore que divergiram há décadas ou séculos podem ser 
geneticamente diferentes um do outro. Outro exemplo é o quimerismo, fenômeno em que o mesmo 
indivíduo tem dois conjuntos diferentes de genótipo - fenômeno observado em saguis e mesmo em 
humanos. 
Esses exemplos desafiam as noções clássicas de reprodução, mas Godfrey-Smith busca 
superá-los propondo uma nova abordagem que admite uma pluralidade de modos de reprodução 
como parte do processo reprodutivo. De acordo com ele, há três tipos de relação reprodutiva que 
podem, em princípio, gerar indivíduos darwinistas: entidades coletivas, reprodutores simples e 
reprodutores de suporte (scaffolded reproducers).  
Entidades coletivas são compostas por partes que têm, elas mesmas, a capacidade de 
reproduzir. É o caso, por exemplo, de uma manada de búfalos, organismos multicelulares e 
colônias. Nesses casos, a reprodução da entidade coletiva se dá pela reprodução dos componentes 
de baixo-nível. Uma manada se reproduz por meio da reprodução dos búfalos que a compõem e 
levam a seu crescimento. Eventualmente, a manada pode crescer demais, se separar em duas e 
gerar uma outra manada. Reprodutores simples, por sua vez, são os elementos das entidades 
coletivas capazes de se reproduzir. O caso paradigmático de reprodutor simples é o de uma célula 
bacteriana que independe da reprodução em entidades de nível ainda mais baixo de modo a se 
replicar. Por fim, os reprodutores de suporte são aqueles que se reproduzem como parte da 
replicação de entidades maiores, embora produzam uma linhagem evolutiva própria, como vírus e 
cromossomos. 
Como uma entidade coletiva se reproduz, nesse contexto? Essa questão, como se verá 
adiante, é essencial para compreender o que se pode compreender como reprodução em contextos 
sociológicos. Para enfrentar essa questão, Godfrey-Smith introduz três outras dimensões, aplicáveis 
especificamente à categoria da reprodução: gargalos (bottlenecks - B), linha germinal (germ line - G) e 
integração (I).  
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Gargalos são o grau de divisão entre duas gerações. A reprodução envolve a produção de 
um novo indivíduo similar e causalmente conectado a outro (o "progenitor"). Quando o gargalo é 
alto, é possível identificar facilmente a distinção entre as gerações. Quando B é baixo, novos 
indivíduos são mera continuação dos progenitores -- como ocorre em certos tipos de planta (como a 
flor-de-lís), nas quais os novos ramos são basicamente clones da planta original. Gargalos são 
evolutivamente importantes por forçarem cada geração a se desenvolverem autonomamente desde 
o início, abrindo uma janela de oportunidade para que mutações afetem a organização estrutural 
do organismo e transmitam novos genes para as gerações futuras. Gargalos, assim, são importantes 
para a produção de variantes novas (V). Em situações onde B tem valor baixo, há uma limitação do 
grau de reorganização estrutural dos novos indivíduos, que se estruturam a partir de um estágio 
relativamente avançado de desenvolvimento. É o que ocorre, por exemplo, em manadas de búfalo 
que crescem e depois se separam em novas manadas; não há qualquer reorganização no nível da 
manada, embora haja reprodução. 
O segundo parâmetro, linha germinal (G), é o grau de especialização reprodutiva, sendo 
possível distinguir entre as partes germinativas (reprodutoras) e somáticas. Quando G é alto, a 
entidade coletiva se especializa por meio de elementos especializados (partes germinativas, como os 
gametas), capazes de produzir outro ente coletivo por si só. Quando G é baixo, inexiste distinção 
entre partes germinativas e somáticas, como ocorre em colônias de esponjas. 
A integração (I) diz respeito ao grau de interdependência das partes da entidade coletiva, 
que se reflete na divisão de trabalho, na mútua dependência (perda de autonomia) dessas partes e 
da manutenção de uma fronteira entre a entidade coletiva como um todo e o seu ambiente. Um 
valor alto de I significa um alto nível de integração. 
Casos paradigmáticos de indivíduos darwinistas coletivos alcançam valores altos em todos 
os parâmetros. Nesses indivíduos, além disso, ocorre um fenômeno interessante: a desdarwinização 
de suas partes inferiores. Godfrey-Smith alega que a emergência de reprodutores coletivos como 
indivíduos darwinistas resulta da supressão da evolução (desdarwinização) dos elementos de nível 
mais baixo (reprodutores simples e de suporte). Essa consequência resulta do fato de que a evolução 
de reprodutores coletivos somente é viável quando a entidade coletiva reorganiza a reprodução dos 
níveis inferiores a fim de que não inviabilize a reprodução e as operações nos níveis mais altos de 
organização.  
Com isso, entidades de nível mais alto desdarwinizam a replicação de seus elementos por 
meio de alguns mecanismos. O primeiro desses é relacionado aos gargalos (B), que garantem a 
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uniformidade genética das células da geração descendente. O novo indivíduo é gerado a partir de 
uma única célula que se divide funcionalmente em novas células clones da original. O gargalo limita 
a variação (V) nos níveis mais baixos, reduzindo a força da competição evolutiva nesse nível. O 
segundo mecanismo é associado à linha germinativa (G): a presença de células especializadas em 
reprodução desdarwiniza o nível mais baixo porque as únicas células com propriedades herdáveis, 
no longo prazo, são as germinativas.  
A abordagem de Godfrey-Smith é baseada simultaneamente em processos ascendentes 
(bottom-up) e descendentes (top-down), uma vez que a replicação do reprodutor coletivo é baseada em 
processos ocorrendo nas partes de nível mais baixo, embora a organização coletiva as reorganize de 
modo a estruturar a reprodução do todo, desdarwinizando os níveis mais baixos. 
Essa discussão pode contribuir com a compreensão da evolução nas sociedades humanas, 
caso as descrevamos como reprodutores coletivos. A partir dessa premissa, é possível inferir que a 
cultura produziu um novo nível evolutivo (novos indivíduos darwinistas) em nossa história natural. 
A seleção natural atua tanto no nível dos indivíduos humanos e de comunidades.  
Antes de tangenciar essa questão, é importante elucidar como Godfrey-Smith explica as 
transições evolutivas para a emergência de novos indivíduos darwinistas, reprodutores coletivos com 
organização estrutural própria. De acordo com ele, a organização hierárquica do mundo biológico 
envolve partes e todos. Cada uma dessas partes é um indivíduo (e parte de uma população) 
darwinista em seu próprio direito. Como resultado, casos de seleção natural atuando em múltiplos 
níveis podem ser definidos como o aninhamento de populações darwinistas no interior de outras 
populações darwinistas.  
A transição entre níveis evolutivos hierarquicamente mais baixos e níveis organizacionais 
mais elevados decorre do que John Maynard Smith e Eörs Szathmáry chamam de transições 
informacionais: o aumento de complexidade no curso da evolução é o resultado de transições na 
forma de transmissão de informação entre gerações. Exemplos biológicos incluem a origem dos 
eucariontes, os códigos genéticos e a multicelularidade. Em cada transição, entidades de nível mais 
baixo de algum modo possibilitaram a evolução de entidades de nível mais alto.  
Smith & Szathmáry apontam três mecanismos capazes de evitar que as partes de nível 
mais baixo subvertam a organização dos níveis superiores: seleção de parentesco, irreversibilidade 
contingente e controle central. A seleção de parentesco suprime o free-riding em níveis inferiores em 
razão de as partes nesse nível serem geneticamente próximas (virtualmente clones), elevando a 
aptidão inclusiva e reduzindo a pressão seletiva de células "trapaceiras". A irreversibilidade 
 424 
contingente, por sua vez, estrutura a dependência histórica (path dependence) do desenvolvimento 
orgânico. Muitas vezes, os produtos da evolução se tornam incapazes de se reverter a organismos 
mais simples por conta da inércia e de outras razões acidentais, não da seleção natural. A terceira 
possibilidade é o controle central: a organização pode ser mantida por meio de um controle central 
que mantenha a integridade e suprima o free-riding. 
A transição para níveis superiores de organização também envolve uma maior 
especialização de funções (divisão social do trabalho) e novos mecanismos de transmissão de 
informação. A divisão do trabalho é favorecida pela seleção natural de novos indivíduos darwinistas 
porque entidades especializadas podem ser mais eficientes do que entidades que executam todas as 
funções de que o sistema necessita. Além disso, a emergência de novos sistemas a partir de níveis 
inferiores induz o surgimento de novas formas de transmissão de informação. A evolução do código 
genético é o maior exemplo disso. Muito antes do DNA e do RNA, sistemas hereditários baseados 
em informação, como sistemas autocatalíticos, existiam. Mas tanto o RNA quanto o DNA 
aumentaram a eficiência da replicação. A linguagem humana é outro exemplo de como a 
transmissão de informação é uma das características da emergência de um novo sistema. 
Peter Godfrey-Smith considera as transições a que aludem Smith e Szathmáry como 
eventos evolutivos que modificam fundamentalmente o curso da evolução. De acordo com ele, 
novos indivíduos darwinistas surgem quando uma mudança fundamental ocorre no status dos 
reprodutores coletivos. A emergência se inicia como uma associação de diferentes classes de 
reprodutores começam a se reproduzir marginalmente no nível coletivo. Posteriormente, os 
diferentes reprodutores podem conectar sua forma reprodutiva ao ente coletivo, ganhando em 
integração e perdendo sua autonomia. A evolução passa a ser associada como a evolução do 
reprodutor coletivo, desdarwinizando suas partes componentes. 
Até aqui, descrevi a proposta de Godfrey-Smith. É o momento de aproximar essa discussão 
da sociologia, de modo a dar suporte à tese de que a ideia de população darwinista é um conceito 
formal a que tanto a sociologia quanto a biologia podem recorrer de forma a explicar a emergência 
de fenômenos complexos.  
Na sociologia, o problema da emergência tem sido debatido a partir do problema 
conhecido como a conexão entre o micro e o macro (micro-macro link), ou seja, a relação entre o 
indivíduo humano e a coletividade de que faz parte. Muito desse debate tem sido travado a partir 
da noção de emergência, fundado na ideia de que fenômenos de ordem superior (coletivos), embora 
construído a partir de redes de interação entre indivíduos, não são redutíveis a processos de nível 
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mais baixo. Segundo Humphreys, a emergência é mais do que a mera superveniência. Em relações 
supervenientes, as propriedades de baixo nível no sistema determinam as propriedades de nível 
superior, que se tornam então mero epifenômeno.  
Ao invés da superveniência, Humphrey propõe que a emergência é o conceito mais 
adequado para explicar a relação entre diferentes níveis ontológicos. Segundo o epistemólogo, 
fenômenos emergentes apresentam seis características: (1) são novos, pois exibem propriedades 
inexistentes nos níveis inferiores; (2) são qualitativamente diferentes dos níveis inferiores; (3) não 
podem ser instanciados nos níveis inferiores; (4) há uma nomológica diferença, pois leis diferentes se 
aplicam a cada nível, que possuem dinâmicas diversas; (5) as propriedades emergentes derivam da 
interação nos níveis inferiores; e (6) fenômenos emergentes são holísticos, uma vez que as 
propriedades do sistema não são reduzíveis às propriedades locais de seus constituintes. 
Assumo como premissa que a realidade sociológica é emergente nesse sentido. Entidades 
sociológicas, como os sistemas sociais, apresentam características novas, inexistentes nas interações 
individuais. Além disso, entidades sociais são qualitativamente diferentes e propriedades sociais, 
como a ideia de legitimidade, não são aplicáveis aos níveis ontológicos individuais. A compreensão 
de um sistema social demanda perspectivas teóricas diferentes das necessárias para explicar o 
comportamento individual, uma vez que as propriedades nomológicas são diversas em cada nível.  
Ainda que seja reconhecido o status emergente das entidades sociológicas, é preciso 
responder a uma questão remanescente: como as entidades sociológicas emergem dos componentes 
individuais? Para responder a esta questão, recorro à discussão proposta por Keith Sawyer. De 
acordo com ele, o estudo da emergência na sociologia demanda que nos concentremos 
simultaneamente em três elementos analíticos: indivíduos, suas interações e as propriedades sociais 
emergentes. A maioria das teorias sociológicas, contudo, se concentraram em um ou dois desses 
elementos, mas não nos três. Sua perspectiva, denominada de "paradigma emergente", busca 
integrar sociologias interacionistas e estruturalistas. Ao passo que interacionistas concentram seus 
esforços em explicar a sociedade a partir de elementos metodológicos individualistas (interação e 
comunicação simbólica), os estruturalistas buscariam explicar a sociedade a partir de estruturas 
socioculturais.  
Para Sawyer, há dois níveis intermediários entre as interações individuais (microssociologia) 
e estruturas sociais (macrossociologia): emergentes estáveis e emergentes efêmeros. Sua proposta 
oferece cinco níveis de análise sociológica: processos psicológicos, interação, emergentes efêmeros 
(contexto das interações e estrutura de participação), emergentes estáveis (memória coletiva, 
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subculturas de grupo, práticas sociais compartilhadas) e o nível macrossociológico (infraestrutura e 
textos escritos capazes de afetar a estrutura social, como a legislação). Esses níveis interagem de 
maneira complexa, designada por ele como o círculo de emergência.  
A proposta de Sawyer, embora interessante, é um passo incompleto na construção de uma 
teoria sociológica da emergência. Embora ele esteja certo em apostar em uma teoria de análise em 
múltiplos níveis, que leve em conta a causação entre vários níveis, sua proposta encontra ao menos 
duas limitações teóricas.  
Em primeiro lugar, o paradigma emergente é sincrônico: sua análise explica como 
estruturas sociais emanam da ação individual simultaneamente, mas não como estruturas sociais se 
modificam ao longo do tempo. No máximo, há uma explicação do surgimento de estruturas sociais 
efêmeras, que persistem enquanto a interação ocorre, mas não estruturas sociais duradouras. Em 
segundo lugar, sua perspectiva não oferece uma proposta de fundamentação da sociologia a partir 
de uma perspectiva naturalista. Apesar de reconhecer que algumas características psicológicas são 
universais e produto de processos evolutivos, Sawyer não discute como estruturas psicológicas 
impõem restrições e possibilidades sobre os tipos de estruturas sociais que podem emergir. Essas 
limitações podem ser superadas se adicionarmos um elemento em sua formulação: uma abordagem 
evolutiva capaz de explicar tanto como estruturas se mantém ao longo do tempo quanto de propor 
um marco teórico naturalista para lidar com problemas sociológicos. 
Na seção anterior, chamei a atenção para a teoria da coevolução gene-cultura de Peter 
Richerson e Robert Boyd como uma possibilidade de utilização da teoria darwinista para explicar a 
sociabilidade humana. Todavia, a teoria da dupla herança jamais pretendeu explicar mais do que a 
evolução cultural em pequenos grupos ou, quando muito, a estruturação da cooperação em 
comunidades culturalmente homogêneas como as grandes civilizações da Antiguidade. Mas o 
caminho aberto por eles pode levar a novas direções. Se levarmos em conta elementos da teoria 
sociológica contemporânea, podemos delinear uma teoria sociológica da seleção em múltiplos níveis 
que possa ser utilizada para compreender a evolução da sociedade moderna. 
Com esse objetivo, volto-me agora a uma perspectiva sociológica distinta: a teoria dos 
sistemas de Niklas Luhmann. O ponto a ser destacado é que, interpretada por meio da teoria da 
coevolução gene-cultura, sua abordagem teórica pode nos levar a uma compreensão da evolução 
social que leva em conta as implicações recíprocas entre processos psicológicos, interação individual 
baseada na transmissão de informação cultural e a emergência de instituições, estruturas e sistemas 
sociais. Baseado nessa abordagem reformulada do pensamento luhmanniano, sustentarei que a 
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teoria dos sistemas pode ser conciliada com a abordagem de Peter Godfrey-Smith de modo a 
proporcionar um bom ponto de partida para a elaboração de uma teoria das populações 
darwinistas socioculturais. 
O ponto de partida da teoria dos sistemas é o teorema da dupla contingência, segundo o 
qual a ação social é indeterminada porque a ação de ego depende da ação de alter. Uma expectativa 
sobre como alter se comportará precisa se formar para que ego decida seu curso de ação. Talcott 
Parsons buscou solucionar o teorema da dupla contingência a partir da pressuposição de que alter e 
ego compartilham um sistema simbólico que produz uma suposição de consenso a respeito de 
valores e orientações normativas que guiam a ação humana. Luhmann, contudo, critica 
Parsons  por assumir uma diferença a priori entre as estruturas psicológicas e biológicas dos sujeitos 
(alter/ego). Ao invés de se concentrar na ação de agentes individuais, Luhmann  se concentra na 
comunicação como meio de superação da dupla contingência. Para resolver esse problema, a teoria 
dos sistemas assume uma diferença entre sistemas psíquicos e os sistemas sociais. Quando a ação 
social ocorre, os agentes coordenam suas ações uns com os outros por compreender as expectativas 
cognitivas e normativas relativas a seu comportamento -- expectativas fundadas em conhecimento 
compartilhado que possibilita a compreensão mútua por meio da comunicação. 
Luhmann reconhece o papel necessário da psicologia individual no estabelecimento das 
bases para a emergência dos sistemas sociais. De acordo com ele, sistemas psíquicos e sociais 
coevoluíram como o ambiente seletivo um do outro, estipulando a codependência entre mente e 
sociedade. Embora a comunicação ocorra apenas a partir de operações em sistemas sociais 
autopoiéticos, há interpenetração entre o sistema psíquico e os sistemas sociais. Quando o sistema 
psíquico observa comunicações em sistemas sociais, a traduz em termos compreensíveis pela 
consciência.  A teoria luhmanniana pode providenciar uma fundação sólida para uma teoria 
sociológica evolutiva que considera o papel de processos psicológicos como precondição da 
evolução de sistemas sociais justamente por reconhecer na interpenetração como processo 
relevante, causalmente conectando os níveis psicológico e social.  
A influência de processos psicológicos na dinâmica social precisa ser compreendida em 
termos de constrangimentos e ruídos de fundo. E isso não é pouco: esses constrangimentos impõem 
questões importantes para a organização social, na medida em que há evidências antropológicas, 
etnológicas e econômicas de que estruturas sociais de fato refletem processos psicológicos 
específicos. 
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Pretende-se, aqui, explorar como a teoria luhmanniana pode ser reconstruída de forma a 
dialogar com descobertas nessas áreas do conhecimento, a partir de três eixos: (i) a compreensão de 
que nossa psicologia impõe restrições à evolução de sistemas culturais; (ii) a necessidade de uma 
teoria microssociológica da cultura e (iii) uma análise  a partir da seleção em múltiplos níveis.  
Nossa psicologia impõe constrangimentos à evolução cultural. O próprio Luhmann usava 
o conceito de "constrangimento" para afirmar os limites recíprocos que sistemas sociais impõem um 
ao outro. Sempre que um novo sistema é formado, constrange suas próprias possibilidades de 
evolução futura. É importante diferenciar, nesse sentido, a diferenciação interna - quando sistemas 
se distinguem em sistemas semelhantes - da diferenciação externa, que ocorre quando um sistema 
emerge de sistemas ontológicos distintos. Como exemplo da diferenciação externa temos os sistemas 
vivos, psíquicos e sociais.  
A diferenciação externa nos leva a questionar como sistemas sociais podem emergir de 
sistemas psíquicos e vivos. A resposta a essa questão nos leva a uma grande consequência para a 
teoria dos sistemas, pois precisa reconhecer que a própria lógica autopoiética dos sistemas sociais 
depende em processos psicológicos. 
Sistemas psíquicos impõem constrangimentos hierárquicos sobre os sistemas sociais. 
Luhmann admite que sistemas psíquicos e sociais se comunicam por meio da linguagem, mas é 
preciso reconhecer outras possibilidades. O acoplamento estrutural entre a psicologia individual e a 
realidade social se dá não apenas pela linguagem, mas também pela própria estrutura de nossa 
psicologia, por meio de disposições inatas resultantes da seleção natural. O entrelaçamento entre 
linguagem e nossa psicologia -- aí incluídos os elementos da gramática [moral] universal -- impõe 
constrangimentos à evolução social, de forma que as estruturas das sociedades humanas precisam 
ser compatíveis com as expectativas inatas de nossa psicologia. Caso contrário, o estresse psicológico 
levaria à disrupção da tessitura social. 
Além disso, apesar de Luhmann reconhecer a relevância da interpenetração entre sistemas 
sociais e psicológicos, não discutiu os detalhes a respeito de como ela se processa. Como resultado, 
ignora processos fundados em níveis mais baixos de realidade a respeito de como a reprodução 
sistêmica ocorre, por meio da repricação cultural. Ainda que Luhmann reconheça que mente e 
sociedade coevoluíram, essa ligação sempre parece ser secundária. Contudo, a evolução cultural 
depende da psicologia humana e, por isso, a sociologia precisa incorporar uma teoria a respeito de 
como a evolução cultural de fato ocorre no nível das interações individuais -- onde o papel da mente 
é fundamental. A proposta de Richerson & Boyd é uma alternativa teória importante para 
 429 
desenvolvermos uma teoria da interpenetração entre sistemas psíquicos e sociais, pois admite que 
nossa psicologia, desde o início, seleciona comunicações compatíveis com sua estrutura. Essa 
operação ocorre mesmo antes de pensamentos serem transmitidos por meio da linguagem.  
Por fim, a teoria dos sistemas deve se acoplar a uma teoria da seleção em múltiplos 
níveis.  De certo modo, o próprio Luhmann reconhecia isso, ao admitir a coevolução entre mente e 
sistemas sociais. Para explicar adequadamente a evolução sociocultural, a teoria sociológica precisa 
levar em conta processos coevolutivos ocorrendo simultaneamente em múltiplos níveis: (i) processos 
psicológicos ocorrendo na pré-seleção de memes particulares antes do output linguístico; (ii) processos 
culturais que selecionam esses memes e induzem a evolução cultural; e (iii) o efeito rebote dos 
memes selecionados na evolução de genes relacionados a nossa psicologia.  
Essa perspectiva multinível aproxima a teoria luhmanniana à teoria memética. Na 
terminologia sistêmica, um meme deve ser entendido como uma unidade de sentido. Um sistema 
social, por sua vez, pode ser compreendido como um memeplexo -- um conjunto de memes que se 
reproduzem melhor como parte de um aglomerado cultural. Aqui, a teoria dos sistemas pode 
oferecer muito à teoria memética porque permite uma compreensão sociológica melhor da 
evolução de um sistema sociocultural. Desse modo, ambas as teorias se complementam. 
De modo a incorporar processos multinível no  framework da teoria dos sistemas, é preciso 
ajustar outra pressuposição da teoria luhmanniana. De acordo com Luhmann, a teoria sociológica 
deveria abandonar a distinção parte/todo e substitui-la pela distinção sistema/ambiente. Uma 
análise em múltiplos níveis, contudo, pode incorporar simultaneamente as duas distinções, 
adotando um modelo de causação dual segundo o qual os níveis ontológicos mais baixos do sistema 
simultaneamente afetam os níveis mais altos e são constrangidos por eles.  
Uma inspiração para construir tal modelo teórico seria o de integrar a teoria luhmanniana 
à de Jonathan Turner em Theoretical Principles of Sociology. Turner busca formular uma teoria 
sociológica ampla baseada em uma análise tripartite da realidade social, fundada nos níveis macro 
(sistemas sociais e inter-sociais), meso (unidades corporativas, como emrpesas e organizações) e 
micro (interações individuais). De acordo com sua proposta, algumas emoçoes humanas criam as 
condições necessárias para a emergência dos níveis meso e macro da realidade social, como 
emoções que criam laços individuais e coordenam a ação entre pessoas, possibilitando a 
compreensão mútua, e outras que possibilitam a própria ligação entre indivíduos e comunidade. A 
abordagem de Turner é sincrônica, na medida em que se foca na explicação de como realidades 
meso e macro emergem de interações microdinâmicas.  
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De acordo com Turner, a reprodução social opera em dois níveis distintos. O primeiro é a 
reprodução das bases biológicas das sociedades humanas, ou a reprodução biológica humana em si. 
O segundo é a socialização de indivíduos nos sistemas simbólicos necessários para sua inclusão nas 
estruturas sociais. Nesse nível, a reprodução está relacionada à manutenção da estabilidade 
estrutural no nível macro, baseada na reprodução cultural que ocorre nos níveis inferiores. De 
acordo com Turner, o surgimento de novos domínios institucionais (que poderiam ser 
compreendidos como sistemas sociais)  depende do desenvolvimento de uma cultura distinta, 
baseada no compartilhamento de um meio de generalização simbólica. Novos domínios 
institucionais surgem porque as estruturas de micro e meso nível precisam lidar com novas pressões 
seletivas resultando do ambiente - forças internas (crescimento populacional ou mesmo a 
emergência de novas instituições) e externas 9como uma guerra ou relações ecológicas entre 
sociedades). 
O processo de diferenciação institucional vem com a necessidade de integração cultural e 
estrutural dos novos sistemas sociais. O mais relevante desses mecanismos é a interdependência 
estrutural, que deriva da necessidade de manutenção de relações intrincadas entre os sistemas 
sociais de modo a manter suas operações internas. 
A teoria de Turner oferece uma importante contribuição à teoria dos sistemas por 
funcionar dentro da lógica parte/todo que se torna essencial ao programa luhmanniano. Sem 
adotar tal distinção, a teoria de Luhmann é muito útil para discussões macrossociológicas, mas não 
oferece uma perspectiva de nível micro/macro por meio da qual processos coevolutivos de 
emergência social podem surgir. Turner, portanto, oferece um importante complemento à teoria 
dos sistemas sociais de Luhmann, permitindo compreender melhor sua abordagem evolutiva. 
Em seu corpo teórico, Luhmann busca construir uma teoria da sociedade baseada em 
muitas disciplinas, indo da cibernética à teoria dos sistemas sociais, passando pela teoria da 
informação e mesmo pela teoria computacional. Em um estágio posterior, propôs uma teoria da 
evolução social que incorpora muitos elementos da teoria autopoiética e da própria teoria da 
evolução de Darwin, o ponto em que pretendo me concentrar agora. 
Ler Luhmann por meio das lentes de Darwin soa estranho porque a teoria autopoiética e o 
darwinismo parecem ser de algum modo contraditórios e, apesar disso, Luhmann busca fundar sua 
teoria em ambas as abordagens. Pretendo destacar essas relações. 
O Darwin de Luhmann é baseado em três elementos: variação, seleção e reestabilização. 
Os primeiros dois elementos são compreendidos como na tradicional teoria darwinista. Como 
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Luhmann está preocupado com o domínio social, a variação é compreendida em seu contexto 
social -- modificação nos elementos sistêmicos de comunicação. A seleção está relacionada à 
seleção, em Luhmann, porque o processo de comunicação produz variação e, ao mesmo tempo, 
rejeita algumas das variantes produzidas. Assim como na evolução biológica, algumas estruturas 
induzem a separação entre variação e seleção - a variação como produto da comunicação e a 
seleção, como resultado de estruturas sociais específicas.  
O último elemento - a reestabilização - concerne ao fato de que os elementos selecionados 
proporcionam certa estabilidade ao sistema.As estruturas sociais existentes se tornam incapazes de 
lidar com certas variantes produzidas e, para lidar com esse problema, produz novos sistemas 
sociais capazes de lidar com elas. Essas novas estruturas podem reestabilizar as funções sociais, que 
podem novamente lidar eficazmente com suas operações internas. É o traço central do que Turner 
chama de interdependência estrutural. 
A descrição de Luhmann pode soar estranha a um darwinista, porque Luhmann carece de 
dois elementos centrais na teoria do biológo inglês: aptidão diferencial e herança, que são 
substituídos pela seleção e restabilização.  O próprio Luhmann reconhece isso, mas pensa que a 
restabilização pode se fundir com a seleção apenas em sistemas estáticos. Não penso ser esse o caso. 
A reestabilização poderia ser melhor compreendida por Luhmann como uma adaptação no nível 
social - um produto evolutivo selecionado por exercer uma função.  
Como resultado, é possível ver em Luhmann a possibilidade de uma teoria selecionista 
mais ampla, embora a partir de uma leitura pouco ortodoxa de sua obra. Para ele, o agente da 
seleção é estrutura. A restabilização é um tipo diferente de seleção, pois seleciona as próprias 
estruturas.  
É importante notar que, agora, podemos falar de três tipos de seleção operando: seleção 
cultural, social e estrutural.  
A seleção cultural diz respeito à seleção de indivíduos que adotam traços culturais que os 
leva a serem mais imitados do que indivíduos adotando traços culturais distintos. Usualmente, 
teóricos da evolução cultural buscam explicar a evolução social apenas recorrendo à evolução 
cultural. Mas esse é um erro, por desconsiderar dimensões sociais irredutíveis à cultura. Essa 
questão é central à crítica do próprio termo "sistema social", compreendido como sistema de 
processamento de sentidos. É possível vislumbrar uma sociedade animal inteiramente organizada 
em bases genéticas, sem nenhum sistema como a linguagem para organizá-la (pense nas formigas ou 
abelhas). É preciso ir além da cultura.  
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W. G. Runciman propõe que, além da cultura, o estudo da evolução social leve em conta a 
seleção social, ou seja, os processos evolutivos de práticas sociais que definem papéis institucionais 
que interagem mutuamente. De acordo com ele, enquanto a evolução cultural diz respeito ao 
comportamento adquirido por meio da imitação ou do aprendizado social, a evolução social diz 
respeito a comportamentos impostos por incentivos ou sanções institucionais. 
Há, ainda, a seleção estrutural. A evolução societal (nas estruturas da sociedade) ocorre 
como resultado de variação, herança e aptidão no nível das estruturas sociais. Sistemas sociais 
distintos apresentam diferentes estruturas funcionais (variação); as reproduzem por meio da 
replicação de sua cultura e das instituições sociais que mantem a operação do sistema social 
(herança); e a relação estrutural entre sistemas sociais pode conferir a todo o sistema societal 
diferentes vantagens sobre outras sociedades (aptidão). 
Agora, é possível retomar o conceito luhmanniano de reestabilização. Ao invés de uma 
condição evolutiva, como propõe o sociólogo, a reestabilização é um produto da evolução social. 
Ela ocorre quando a estrutura societal se adapta a seu ambiente, reorganizando seus elementos 
internos de modo a apoiar sua própria existência. Assim, a reestabilização pode ser compreendida 
como coevolução entre memes, práticas e estruturas, reorganizando os três níveis como resultado da 
seleção de uma nova estrutura social.  
Compreender a reestabilização desse modo soluciona o segundo problema identificado na 
teoria evolutiva luhmanniana, a ausência de um conceito de aptidão. Ou será que há? Na 
perspectiva de Luhmann, cada sistema social opera por meio de um meio de comunicação 
simbólica generalizado e especializado.  
Embora Luhmann não descreva sua teoria nesses termos, há um conceito de aptidão 
embutido em sua abordagem evolutiva, tanto no nível mais baixo de memes/práticas quanto no 
nível macroestrutural. Seleção, para ele, ocorre no nível intermediário, no interior de cada sistema 
social. Memes e práticas são selecionados por se conformar aos critérios de cada sistema. Contudo, 
a seleção também ocorre no domínio macroestrutural, como reestabilização de todo o sistema. 
Compreendida desse modo, sua teoria social pode ser reconstruída a partir da abordagem 
darwinista. 
A última questão diz respeito à autopoiese, conceito central de sua obra tardia. Humberto 
Maturana e Francisco Varela conceberam a autopoiese de modo a explicar como sistemas 
biológicos, como as células, são o produto de sua própria produção. Um sistema autopoiético não 
apenas produz a si mesmo, mas também é auto-organizado, auto-sustentado e auto-referencial. Mas 
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como a mudança evolutiva se relaciona à autopoiese? O primeiro ponto a ser destacado é que a 
evolução não é considerada essencial para compreender a dinâmica dos sistemas de organização 
vivos, mas apenas para compreender suas transformações históricas. Para os autores, a evolução é 
baseada na deriva natural - a manutenção da coerência e autonomia do organismo vivo, como 
resultado do acoplamento estrutural contínuo entre diferentes organismos que se mantem ligados 
por meio de uma rede populacional. 
Maturana e Varela recusam a ideia de aptidão por ser um conceito gradativo. De acordo 
com eles, não podemos falar em graus de aptidão porque ou um ser vivo está adaptado ou não está. 
É um conceito binário. Esse é um erro, uma vez que o conceito de aptidão é relativa, levando em 
conta diferenças estruturais entre indivíduos que proporcionam a eles pequenas vantagens que ao 
longo do tempo modificam a estrutura genética da população. 
Maturana e Varela também rejeitam a própria ideia de seleção natural em favor da deriva 
natural. Ao invés de ser selecionado pelo ambiente, o organismo se acopla ao ambiente e ambos são 
modificados no processo. Mas nada disso precisa implicar a rejeição da  seleção natural. Pelo 
contrário, a ideia de que os organismos também constroem seus próprios ambientes, sendo ambos 
modificados no processo, é parte da própria ideia darwinista. Uma importante ramificação do 
darwinismo contemporâneo é a construção de nichos, que estuda justamente esses processos 
coevolutivos entre organismos e ambientes. O que Maturana e Varela rejeitam são as ideias de que 
o ambiente é fixo e que os organismos são passivos no processo evolutivo; mas essa crítica pode ser 
facilmente acomodada ao marco teórico darwinista. 
Além disso, a deriva natural não é uma alternativa à seleção natural, mas uma visão do 
processo evolutivo do ponto de vista de um sistema autopoiético. Maturana e Varela se concentram 
na manutenção da autopoiese em diferentes estruturas que surgem ao longo do tempo, não na 
variação produzida em uma dada população. Nessa perspectiva, a evolução somente pode ser 
compreendida como deriva porque seu ponto de observação não pode levar em conta o que está 
fora do sistema autopoiético. Ao adotar essa perspectiva, não podem providenciar uma explicação 
baseada nas pressões evolutivas que levam à seleção de traços particulares e, por isso, podem apenas 
enxergar a deriva de estruturas, sem traçar uma explicação a respeito de porque ela ocorre. E essa 
explicação é a seleção natural, que requer uma abordagem populacional do problema.  Com isso, o 
desafio imposto pela autopoiese é muito mais fraco do que alguns assumem. 
A abordagem de Maturana e Varela deve ser compreendida como uma teoria sobre a 
ontogenia de um sistema vivo, não sobre a evolução. Isso não significa que a teoria autopoiética é 
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incompatível com o darwinismo, mas que ambas estão preocupadas com questões diferentes. A 
autopoiese concentra-se na manutenção da homeostasis no desenvolvimento de um organismo e em 
como a evolução mantém a autopoiese em estruturas diferentes que evoluíram. A teoria evolutiva, 
de outro lado, se concentra em questões filogenéticas, explicando como variação, herança e aptidão 
produzem novos indivíduos por meio da seleção natural. A autopoiese diz respeito a processos 
sincrônicos que dizem respeito ao ciclo de vida de um organismo individual, ao passo que o 
darwinismo se concentra em processos diacrônicos ocorrendo em um período de tempo evolutivo. 
É por isso que parece tão estranha a referência luhmanniana simultaneamente a ambas as 
teorias. Os sistemas sociais não são apenas autopoiéticos; sua estrutura também evolui. Apesar disso, 
a estranheza da formulação luhmanniana pode ser dissipada se acoplarmos uma perspectiva 
baseada na seleção em múltiplos níveis à ideia de populações darwinistas em Godfrey-Smith. Com 
isso, podemos compreender indivíduos darwinistas tanto como unidades autopoiéticas e como o 
resultado de processos evolutivos aninhados. 
O primeiro ponto a ser destacado nessa tarefa é que o próprio Peter Godfrey-Smith buscou 
tratar da evolução cultural no último capítulo de seu Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. 
Embora algumas ideias desenvolvidas no capítulo sejam interessantes, não acredito que o desafio foi 
superado satisfatoriamente. 
De acordo com ele, a evolução cultural pode ser modelada a partir de sua proposta a partir 
de basicamente duas categorias principais. A primeira abordagem é individualista e pode ser 
concebida de dois modos. Em primeiro lugar, adota-se uma perspectiva biológica, que descreve 
uma população de indivíduos biológicos adotando fenótipos culturais que são, então, passados a 
seus descendentes biológicos. Uma abordagem alternativa considera as próprias variantes culturais 
como populações por direito próprio, similarmente à abordagem memética. Uma outra 
possibilidade é que a evolução cultural ocorra no nível do grupo -- também a partir das duas 
abordagens, biológica e cultural. 
Em artigo no qual discute a proposta de Peter Godfrey-Smith, Paulo Abrantes propõe - 
com base na teoria de Richerson & Boyd - que o viés conformista,  a punição moralista e a 
sensitividade a marcadores simbólicos é capaz de reduzir a variação no nível do grupo. Mas, para 
aplicar a abordagem de Godfrey-Smith ao universo cultural, é preciso adotar uma perspectiva de 
seleção em múltiplos níveis. 
Essa perspectiva pode ser definida de basicamente dois modos, como proposto por Okasha. 
No primeiro modo (MLS1), os membros do grupo são as unidades selecionadas e a aptidão do 
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grupo é tão-somente a soma da aptidão de todo o grupo. No segundo modo (MLS2), grupos são os 
indivíduos selecionados e possuem características próprias que afetam sua aptidão. A aptidão é, 
portanto, um traço atribuível ao grupo.  
De acordo com Abrantes, Godfrey-Smith rejeita a aplicação de processos de seleção MLS2 
a grupos humanos porque dificilmente o conceito de reprodução poderia ser aplicado ao nível do 
grupo.  Mas Paulo propõe uma maneira pela qual o processo MLS2 poderia ser aplicado a grupos 
culturais. Baseado em Okasha, ele alega que MLS1 pode ser o primeiro estágio da emergência de 
um indivíduo darwinista selecionado a partir de MLS2. Nos primeiros estágios, mecanismos MLS1 
induziriam a transição de grupos cooperativos e, no último estágio, processos MLS2 os 
estabilizariam como indivíduos darwinistas. Nos primeiros estágios, a seleção de parentesco e o 
altruísmo recíproco poderiam estabilizar a cooperação no interior de pequenos grupos familiares e 
grupos de indivíduos não aparentados (mecanismos MLS1).  
Cada uma dessas transições apresentam valores diferentes nos parâmetros propostos por 
Godfrey-Smith. Família e pequenos grupos compostos por indivíduos não aparentados apresentam 
um valor alto na herança (H), variação baixa entre grupos (V), um baixo (S) no nível do grupo, 
assim como baixos valores em gargalo (B), linhas germinais (G) e integração (I).  Grupos maiores, 
como as comunidades humanas nos duzentos mil anos que antecedem o Holoceno, seriam um caso 
de transição. Apresentam um alto valor de herança (H), em virtude da transmissão cultural; um alto 
valor em variação (V), por força da seleção cultural e outras forças operando no micronível da 
evolução cultural. Mas apresentam ainda um baixo valor em aptidão (S), em virtude de a aptidão 
do grupo estar relacionada ainda à aptidão individual. Apresentam um valor baixo no gargalo (B), 
pois a reprodução ainda se deve apenas a mecanismos de baixo nível, e um baixo valor nas linhas 
germinais (G), pois não há especialização institucional que afete a transmissão cultural. Por fim, 
apresentam um valor alto no parâmetro integração (I), baseado na marcação simbólica como uma 
fundação genuína da cooperação. 
A evolução de grupos cooperativos maiores deu início a uma pressão seletiva sobre 
indivíduos possuidores de determinados instintos sociais tribais, incluindo o que Tomasello chama 
de intencionalidade coletiva - uma precondição para a seleção de grupos culturais como indivíduos 
darwinistas. Ao invés de os membros de um grupo dependerem apenas de sua própria perspectiva 
(intencionalidade individual), compartilham um ponto de vista com todos os demais membros do 
grupo. Essa capacidade aumenta a coesão do grupo como entidade, levando ao fechamento 
integrativo do grupo a partir de uma perspectiva ascendente (bottom-up). 
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Mas o completo fechamento de sociedades humanas como indivíduos darwinistas 
demanda a existência de traços eminentemente presentes no nível societal. De modo a alcançar tal 
possibilidade evolutiva, uma certa estrutura social precisa elevar-se sobre a cultura. Para Richerson 
& Boyd, a evolução social cria mecanismos institucionais que facilitam o ajustamento de nossa 
psicologia a uma sociedade cada vez mais complexas -- baseados na coerção, segmentação 
hierárquica e legitimidade simbólica. Esses mecanismos institucionais são a base fundacional de 
uma estrutura social de sociedades mais complexas.  
O exemplo óbvio de uma inovação cultural que alcança o status estrutural é a ideia de 
norma. Embora existam culturalmente e sejam transmitidas individualmente, normas alcançam o 
status existencial por si sós, na medida em que definem parte da identidade comunitária e, com isso, 
tornam-se uma característica de todo o grupo. Outro exemplo é a estrutura de governo, na medida 
em que fundada em uma rede de papéis cuja interconexão é irredutível a crenças individuais. 
Embora irredutíveis a crenças, esses traços se conectam a elas por meio da intencionalidade 
coletiva, que produzem convenções públicas e, por meio delas, criam realidades institucionais.  
A transição para sociedades humanas como indivíduos darwinistas (MLS2) se estabilizou 
com o acoplamento entre a capacidade para intencionalidade coletiva e a diferenciação social que, 
como resultado, produziu adaptações no nível do grupo. A estruturação do governo, de sistemas 
normativos e de estratificação baseada em papéis são todos traços que só podem ser atribuídos a um 
grupo social e, como tal, são irredutíveis a indivíduos. Como resultado desse processo, a seleção 
natural poderia trabalhar no nível do grupo social, selecionando traços próprios desse nível. 
Como grupos como esses se enquadrariam nos parâmetros de Godfrey-Smith? Em 
primeiro lugar, entidades de níveis mais baixos seriam de-darwinizados. Embora os indivíduos 
interajam de modo competitivo entre si, sua interação é estruturada pela cultura e pela estrutura 
social, produzindo como resultado interações cooperativas. Como resultado da punição e da 
conformidade, a variação interna a cada comunidade é baixa, ao passo que é alta em grupos 
culturais distintos. O parâmetro H (hereditariedade) é alto, uma vez que o controle social monitora 
os processos de transmissão de informação cultural -- e, em scoiedades mais complexas, o sistema 
educacional nivela o grau de informação dos mais jovens, garantidno a manutenção de um cerne 
cultural básico. Essas sociedades apresentam um gargalo (B) baixo, pois não há uma divisão clara 
entre gerações. Mas alcançam um patamar elevado no parâmetro G (linhagem germinativa), por 
meio do sistema educacional, que assume o papel reprodutivo no nível memético. É uma instituição 
especializada na educação de indivíduos que permitem a sua participação potencial nos demais 
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domínios institucionais. Sociedades evoluídas a partir de processos MLS2 também apresentam alta 
integração (I), por duas razões: em primeiro lugar, os indivíduos são integrados por meio de um 
sistema de valores unificado, passado geração a geração por meio da educação. Além disso, o 
direito permite o fechamento estrutural por criar mecanismos institucionais que reforçam a 
aderência a uma estrutura societal comum. Há tanto cooperação no nível mais baixo (individual) 
quanto no nível das instituições (integração institucional). 
 
4. A Função do Direito em uma Teoria Evolutiva da Estratificação 
 
Na presente seção, será explorada a ideia de que estruturas macrossociológicas conferem 
certas vantagens evolutivas a sociedades humanas porque exercem uma  função. Mas o que isso 
significa? Em especial, o propósito desse debate é mostrar o papel do direito na reconstrução dos 
bandos igualitários típicos do Pleistoceno, que deram vez a sociedades estratificadas ao longo dos 
últimos 10.000 anos -- justamente em razão da função desempenhada pela estratificação. 
O funcionalismo não é uma abordagem presente apenas na biologia, sendo também 
presente em teorias sociológicas clássicas, como as de Parsons, Merton, Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown 
e Bronislaw Malinowski. A ideia de função é parte de uma abordagem darwinista generalizada, 
aplicável tanto a entidades biológicas quanto socioculturais.  
A ligação entre o funcionalismo sociológico e uma abordagem darwinista é clara. Se um 
elemento social executa uma função quando ajuda a construir e a manter a integração social, então 
uma sociedade que não tenha esse traço estaria em piores condições que a primeira. No longo 
prazo, a extinção de uma em detrimento de outra não seria uma surpresa. Se esse é o caso, não há 
porque não aplicar o conceito de função a entes sociais. 
Nesse contexto, é razoável assumir que o direito desempenha uma função. Hodgson e 
Knudsen, a partir da tese de John Maynard Smith e Eörs Szathmáry, alegam que a evolução social 
é estruturada a partir de transições no modo de tratamento e transmissão da informação. De acordo 
com eles, houve seis transições evolutivas no domínio sociocultural: a emergência da cultura; o 
surgimento da linguagem; a transição de grupos culturais a tribos; a invenção da escrita; o 
surgimento do direito; e a institucionalização da ciência e tecnologia.  
Aqui, estou interessado particularmente no surgimento do direito que, para eles, é "mais do 
que o costume codificado". Mas o modo como Hodgson e Knudsen concebem o direito é muito 
complexo, exigindo a existência de um Estado e de um Poder Judiciário relativamente diferenciado. 
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Ou seja, a maior parte das sociedades antigas, na concepção deles, não tinham um sistema jurídicos, 
mas tão somente um sistema normativo fundado em costumes.  
Acredito que essa visão deriva de uma projeção sobre o passado de um conceito de direito 
contemporâneo. E Hodgson e Knudsen incorrem nesse erro por não distinguirem dois modos pelos 
quais o direito pode ser compreendido: como estrutura e como social. Além disso, a descrição sobre 
as transições informacionais está equivocada, pois a terceira transação não é a transição para tribos 
estruturadas em torno do costume, mas a evolução do direito como estrutura social.  
Com efeito, o direito pode ser compreendido como estrutura social e como sistema social. 
Hodgson e Knudsen se concentram apenas no segundo aspecto do direito, que é definido a como 
um sistema judicial independente composto de tribunais e que integram estados completamente 
desenvolvidos. Mas esquecem que o direito é mais que um sistema funcional de decisões; também é 
uma arquitetura normativa a partir da qual todo o sistema societal opera e na qual todos os demais 
sistemas sociais confiam para estruturar suas próprias operações. 
Meu argumento é que o direito como estrutura social evoluiu muito antes do direito como 
sistema social diferenciado. O direito, e não o costume, foi a adaptação societal que possibilitou a 
transição social de bandos de caçadores coletores a formas arcaicas de organização social e às 
primeiras sociedades hierarquizadas. Ele confere a sociedades humanas a capacidade de sustentar 
formas sociais mais complexas. O costume não seria capaz de executar essa função, pois pode ser 
reduzido ao domínio cultural, não dependendo de nenhuma outra estrutura social.  
Mas como o direito pavimentou o caminho que levou à evolução de socidades 
hierarquizadas? Para responder a esta questão, é crucial entender a função do direito. Como ponto 
de partida, adoto a perspectiva de Niklas Luhmann, para quem a função do direito é a estabilização 
de expectativas normativas. Em minha leitura, essa definição atribui ao direito justamente o caráter 
estrutural a que referi anteriormente. Contudo, embora proveitosa, a análise luhmanniana é 
incompleta por tratar apenas dos aspectos macroestruturais do direito,  ignorando sua função no 
nível microdinâmico - que é a de promover a cooperação no nível das interações individuais, 
mantendo a desdarwinização dos níveis sociais microdinâmicos. 
O direito não pode ser reduzido ao nível das interações individuais, pois não é um traço 
cultural (um meme) transmissível individualmente. Pelo contrário, embora normas particulares 
sejam redutíveis à cultura, o direito só pode exercer sua função porque é assumido como um traço 
da sociedade como um todo e, como tal, se torna capaz de coordenar a organização social. Todos 
os membros da sociedade e, em sociedades mais complexas, todos os sistemas sociais, formulam suas 
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expectativas baseados nas expectativas normativas de todos os demais. Quando o direito é 
institucionalizado, os indivíduos organizam seus afazeres presumindo um consenso normativo, 
característico do direito.  
Além disso, o caráter estrutural do direito se manifesta no fato de que normas jurídicas 
codificam a estrutura social, cristalizando a "hierarquia, posições sociais, rituais e a divisão do 
trabalho". Em virtude dessa cristalização da estrutura social, o direito foi essencial para que as 
comunidades humanas passassem a ter estruturas próprias (no nível societal), capazes de sustentar 
processos evolutivos de tipo MLS2. Originalmente, os grupos comunitários do Pleistoceno se 
organizavam a partir de normas culturalmente compartilhadas como um mecanismo de estruturar 
a cooperação no nível das interações individuais, punindo trapaceiros e estrangeiros, mas sem 
praticamente qualquer divisão de trabalho, hierarquia e distinção de papéis. Essa são as origens do 
direito: não como estrutura societal, mas convencional -- evoluída a partir de um processo 
ascendente envolvendo normas sociais fundadas na punição moralista, transmissão cultural e um 
tímido processo de seleção de grupo que, paulatinamente, codificou macroestruturas sociais.  
Se no nível macrodinâmico o direito codifica estruturas sociais, no nível microdinâmico seu 
papel é o de promover a cooperação. Esse ponto se relaciona à tese de Peter Godfrey-Smith a 
respeito da dedarwinização dos níveis evolutivos inferiores. O direito atua como gargalo (B) ao 
regular a variação cultural e comportamental por meio do enforcement de normas sociais. Como 
resultado, o direito estabiliza o conjunto de variantes culturais aceitáveis, diminuindo a pressão 
seletiva no interior da comunidade e desdarwinizando o nível das interações sociais.  
A transição para grupos sujeitos a processos evolutivos MLS2 foi possível em virtude de 
três fatores pertinentes ao nível microdinâmico: a acumulação cultural de normas sociais, 
produzindo uma rede de regras autorreferentes que se torna progressivamente uma referência de 
fundo para outras normas; a atribuição de intencionalidade a sistemas normativos; e a diferenciação 
entre normas primárias e secundárias (Hart). Apenas quando ocorre a diferenciação entre normas 
primárias e secundárias (metanormas), é possível falar na transição para grupos evoluídos a partir de 
processos MLS2. 
Compreender o direito a partir de sua função é essencial para entender o seu papel na 
reversão do igualitarismo típico dos bandos de caçadores-coletores do Pleistoceno. Há mais ou 
menos 12.000 anos, a estabilização climática do Holoceno permitiu que nossos ancestrais passassem 
a viver em assentamentos sedentários e a desenvolver a agricultura. Simultaneamente, ocorreram 
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mudanças na estrutura societal, com o surgimento das primeiras sociedades estratificadas. Mas 
como esse processo ocorreu e qual o papel do direito nessa transição?  
A fim de explicar essa transição, recorro ao trabalho dos arqueólogos Kent Flannery e 
Joyce Marcus, The Creation of Inequality. Segundo os cientistas, a transição entre bandos igualitários e 
sociedades hierarquizadas decorreu de mudanças pequenas na lógica social presente em bandos 
igualitários. Assim como Boehm, Flannery e Marcus afirmam que a igualdade se justifica, nesses 
bandos, a partir de uma justificação moral aceita por todos os membros do grupo e cristalizada na 
cosmologia aceita por uma dada sociedade.  
O igualitarismo desses bandos, contudo, não é uma ausência de hierarquia, mas uma 
hierarquia invertida, mantida pelo monitoramento coletivo contra eventuais usurpadores que 
busquem estabelecer hierarquias. Para Flannery e Marcus, mesmo esses bandos possuem uma 
hierarquia "sobrenatural", na medida em que os indivíduos alpha não são membros do bando, mas 
entidades sobrenaturais (deuses, espíritos). Além disso, esses bandos apresentam os seguintes 
princípios comuns: admiração pelos generosos e repressão contra o egoísmo; manutenção de 
relações sociais por meio do altruísmo recíproco; atribuição de características mágicas aos nomes 
ancestrais; repressão ao homicídio e ao incesto; exigência de dotes para matrimônio; a 
pressuposição de que homens são mais virtuosos que as mulheres; que os idosos são mais virtuosos 
que os jovens; e o etnocentrismo. 
Paulatinamente, determinadas sociedades modificaram ligeiramente esses princípios. Por 
exemplo, alguns bandos eram organizados em clãs, que passaram a se organizar de modo 
segmentário. Nessa organização, os membros de um clã começam a enxergar os de outro como se 
fossem estrangeiros (outsiders), ocasionando um tensionamento entre os diversos clãs. Com a 
estabilização de clãs diferentes como parte de uma mesma comunidade, o eventual acesso de um 
dos clãs a recursos materiais específicos poderia levar a uma desigualdade entre clãs, embora no 
interior de cada um as relações individuais fossem igualitárias. Ao longo do tempo, um clã poderia 
se afirmar como superior ao outro, estabelecendo relações hierárquicas. Flannery e Marcus 
descrevem esse processo em várias sociedades tribais, como os Nootka.  
Além disso, pequenas mudanças na lógica social poderiam levar a modificações drásticas 
na estrutura social. Os arqueólogos mencionam, por exemplo, o surgimento da escravidão por 
dívida como uma derivação da lógica do altruísmo recíproco. Um indivíduo que deve algo a outro, 
mas não pode pagar, sujeita-se ao trabalho escravo para pagar a dívida. Além disso, se nos bandos 
de caçadores-coletores indivíduos arrogantes eram vistos com suspeita, pequenas mudanças na 
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cosmologia do bando poderiam justificar que alguns fossem tratados com maior prestígio do que 
outros. Progressivamente, o respeito reverencial a determinados indivíduos prestigiados 
transformou-se em hierarquia hereditária fixada com base em normas que a legitimam.  
Quando isso ocorre, podemos começar a falar em sociedades que estão evoluindo por 
processos de seleção MLS2, pois possuem uma estrutura societal irredutível. O direito passa a 
codificar a estrutura em normas sociais, incluindo regras de adjudicação e de sucessão de chefes. 
Com isso, assim como as sociedades de primatas ancestrais, as sociedades humanas voltaram a 
apresentar hierarquia. Evidentemente, de um tipo qualitativamente distinto, fundado em uma 
estrutura social na qual existe o poder político. O último passo nessa direção é o surgimento de 
sociedades estratificadas, nas quais existe uma divisão brusca entre os estratos sociais. Se nas 
sociedades primitivas hierarquizadas por posto há uma continuidade entre os indivíduos menos 
valorosos e o chefe do bando, as sociedades estratificadas institucionalizam uma diferença 
categórica entre a aristocracia e o homem comum. 
É importante notar que a explicação antropológica de Flannery e Marcus faz sentido a 
partir de uma perspectiva de seleção em múltiplos níveis. Em primeiro lugar, a abordagem deles dá 
conta de que o registro arqueológico mostra sinais de avanços e retrocessos. Alguns bandos 
igualitários se tornam sociedades de rank e posteriormente retornam ao modo igualitário como 
resultado de revoltas internas contra elites. Em outros casos, são registrados períodos cíclicos entre 
igualitarismo e ranking. É o que exatamente seria esperado a partir de uma abordagem evolutiva: 
uma variedade de tipos de organização social emergindo e sendo selecionadas, de forma que vários 
equilíbrios poderiam ser selecionados. Em alguns casos, as forças igualitárias prevaleceriam e, em 
outros, o ranking e a hierarquia estratificada prevaleceriam.  
Eventualmente, as sociedades estratificadas prevaleceram sobre as comunidades 
segmentárias e os bandos de caçadores-coletores, possibilitando a evolução de reinos e impérios 
mais complexos - as chamadas altas culturas pré-modernas (Luhmann) ou impérios históricos 
intermediários. Mas por que elas prevaleceram?  
Em seu Evolutionary Universals in Society, Parsons defende uma teoria da universalidade da 
estratificação. Em harmonia com Flannery e Marcus, Parsons assume que a estratificação resulta 
quando ao menos dois grupos endogâmicos se tornam parte da mesma sociedade e se diferenciam 
verticalmente, resultando em poder político e econômico para o grupo mais bem posicionado e a 
relegação dos outros a uma posição subordinada.  
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A estratificação é uma estrutura por criar novas possibilidades para o sistema social. Como 
Parsons diz, "a sociedade como sistema ganha vantagens funcionais ao concentrar a 
responsabilidade por certas funções". Em primeiro lugar, há a concentração de poder político e 
religioso nas mãos da classe governante, o que é importante para lidar com problemas relativos à 
violência e à organização de forças militares contra outras comunidades.  
Uma sociedade estratificada é diferenciada em subsistemas desiguais, alinhando a 
assimetria entre sistema/ambiente à igualdade/desigualdade. A igualdade regula as relações entre 
os membros dos estratos mais elevados, ao passo que a desigualdade regula os demais estratos, 
relegados ao ambiente. Mas por que a estratificação evoluiu? Sua predominância somente pode ser 
compreendida em virtude de seu papel como adaptação social. Em caso contrário, deveríamos 
esperar uma quantidade muito maior de sociedades resistentes à estratificação. 
Segundo Luhmann, a estratificação resultou do crescimento das sociedades em tamanho e 
complexidade, o que exigiu novos modos de lidar com questões administrativas, políticas, 
econômicas e religiosas. A incipiente diferenciação funcional que passa a existir é organizada a 
partir da diferenciação hierárquica de papéis - e nisso reside a maior parte das vantagens da 
estratificação. Sociedades hierarquizadas podem sustentar especialização e, com ela, produtividade 
maior. Com isso, podem sustentar exércitos maiores, populações maiores e desenvolver tecnologias 
mais rapidamente. 
A transição para sociedades estratificadas implicou mudanças na estrutura do direito. O 
direito arcaico era legitimado nos princípios do parentesco e reciprocidade -- exatamente os 
princípios que deveríamos esperar, dada nossa psicologia social inata.  
As sociedades pré-modernas, por sua vez, passaram a se estruturar de modo bastante 
distinto, baseado não apenas na hierarquização, mas também na distinção entre centro e periferia. 
Além disso,  o direito dessas sociedades se desconecta do parentesco, embora ainda esteja preso à 
religião, que se afirma como base legitimadora do poder político e da estrutura burocrática. O 
direito dessas sociedades também é mais abstrato, fundado em papéis jurídicos específicos que, 
posteriormente, seriam a base social para a diferenciação entre direito e outros sistemas sociais.  
O direito, nessas sociedades, se tornou uma estrutura capaz de manter a coesão em 
sociedades estratificadas, não apenas por codificar a estrutura social, mas também por impulsionar a 
cooperação em um ambiente social mais complexo. A estratificação evoluiu por conferir vantagens 
adaptativas em face aos bandos igualitários e às tribos segmentárias, permitindo às sociedades pré-
modernas que desenvolvessem uma organização sociológica nunca antes possível. 
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Mas não vivemos mais em sociedades estratificadas. Ainda que seja altíssimo o grau de 
desigualdade nas sociedades democráticas contemporâneas, nada como a divisão por estratos que 
existia na Antiguidade no Egito, na China, na Índia ou mesmo em Roma é mais uma realidade. A 
desigualdade econômica e a pobreza são problemáticas precisamente porque conseguimos enxergá-
las como um problema, por entendermos que ela não se ajusta bem aos padrões de uma democracia 
plena.  
Em certo sentido, então, podemos dizer que outra reviravolta ocorreu na história humana, 
trazendo o igualitarismo de volta ao jogo. E, de novo, essa reviravolta não veio sem perplexidade. 
Sociedades estratificadas evoluíram precisamente por solucionar certos dilemas sociais melhor que 
os bandos igualitários e as tribos segmentárias. O direito teve um papel essencial nesse processo, 
tanto por ter estabilizado as expectativas normativas, mantendo a estrutura hierárquica de papéis, 
quanto por ter tornado mais eficientes as possibilidades de cooperação por meio do enforcement 
normativo e da marcação simbólica, ao atribuir diferentes status legais aos membros de estratos 
distintos. Mas, se as sociedades estratificadas são tão eficientes, por que não vivemos mais em 
sociedades estratificadas? 
Parsons sustenta que esse retorno ao igualitarismo ocorreu, em parte, como resultado das 
revoluções constitucionais do século XVIII. No próximo capítulo, explorarei esse insight de forma a 
mostrar que o "retorno" ao igualitarismo é o resultado de profundas mudanças estruturais que 
ocorreram nas sociedades modernas. E muito disso ocorreu em virtude do surgimento de uma 
estrutura política e jurídica moderna, fundada no constitucionalismo - que deve ser compreendido 
como uma aquisição evolutiva. 
 
5. Constitucionalismo como Adaptação Evolutiva 
 
A diferenciação funcional da sociedade ocorreu na modernidade, como resultado de 
transformações contingentes que levaram à seleção de instituições, papéis e estruturas que a 
sustentaram. Nas sociedades pré-modernas, não seria possível conceber a diferenciação funcional, 
uma vez que todas as funções sociais eram exercidas pelo sistema 'sociedade', sem diferenciação 
entre política, direito, medicina, educação, etc. Mas como a diferenciação funcional ocorreu? 
A tese é a de que o processo de diferenciação funcional resultou de um processo de seleção 
em múltiplos níveis que acarretou a seleção de estados constitucionais como indivíduos darwinistas 
(Peter Godfrey-Smith). As condições sociais da Europa medieval e moderna apresentam 
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particularidades em comparação a outras sociedades estratificadas e, como resultado de pressões 
evolutivas decorrentes de processos bottom-up atuando nos níveis microdinâmicos e mesodinâmicos e 
também de processos top-down decorrentes da interação entre diferentes organizações estatais e do 
direito internacional. O resultado desse processo é a sociedade constitucional. 
Hauke Brunkhorst oferece uma descrição sociológica da dissolução da estratificação e das 
origens do constitucionalismo em seu Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions. De acordo com ele, as 
mudanças da Idade Média e na aurora da modernidade constrangiram o caminho evolutivo das 
sociedades modernas ao impor alguns constrangimentos normativos na evolução social. Baseado na 
tese do equilíbro pontuado de Stephen Jay Gould, ele argumenta que eventos como a revolução 
papal do século XI d.C. e a Revolução Protestante do século XVII canalizaram a mudança 
evolutiva, bloqueando alguns caminhos evolutivos e abrindo outros. 
Não penso que Brunkhorst está certo ao tratar esses eventos como casos de equilíbrio 
pontuado e não de evolução gradual. Os exemplos mencionados como resultado de especiação e 
stasis poderiam ser compreendidos de modo diverso ao oferecido. Não há substanciação para a tese 
de que houve especiação cultural antes das revoluções mencionadas, já que todas ocorreram no 
mesmo pool cultural, com pouco isolamento como seria necessário para que a especiação ocorra. 
Além disso, o que Brunkhorst vê como explosões pontuadas são eventos importantes, mas de 
nenhum modo são argumento para a especiação. Quando pensamos no longo prazo, a maior parte 
da história do constitucionalismo é uma história de acumulação gradual do século XI em diante.  
Cada uma das revoluções mencionadas por Brunkhorst teve importância ímpar na 
evolução do constitucionalismo. A revolução papal levou a uma certa liberação da igreja em relação 
ao poder imperial, iniciando um longo processo de dessacralização do poder político. Além disso, 
iniciou o longo caminho que levaria à ideia de que o poder político deve ser exercido por meio do 
direito. E, por fim, passou-se a estruturar juridicamente novas formas de corporação, reguladas sob 
a égide do direito canônico, como ordens religiosas, cidades, universidades, fraternidades e outras 
formas organizacionais. 
A segunda revolução mencionada por Brunkhorst é a revolução protestante. O maior 
resultado dela foi a diferenciação entre direito, moral e religião, o que posteriormente tornou 
possível a positivação do direito. Além disso, pela primeira vez na história, os indivíduos passaram a 
ser concebidos como iguais portadores de direitos.  
A terceira revolução descrita por Hauke Brunkhorst é a Revolução Mundial Atlântica, que 
envolve as revoluções Americana, Francesa, além das várias revoluções latino-americanas e as 
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demais europeias. Segundo Brunkhorst, essas revoluções  levaram à crise global das sociedades 
estratificadas que prevaleceram nos 5.000 anos anteriores. Além da crise fiscal, havia uma crise 
econômica decorrente da concentração desigual de recursos apenas na elite. O direito e a política se 
diferenciaram, encerrando um processo iniciado com a revolução papal. Os direitos se tornaram 
universais e a soberania popular se afirmou como base revolucionária de legitimação. O 
igualitarismo se tornou um ideal amplamente aceito, difundido em uma esfera pública emergente. 
Uma nova era de liberdade emergiu na forma de declaração de direitos. Da Revolução Mundial 
Atlântica em diante, a antiga sociedade estratificada foi substituída por uma nova estrutura, 
compatível com os imperativos da diferenciação funcional.  
O que mudou, do ponto de vista evolutivo? É importante entender que as constituições são 
o resultado de um longo processo evolutivo, e não apenas de uma reunião popular em uma 
assembleia. Dessa perspectiva, constituições são uma adaptação às condições de progressiva 
diferenciação funcional (Luhmann). A novidade da abordagem proposta está no fato de que 
sustento que Estados constitucionais foram selecionados em um processo de seleção em múltiplos 
níveis, respondendo a pressões internas e a pressões decorrentes da interação com outros Estados e 
organizações internacionais.  
Sociedades estratificadas eram sujeitas  pouca pressão interna, uma vez que a concentração 
de poder político, militar e econômico nas mãos de uma pequena elite virtualmente obstruía 
qualquer tentativa de subversão estrutural da ordem estratificada. As revoltas de escravos e 
camponeses revoltas, comuns durante a Antiguidade e Idade Média, dificilmente poderiam ser 
vistas como tentativas de subverter a ordem política , mas apenas como esforços para mudar a 
autoridade no lugar.  
David Sciuli explica porque essa realidade mudou na modernidade. Sendo funcionalmente 
indiferenciadas, sociedades estratificadas ofereciam pouca oportunidades para que indivíduos 
discutissem e se organizassem em coalizões fortes o suficiente para desestabilizar a ordem política de 
modo democrático. Para Sciulli, a forma colegial de organização é uma precondição necessária 
para a política democrática. 
A forma colegial é peculiar para organizações normativas, e inclui institutos de pesquisas, 
universidades e redes de intelectuais e artistas, assim como corpos legislativos, tribunais, associações 
não-lucrativas, entre outros. Ao se institucionalizarem, formas colegiais de organização 
implementam, em virtude de sua existência, controle sobre formas políticas autoritárias, uma vez 
que atuam de forma a proteger sua própria autonomia.  
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Sociedades antigas e medievais não poderiam delinear uma revolução democrática porque, 
com o baixo nível de diferenciação, haveria pouca proteção a qualquer formação colegial 
emergindo dos estratos mais baixos. Em sociedades diferenciadas, o surgimento de novas formas de 
organização torna mais provável o evento revolucionário. E é precisamente o que ocorre no fim da 
Idade Média, com o surgimento de universidades, monastérios, cidades, pequenas repúblicas e 
guildas comerciais. Cada uma dessas unidades meso-nível (Turner) buscava sua autonomia, 
institucionalizando restrições normativas para garantir sua própria existência - de tal modo que logo 
surgiram garantias legais a sua existência. 
A Europa medieval foi um grande experimento de seleção de grupo. No século XII, a 
Europa tinha mais de 500 corpos soberanos, de federações de cidades, ordens religiosas, cidades-
estados e feudos, reinos e impérios. Ninguém tinha capacidade de exercer o poder político sozinho, 
nem de interferir de uma só vez na economia. Niall Ferguson alega que uma das razões para o 
progresso do Ocidente durante a modernidade decorreu do processo de competição no ambiente 
societal europeu, que impulsionou a seleção de estruturas institucionais capazes de lidar com o 
problema da diferenciação funcional, que elevou o risco da desintegração social.  
De acordo com John Maynard Smith e Eörs Szathmáry, há quatro mecanismos capazes de 
diluir esse risco, suprimindo a evolução autônoma dos componentes de nível mais baixo de um 
sistema evolutivo coletivo: a seleção de parentesco, a divisão do trabalho entre soma e partes 
germinativas, irreversibilidade contingente e controle central. Meu argumento é que as constituições 
executam duas dessas funções no nível societal -- seleção de parentesco e controle central --, 
produzindo a integração necessária para a emergência de um novos indivíduo darwinista, a 
sociedade constitucional, a partir de um processo de seleção em múltiplos níveis.  
Mas qual seria o ambiente de uma sociedade constitucional? Um ponto de partida é a 
descrição luhmanniana da sociedade mundial. Com a diferenciação funcional, fronteiras nacionais 
fazem cada vez menos sentido, pois a comunicação se universaliza. Apesar disso, existe variação 
regional: a sociedade mundial também tem centros e periferias, construídas na segmentação 
territorial de sistemas jurídicos e políticos na forma de estados. De acordo com Luhmann, há 
competição entre Estados, mas, além disso, o sistema político da sociedade mundial pode ser 
concebido como sistema de sistemas. Além disso, evidentemente, há outras organizações 
internacionais que têm papel fundamental. 
A construção da sociedade mundial é fruto da diferenciação funcional. De acordo com 
Brunkhorst, o processo evolutivo que levou às origens do Estado constitucional também construiu o 
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Estado cosmopolita, uma ordem legal insternacional. Em minha perspectiva, esse é o resultado de 
um processo de construção de nichos; a evolução do Estado como indivíduo darwinista também 
levou à construção de uma ordem legal internacional. 
O processo de construção de nichos, como definido por Laland, Odling-Smee e Marcus 
Feldman, se refere ao processo pelo qual organismos criam seu próprio nicho. O processo evolutivo 
entre Estado nacional e cosmopolita pode ser entendido como um caso de construção de nicho. A 
emergência do Estado não apenas trouxe uma nova forma de organização política, mas também 
uma nova estrutura, que progressivamente evoluiu do ius gentium ao direito internacional. 
Progressivamente, a arquitetura jurídica institucionalizada no nível do direito internacional impôs 
novas restrições normativas sobre os Estados, canalizando sua evolução. 
Como resultado, o novo sistema internacional deve ser visto tanto como uma consequência 
da seleção estrutural de grupo entre estados, com a afirmação da soberania territorial, como 
também o resultado de restrições externas (Sciulli). A própria existência de Estados impôs restrições 
sobre a soberania dos demais Estados. De certo modo, a Paz de Westfália, que estabeleceu o 
princípio da soberania, impôs um Equilíbrio de Nash na política internacional europeia. O conceito 
de soberania popular como fundamento do poder político estatal serviu para organizar o Estado 
como uma forma colegiada, capaz de lutar por sua própria autonomia.  
Do ponto de vista evolutivo, a afirmação do Estado como forma soberana institucionalizou 
uma fronteira entre o Estado como organização e o seu ambiente - um passo importante para a 
construção de um indivíduo darwinista integrado. Constituições estatais são o lado interno da 
construção do Estado como uma organização soberana e integrada. Uma vez que estados diferentes 
podem impor diferentes regulações normativas sobre os outros sistemas sociais, que reagem ao 
direito, cada sistema local resulta em circunstâncias políticas, econômicas e sociais diferentes. Nesses 
entido, mesmo que a sociedade seja descrita como sociedade mundial porque a comunicação é 
distribuída globalmente, as interações regionais resultam em comunicações sistêmicas mais ou 
menos eficientes. O resultado do processo é que a variação (V) ocorre não apenas entre estados, mas 
também entre os agregados compostos pelos estados e as organizações (negócios, universidades, 
sindicatos, etc.) afetados por estados particulares e que produzem, ao longo do tempo, diferenças 
regionais em resultados econômicos, científicos, políticos e jurídicos. 
Dessa perspectiva, a sociedade mundial é um ambiente construído não apenas pelos 
estados, mas por todos os sistemas sociais, e que pode ser diferenciado regionalmente em agregados 
que se tornam indivíduos darwinistas, englobando a comunicação relativa a organizações dos mais 
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diversos sistemas sociais e que, ao longo do tempo, trabalham de modo funcionalmente acoplado, 
como simbiontes. O estado político se acopla a negócios (sistema econômico) por meio dos bancos 
centrais e outras formas de regulação econômica, com universidades (ciência), escolas (educação), 
hospitais (medicina), igrejas (religião) por meio do direito e, mais especificamente, do direito 
constitucional. Esses agregados reproduzem a diferenciação funcional no âmbito de sua realidade 
sociológica regional. A esses agregados funcionais, dou o nome de sociedades constitucionais. É um 
conceito não baseado na comunicação (como Luhmann), mas na cooperação entre sistemas sociais, 
tornada possível mediante a regulação constitucional. Como a sociedade constitucional se 
(co)origina com o direito internacional, é possível dizer que os dois sistemas são mutuamente 
dependentes e interconectados.  
O indivíduo selecionado, a sociedade constitucional, não é apenas a organização política (o 
Estado), mas o agregado composto pelo estado e por todas as organizações diretamente e 
localmente regulada pelas instituições legais ligadas a aquele estado por meio da constituição 
nacional. Como resultado de processos de path dependence, diferentes sociedades constitucionais se 
tornam progressivamente distintas, seguindo um caminho próprio e dependente e construindo 
diferentes arquétipos constitucionais. Esse indivíduo é selecionado como resultado da interação com 
outras sociedades constitucionais, em um processo que alcança diferentes aptidões (S) em virtude da 
estruturação funcional das relações entre o direito e os demais sistemas sociais.  
A aptidão das sociedades constitucionais deriva de ao menos uma adaptação no nível 
societal - a constituição política e legal. Sua função é a de estruturar a integração entre organizações 
executando diferentes funções para toda a sociedade constitucional, gerando uma forte 
interdependência mútua entre suas partes. Para além disso, a constituição também estrutura as 
relações entre a sociedade constitucional e a sociedade mundial, seu ambiente. Como resultado, 
uma sociedade constitucional integrada dessa forma pode se afirmar como uma entidade 
darwiniana selecionada por processos MLS2 - um indivíduo suficientemente coeso e capaz de se 
reproduzir por meio de seu próprio desenvolvimento e persistência. 
Mas como as constituições integram organizações tão distintas? A função macrodinâmica 
do direito é estrutural: sendo normativamente vinculante, estabiliza a estrutura social ao longo do 
tempo ao fixar expectativas normativas (Luhmann) e a estrutura de papéis sociais (Hodgson & 
Knudsen). A atribuição de direitos políticos, direitos de propriedade e a separação entre igreja e 
estado expandiram o universo de indivíduos incluídos política e economicamente. Em uma 
sociedade constitucional, diferenciada funcionalmente, o direito especifica condições normativas nas 
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quais cada sistema social pode evoluir regionalmente. A constituição define os limites normativos da 
ação de cada sistema social.  
A abordagem de Sciulli é útil por salientar a autonomia organizacional como pressuposto 
antiautoritário. Todavia, é limitada por não entender o papel do direito na proteção da autonomia 
das entidades organizadas sob a forma colegial. Sciuli não enxerga que a atribuição legal de 
autonomia também é procedimental e, ao fazer isso, atribui pouca função para a esfera pública. 
Mas a principal função das constituições no nível mesodinâmico é proteger a diferenciação 
funcional protegendo diferentes comunicações sistêmicas e definindo os limites das formas 
organizacionais. Constituições fazem isso ao atribuir direitos fundamentais que 
institucionalizam  certas expectativas sob o sistema jurídico relativamente às organizações e à 
comunicação sistêmica. Quando a liberdade religiosa é institucionalizada, por exemplo, protege 
tanto o Estado e igrejas de interferência mútua, permitindo a ambos para operar de acordo com os 
códigos sistêmicos da política e religião. Se o direito não desempenha nenhum papel na restrição de 
como as organizações poderiam manter sua própria autodeterminação, como Sciulli pareceu 
sugerir em sua Theory of Societal Constitucionalism, elas poderiam desenvolver qualquer estratégia 
diferente para defender-se. De acordo com Sciulli, a única coisa que importa para os membros de 
uma organização é a proteção da própria formação colegial, e não da democratização política como 
tal. 
Do ponto de vista mesodinâmico, uma constituição emerge com o aumento do número de 
novas organizações arranjadas sob forma colegial e outras formas, mas sempre com a garantia 
normativa de sua autonomia. Na Europa, esse processo se iniciou no século XI com a Revolução 
Papal e se concretizou no século XVIII, com a institucionalização formal das constituições. Do 
ponto de vista do direito, nem todas as estratégias de preservação da autonomia  organizacional 
podem ser permitidas, ao contrário do que sustenta Sciulli. O direito pode induzir a estruturação 
interna de organizações, mantendo a autonomia de outras (mesodinâmica) e a autopoiese de cada 
sistema social (macrodinâmica). O modo de fazer isso é por meio da institucionalização de direitos 
fundamentais.  
Há uma forte conexão entre os níveis meso e macrodinâmicos da sociedade constitucional: 
os modos pelos quais a constituição limita a autonomia das organizações afetam diretamente a 
aptidão de toda a sociedade constitucional, uma vez que resultará em diferentes resultados políticos, 
educacionais, religiosos, científicos e econômicos. Como resultado, há variação na aptidão entre 
sociedades constitucionais distintas, com a consequente produção de centros e periferias.  
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Ao sustentar a diferenciação funcional, constituições constroem a estrutura normativa 
necessária para manter a divisão de trabalho entre distintos sistemas sociais em suas comunicações 
regionais. A manutenção e difusão da divisão do trabalho é uma consequência do processo 
evolutivo. Como Szathmáry e Smith propõem, as principais transições evolutivas decorreram da 
divisão do trabalho. No âmbito social, a divisão de trabalho entre sistemas eleva a eficiência da 
comunicação sistêmica, assegurando a autopoiese de cada sistêmica. É esse aumento de eficiência 
que qualifica a constituição como aquisição evolutiva: é uma adaptação que permite a 
horizontalização das relações sistêmicas, possibilitando que cada sistema funcione o mais 
eficientemente possível dentro de sua própria lógica. 
Além disso, constituições institucionalizam uma arquitetura em que operam dois 
mecanismos propostos por John Maynard Smith e Eörs Szathmáry para explicar a transição a 
entidades de nível mais elevado: a seleção de parentesco e o controle central.  
A seleção de parentesco estrutura a evolução para entidades mais complexas ao suprimir o 
free riding entre células ao assegurar que cada célula é geneticamente idêntica às demais. 
Constituições fazem ao mesmo ao atribuir direitos fundamentais a todos e reconhecer que todas as 
pessoas são iguais portadores de direito pertencentes à mesma sociedade constitucional. É isso que 
conceitos como o "nós, o povo" fazem:   sinalizam que todos são iguais do ponto de vista jurídico. 
No lugar do parentesco genético, constituições asseguram parentesco jurídico, permitindo a emergência 
da cooperação como fruto de interações jurídicas, como contratos, promessas, investidura em 
cargos públicos e atribuição legal de autoridade. 
Esse é um ponto fundamental. o reconhecimento legal de pessoas como portadores de 
direitos é um ponto de partida para interações microdinâmicas, que ocorrem no seio da arquitetura 
jurídica constitucional. As interações microdinâmicas mantém a estrutura constitucional 
operacional; os padrões das relações sociais são mantidos pela confiança generalizada no estado de 
direito. É um modo inovador de integração social, fundado não na fidelidade profunda aos 
princípios religiosos de uma comunidade, mas no compromisso superficial com o direito. 
Outro mecanismo delineado por Smith & Szathmáry é o controle central. As instituições 
constitucionais organizam os arranjos políticos de modo que os agentes têm incentivos para 
monitorarem o comportamentos uns dos outros e, como resultado, prevenir o free riding político. 
Instituições como o judicial review, a separação de poderes, a distinção entre Senado e Câmara e 
mesmo a cisão de níveis federais são mecanismos projetados para impor limites a essas instituições. 
Outras instituições como a política podem ser invocadas para reprimir a violação do direito e 
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manter o nível de confiança necessário para dar suporte ao nível microdinâmico. O Estado 
constitucional executa o controle central em uma sociedade constitucional, estruturando o estado de 
direito e as condições necessárias para a integração entre o direito e outros sistemas sociais.  
Outra questão importante, no que diz respeito às sociedades constitucionais, se relaciona à 
legitimação. Democracias constitucionais são legítimas em virtude da atribuição de direitos a todos, 
possibilitando a qualquer um a vida livre de acordo com os valores designados por uma doutrina 
abrangente adotada livremente. Nesse sentido, é útil a distinção entre direitos e valores estabelecida 
por Rawls a partir da diferença entre a razão pública e doutrinas abrangentes. Democracias 
constitucionais são estáveis porque há um acordo implícito de que cada cidadão é dotado de uma 
conjunto de direitos fundamentais, ainda que não concordem com uma doutrina abrangente 
específica. Esta é uma diferença enorme, na medida em que a unidade política é assegurada 
processualmente através de discussões sobre o significado de direitos e obrigações  e não 
substantivamente através de um conjunto de valores constitutivos. Ainda quanto a esse ponto, é 
importante notar que o liberalismo rawlsiano adota uma kantiana prioridade do direito sobre o 
bem, subordinando questões relativas a valores éticos compartilhados pela comunidade a 
considerações relativas a direitos. Constituições impõem limites aos valores que são considerados 
aceitáveis.  
Todos os sistemas sociais são heterárquicos em uma sociedade funcionalmente 
diferenciada, ou seja, nenhum sistema tem precedência sobre os outros. A partir da perspectiva do 
sistema jurídico e político, há uma prioridade de considerações legais e políticas sobre as operações 
de qualquer outro sistema e de crenças metafísicas - incluindo a cultura como tal. A prioridade do 
direito sobre o bem é apenas uma especificação de um princípio muito mais amplo - a prioridade 
do sistema jurídico e político sobre todas as outras comunicações. Este recurso é o que mantém a 
sociedade constitucional integrada, na medida em que impõe legal restrições sobre a comunicação e 
cooperação social. A economia, medicina, ciência, religião e educação, entre outros sistemas sociais, 
são limitados pela lei constitucional, que especifica os limites estruturais da comunicação. Como 
resultado, as constituições definem os limites regionais de sistemas sociais, impondo limites 
normativos sobre suas operações. 
Além de institucionalizar a seleção de parentesco (a partir de atribuições de direitos) e o 
controle central, constituições também têm um papel fundamental na produção da divisão de 
trabalho entre elementos somáticos e germinativos e na prevenção de reversibilidade do processo 
evolutivo. A distinção Germinativo/Somático limita a extensão do dano de uma unidade mutante, 
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porque as unidades de nível inferior somáticas não pode produzir um reprodutor coletivo, e as 
unidades germinativas relativamente aleatórias podem pavimentar a estrada sozinho para um 
indivíduo recentemente replicado. A reprodução é difícil de ser definido em unidades sociais, na 
medida em que o parâmetro B (gargalo) de Godfrey-Smith é baixo. Sociedades complexas não 
geram qualquer  marca divisória visível entre diferentes gerações. No entanto, como argumentado 
anteriormente, podem marcar a elevação no parâmetro G (Linha germinativa), devido ao sistema 
educacional moderno, que prepara jovens para ocupar diferentes papéis em uma sociedade 
funcionalmente diferenciada ao mesmo tempo, educá-los a reconhecer uns aos outros como agentes 
livres e iguais capaz de agir no sistema político. O sistema educacional age como uma linha 
germinal memética, uma instituição sistêmica especializada em educar indivíduos em informações 
básicas para que participem potencialmente dentro de todos os domínios institucionais. No entanto, 
como mencionado, o sistema educacional também é normativamente constrangido pela arquitetura 
constitucional, que atribui poderes a certas instituições para definir o currículo, deveres e direitos do 
professor, a estrutura da educação e assim por diante. 
 
Constituições também são essenciais para a manutenção da irreversibilidade nas 
democracias constitucionais modernas. Uma característica fundamental dos indivíduos darwinianos 
complexos, a irreversibilidade contingente refere-se à interdependência mútua de componentes de 
nível inferior, que perdem a capacidade de replicação independente Ao estruturar as operações 
legais e políticas que mantém sistemas sociais regionais agregados, a constituição bloqueia a 
reversibilidade. Cada sistema social, operando regionalmente, assume a arquitetura constitucional 
como um dado e , como tal, opera em resposta às pressões normativamente imposta pelas suas 
instituições legais/políticas. Como resultado, a reversão para o contexto pré-moderno de 
indiferenciação funcional se torna improvável. 
Como uma sociedade constitucional poderia ser compreendida nos termos dos parâmetros 
propostos por Peter Godfrey-Smith? Como mencionado, uma característica dos indivíduos 
darwinistas é a redução da variação no interior do sistema evolutivo. Em sociedades pré-modernas, 
a variação cultural no interior do grupo é mantida por meio do viés conformista, da punição moral 
e da sensitividade a marcadores simbólicos por meio da adoção de um pano de fundo religioso e 
cultural comum. Em sociedades constitucionais, há uma tensão característica, já que são pluralistas, 
sendo permissível a adoção de valores radicalmente distintos. Nesse ambiente pluralista, há duas 
fontes de marcação simbólica -- a realidade parcial das doutrinas abrangentes e a ordem abrangente 
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de princípios constitucionais. Contudo, essas sociedades podem manter a variação baixa do ponto 
de vista dos direitos, uma vez que todas as pessoas têm os mesmos direitos, ao mesmo tempo em 
que possibilitam a variação no nível das doutrinas abrangentes.  
Além disso, também como resultado da distinção entre direitos e valores, a punição 
moralista é substituída pela punição legal, que estrutura a cooperação nas sociedades modernas, 
punindo free riders que violam a identidade abstrata construída sobre princípios constitucionais e 
direitos fundamentais. 
Sociedades constitucionais também alcançam um alto valor de herança (H). Nesse caso, a 
hereditariedade não é baseada apenas na cultura, mas também na manutenção de traços 
institucionais como a separação entre igreja e estado, a divisão de poderes e outros checks and 
balances, assim como a estrutura constitucional como um todo. A arquitetura institucional é 
transmitida de uma geração a outra e se mantém relativamente estável ao longo do tempo como 
resultado das sanções e do monitoramento democrático de tentativas de usurpação do poder. 
Sociedades constitucionais também têm um alto grau de relação entre propriedades 
intrínsecas e aptidão (S), uma vez que suas estruturas institucionais afetam sua seleção em relação a 
outras sociedades (seleção estrutural). Um  desenho constitucional falho que não protege funcional 
bem diferenciação e permite muito espaço para a corrupção e invasora de pilotos livres dentro 
instituições constitucionais provavelmente terá impacto sobre a aptidão de uma sociedade 
constitucional. A longo prazo, ela pode se desintegrar-se e, eventualmente, produzir uma nova 
sociedade constitucional (através de uma revolução ), ou ser bloqueada em uma crise institucional 
durante um longo período de tempo.  
Sociedades constitucionais apresentam uma relação importante entre a integração (I) e 
aptidão intrínseca (S). Uma das principais funções constitucionais macro e meso-dinâmicas 
relaciona-se com a sua capacidade de regular as interações entre o sistema jurídico e outros sistemas 
sociais no nível regional, resultando na integração de toda a sociedade constitucional – o que 
Jonathan Turner 
denomina integração institucional. Como resultado, quão mais bem integrados os sistemas sociais 
estão em uma dada sociedade constitucional, mais eficientemente realizará as suas operações , 
resultando num aumentar na aptidão intrínseca. Uma constituição incapaz de regular essas 
interações também provavelmente resultará em sistemas sociais regionais disfuncionais e mal 
integrados, provavelmente dominados por um sistema que atue em nome dos outros e arrisque a 
estabilidade da diferenciação funcional. 
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Por fim, pretendo discutir a natureza das revoluções constitucionais a partir de uma 
perspectiva evolutiva. Muitos autores, incluindo Hauke Brunkhorst e Bruce Ackerman, consideram 
revoluções constitucionais, como produto de explosões pontuadas - momentos revolucionários 
especiais quando uma aceleração do processo evolutivo ocorre. Esta afirmação baseia-se Stephen 
Jay Gould e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado de Niles Eldredge, de acordo com os quais as espécies, ao 
invés de evoluir gradualmente para novas espécies, surgem por uma divisão no espécies parentais 
através de um processo de especiação. Em vez de emergirem gradualmente, novas espécies 
aparecem de repente e passam por nenhuma mudança evolutiva significativa até à sua extinção - 
um período chamado por Gould como stasis, quando a população atinge seu equilíbrio. A evolução 
é acelerada em rajadas pontuadas, que ocorrem como resultado do isolamento reprodutivo 
(resultantes, por exemplo, do isolamento geográfico) e especiação subsequente. Como resultado, 
algumas vezes mudanças evolutivas que levariam milhões de gerações pode acontecer mais rápido, 
em "apenas" milhares das gerações.  
Na minha perspectiva, as revoluções constitucionais podem ser explicadas em uma 
estrutura gradualista. Mesmo que as revoluções possam acelerar o curso da evolução social, nós não 
precisamos assumir que são explosões pontuais, já que o paradigma gradualista também pode 
explicar os diferentes ritmos em evolução. Na opinião de Dawkins, por exemplo, não há nada no 
gradualismo que exija da evolução que siga um ritmo constante. Há situações em que o ritmo 
evolutivo pode se acelerar ou diminuir, em virtude de mudanças na pressão seletiva imposta pelo 
ambiente.  
Não estou convencido de que os exemplos de Brunkhorst sejam casos de explosões 
pontuadas. A rigor, os exemplos mencionados por ele são relacionados ao isolamento cultural 
dentro de uma sociedade particular, não o tipo de isolamento que poderia explicar a evolução 
estrutural por meio de um análogo social da especiação. Os exemplos mencionados no livro 
(isolamento de monges experimentando novas formações sociais antes da revolução papal, 
corporações heréticas se desenvolvendo em comunidades isoladas antes da reforma protestante ou 
as casas maçônicas anteriores às revoluções atlânticas) podem todos ser descritos como inovações 
culturais, não (ainda!) estruturais. Eram apenas trações culturais pré-adaptativos, que poderiam se 
difundir devagar na população. Em tempo, a influência desses traços culturais poderia afetar 
instituições (um processo bottom-up) e a estrutura societal como um todo. Mas a estabilização dos 
novos traços somente poderia ocorrer como resultado da seleção natural atuando no nível societal 
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dos novos indivíduos darwinistas (um processo top-down), em virtude das características institucionais 
capazes de atribuir aptidão diferencial em relação a outras sociedades.  
Além disso, existe outra razão para não considerar episódios revolucionários como 
explosões pontuadas. Mesmo que revoluções implementem mudanças sociais radicais na estrutura 
da sociedade, não podemos assumir que esses eventos são mais importantes do que qualquer 
episódio passado no curso da evolução da sociedade. Cada pequeno passo evolutivo que levou a um 
conjunto de adaptação de características funcionais é tão necessário para o estado de coisas corrente 
como qualquer outro. Não podemos imaginar a erupção da Revolução Francesa sem o avanço 
anterior de economia francesa no século inteiro anterior, que possibilitou o surgimento de uma 
classe comercial burguesa. Não podemos imaginar a rápida disseminação dos ideais de tolerância 
religiosa, igualdade e liberdade, sem a invenção da imprensa cerca de três séculos antes. Talvez a 
Assembleia Nacional - que, na sequência do panfleto de Sieyès, tornou-se a figura paradigmática de 
como o poder constituinte deve ser democraticamente realizado a fim de instituir uma nova 
Constituição - nunca poderia ter ocorrido se a Assembléia dos Estados Gerais  não tivesse sido 
estabelecida em tempos medievais e não tivesse sido invocado naquele momento preciso. 
Dificilmente a existência de freios e contrapesos, uma característica central das constituições 
modernas, poderia ter existido sem os limites para o poder real anteriormente imposta pela cartais 
feudais de liberdade, a mais famosa das quais é a Magna Carta de 1215. Nenhum desses eventos 
podem ser mencionados como o evento catalítico que pavimentou o caminho das constituições 
modernas. Revoluções são importantes, mas devem ser consideradas como momentos 
representativos de mudanças societais importantes subjacentes ao ajuste dos sistemas sociais. 
Revoluções são apenas um dos milhares de passos evolutivos -- importantes, mas não mais 
importante que qualquer outro passo. 
Tomar revoluções como eventos mais importantes do que a instituições jurídicas e políticas 
que evoluíram gradualmente ao longo do tempo, produzindo estruturas funcionais que 
eventualmente equiparam sociedades com uma arquitetura constitucional eficiente o suficiente para 
regular e manter funcional a diferenciação, é um pressuposto típico das teorias ainda predominantes 
de poder constituinte. A maioria destas teorias supõem que as constituições são dadas em um 
momento específico por uma entidade abstrata como "o povo", que tem uma vontade capaz de 
projetar todo o quadro jurídico e político para gerações subsequentes. Decerto, o momento da 
elaboração de uma constituição é importante, mas o que quase não é tido em conta nestes teorias é 
que eles são uma descrição nua de causas sociológicas subjacentes muito mais complexas. A 
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descrição do momento que dá a constituição como reinicialização política que instala um 
totalmente novo regime a partir do zero é útil do ponto de vista jurídico e das operações internas da 
política, na medida em que oferece um discurso de legitimidade que evita questões relativas à 
validade.  
No entanto, esta descrição não tem sentido a partir de qualquer ponto de vista externo às 
operações os sistemas jurídicos e políticos, especialmente quando adotamos uma postura 
evolucionista. De uma perspectiva gradualista, não faz qualquer sentido descrever constituições 
como um produto da vontade de um tal entidade abstracta como 'o povo', 'a nação' ou qualquer 
outro. Constituições têm uma longa história evolutiva  que é simplesmente deixada de lado nestas 
descrições teóricas. Isso não é subestimar o papel das constituições na institucionalização de 
mecanismos que distribuição de poder e conceder representação política, mas de reconhecer que 
eles não são necessariamente do produto de qualquer vontade. Constituições são um produto gradual da 
evolução. 
De forma a proteger a diferenciação funcional do risco de parasitismo, o sistema da política 
deve ser não-autoritário, ou caso contrário, pode ser facilmente cooptado por uma elite específica 
que tenta desviar recursos econômicos para o segmento específico a que pertence. Mais uma vez 
inspirado em Sciulli, é possível dizer que um sistema político segue uma direção não-autoritária 
sempre que adoptar um forma colegial  de organização. Os órgãos mais representativos do Estado, 
por exemplo, devem ser organizados de acordo com uma estrutura representativa que 
minimamente se apresenta como uma formação colegial cujos membros são todos os cidadãos de 
uma sociedade constitucional. As normas constitucionais que regulam o sufrágio, a participação 
política, a divisão de poderes, o direito de ocupar cargos públicos, e assim por diante , não são nada 
mais que regras  processuais, no sentido em que Sciulli estipula o termo em seu constitucionalismo 
societal. 
Entidades e instituições políticas da sociedade civil que adotam formas colegiais de 
organização protegidas pela lei são mais propensas a proteger diferenciação funcional do que os 
estados não organizados de acordo com estes princípios. A fim de apoiar este ponto, remeto para o 
trabalho por Daron Acemoglu e James Robinson, segundo os quais a adoção de instituições 
políticas inclusivas é uma condição necessária para as instituições econômicas inclusivas de sucesso e 
também. Eles sustentam que, sempre que as instituições políticas, embora centralizadas na forma de 
uma estados políticos, são inclusivas e distribuem o poder amplamente na sociedade, a economia 
tende a ser também inclusiva.  
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A adoção de instituições políticas e legais que restringem o uso do poder político e o 
canalizam de forma a libertar as operações sistêmicas teve um papel importante na proteção do 
processo de diferenciação funcional. Até o final do século XVIII, a Inglaterra desenvolveu 
instituições políticas inclusivas (embora ainda não democráticas, uma vez que ainda adotavam a 
renda e propriedade como um requisito para os direitos do sufrágio) para fornecer para as 
instituições econômicas inclusivas, abrindo o caminho para a Revolução Industrial. Como 
resultado, foi o primeiro país a reagir aos benefícios da industrialização, ganhando uma vantagem 
sobre outras nações, não só economicamente, mas também militarmente. Depois da Revolução, a 
França também colhey os benefícios de uma melhor funcionamento da economia e da inovação 
institucional: em agosto de 1793, a invenção de recrutamento em massa - uma instituição 
inimaginável no mundo feudal, em que o recrutamento dependia de uma série de acordos 
senhoriais - permitiu que o novo país se defendesse contra ataques das forças contrarrevolucionárias 
da Prússia e Áustria e, mais tarde, sob o comando de Napoleão, expandisse as fronteiras da França. 
Se Christopher Boehm estiver correto, os nossos antepassados do Pleistoceno viviam em 
comunidades igualitárias como resultado de uma revolução política que manteve os machos alfa 
constantemente monitorados. Ao fazê-lo, garantiram que ninguém estava acima nenhuma outra 
pessoa. As instituições políticas e legais associadas ao constitucionalismo fazem o mesmo, mas não 
só ao nível individual, concedendo iguais direitos individuais de liberdade, mas também no nível da 
sociedade dos sistemas sociais, regionalmente segmentado como sociedades constitucionais. Elas 
institucionalizam condições normativas através do qual a política sistema opera heterarquicamente, 
por meio de acoplamentos horizontais com outros sistemas sociais. O sistema político não tem 
primazia sobre qualquer outro sistema. Nos níveis meso-dinâmico e micro-dinâmico, isto significa 
que as instituições de proteção do constitucionalismo também devem garantir que ninguém tem um 
estatuto especial concedido devido ao pertencimento a um estrato social específico. 
É por isso que o constitucionalismo trouxe o igualitarismo de volta para o curso da história 
humana. A fim de proteger diferenciação funcional, deve ser assegurado que os sistemas sociais 
operar de acordo com seus próprios critérios funcionais. Uma condição para tal conquista é que 
oportunidades de participação sejam atribuídas a todos os cidadãos; caso contrário, a lógica interna 
de um sistema específico seria parcialmente determinada pelo outro sistema. Além disso, ao 
restringir os indivíduos de participação no sistema econômico, a negação a priori da 
acesso aos participantes reduz o volume de operações económicas, transformando-se em um 
ineficiente arranjo do ponto de vista do sistema econômico. O mesmo pode ser dito em relação a 
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outros sistemas sociais: a exclusão da participação política em decorrência do voto censitário (como 
ocorreu no século 19 na Inglaterra, por exemplo) também prejudica o sistema político, pois torna-se 
menos legítima, uma vez que as oportunidades de comunicação política são restritos a um pequeno 
setor da população, que se torna superincluído. Não só a massa excluída é relegado a um estatuto 
de cidadania de segunda classe, mas também a identidade do sistema político torna-se parcialmente 
determinada pelo sistema econômico. 
Como resultado, a diferenciação funcional depende de promover a inclusão através da 
concessão de acesso universal aos benefícios de todos os sistemas. Esta é não só uma demanda 
proveniente de pessoas, mas também imperativa para a manutenção da diferenciação funcional, na 
medida em que cresce o crescimento da exclusão canaliza benefícios funcionais (dinheiro, educação, 
acesso a medicamentos, e assim por diante) para segmentos específicos. A diferenciação funcional 
torna-se ameaçada pela crescente exclusão tanto porque as operações sistêmicas são determinadas 
por operações de outros sistemas (corrupção sistêmica) e por critérios de status, elementos típicos de 
tempos pré-modernos. Neste sentido, a manutenção de diferenciação funcional requer uma 
dinâmica igualitária sustentada no delicado equilíbrio fornecido pela Constituições formais. 
Essa perspectiva gera um quebra-cabeça evolutivo. Se nossa psicologia foi moldada pela 
evolução natural e cultural para abordar um mundo de unidade simbólica, como poderia lidar com 
sociedades funcionalmente diferenciadas? Esse é o último problema a ser discutido.  
Sociedades constitucionais são muito diferentes de qualquer tipo social existente antes na 
história da humanidade. Apesar de ser igualitária, essas sociedades são qualitativamente diferentes 
do igualitarismo típico de bandas pré- históricas de caçadores-coletores. Embora contando com um 
suposto consenso sobre certos direitos e princípios morais , ao longo das linhas de uma  consenso 
sobreposto (Rawls), estas sociedades não estão estruturadas em uma concepção compartilhada do 
bem, como eram as sociedades pré-modernas. Mas como as sociedades constitucionais se tornaram 
possíveis? Sendo diferentes de tudo o que existia até então, deveríamos esperar que as sociedades 
constitucionais não fossem compatíveis com nossa psicologia social inata, adaptada a um ambiente 
social de monismo moral. Compreender como nossa mente lida com essa arquitetura sociológica é 
necessário para compreender como o constitucionalismo conseguiu se sustentar no nível 
microdinâmico da psicologia individual. 
Constituições proporcionam estabilidade psicológica por três razões principais: substituem 
a religião e a moralidade como fonte de validade normativa e, como resultado, usam nossa 
disposição a raciocinar a partir de marcadores simbólicos para sustentar a cooperação num quadro 
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moral e religiosamente pluralista; as constituições rompem com a distinção amigo/inimigo 
característica de nossas mentes , como resultado de uma lógica inclusiva, que fornece uma critérios 
formais (direitos) para o potencial inclusão de todos os portadores de certas; e as constituições 
mantêm a estabilidade social, por se basearem em princípios normativos que são compatíveis com a 
estrutura da gramática moral universal. 
Como poderia a dissonância cognitiva derivada de um ambiente moral pluralista ser 
resolvida? O ponto de partida é que a mente humana precisa lidar com a prioridade do direito 
sobre o bem (Rawls). Sua gramática moral interior teria de evitar a dissonância cognitiva, 
organizando a percepção sobre o novo mundo social de uma maneira mais fácil e estruturada. A 
partir do ponto de vista da mente, a prioridade do direito significa que tanto a distinção entre 
amigo/inimigo quanto a fonte da principal lealdade normativa e simbólica é o direito, e não a 
religião ou a moral. Esta afirmação não significa que cada indivíduo obedecerá à lei ou que a 
religião não tem lugar nas democracias constitucionais contemporâneas, mas que a lei é 
reconhecida como a fonte de normatividade obrigatória por um número de indivíduos que 
transcendem um limiar estatístico necessário para afirmar um estado de coisas como legítima, como 
resultado de intencionalidade coletiva (Tomasello). Além disso, tanto a moral quanto a religião 
tornaram-se uma questão de consciência individual na modernidade; após a separação de igreja e 
estado, a religião perdeu a sua relevância como um ponto de vista privilegiado.  
O constitucionalismo substituiu a religião e a moral como fonte central de normatividade, 
capturando esta função como um marcador simbólico a partir do qual todas as normas legais 
derivam. Em um sentido muito específico, não seria errado supor que as racionalidades 
constitucionais e  teológica são notavelmente semelhantes.  Assim, o constitucionalismo pode ser 
entendido como uma religião civil nacional que funciona como uma nova fonte de normatividade 
através do estabelecimento de um senso e identidade de uma determinada coletividade. A 
constituição torna o foco da vida política em uma sociedade pluralista - um fenômeno descrito por 
Rawls como um consenso sobreposto e por Habermas como patriotismo constitucional. 
A segunda maneira pela qual o constitucionalismo relaciona-se a sistemas psíquicos é por 
meio do estabelecimento de critérios para distinguir entre in-group members e outgroups. Esta distinção é 
necessária para induzir e manter o fluxo de cooperação em grandes comunidades de indivíduos não 
aparentados geneticamente. Caso contrário, os custos epistêmicos de monitoramento de 
comportamento social para identificar e punir os trapaceiros seriam tão altos que a vida em grandes 
sociedades não seria evolutivamente estável. 
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Em uma sociedade constitucional pluralista, a identidade social dos indivíduos não é 
atribuída para uma pessoa por motivos de crenças ou valores pessoais, mas no pressuposto de que 
"todos os homens são criados iguais "e dotados de" direitos inalienáveis", como a Declaração 
Americana de Independência (1776) afirma. Da mesma forma, a Declaração Francesa dos Direitos 
do Homem e do Cidadão (1789) afirma que "os homens nascem e permanecem livres e iguais em 
direitos." No começo, a atribuição de direitos era muito mais restritiva do que esta declaração 
deveria significar: mulheres, negros, crianças, indigentes, nativos, minorias religiosas e muitas outras 
classes de pessoas quase não tinha direitos de acordo com estas declarações ousadas. No entanto, a 
abstração das declarações de direitos levantou a possibilidade de discutir a quem os direitos 
constitucionais devem ser aplicáveis. Por não depender de fortes hipóteses metafísicas, a aquisição 
de direitos tornou-se um estritamente questão política e, por meio de guerras, protestos, greves e 
outros movimentos políticos, muitas classes de indivíduos vieram a desafiar os costumes tradicionais 
e obter o status de igualdade.  
Do ponto de vista dos sistemas psíquicos, isto significa que, em princípio, ninguém deve ser 
considerado como um inimigo a menos que represente uma ameaça real de violar os direitos dos 
outros. Esta foi um grande conquista evolutiva, não só do ponto de vista cultural, mas também 
biológica: pela primeira vez, todo ser humano pode ser considerado um "amigo", um membro do 
grupo , a menos que se recuse a obedecer ao estado de direito. A punição de free riders é válida e tão 
somente por motivos de violação do direito, não como o resultado do pertencimento a um grupo 
religioso/moral/étnico em particular. 
A terceira e última forma pela  constitutionalismo refere-se a sistemas psíquicos deriva do 
fato de que seus princípios normativos são altamente compatíveis com princípios inatos da universal 
da gramática moral. O constitucionalismo não só se encaixa com a psicologia moral quanto à sua 
institucionalização da lógica de marcadores simbólicos que estabelecem um senso altamente 
abstrato de identidade e uma distinção amigo/inimigo altamente inclusiva, mas também é 
adequado para o nosso senso inato de justiça baseado em altruísmo recíproco e no igualitarismo. 
A lógica dos direitos fundamentais é altamente recíproca. Os cidadãos de democracias 
constitucionais são considerados como iguais em direitos e podem invocar as instituições legais para 
protegê-los contra quem viole tais direitos. A descrição legal de uma violação dos direitos pode ser 
traduzida em uma abordagem de teoria dos jogos como um indutor para a punição institucional 
baseada na reciprocidade indireta. Marcadores simbólicos constitucionais definem critérios 
baseados em direitos ao distinguir entre altruístas (amigos, ou aqueles que têm direitos) e free riders 
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(inimigos , aqueles que violam os direitos dos outros ou que não têm quaisquer direitos). Ao atribuir 
competências a várias autoridades legais, constituições também designam as instituições 
responsáveis por monitorar o comportamento social. Do ponto de vista da lógica altruísmo 
recíproco, constituições estabelecem instituições que, a partir de sua perspectiva, exercem a função 
de comunidades morais que punem trapaceiros. 
Por fim, o constitutionalismo é altamente congruente com o igualitarismo fundado na 
hierarquia reversa,  que é outra característica de nossa psicologia moral. Na verdade, é  o primeiro 
arranjo social na história da humanidade que estruturou instituições complexas em torno desta 
traço psicológico após as tribos igualitárias do Pleistoceno. Existem semelhanças notáveis entre as 
formas pelas quais o constitucionalismo e as tribos pré-históricas  abordam a questão da distribuição 
do poder. Como a pesquisa de Boehm demonstra, antigas comunidades de caçadores-coletores 
eram estruturadas em hierarquias invertidas em que o chefe da tribo é estritamente dependente da 
comunidade moral. Sua força está sob escrutínio crítico da tribo, e qualquer tentativa de impor sua 
vontade sobre outros pode ser punida com uma ampla gama de sanções morais, incluindo o 
ostracismo e assassinato. A autonomia de cada membro da tribo contra o chefe é justificada pela 
comunidade inteira como resultado de uma disposição psicológica para a revolta contra o uso 
indevido do poder político. Da mesma forma, o constitucionalismo é baseado em uma suspeita de 
abuso político do poder. A separação de poderes, a atribuição de competências legais para 
diferentes autoridades, distribuição de atribuições entre uma estrutura federada, o judicial review e os 
direitos fundamentais são instituições que protegem diferentes esferas de autonomia. As origens do 
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